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This thesis centres on the problem of the taxon 'myth' as a typology of
religion in ancient Egypt. The problem is partially resolved if the word 'myth' is
replaced by the term 'text' or 'narrative'. The difference at first may appear
insignificant given that 'myth' is interpreted as a story which concerns superhuman
beings. Similarly, the texts and iconography of ancient Egypt depict divine kingship
supported by the gods and goddesses ofEgypt. Literature research on the
phenomenology of religion revealed that 'myth' carried an overlay of 'falseness', a
concept absent in the neutral terms, 'text' or narrative'. In the myth-religion
partnership, when 'myth' is classified as a typology of religion, it is encumbered with
the polemic 'false'. 'My' religion is true but 'your' religion is 'myth'; it is false.
Further literary research on Egyptian 'religion' revealed the absence of the modern
concept of religion in the form of doctrines or communal worship. Egyptian beliefs
were incorporated within a socio-political context in which the king, who symbolised
the state ofEgypt, maintained order. Other overlays are identified in the thesis:
Plutarch's Greek overlay on the characters of the Egyptian deities, Isis and Osiris is
one; the Greek so-called origin of the true-false dichotomy ofmylhos is another.
Consequently, Egyptian beliefs were misrepresented by an interpretation that failed
to give justice to the beliefs of the ancient Egyptians.
To resolve the various issues identified and to hear the voice of the ancient
Egyptians through their texts and iconography, the research method employed in the
thesis demanded rigorous scrutiny of the secondary literature of religion,
phenomenology and Egyptian literature, history, culture, kingship, 'religion' and
'myths'. Egyptian primary texts, iconography and archaeology provided crucial
source material for comparison as did contemporary critiques from scholars in the
fields of religion, phenomenology and Egyptology. The aim of the thesis is
comprehension of Egyptian texts 'as if, that is, from the insider's perspective.
When phenomenology is re-visited, resolution of the issues is achieved;
epoche, empathy and a subjective-objective method are the tools for understanding
the Egyptian ethos. Scrutiny of the literature of classical pioneers of phenomenology
established that the common element of similarity, which classifies religious data
into universal typologies of religion, was the 'essence' of religion. The latter,
ii
identified as the 'essence' ofChristianity, was another layer superimposed on the so-
called 'religion' of ancient Egypt To extricate the meaning intended by the ancient
Egyptian texts and iconography, a new hermeneutic of 'myth' is proposed. A Case
Study draws together the salient points of the research into a new approach that
applies a phenomenological method. Translations and interpretations of different
types ofEgyptian texts are compared and tested. When ancient Egyptian culture is
'experienced' through the lens ofphenomenology, Egyptian kingship is seen as the
symbolic link between the gods and the Egyptian people, a fact demonstrated
throughout this thesis and tested in the Case Study which finalises the argument.
iii
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Examine every matter, that you may understand it.1
1.1 The Issue
The taxon 'myth' is the subject ofmy research. The key issue in my thesis
concerns the phenomenological classification of the term 'myth' as a typology of
'religion' in ancient Egypt. My first task therefore is to research the literature of the
classical phenomenologists who first determined the method of classifying religious
data into universals of different 'types'. Equally important are critiques from
contemporary writers in the field who challenge not only 'myth' as a category of
religion but also the common element for identifying religious data, the 'essence' of
religion. The implication is that the so-called universal 'essence' which defines all
religious categories is the same 'essence' which identifies the 'myths' of ancient
Egypt as a typology of religion.
The nucleus of the issue relates to the context in which the term 'myth' is
understood and defined by Egyptologists and Phenomenologists of religion. I posit
that the taxon 'myth', rather than being interpreted as religion-centred in ancient
Egypt, may be identified within a socio-political genre which, I propose, is human-
centred. In this context I research the interrelated role of the so-called 'myths'
embedded in the narratives and texts of ancient Egypt with the socio-political office
of kingship. Within this framework, I offer not only a new hermeneutic of'myth' but
also a new approach to the phenomenological method of classifying typologies of
religion, in particular the taxon 'myth'.
1 The Instructions ofAnkhesheshonq, 6.7, British Museum, Papyrus 10508. Quoted in M.Lichtheim,
AEL.Vol.3:164, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1980).
2 For the paucity of texts or narratives that may be described as 'myth', see John Baines, 'Egyptian
Myth and Discourse: Myth, Gods, and the Early Written and Iconographic Record', 81, JNES, 50,
1991:81-105. For a detailed critique of the word 'myth', see Russell T. McCutcheon, 'Myth', in Guide
to the Study ofReligion, eds., Willi Braun, Russell T. McCutcheon, (London: Cassell, 2000), 190-
208. See also Mark C. Taylor, ed., Critical termsfor Religious Studies, (Chicago; London: University




Some anomalies which concern the taxon 'myth' are significant. For example,
the true-false dichotomy of the typology 'myth' in partnership with the construct
term 'religion' is one incongruity. The ambivalent concept of'myth' appears to
challenge its classification as a category of religion given that the construct term
'religion', not only concerns the faith or beliefs of the adherent, but also signifies
monotheism, the communal worship of one god. When a false encumbrance is
imposed on the term 'myth', adherents today deny that their sacred story, which they
regard as 'true', is 'myth'. The meaning therefore of the term 'myth' seems at
variance with the ethos of the beliefs of religion and appear as 'false friends'.
Equally, the myth-religion partnership may be a contradiction in terms when
considered within the context of the key phenomenological principle, the autonomy
of the adherent. Given that epoche requires the absence of any distinction between an
adherent's story and 'myth', whether true or false. If it is designated 'false', then the
autonomy of the adherent is invalidated. Similarly, when an Egyptian text or
narrative is named or classified as 'myth', that it is 'false', then the voice of the
ancient Egyptian is unlikely to be 'heard'.3 In the end, the meaning intended by the
Egyptians in their texts or narratives, is distorted. Equally, the fundamental principles
ofphenomenology are jeopardised.
Two of the key principles of the phenomenological method are empathy and
epoche-, the latter aims to bracket opinions, preconceptions, and biases in order to
compare and understand the beliefs of the 'other'. The absence of empathy and
epoche therefore, even in part, signifies that the inner voice of the phenomenologist
of religion is heard rather than the validating voice of the adherent. The autonomy of
the adherent was a key contribution to the phenomenology of religion by W. Brede
Kristensen. James L. Cox explained succinctly the significance of its absence.
If a researcher cannot accede to such a testimony, [the believer's
validation] empathy has not been utilized, the religion has been
described and interpreted in ways that are foreign to the believers, and
the religious reality has been negated.4
31 distinguish the difference between Egyptian texts as a phrase or paragraph, or an account which
records a sequence of events, with a narrative as an account or story with a beginning, middle and end
in the modern sense. The premise throughout this thesis is to understand the texts, contextually, from
the Egyptian perspective. For a comparative analysis between a textual and contextual approach, see
John P. Burris, 'Text and Content in the Study ofReligion', MTSR, 15, 2003:28-47.
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Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the comparative religion scholar, deconstructed the
traditional form of religion and proposed the more neutral, bi-polar concepts of
'faith' and 'cumulative tradition'.3 Notwithstanding his contribution to comparative
religion, he also struggled with the application of epoche. Smith described his great
effort to overcome the difficulties ofbracketing his own views. His aim was to
understand ancient Egyptian beliefs, in particular the sky goddess Nut. He was
impressed by the history, art, architecture, and by the order that the Egyptian people
attained or created in, for example, political life. He was also impressed by their
'religious' life but admitted he did not understand why the ancient Egyptians 'held
that the sky is a cow'.
Smith elaborated on the positive reasons why the Egyptians would consider
the sky as a cow and reasoned: 'Now you and I know that the sky is not a cow ... the
ancient Egyptians were simply wrong when they said that it was'. Smith suggested
that we may think the statement 'was not false but meaningless'. Or ifyou or I said
that the sky was a cow then 'we should be either wrong or absurd', although this
does not imply that we think the Egyptians are wrong or absurd. He suggested that
'we should listen doubly hard to the different perceptions of the world' and
concluded: 'Is the sky a cow? It would not be true if I said it; but from this it does not
follow that it was not at least partially true when they did'.6 The striving to
understand is present in Smith's dialogue with himself, and, following Kristensen,
for Smith, certainty was elusive.
Equally important are the diverse theories of a definition of the term 'myth',
given that various theories may be proposed not only by scholars within the field but
also by phenomenologists of religion. M. L. Satlow reduced the many into one
theory: 'In any given analysis, then, "myth" - in theory - becomes whatever we say
it is'.7 Whether or not resolution of the issue, even in part, rests within the actual
word itself, the word 'myth' also forms part ofmy research. Rather than attempting
to jettison the pejorative baggage accumulated over time by the word 'myth', it may
5
For an overview, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 'Comparative Religions: Whither and Why?', in
History ofReligions: Essays inMethodology, eds., M. Eliade and J. M. Kitagawa, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1959), 31-58; Kenneth Cracknell, ed., Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A
Reader, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001).
6 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 'The Sky is a Cow', 47-49, in Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 46-51.
7




be necessary to reconfigure this term if only to accommodate the criterion of the
believer's validation. Given that the core ofmy argument concerns the concept of
'myth' as a typology of religion in ancient Egypt, I propose using the word 'text' or
'narrative' for the term 'myth' but only in contexts where the meaning intended by
the authors ofmy research literature is uncompromised.
My aim throughout my thesis is to introduce different types of ancient
Egyptian texts, not only as an example of the thesis issue being discussed, but also to
demonstrate positive aspects of phenomenology. First, the comment by the classical
phenomenologist, Gerardus van der Leeuw: 'The essentially human always remains
essentially human, and is, as such, comprehensible'.8 The second is from an Egyptian
priest. In the Instructions ofAnkhesheshonq, the text follows van der Leeuw's
human-centred approach as if in response to the universal human question, 'How
shall I live?': Examine every matter, that you may understand it'.9 Although neither
statement is a 'religious' statement the premise ofboth is towards human
understanding which links the two statements within a timeframe of nearly one
thousand five hundred years. Equally, the aim of phenomenologists of religion is an
undertaking to comprehend the beliefs of others. To this end, the following sections
demonstrate problems which link to the main issue.
1.2 The Problem of Egyptian 'Religion'
Lewis Spence described the so-called Egyptian 'religion' in 1915: 'The group
of beliefs which constituted whatfor convenience sake is called the Egyptian
religion' (my emphasis).10 Even at this early period not only was the term 'religion'
problematic to Spence, he was aware also of the convenience of applying the term
'religion' to the traditional values of ancient Egypt, if only because of the lack of an
alternative word. Decades later Michael Rice remarked in 1990, that there is no such
thing as "Egyptian religion" because to an Egyptian, the concept of religion would
be meaningless. He continued: 'The society which grew up in Egypt in the third
millennium was entirely god-centred: it was thus theocratic and theocentric in a quite
8 Gerardus van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence andManifestation, (London: G. Allen & Unwin,
1938), 675.
9 See previous 1.




literal sense'.11 In 2001, Nicolas Wyatt described a similar issue: 'We cannot speak
of "Egyptian religion" in the singular, because the phenomenon we call 'religio', for
which the Egyptians had no specific term, was variously conceived in the different
groups making up Egyptian society'.12
I conclude with a more detailed account by John Baines, Professor of
Egyptology at Oxford University. He agreed that what is termed Egyptian "religion"
cannot be detached from that society's social order, that the Egyptians 'had no single
term for "religion" that would have facilitated any discussion of such issues'. He
argued: 'Religious beliefs were essentially and largely unquestioned presuppositions
underlying the conduct of life'.13 Although he agreed that society interacted with
religious beliefs they could not be seen in exclusively social terms. Nonetheless,
society was seen in terms of the gods, the king, the people and the akhs. The latter
signified those Egyptians who had been transfigured from an earthly existence into
their new 'spiritual' form.14 In the end, Baines concluded: 'From the vast span of
times I have surveyed, the evidence for everyday religious beliefs and practice is
sparse and fragmentary, and its organization may defy analyses'.1? It may be
concluded that the concept of an Egyptian 'religion', in the modern sense, is
challenged and thus merits further research.
1.3 The Problem of the Term 'Myth'
On the subject of the term 'myth', in 1999, Bruce Lincoln acknowledged
there was a problem of definition. He declined to offer yet another definition: 'It
would be nice to begin with a clear and concise definition of "myth" but
unfortunately that can't be done.'16 Wyatt's comment in 2001 encapsulates one
aspect of the issue: 'The term "myth" has endured a confused perception in recent
11 Michael Rice, Egypt's Making: The Origins ofancient Egypt, 5000-2000 BC, (London: Routledge,
1991), 219.
12 Nicolas Wyatt, Space and Time in the Religions Life of the Near East, (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 2001), 27-28.
13 John Baines, 'Society, Morality, and Religious Practice', 124, in Religion in Ancient Egypt, ed.,
Byron E. Shafer, (London: Routledge, 1991), 123-200.
14
Baines, 'Society, Morality', 129.
15
Baines, 'Society, Morality', 199.
16 Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, (Chicago; London:
University ofChicago Press, 1999), 1.
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years. On the one hand there has been a long tradition of hostile intent towards it,
typical for the most part, curiously, among biblical scholars and systematic
theologians.'17 Rather than a theological or religious genre of the term 'myth',
Geraldine Pinch recently proposed a cultural element: 'Myth was one of the elements
ofEgyptian culture that most impressed and influenced contemporary civilisations.
Stories and symbols crossed national boundaries and were reinterpreted to suit their
new settings'.18
The issue of the meaning of the term 'myth' continues today, although it does
not emerge in a vacuum. Many scholars attribute the first impulse of the term mythos
to the Greeks. Whether or not the true-false dichotomy of the term has been taken out
of its original context is also a subject of research. Various influences on the
interpretation of the Greek word mythos over time, historically, politically and
philosophically, together with a myriad of literature, have offered theories of the
definition of the taxon 'myth'. Can the term 'myth', or a story, text, or narrative, be
understood outside of its own cultural context? Ifmy research reveals the absence of
a correlation between the theory of'religion' in a modern sense and the beliefs of the
ancient Egyptians, then a clear issue is evident. Moreover, when the term 'myth' is
in partnership with the term 'religion', each term may superimpose their different
nuances, one on the other. For example, whose religion is 'false' when in association
with the term 'myth'?
The terms 'myth' and 'religion' therefore appear as unresolved issues of long¬
standing duration. When the terms are superimposed on the texts of ancient Egypt,
the problem is perpetuated. Nonetheless, the issue is not with the term 'religion' per
se, the fact of the function of religion is evidenced in, for example, the churches,
synagogues, temples and mosques and other places of communal worship. I posit
that the term 'religion' imposes a value judgement on the term 'myth'. G.S. Kirk
suggested that the religion-myth partnership are false friends: 'It will be wise to
reject from the outset the idea that myth and religion are twin aspects of the same
subject...'19 My particular concern is with the so-called phenomenological
17 Nicolas Wyatt, 'The Mythic Mind', 3, SJOT, 15, 2001:3-56.
18 Geraldine Pinch, EgyptianMyth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13.
19 G. S. Kirk, Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Others Cultures, (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 31.
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partnership between the problem terms 'religion' and 'myth', when these terms are
imposed on the cultural values of ancient Egypt.
1.4 The Problem of Phenomenology of Religion
It is important at this stage to provide a brief summary of the method which
classifies religious data into universal categories of religion, before presenting what I
propose are the key issues ofmy thesis. First, empirical data is collated then grouped
into religious or non-religious phenomena. The religious data are identified by a
common 'essence' of religion then grouped into universal typologies of religion;
non-religious data is discarded. Next, the classical phenomenologists who first
classified religious data into groups of similarities, classified 'myths' as a typology
of religion, another example is the category 'kingship'. The early phenomenologists
proposed a rigorous method which would ensure identity of the element of
commonality, the 'essence' of religion.
For example, one of the principles to which researchers must strive, is the
exercise of epoche, that is, to suspend judgements and to bracket previous theories or
opinions. Only then is the religious 'essence' revealed to the researcher. Equally,
prior distinctions between the real and apparent, true or false should be discarded.
Only then are the religious phenomena allowed to speak for themselves within the
bracketed consciousness of the researcher. To use empathy, to intuit the essential
meanings of the phenomena from their structures, completes the procedure, but only
90
after a final re-testing of the phenomenological process.
When this method is applied to so-called Egyptian 'myths' two issues are
identified. First, the true-false dichotomy of the term 'myth', illustrated in the
previous section, was at variance with the phenomenological dictum, that any prior
distinctions between the true and the false should be discarded by the researcher.
Second, the absence of a belief system in ancient Egyptian texts, which is congruent
with the contemporary meaning of today's concept of religion, challenges the
autonomy of the adherent. There is also the issue of the 'essence' of religion. If the
researcher seeks to distinguish the 'religious' from the 'non-religious' using epoche
20 For a more detailed account of the various models of the phenomenological method see James L.
Cox, Expressing the Sacred, (Harare: University ofZimbabwe Publications, 1996), 15-21. For the
application of the method, see 24-41.
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and empathy, and applies these principles to Egyptian texts, then I propose that the
result of the appraisal would be 'non-religious'. For this reason, the issue of the
'essence' of religion, the element of commonality which signifies whether or not the
Egyptian data is 'religious', requires critical analysis.
W. Brede Kristensen, one of the classical phenomenologists in my research,
acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the phenomenological method, in that to
understand other religions, full understanding was a probability only, certainty was
more elusive. I quoted earlier the experience ofCantwell Smith. Nonetheless, the
phenomenological method, although rigorous, fails to consider Egyptian narrative
texts from their viewpoint, given that the adherent's validation is central to the
principles of phenomenology.
If the phenomenologist seeks to understand a 'religion' that is foreign, it is
important that he or she views or 'experiences' it through the auspices of the
adherent. If the phenomenologist is unable to comprehend fully the religion of the
adherent because various true-false distinctions are made, then the consequence may
be the overlay of one religion or culture over another. Plutarch's Greek overlay on
the so-called Egyptian myth ofOsiris and Isis is one example offered. A distortion
of the adherent's reality is the ultimate result.
1.5 Example of the Issue
To classify not only the cultural beliefs of the ancient Egyptians under the
rubric of the construct term 'religion', but also to include the narratives which
describe their beliefs within the parameters of the pejorative term 'myth', invalidates
the meaning intended by the ancient Egyptians. It also negates the basic premise of
the phenomenological method discussed earlier. Given the scholarly consensus of the
general definition of the term 'myth' as a 'story that concerns gods or superhuman
beings', little mention if any, is made of the measure of the divine presence in
'mythic' narratives. Is a briefreference or the name of a deity or deities within the
structure of an Egyptian narrative sufficient content to name the narrative a 'mythic'
composition, or a story that concerns superhuman beings? Once the form of a deity
is established, the Egyptians formulated a story to explain its origin, characteristics
8
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and function and, 'in this process the god received a name'.21 In Ancient Egypt the
names of the gods and goddesses identify and provide the characteristics which
signify their role in a given drama. The naming process therefore was not only an
important source of information in ancient Egyptian beliefs, 'the name was an
integral part of the personality'.22
For example, in some contexts, when the names of the Egyptian gods Horus or
Osiris are mentioned briefly within a text, there is an inherent understanding between
the scribes and the 'divine reader' of the texts that the knowledge is conveyed in the
name, that any further expansion may be superfluous.2'1 Consequently, it may be a
story about the gods but the divine content is inferred rather than made explicit.24 A
case in point is the text inscribed on the walls of a 'house of eternity' or on the
papyrus, Coming Forth by Day, enfolded within the bandages of a mummified
'being' passing into the Otherworld. The words are for divine eyes only. The king or
those seeking entry into the Otherworld are transfigured into the god Osiris by the
9 c
simple expedient of being named or depicted in the form ofOsiris. The divine
names of Elorus and Osiris within a narrative signify that the context concerns the
function and power of kingship.26
21 David P. Silverman, 'Divinity and Deities in Ancient Egypt', 23-25, in Religion in Ancient Egypt,
7-87.
22
Silverman, 'Divinity and Deities', 28.
23 For the importance of the naming principle, see R.O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Book ofthe
Dead, (London: British Museum Press, 1989), 137. Knowledge of the names is required not only of
the deities, the 'spiritual beings' encountered on their journey to the Otherworld but also the names of
the places and the technical terms of objects they encountered. Spell 148: 'I know you and I know
your name. I know the name of the seven cows and their bull'. See also Barry Kemp, How to Read the
Egyptian Book of the Dead, (London: Granta Publications, 2006).
24 David P. Silverman, 'Textual Criticism in the Coffin Texts', 38, in Religion andPhilosophy in
Ancient Egypt, ed., William Kelly Simpson, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1989), 29-46.
Silverman noted that in one version the spell "Ra-Horakhty" is mentioned by name, while in another,
the name is replaced with the epithet "lord of the horizon" (CT1040 VII 289b). See also Jan
Assmann, 'Death and Initiation in the Funerary Religion of Ancient Egypt', 136, in Religion and
Philosophy in Ancient Egypt, 135-159. Assmann explains that funerary literature should be qualified
as 'esoteric' in the sense that it was not meant to be seen by the eyes of mortals. Thus when texts refer
briefly to a deity, or, name the god in general terms as the 'Lord of the Horizon', the scribal priest
would assume the gods hadfull knowledge (my emphasis). Once the tomb is closed the texts are for
the eyes of the gods only.
25 See Kemp BD, 32.
26 This is a simplified statement of a complex theme discussed in detail in chapter four. See also
Kemp, BD, 27, and his comment that the Osiris myth was not simply a myth about the afterlife but
also a story about Horus, the son ofOsiris.
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The name Horus, given to the king at his coronation, signifies that he possesses
the full power and authority of the royal god Horus. Similarly, the name Osiris
affirms that the king has been transfigured from Horus, Lord ofthe Two Lands to
27
Osiris, Lord ofthe West. Such is the nature of royal power in ancient Egypt: rather
than elaborating on a story-line, the royal names ofHorus and Osiris, I suggest carry
the ethos of their divine characteristics. I propose that most if not all ancient
Egyptian narratives incorporate in diverse genres the function of the office of
kingship. Similarly, narratives that relate to the goddess motif constitute a key role in
the office of kingship, one that is supportive rather than subordinate or subservient.
Equally relevant therefore to the issue of the term 'myth' is the form and
function of the Egyptian office of kingship. The king not only embodies and
maintains order in the institution ofEgypt, the ethos ofHorus and Osiris is manifest
also in the office of kingship. The profound nature of the naming principle in ancient
Egypt is further reflected in the royal titulary; five names are given to each king at
his coronation, each of which infers knowledge of the characteristics of the titular
gods. The naming process of kingship is one of the rituals of the king's coronation;
the first name ofHorus signifies not only knowledge of the role of kingship, but also
that the king embodies the dual nature of kingship.28
He is not only a human king (nswt), he partakes also of the divine perpetuity of
kings in the form of the ka (klw) of kings. He is named 'Majesty' (hm), a term which
is manifest in his divine nature.29 If a 'myth' is a story about the gods, and the
Egyptian king, in his role in the office of kingship is considered a god, then, are the
stories that relate the exploits of kings considered 'myths', that is, in the context of
the phenomenological model? Is the function of the Egyptian office of kingship,
political, theological or religious? When Barbara Lesko commented that 'inscriptions
on royal monuments were intended primarily to bolster "the greatest myth of all,"
27 His other epithets are, 'King of the Westerners' or'King of the Netherworld'.
28 The office of kingship is the premise throughout this thesis. For the titulary of kingship, see Henri
Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 46-47; Alan
Gardiner, 'The Coronation ofKing Haremhab', 15, JEA, 39, 1953:13-31.
29 See James P. Allen, Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language and Culture ofHieroglyphs,
(Cambridge: University Press, 2005), 64-66, 31-33. Cf. 31: Allen translates the term 'hm' as
'incarnation' or 'Majesty'. When this term is given to the king it infers that he is incarnated with the
perpetual divine power of kingship, 'hm'. For a similar view on the earthly and divine nature of
kingship, see Silverman, 'Divinity and Deities', 66-67.
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divine kingship', did she mean that the concept of divine kingship was a 'false'
premise?30
Returning to the issue of the term 'myth', generally defined as a story about a
god or gods, a comparison may be made within the context ofMesopotamian
kingship. In the Epic ofGilgamesh, the narrative concerns Gilgamesh, the near-
divine king of the city-state Uruk. His mother was the goddess Ninsun from whom
Gilgamesh inherited two-thirds of his divine nature. 31 The Epic is described by
Stephanie Dalley as a 'literary composition' which narrates a heroic quest for fame
and immortality. She explains why the narrative is named an 'epic' rather than
'myth': 'The work is classed as an epic because it features the heroic exploits of a
dimly historical figure with, on the sidelines, gods and goddesses who sometimes
•7 j
take a part in the action...' That Dalley chose to comment on the Gilgamesh
narrative as an epic rather than 'myth' implies her deliberation on its narrative status.
Yet she makes no reference to why the Epic ofCreation is named an epic, even
though she describes it as 'quite different to that of the Epic ofGilgameshthere is
no human hero, only 'the hero-god Marduk'. In the Epic ofCreation, the hero-god
Marduk is attested with the title, 'King of the Gods', although he has no claim to
historical status, nor is his name attested in any King List. Here are narratives that
appear to fit the general theory of a 'myth', one is a creation story about the gods, the
other concerns a demi-god and relates the concept of immortality. Yet both are given
the narrative status of an 'epic'.33 Neither is classified as a 'religion'.
These examples serve to illustrate the key issues ofmy thesis. A comparison
reveals certain similarities between the Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian concepts
of kingship. However, clear cultural distinctions are demonstrated between the
30 Barbara S. Lesko, The Great Goddesses ofEgypt, (Norman, U. S.A: University ofOklahoma Press,
1999), 32. See also section, 'The Myth ofDivine Kingship', 31-36.
31 See Stephanie Dalley, Mythsfrom Mesopotamia, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 40-41; A. George, The Epic ofGilgamesh, (Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1999), xxxi. In his
Introduction, George also described the narrative as an epic. He refers to the mother ofGilgamesh as
the goddess, Ninsan, and adds that Gilgamesh is 'none the less mortal'. This serves to illustrate the
problem of defining the meaning of the term 'myth', whether, or to what extent, any divine element is
measurable in a mythic narrative. Gilgamesh appears in the Sumerian King List as the fifth ruler of the
First Dynasty ofUruk; he ruled 126 years.
32
Dalley, Myths, 39.




concept of the divine in Mesopotamian and that in ancient Egyptian kingship.
Although the divine element ofGilgamesh is measured as two-thirds of his nature,
the Epic ofGilgamesh describes his failure to achieve immortality. The opposite is
the norm in the Horus-Osiris alliance ofEgyptian kingship described earlier.
Historical evidence inscribed in texts and on temple and tomb walls not only validate
a belief in immortality, their king lists verify the historical succession ofEgyptian
kings. Some names are omitted for political reasons; the rest testify to both the
historical and divine status of kingship. Similarly, although the name ofGilgamesh is
recorded in the Sumerian King List, he fails to achieve immortality. Consequently,
the perception ofEternity in a supernatural world is absent in Mesopotamia, but
present in ancient Egypt.
I return to the question posed earlier. What degree or measure of the divine
presence in a narrative justifies its status as 'myth', given that the mother of
Gilgamesh was a goddess, Marduk was a hero-god and creator-god, and Egyptian
kingship was a divine office? Assuming the commonality of the typology 'kingship'
as a category of religion, their differences signify the diverse viewpoints of each
culture's reality.
1.6 Research methods
In any research of value those who seek to incorporate the primary and
secondary literature of any given discipline as the key method of research as I do,
must provide some account of the history and background of the key authors. Only
when the literature under scrutiny is placed within the context of its time are the
intentions of the authors understood. It is within this framework that the writings of
the early twentieth century classical phenomenologists of religion who first classified
religious phenomena into typologies are re-examined. Whether, or to what extent,
later phenomenologists were influenced by or superseded the earlier classification of
universal typologies, their writing also forms part of this research. I must emphasise
that the research area concerns only the configuration of typologies of religion and in
particular, the term 'myth' as a category of religion, in ancient Egypt. The
consequential ripples which result from the literature research, the mythos-myth
question; the polemic of'myth'; the 'essence' of religion, the 'naming' principle and
others, contribute substantially to my research.
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Equally, it is important that the same criterion is given to the literary
traditions of ancient Egypt, more so, given that their historical period of three
thousand years is situated in ancient times. Further, because their voice is silent, I
make some endeavour to interpret the meaning and intent of their texts, iconography,
and archaeology, 'as if from the insider Egyptian perspective. Because the ancient
Egyptians appear to incorporate their text or narratives within a socio-political
system in which kingship symbolised societal order, a broad continuum of literature
in a diverse range of disciplines is examined. Thus, the theories and critiques of
contemporary scholars in the field are an important contribution to my research,
whether scholars of phenomenology, religion or Egyptology. Given that critiques
may offer salient points which not only illustrate contentious issues but also offer
theories of resolution, their literature forms a key part in my research. Finally, re¬
examination of the traditional presentations of'myth' as a phenomenological
category may resolve some of the issues of contemporary critiques when these
critiques are applied to ancient Egyptian texts.34
Although I demonstrated earlier what appeared as issues of the
phenomenological method, I propose that rather than the process itself, the key issue
may lie within the human propensity to identify with similar beliefs and cultural
concepts. Difficulties may arise when, with good intentions, the phenomenologist
struggles to engage fully with the principles of empathy and epoche when they are
applied to beliefs unfamiliar and unlike our own. The phenomenologist may be
unable to comprehend these concepts which appear strange and foreign; I mentioned
earlier that Smith was aware that he was unable to fully comprehend why the ancient
Egyptian believed that 'the sky was a cow'. An observation of some worth is that the
classical phenomenologists were also aware of the difficulties inherent in the
phenomenological method. It is important to reiterate my earlier comment that the
phenomenological directive to the researcher was not only to strive to practice
empathy and epoche but also on completion, to re-appraise the research. I have
endeavoured to follow this principle in my research, to scrutinise the literature with
35
rigour.
341 have referred also the academic journals of the relevant disciplines in my literature research, if
only to access the immediacy and inter-academic scholarly dialogue to new theories.
35 Recent studies in Egyptian literature demonstrate a similar approach to understanding texts from an
Egyptian perspective. For example, the contribution by a group of scholars from different disciplines
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To summarise the issue, my thesis concerns the terms 'myth' and 'religion',
modern constructs that convey to a myriad of scholars and students a complex range
of diverse interpretations. Contemporary writers in the field who offer theories of the
terms 'religion' and 'myth' for scholarly discussion, do so with the implied
understanding that both terms are defined generally as universal constructs based on
a religious 'essence' as the commonality of similarities. On the one hand, no matter
how similar the categories appear, only rarely, are categories from different traditions
exactly congruent.361 propose therefore that differences matter.
Barry Kemp, archaeologist and Field Director of the Egyptian Exploration
Society's excavations at el-Amarna, suggested that the ancient Egyptians 'were like
us, but only so far. The difference is more profound than their mass of gods and
fragments of unfamiliar mythology'. He continued that certain texts reveal 'a
relationship between the human individual and the divine which is quite unlike that
found in some of the major religions of the modern world (especially Christianity
and Islam)'.37 If the aim of the phenomenologist of religion is towards understanding
another culture then general similarities of religious data may provide a general
understanding only. In the phenomenological model the similarities may blur the
reality of an individual culture. I propose that the key element which identifies the
myriad ofworld cultures, whether Egyptian, Buddhist, Christian or an 'Other', is the
signifier term 'difference'. Consequently, differences offer not only a more profound
understanding ofwhat the term 'myth', sacred story or narrative means to the
adherent, but also allows the phenomenologist of religion to comprehend the texts 'as
if through the eyes of the insider. My intention therefore is not only to retain the
phenomenological method of classifying similarities into groups but to extend the
analysis to incorporate socio-cultural differences. Egyptian texts are the signifier
which identity the socio-political institution of ancient Egypt.
There is some advantage in the phenomenological method of classifying
similarities into groups given that differences may be found only after a consensus of
in the field ofEgyptology, see Antonio Loprieno, ed., Ancient Egyptian Literature: History and
Forms, (Leiden;NewYork;Koln: E.J.Brill, 1996).
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similarities is established. With this in mind, the aim ofmy thesis is to re-evaluate
the universal classification of the taxon 'myth' as a typology of religion in ancient
Egypt. I offer various comparisons to the taxon 'myth' but I emphasise the socio-
cultural differences demonstrated in the texts of ancient Egypt. Consequently, rather
than a religion-centred interpretation of'myth', I posit that the so-called 'myths', or
more simply, 'texts' or 'narratives' of ancient Egypt demonstrate the socio-cultural
identity of the ancient Egyptians. Further, that the different types of Egyptian texts
which permeate my thesis demonstrate that the office of kingship is not only the
pivotal focus but also the mirror through which the ancient Egyptian voice is heard.
1.7 Chapters Overview
Chapter two is my pivotal chapter; I re-visit the subject of phenomenology to
establish the veracity of the issue proposed in my thesis. My aim is to identify the
roots that result in the issue, the problem of'myth' as a category of religion in
ancient Egypt. I posit that 'myth', alternatively, the texts and narratives of ancient
Egypt, are more appropriately classified within the rubric of a socio-political genre,
which is human-centred rather than interpreted as 'religion-centred'. Subsequent
chapters examine the various issues which have been identified in chapter two.
Because my thesis concerns phenomenology of religion it is necessary first to
examine the interrelationship between the history of religions, which concerns the
study of religion, and the key factors which result in the discipline of the
phenomenology of religion, that is, the study of religious data. Since the latter
determines the method of classifying religious data into typologies of religion, in
particular, 'myth' as a category of religion, scrutiny of the literature of the classical
phenomenologists, William Brede Kristensen, Gerardus van der Leeuw and Mircea
Eliade, who first established the method, is the focus of this chapter. Critiques from
contemporary scholars in the field are equally important, if only, to justify the
presence of certain issues within the discipline of phenomenology of religion. For
example, a key issue is the overlay ofChristianity as the 'essence' of religion, the
common element which classifies religious data in typologies of religion. Universal




typologies in general and 'myth' as a universal category of religion are among other
issues discussed.
As a result ofmy literature research, I respond to the key questions in the
summary of chapter two. How has 'myth' been defined as a classification or
typology? What is the meaning intended by the three classical phenomenologists of
the 'essence' of religion? What are the consequences to the meaning of the term
'myth' when classified as a typology of'religion'? Is there evidence of socio-cultural
differences observed in 'myths'?
In chapter three, a similar issue to the Christian overlay is identified in the
Greek overlay of the characters of the Egyptian deities, Isis and Osiris. I examine the
literature of the Greek historian, Plutarch, on the so-called 'myth' of Isis and Osiris
and the critique of the Plutarch version by J. Gwyn Griffiths. I argue not only that the
Greek overlay has distorted the Egyptian image of Isis and Osiris but also that the
fundamental character of the Egyptian god, Osiris as the 'Lord ofthe Westernersis
're-created' in Greek fashion, as an earthly king. The Egyptian perspective of the role
of Isis and Osiris is provided by the Pyramid Texts, the earliest source writings of the
ancient Egyptians. The thrust of this chapter is to emphasise not only the absence in
Egyptian texts of the depiction of Isis and Osiris as an earthly king and queen of
Egypt, but also the frequent inference in today's literature, that Plutarch's account is
the extant Egyptian version of the 'myth' of Isis and Osiris. Chapter three first
introduces the key function of the royal Horus-Osiris axis and the role of kingship in
ancient Egypt. Of considerable importance to my thesis is my endeavour to utilise
the phenomenological method of comparing data 'as if from the insider view,
although I discard the common element of comparison, the 'religious' element with
its association with Christian theology.
In chapter four I re-appraise the term 'myth' in its relationship with 'religion'
and I challenge the perception that all 'myths' contain the universal religious
'essence', identified in chapter two. I demonstrate the confusion which results from
the myriad of definitions by contemporary writers in the field of religion, and in
particular, I research why 'myth' has been labelled with the polemic term 'false'. The
dichotomy of'myth', in its relationship with 'religion', creates its own problems.
When the story of the 'Other' religion is defined as 'myth', that it is false, then my
story is not 'myth, because it is 'true'. I seek some resolution in retracing the Greek
origin and interpretation of the term mythos in its association with logos, and the
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apparent, changing authorial intent of both terms. One of the key questions seeking
resolution in this chapter is whether, or to what extent, the Greeks were the source of
today's polemic that myth is 'false'. While chapter two identified key issues,
chapters three and four illustrate what appears as the consequence of the absence of
the principle methods of phenomenology, epoche and empathy.
I introduce in chapter five a reconstruction of the positive aspects of a myth-
phenomenology partnership and draw together the subjects highlighted in the
previous chapters. I demonstrate a subjective-objective approach to the study of texts
and iconography and I urge also that the core principles of phenomenology should
not be discarded under the weight of critiques from scholars in the field. To this end,
I present a selection of texts which demonstrate the myth-religion issues critiqued by
contemporary scholars. From a positive position I offer not only a re-appraisal of the
method of van der Leeuw but also aspects of phenomenology from different
disciplines. Equally, while I discuss the importance of the etic-emic inter-relationship
for analysing key texts, the 'naming' principle in ancient Egypt is a central tenet
towards understanding Egyptian texts 'as if from the inside. I enquire whether van
der Leeuw's method of'naming' is similar to that of the ancient Egyptians. My aim
in this chapter is to demonstrate that phenomenology, as a method, is a crucial tool
for the study of'religions' or cultures. The final section introduces texts which
confirm that scholars, who 'do' phenomenology in different disciplines, appear, to
some extent, successful in their endeavours. The chapter concludes with a
phenomenological approach to Egyptian texts as a pre-cursor to my Case Study in
chapter six.
Chapter six is the accumulation ofmy research in the previous chapters. The
Case Study demonstrates not only a new hermeneutic of the taxon 'myth' within the
framework of the phenomenological method but also indicates that in ancient Egypt
names and context matter. My method, the subjective-objective comparison of
Egyptian texts, detailed in chapter six, excludes the intangible 'essence' of religion
as the common element of comparison. Following the principles of phenomenology,
the texts, as the voice of the ancient Egyptians, are reinstated and act as, the
validating referent of the adherent. I demonstrate that Egyptian words and names are
understood as signifiers in the context and textual meaning intended by the ancient
Egyptians. As an example of the Egyptian perspective, I introduce hieroglyphs of the
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key deities not only to indicate that they convey to some extent the meaning and
character of the deities depicted, but also suggest a phonetic rendering.
Thus, 'seeing' from the insider view, which in my Case Study is the Egyptian
view, predicates the fundamental principle of phenomenology, that is, to understand
the Egyptians, within the limits of their parameters. Only then may a conjoined
subjective-objective view be realised. This is not to say that I achieve full
understanding of the Egyptian texts, rather I am aware that as a human being,
comprehension as the adherents intended, is elusive. Given that I demonstrate the
fact that the classical phenomenologists agree that absolute certainty cannot be
achieved in the understanding of another religion or culture, in this issue, to some
degree, the voice of the critiques may be silenced. Notwithstanding these comments,
it is important that I indicate what I mean by the insider view, and what appears as,
hints of different insider voices within the Egyptian texts under scrutiny.
Within the inter-contextual genres discussed in this thesis, the Egyptian insider
view is culturally identified with the rituals, beliefs, and socio-political traditions
exemplified in the texts, iconography and archaeology. For example, in chapter three,
and within the context of the Pyramid Texts, the authoritative, insider voices of the
fifth and sixth dynasty kings are accompanied by texts which declare divine support
of the Horus-king's transfiguration or transcendence as Osiris. Equally, in my Case
Study, insiders are identified as the Egyptian elite, the hierarchical administrators of
the Egyptian state who act on behalf of the king. Thus, different insider voices are
representative of the diverse genres of the insider Egyptian perspective as a whole.
Although Egyptian deities, the earthly Horus-king, Osiris, Lord ofthe West, the elite
administrators, and others, hint to different insider voices, I posit that the definitive
insider which signifies the essential Egyptian point of view, is the theocratic office of
Egyptian kingship.
My premise is first, to examine the texts 'as if from the perspective of the
ancient Egyptians and second, to achieve comprehension as far as my endeavours
allow. The protagonist is the complex concept of kingship although the term
'kingship' or 'king' is absent in ancient Egyptian texts and iconography. Other than
the five titular names of kingship, the key epithet for all Egyptian kings is the 'Lord
ofthe Two Lands'. Only when viewed through the lens of the Egyptian texts,
iconography and archaeology does the term convey its full implication. For example,
the Power of the king, a key motif throughout my thesis, maintains the unity of the
18
1 Introduction
Two Lands, a concept which signifies among others, stability, order, and a royal
adherence to the principles of the goddess Maat. Thus the 'naming' principle, first re¬
appraised in the previous chapter, continues in the Case Study. Phenomenology is re¬
visited in a comparative analysis between the modern interpretation of different types
of texts, and the contextual meaning conveyed by the Egyptian texts. 'Funerary' texts
and 'transfiguration' texts are an example; the former suggests 'finality', the latter an
'ongoing' existence.
In the end, my Case Study is the vehicle for my new hermeneutic for the term
'myth'. Given that the names 'text', 'textual narrative' or 'narrative' convey a
meaning devoid of the polemic 'false', it is an important first step. My aim
throughout my thesis is to acknowledge the practical function of a subject-objective,
phenomenological method in its application to the phenomenology of Egyptian texts.
In my final example, the Case Study presents an analysis of an Egyptian
'incantation' text with textual re-appraisal, iconographic images and evidence from
archaeological sources. The latter serves as a model for van der Leeuw's premise,
that all empirical data should undergo a rigorous re-appraisal and correction process.
Finally, because research within my thesis topic appears sparse, further
research is necessary in the application of this new understanding of phenomenology
as a tool towards understanding other ancient cultures.
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Chapter Two
Development of the Theory of Myth in the History and
Phenomenology of Religion
Indubitable certitude or clarity cannot be obtained and, indeed, can never be reached
when we are seeking understanding, but we can come to the greatest attainable
probability.1
2.1 Introduction
The key focus in this chapter is to establish the development of the theory of
'myth' as a phenomenological category of 'religion'. My purpose is to exemplify the
basis for the issue proposed in my thesis, namely, that the category 'myth' rather
than being interpreted as religion-centred, may be more appropriately classified
within a socio-political genre which is human-centred.21 propose that a historical
socio-political method allows for a human-divine liaison rather than the exclusive
religion-centred ahistorical approach of the classical phenomenologists. 31
differentiate between the meaning of human-centred and the religious nature implied
by the term homo religiosus, given that the 'essence' of religion is one of the key
issues under scrutiny. The so-called 'myths' of ancient Egyptian 'religion' which I
posit are centred around the socio-political office of kingship, provide not only a
linking thread throughout my thesis but also the framework for a new hermeneutic of
'myth'. Accordingly, Merlin Donald, a professor ofPsychology, is one ofmany
scholars who acknowledge that the 'mythic mantle' is located within the wider,
socio-political spectrum ofdivine kingship.
Thus the storied king, with his divine right and his power protected by
an armamentarium of validating myths, nevertheless had to rely on
1
W. Brede Kristensen, TheMeaning ofReligion, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 6.
2 See chapter one, Introduction, on the problems of the terms 'myth' and 'religion'. On various
concepts of religion, see Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention ofWorldReligions, (University of
Chicago Press, 2005) and his chapter: 'The Birth Trauma ofWorld Religions', 107-120. Chapter four
of this thesis provides and analysis of the issues between the terms, 'myth' and 'religion'.
3 See G.A. James, Interpreting Religion, (Washington, DC.: Catholic University of America Press,
1995), 6. James commented: 'This is not to say that all phenomenological approaches to religion are
a-historical, a-theological, and anti-reductive to the same extent, in precisely the same way, or with
the same response to the philosophical and methodological problems involved therein'. Some
problems which may connect to the ahistorical approach are discussed in the next chapter.
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coronations, elaborate weddings, customs, ... and all the formalities of
a courtly hierarchy to consolidate and implement his power in daily
life ... There is no doubt where the power lies in traditional societies.
Consequently, my overall aims in this chapter are threefold: first, to examine
the interrelationship between the history of religions and the key factors that result in
the discipline of'the phenomenology of religion'. To this end, an appraisal is
necessary not only of the literature of the classical phenomenologists but also
critiques from contemporary writers in the field to establish the veracity of the issues
I propose. My second aim is to determine the method of classifying typologies of
religion and 'myth' as a category of religion given that it is the phenomeno logical,
systematic study of religious data that first classifies phenomena into categories or
typologies.3 Finally, I refer in this chapter and subsequent chapters to critiques by
contemporary writers in the field who challenge not only the taxonomy myth as a
religion-centred category but also the problem of universal typologies in general.
Consequently, a re-evaluation of the traditional classification of'myth' as a
phenomenological category of religion may illustrate some of the issues posited by
contemporary critiques. While it is essential to scrutinize the phenomenological
methodology that establishes the categories in the first place, the ultimate objective
in this chapter is to identify the key issues ofmy thesis.
2.2 Phenomenology of Religion: Lack of Consensus
In his publication concerning the methodology of the classical
phenomenologist George Alfred James notes that scholars within other fields agree
to a positive contribution of phenomenology but 'such is not the case in the academic
study of religion'.6 However, this is not to say that other disciplines are entirely free
of issues. Nursing, for example, is one field in which phenomenology has
experienced a positive influence although certain issues remain unresolved. For
4 Merlin Donald, A Mind so Rare, (New York, London: W W. Norton & Company, 2001), 297. For
Egyptian kingship, see Barry Kemp, Ancient Egypt Anatomy ofa Civilisation, (London; New York:
Routledge). For continuity of divine kingship in Egypt, 20-27; for the Power inherent in the office of
Egyptian kingship, 183-184.
5 See James, Interpreting Religion, 50. On phenomenology: 'The principal procedure, then, is not
"historical" but systematic'. Also the role of the phenomenologist is to select, systemise and interpret.
See Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion: A History, (London: Duckworth, 1975), 245. Sharpe's view
on phenomenology appears to confirm Eliade's, often controversial status, as both a historian of
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example truth claims.7 There are different types of phenomenology as there are
different approaches to the phenomenology of religion.8 Nonetheless, because of the
ambiguity of the application of the phenomenological methods in the academic study
of religions, there appears to be little agreement. James explains:
But a look at the use made of so-called phenomenology within the
field of religion suggests that the phenomenology of religion, or the
phenomenological approach to religion, entails a level of confusion
that exceeds that of other fields, a confusion of another order.9
A similar level of confusion is present in the initial stages of the 'history of religions'
which continues after the phenomenological method is applied. This may have a
bearing on the lack of a clear definition of the term 'myth' as a 'category of
religion'.10 Equally, there is contention among scholars of the meaning of the term
'the phenomenology of religion'.11 Nonetheless, James suggests there are 'certain
7
See Tania Yegdich, 'On the Phenomenology ofEmpathy in Nursing: Empathy or Sympathy' in
Journal ofAdvancedNursing, 30, 1999:83-93. Research shows that in nurse-patient relationships
nurses, in general, find it difficult to empathise with the experiences of certain patients. Similarly, the
classical phenomenologists of religion struggled to identify their sacred stories with 'another'
culture's 'myth'. See also Anders Bergmark and Lars Oscarsson, 'The Limits of Phenomenology and
Objectivity: On the Encounter between Scientism and Practice', British Journal ofSocial Work,
1992:121-132. In this paper, phenomenological research on alcoholism centred on the tension between
the scientific objective data which contradicted the subjective experience of the practitioners/clients.
The reports failed to convey 'accurately' their historical actions or original intentions; the objective
observations of the researcher tested differently. This does not mean, say the researchers, that the
individuals falsify their experiences, rather they held different 'truth-claims'.
8
For an overall account of different approaches to phenomenology, see the recent work by Cox,
Phenomenology ofReligion. See also C. J.Bleeker, 'The Phenomenological Method' in Numen, 6,
1959:96-111. He also refers to the confusion and polemics of the phenomenology of religion, 106.
9
James, Interpreting Religion, 1. James refers to the insight gained from a phenomenological analysis
when applied to psychology, sociology, history, law, political science, art, etc., particularly that of
Husserl and his followers. James argued that within the field of religion, the phenomenology
employed is not as Husserl, or his followers, intended. See also Bleeker, 'Phenomenological Method',
98, 103. He also supports a non-Husserlian concept of epoche and eidetic vision in that the method is
scientific rather than, as Husserl intended, a 'theory of knowledge'.
10 Cf. preface to Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, ix. He begins: 'It would be nice to begin with a clear and
concise definition of "myth" but unfortunately that can't be done'. See also comment by Marshall
(1988:449) on the use of the term 'myth' in the Bible, quoted by Wyatt, Myths ofPower, (Munster:
Ugarit Verlag, 1996), 11. 'Myth is a confusing term in theology; it is used in so many ill-defined ways
that it would be no bad thing if its use were prohibited'.
11
On the phenomenology of religion, see Sharpe, Comparative, 221. 'The label is, however, far from
explanatory, and simply to use this form ofwords without further definition would be unwise, since
even the scholars who use this term, and claim to apply this method to do their work are not always
sure as to its precise definition'. See also James, Interpreting Religion, 11-21. Chapter A: 'The
Problem' highlights the phenomenological differences ofBleeker, Pettazzoni, Widengren, Bettis, et
at.
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family traits' that can be 'observed, examined, and discussed'.12 Moreover, while he
notes the similarities between the phenomenologists in his study, he concedes that
differences may be taken into account. If the criterion is towards understanding the
phenomena whether concepts, artefacts or family groups then similarities as well as
differences contribute towards a more profound comprehension.12 Nonetheless,
James proposed that the 'family traits' analogy is applied to the phenomenology of
religion that the similarity may be 'slight' or pronounced'.
The notion of family traits is a fitting analogy because family traits,
like the characteristics of the phenomenology of religion, can be slight
or pronounced, and they are accommodated differently within the
whole personality of each family member.14 (my emphasis)
James implies that when this concept is used to classify typologies of religion, the
parameters of commonality are broadened rather than constrained within a rigid,
either-or concept of religiousness. This is not to assume an absence of the 'essence'
of religion rather, if a phenomenon has a degree or measure of such an 'essence',
then it may claim status as a typology of religion. Given that the abstract term 'the
essence of religion' defines the shared characteristics of the pattern or grouping of
data, the term carries also what appears as a hidden theological agenda. The
definition of the term 'essence' of religion may prove to be an issue of some
significance in the later re-appraisal of the phenomenological classification of
categories.
For this reason, this chapter seeks to re-examine the similarities and
differences of the phenomenological methodologies of three pioneers in the
phenomenology of religion; William Brede Kristensen, Gerardus van der Leeuw, and
Mircea Eliade.15 Given that each phenomenologist uses different approaches to the
12
James, Interpreting Religion, 48.
13
James, Interpreting Religion, 7. See also Wyatt, 'Mythic Mind', 14: 'The principle of'patterning',
of seeing in the evidence what we expect to see, or want to see...'
14
James, Interpreting Religion, 6-7. Although James admits the so-called family members of his case
study, he adds that Chantepie, Kristensen and van der Leeuw do not use these terms; he identifies
these family traits as 'a-historical, a-theological, anti-reductive'. See also Gavin D Flood, Beyond
Phenomenology, Rethinking the Study ofReligion, (London; New York: Cassell, 1999), 48. He
suggests a similar familial concept on category formation: 'The degrees of membership of a category
can be linked through family resemblances'.
15 See Flood, Phenomenology, 16. Flood includes Ninian Smart. See also James, Interpreting
Religion, 4. James considers Kristensen and van der Leeuw as 'key examples of the phenomenology
of religion'.
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grouping of similar religious data into categories, ideal types or hierophanies, their
common objective is to understand the religious data. Reference is also made to the
literature of later phenomenologists whose methods have influenced the discipline of
phenomenology of religion. C. J. Bleeker in particular has a combined interest of
some substance in phenomenology and Egyptology. Some mention was made earlier
to Wilfred Cantwell Smith and reference is made later to views on the religion-
tradition discussion. Varying responses will be forthcoming, some critical, others
supportive of the comparative systems proposed by the earlier classical
phenomenologists. In this chapter and later chapters, I refer also to critiques or
comments from contemporary scholars in the field: George Alfred James, Robert
Baird, Eric Sharpe, Gavin Flood, Guilford Dudley III, Jonathan Z. Smith, Hans
Penner, James Cox, and others. Literature therefore forms one of the main sources of
my methodology.
The key questions addressed in this chapter: How has 'myth' been defined as a
classification or typology? What is the meaning intended by the three classical
phenomenologists of the 'essence' of religion? What are the consequences to the
meaning of the term 'myth' when classified as a typology of'religion'? Is there
evidence of socio-cultural differences observed in 'myths'? Responses to these
questions will form part of the conclusion of this chapter. Subsequent chapters serve
to demonstrate the phenomenological issues exemplified in this chapter.
2.3 Diverse Methodologies: the Critiques
Within the academic study of religions, many scholars have voiced concern
about the lack of consensus regarding the parameters delimiting the field. Kitagawa
commented that, 'the "history of religions" means different things to different
people'.16 Baird observes the diverse disciplines of anthropologists, sociologists,
depth psychologists, and social anthropologists. If they were also to be called
historians of religions, 'the majority of scholars surveyed would not be considered
historians of religion in any strict sense'. As a result, 'the latter badge [an historian of
16 Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa, eds., The History ofReligions: Essays in Methodology,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 14. See also James, Interpreting Religion, 47, whether
'phenomenological approaches to religion have anything more in common than a name'.
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religion] becomes even more ambiguous than it already is'.17 Eric Sharpe makes a
similar point.
[T]he sheer weight of material which has accumulated under the
general heading of "comparative religion" is now sub-divided into the
history of religion, the psychology of religion, the sociology of religion,
the phenomenology of religion (not to mention a host of auxiliary
disciplines), the pursuit of any of which might occupy a normal scholar
for a normal lifetime. Each of these now has its own approaches and its
own appropriate methods.18
Sharpe's comments highlight not only the eclectic nature but also the weight of
material available in 1975. It emphasises also the problems envisaged for the student
of religion nearly thirty years later with an increased output of scholarly writing on
the history and phenomenology of religion. Eliade suggests there are
'methodological difficulties inherent in all research in the history of religions,'19
while a similar issue is echoed by Dudley when he offers that historians of religions
sought first to identity themselves with what was known as Religionswissenschaft
and then later as 'history of religions'. This has resulted in an insecure anchor,
because as Dudley concluded, 'historians of religion have lacked a commonly
accepted methodology'.20 Given that Eliade's methodology appears to depend on the
history of religions, Dudley doubts whether Eliade, whose phenomenology is
discussed later in the next section, has shown a way 'through the conflicting
methodologies'. Consequently, there appears to be confusion about what constitutes
the term 'history of religion'.
The conflicting methodologies that subsequently arise in the phenomenology
of religion may be symptomatic of the different approaches by classical
phenomenologists in the formation of'categories of religion' in general and 'myth'
as a 'category of religion' in particular. Baird suggests that while an analysis of
category formation is not a cure for all our problems, it could point us in the right
direction.21 Similarly, the degree or measure ofsimilarity that determines the
17 Robert D. Baird, Category Formation and the History ofReligions, (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter,
1991), 1.
18
Sharpe, preface to Comparative, xiii.
19
Eliade, History ofReligions, 92.
20 Guilford Dudley, Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and his Critics, (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1977), 3.
21
Baird, Category Formation, 2.
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religiousness of given categories is a further consideration. Flood, while less
concerned with category formation, rightly finds it difficult to accept the category
'religion' in universal terms. His comments serve to illustrate the issue of the term
'religion'.
The abstract category 'religion' which developed within the particular
history ofWestern thought has been taken since the Enlightenment to
be universal. This, however, is problematic when 'religion', if defined
in essentialist terms is applied to non-Western contexts.22
Consequently, re-examination of category formation is essential if only to
illustrate the issues from an Egyptian perspective. The next section, therefore,
provides a critical appraisal of the different approaches of three classical
phenomenologists. Equally important is the value each phenomenologist places on
the classification of the taxon 'myth' as a typology of religion.
2.4 Classical Phenomenologists: the Selection
Only the methodologies of the classical phenomenologists as they relate to
the formation of'categories of religion' in general and 'myth' in particular are
considered. My selection is influenced not only by their diverse approaches to the
formation of religious categories but also their similar subjective, predisposition
towards Christianity as the 'essence of religion'. Kristensen and van der Leeuw
appear more predisposed to their Christian beliefs than Eliade, although he hints at
the superiority ofChristianity. I should stress that the phenomenological
methodologies of the early pioneers are equally important to my research.
It seems inevitable that a relationship existed between Eliade, van der Leeuw
and Kristensen; just as Kristensen was of some influence to van der Leeuw, he in
turn was inspirational to Eliade.23 Eliade is selected because he appears to hold 'a
22
Flood, Phenomenology, 63. For an overview of various interpretations of the term 'religion', see
Jonathon Z Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious', in Critical Terms for Religions Studies, 269-284;
For a well-argued difference between 'national' and 'universal' religions, and universal religion and
world religions, see Masuzawa, WorldReligions, 107-120. For the term 'tradition' to supersede the
concept of 'religion', see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning andEndofReligion, (London:
SPCK, 1978).
23 See James, Interpreting Religion, 4. 'The influence of Kristensen can be seen in the phenomenology
of van der Leeuw'. Also Ivan Strenski, Four Theories ofMyth in Twentieth Century History,
(Basingstoke: Macmillan,1987), 116-117 and his comment: 'Eliade's specific debt to van der Leeuw
is hard to estimate'.
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position of unparalleled eminence in the field'24 particularly when he broadens the
system to incorporate an East-West understanding of'religion'. Consequently,
compared to either Kristensen or van der Leeuw, Eliade indicates a more profound
awareness of the phenomenological issues.
James described Kristensen as 'one of the most influential early exponents of
9 S
a phenomenology of religion'; his name is synonymous with the phenomenological
method. Further his grouping together of similar religious data appears to be the
catalyst towards studying the formation and subsequent acceptance of the term
'categories of religion' in Religious Studies departments. Both van der Leeuw and
Kristensen are considered 'foundational' phenomenologists,26 because they represent
'the unity and diversity of the conceptual understanding of the term phenomenology
27of religion'. Van der Leeuw's innovative method places him in the position of 'a
98
pioneering phenomenologist of religion'. There is little doubt that van der Leeuw
comes under the influence of his teacher, Kristensen, although not exclusively so.29
On the one hand, Kristensen appears as the catalyst for van der Leeuw's initial
approach to phenomenology, although he disagrees with some aspects of van der
Leeuw's adoption of various psychological techniques.
It is important to mention that C.P.Tiele, Friedrich Max Muller, and P.D.
Chantepie de la Saussaye are the first phenomenologists of religion who introduce a
TO
descriptive system of classification. While these early fathers of phenomenology
24 Guildford Dudley, 'Mircea Eliade as the "Anti-Historian" of Religions', 346, JAAR, 44, 1976:345-
359.
25
James, preface to Interpreting Religion, xii. See Sharpe, Comparative, 229, and his comment that
Kristensen is 'rightly considered to be the doyen of the phenomenologists'.
26
James, InterpretingReligion, 3. The term 'foundational' is used by James to refer to
phenomenologists of religion who can be regarded as foundational and therefore representative of




Jacques Waardenburg, Classical Approaches to the Study ofReligion, (New York: W. de Gruyter,
1999), 398.
29 C. J. Bleeker was also a student ofKristensen. Because of his important contribution, not only to his
different approach to phenomenology but also to his works on Egyptian rituals, festival and deities, I
refer to his contribution, where appropriate, within this thesis.
30 See James, Interpreting Religion, 4. He commented that Chantepie 'can be seen more clearly in the
works of both Kristensen and van der Leeuw'. This, he argues, justifies his inclusion in his
comparative phenomenological study alongside Kristensen and van der Leeuw. See also Strenski,
Four Theories, 111. He argues that Muller was the father figure and identifies C P. Tiele and P. D.
Chantepie de la Saussaye as the first phenomenologist of religion.
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may be the catalyst, Cox describes Kristensen as occupying 'a strategic position
between Tiele's and Chantepie's theologically slanted views of comparative
31
religions'. Kristensen offers an empirical and analytical study of religious data; he
ascribes the autonomy of the data not only to the phenomenon itself, but also to the
verification of the adherents. Here is a concept of some weight, one which I pursue
quite vigorously throughout my thesis. Finally my choice of the three
phenomenologists is influenced by their interest in ancient Egypt: van der Leeuw
studied ancient Egyptian religion under eminent Egyptologists, AdolfErman and
Kurt Sethe; Kristensen studied various classical languages including ancient
Egyptian in the Faculty ofTheology at the University of Oslo; he received his PhD in
Oslo in 1896 with a dissertation on Egyptian representations of life and death. Eliade
has a similar interest in ancient Egypt as his writings on the subject attest.32
2.5 William Brede Kristensen (1867-1953)
Born in Kristiansand, Norway, Kristensen is known principally as a scholar in
the religions and languages of the Ancient Near East, with specific interest in the
historical religions ofEgypt, Mesopotamia and Greece among others. He became a
Dutch citizen in 1917, and held the Chair of the History and Phenomenology of
Religion in Leiden University for 36 years.
2.5.1 Kristensen: 'Categories of Religion'
The discipline of the History ofReligion originally compared religions in order
to determine their religious value; the aim was to examine the primary documents of
ancient religions for an overall view. In this comparative process the degree of each
religion's value and development was classified as higher or lower; the purpose of
33
this type of classification was to demonstrate "the superiority ofChristianity'.'
Kristensen dismisses this type of comparison which was neither systematic nor
31
Cox, Phenomenology ofReligion, 108.
32
Background information on the three classical scholars, W. Brede Kristensen, Gerardus van der
Leeuw and Mircea Eliade is sourced from Cox, Phenomenology ofReligion; Jacques Waardenbarg.
'Religion between Reality and Idea', Numen, 19, 1972, 128-203; Waardenburg, Classical
Approaches; Hendrik Kraemer's Introduction to Kristensen's Meaning ofReligion; Mircea Eliade,
Encyclopaedia ofReligion, (New York, N.Y.; Macmillan, 1987).
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Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 3. See also Sharpe, Comparative, 229,n.l7 in which he quotes
Kraemer's comment that 'while comparative religion had graded religions on an ascending
evolutionary scale, this technique had now been shown to be wrong'.
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comparative. Rather than comparing religions, Kristensen groups the myriad of
divergent religious data into similarities for comparison. His innovative approach to
phenomenology resulted in the merging of the systematic History ofReligion with
applied Philosophy ofReligion.34
Because of the 'limited validity' of historical research, Kristensen suggests that
the scholar extracts from their historical setting 'the similar facts and phenomena,
•3 c
brings them together and studies them in groups'. Thus in order to come to an
understanding about texts, the scholar removes texts from their historical time
sequence. According to Kristensen, the historian looks at history objectively and only
approximate knowledge of the religious phenomena is achieved. On the other hand,
the believer experiences his faith subjectively; he has an intimate knowledge of it.
Kristensen suggests that the historian should not only adopt an ahistorical but also a
subjective approach to religious phenomena. He believes that to understand religious
data a certain amount of intuition or empathy is indispensable. Only then may a
subjective-objective interrelationship emerge between the 'feeling' of the believer
and 'factual knowledge' of the historian.36
Kristensen explains that only after the scholar extracts the religious data from
their historical setting are the similar phenomena grouped then studied together. The
grouping procedure is not by the greater or lesser religious value of religions, rather
the religious data is grouped into categories. The grouping method separates data
into groups that are 'nearly identical' and share a common religious meaning. The
advantage of placing similarities into groups, Kristensen suggests, allows for a better
understanding of the universal religious category as a whole. 'They shed light upon
one another and lead to a deeper insight into the essence [of religion] of the whole
34
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 9. See also Sharpe, Comparative, 222-223. 'The actual term
"phenomenology of religion" was coined by the Dutch scholar P. D. de la Saussaye and was meant to
be no more than a systematic counterpart of the history of religion. He brings together "groups of
religious phenomena" - the object ofworship, idolatry, sacred stones, trees and animals, nature-
worship, the worship ofmen, the gods, magic and divination, sacrifice and prayer, holy places, times
and persons, the community, scriptures, doctrines, mythology, dogmas and philosophies, ethics and
art'. Sharpe concluded with an important point, that it was meant to be no more than a cross-cultural
comparison of the element of religious belief and practice rather than the comparison in cultural
isolation and chronological sequence. Sharpe suggests that this type of phenomenology is better
described as 'descriptive phenomenology'
35 Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 12.
36
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 10.
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group of similar phenomena'.37 Comparison therefore is between the differentforms
of religious phenomena rather than religions as a whole; Kristensen separates the
religious phenomena from the different religions then classifies them into abstract
ahistorical categories ofdifferent 'types'. Given that the categories are
generalisations suggests a lack of definition and identity.
According to Kristensen, in the study of religion the historian is unable to
'fully understand' the religious data. Similarly, when using the philosophical concept
empathy, approximate knowledge only may be achieved. Likewise, the existential
nature of the believer's faith is elusive; it cannot be defined. Equally, Kristensen
believes that a 'rational' systematic study of religion is impossible. In the end, he
concludes with more uncertainty: 'Indubitable certitude or clarity cannot be obtained
and, indeed, can never be reached when we are seeking understanding, but we can
come to the greatest attainable probability'.38 Consequently, only the believer or the
community of believers have the credentials to validate the religious phenomena
described by the phenomenologist-historian. Kristensen's succinct words are often
quoted: 'Every believer looks upon his own religion as a unique, autonomous and
absolute reality. It is of absolute value and thus incomparable'.39
To find the philosophical, religious 'essence' of the phenomena is for
Kristensen of greater importance than the empirical grouping of the religious data
into common themes.40 For example, the general category 'sacrifice' may be
designated as a category of religion because it contains not only a measure of the
'essence' of religion, but also that the ritual 'sacrifice' is present in most religions.
He groups together the different forms of the category 'sacrifice' for comparison
with similar categories from other religions. He offers another general category, the
typology of'kingship'. Thus Kristensen classifies religious data according to certain
patterns of similarity, what 'sacrifice' or 'kingship' is itself, a 'separate historical
datum'.41 However, his premise is first to identify the religious 'essence' of the
17
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 143.
38
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 6.
39
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 6.
40
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 280.
41
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 2-3.
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myriad of data if only for their acceptance or rejection within the grouping
procedure.
Kristensen's general similarities may serve to illustrate the problem of
confining universal types within a religion-centred category. Equally, some scmtiny
is required of the common element of similarity, the religious nature of the 'essence'
of religion which classifies the phenomena in the first place. Finally, Kristensen
proposes that only a general understanding of the data grouped into similarities is
possible. Does a general understanding suppose comprehension of the beliefs of the
adherent?
2.5.2 Identification of the Issues
A specific example presented by Kristensen of a category of religion that is
'nearly identical' and shares a 'common meaning' is the Greek and Roman concept
of'kingship', a notion Kristensen suggests is to us, strange and "primitive". Because
of the paucity of literary material on Greek and Roman kingship, Kristensen justifies
classifying similar religious data into ahistorical groups. For a general comparison to
be made to the category 'kingship', he suggests that the religious significance of
Egyptian kingship 'enables us to understand the sacredness of kingship among the
Greeks and Romans'. In other words, Egyptian kingship sheds light upon Greek and
Roman kingship. The result is 'a deeper insight into the essence [of religion] of the
whole group'. Two issues are identified. The proposed 'nearly identical' nature of
the Egyptian concept of kingship to that of the Greeks or Romans carries the
implication that the degree of similarity is greater than its difference. Further, in the
phenomenological model, the identity of Egyptian kingship is constrained within the
parameters of today's concept of'religion'.
The form and character ofEgyptian kingship signifies not only the historical,
political, social and economic stability of ancient Egypt but also that the office of
kingship symbolises the central institution of the Egyptian state.42 'Religion' or the
42 On Egyptian kingship, see Allen, Middle Egyptian and sections: Ancient Egyptian Society, 31-33;
The King's Names, 64-66. Also Henri Frankfort et al., The Intellectual Adventure ofAncientMan,
(Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1977. 1st publ. 1946), 71-81. On the ideology of divine
kingship in connection with the political, social and economic stability of ancient Egypt, see Barry
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 20-27.
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more appropriate term 'theocracy'43 appears as an integral part of the institutional
state of ancient Egypt. The latter is dynamic rather than static; it demonstrates
supernatural as well as human historical changes. Consequently, to isolate data from
Egypt's historical past may distort the meaning intended by the ancient Egyptians.
Equally, to impose a meaning on their data not intended by the Egyptians may be a
further misrepresentation. The implication is that the particular, socio-political
aspects and other attributes of Egyptian divine kingship, as Kristensen comments, is
inappropriately identified with that of the Greeks and Romans.44 General similarities
of'nearly identical' phenomena may provide a 'broad-spectrum' understanding of,
for example, the category of divine kingship. It fails however to consider the
importance of socio-cultural or 'religious' differences inherent in most ancient
civilisations.
John Baines offers a similar comparison between ancient Egypt with the world
of the Hebrew Bible. Although situated close to each other in the Ancient Near East,
Baines finds little comparison between forms of kingship in both societies.43 Equally,
Henri Frankfort in his book Kingship and the Gods, a classic in the field of oriental
studies, compares kingship between Egypt and Mesopotamia. He acknowledges the
4:11 use the term 'theocracy' in the sense that the institution and the stability of the state ofEgypt
constitutes rule by the divine office of kingship whose law was absolute. The role of the divine king of
Egypt and his reciprocal relationship with the deities ofEgypt, form a key element in my thesis.
44
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 5. Kristensen refers to the paucity of information on Greek or
Roman 'divine' kings because of their vague or meagre literary materials. But he asserts the divine
qualities of the Egyptian king are not in doubt. For aspects ofEgyptian divine kingship see Frankfort,
IntellectualAdventure, 17. In the Introduction, H. and H.A. Frankfort interpret the throne, symbolised
as the goddess Isis, as charged with the power of kingship. The king becomes king only after sitting
on the throne. This male/female binary motif has no parallel in the Greek or Roman concept of divine
kingship; it is peculiar to ancient Egypt. See also W. Brede Kristensen, Life out ofDeath: Studies in
the Religions ofEgypt and ofAncient Greece, (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1992); Newly translated by H.
J. Franken & G. R. H. Wright from the second Dutch Edition, Haarlem 1949. Kristensen compares,
with broad strokes, certain aspects of the Egyptian 'religion' with that of the Greeks. Other references
and literature relating to Egyptian divine kingship is referred to throughout this thesis.
45 John Baines, 'Ancient Egyptian Kingship', 16, in King andMessiah in Israel and the Ancient Near
East, ed., John Day, (Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 16-53. For a comparison between Egyptian
and Mesopotamian kingship see the chapters in Frankfort, Kingship. Chapter 15; The Historical Forms
ofKingship in Mesopotamia, 215-230; Chapter 17: The Making of a King, 231-248. The secular term
lugal, 'king', means 'great man', the creation of the office of kingship and the source of his power lay
originally in his 'election' by the assembly of elders of the community. 'When peril threatened, the
assembly elected a king to whom it delegated its power', 218. Later, Mesopotamian kingship lost its
temporary nature, kings ruled on a 'renewable' mandate from the gods. In contrast with the divine
nature ofEgyptian kingship, 'a god was king at all times'; the king of Mesopotamia was 'not
essentially different from men', 225. See also Thorkild Jacobson, 'Primitive Democracy in Ancient
Mesopotamia', JNES, 2, 1943:159-172.
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similarity of kingship in both cultures as a social institution, yet he points to distinct
differences. In the traditional Mesopotamian royal titulary 'every trace of deification
is absent'; no reference is made to any distinction between the nature of kings and
other men.46 One of the five titles of the Egyptian titulary, the title of'Horus' given
to the king at his coronation, signifies that the divine king is the manifestation of the
god, Horus who is 'perpetually reincarnated in successive Pharaohs'.4' I understand
Frankfort's use of the term 'reincarnate' to mean the perpetual re-birth of each
reigning king in the ka of kingship, rather than the meaning of'reincarnation' in a
Christian sense.48
A similar issue relates to the philosophical principles of phenomenology,
epoche and empathy. Kristensen believes that the phenomenological principle of
empathy was 'to relive in his own experience that which is "alien".491 understand his
comment to mean that his experience as a human being may identify with the human
being whose religious beliefs are foreign to him. Alternatively, the empathic
relationship may understand and identify a mutual 'religious' experience.
Nonetheless, his later comment on the symbol of divine kingship seems at variance
with the principle of empathy: 'For us they are only "symbols" because their sacred
nature is as impossible for us to conceive as is the Ancient significance of
kingship'.50 Similarly, the key concept of the religious nature of the formation of
the universal categories of religion is the premise that 'we use our own religious
experience in order to understand the experience of others'. This is not to say that the
concept of a universal 'religiousness' is improbable, rather that Kristensen appears to





Frankfort, Kingship, 231. See also Allen, Middle Egyptian, 31-33.
48 The concept of the ka of kingship is discussed in detail in chapters three, four and six.
49
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 7.
50 Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 409.
51 See Sharpe, Comparative, 23 5 .For Sharpe, the phenomenologist of religion 'establishes types,
patterns, morphologies - all with a view to penetrating the "essence" of religion'. Fie questions
whether scholars can be free of presuppositions: 'Presuppositions are writ large across the whole
phenomenological enterprise'. See also Flood, Phenomenology, 6. He is concerned about the teaching
ofworld religions that assume 'the nature of religion as having a common essence variously
manifest'. For a detailed reference to the 'essence' of religion see Baird, Category Formation, 11-14.
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The issue of the definition of the 'essence' of religion continues with
Kristensen's methodology, his two-type evolutionary theory. Given his dismissal of
the comparative method of the History ofReligion to grade different religions into a
lower or higher scale, Kristensen proposes the superiority ofChristianity. 'In religion
as well as the rest of our culture we stand on the apex of the historical pyramid'.32 As
I understand the issue, the tension results from a subjective identity with the
'essence' of religion. Kristensen associates philosophically the 'religious' values of
the historical type handed down to succeeding generations, as the 'essence of
religion'. In grouping together categories of similarities, the scholar, he argues, must
separate the 'essentially religious' from the systemised, historical data but he 'must
have a feeling for religion' in order to identify the essential 'essence' of religion. His
priority is towards the religious nature of the data rather than its historical
connection. In the search for the 'religious essence', Kristensen reveals the influence
of his Christian theology on the formation of'the essence of religion': 'The essence
- the divine will - remains impenetrable, for no man penetrates the council of God'.
Kristensen demonstrates the issue further; he offers his view on Egyptian
'religion'. The task of philosophers, he suggests, is to 'investigate what religious
value the believers (Greeks, Babylonians, Egyptians, etc.) attached to their faith'.
Following his premise of validation by the adherents of their beliefs, he stresses that
he is interested in what religion meant for them, the adherents. 'It is their religion
that we want to understand, and not our own and we are therefore not concerned here
with the essence of religion, for this is necessarily expressed for us in our own
religion'.34 Kristensen seems to imply the absence of the 'essence' of religion, that
the religious aspect of the Greeks, Babylonians and Egyptians may be incomparable
because they lack identity with 'our own religion [Christianity]'.
Although Kristensen insists that he seeks to understand the religion of the
adherents,'their religion', he appears 'not concerned' with understanding the
adherent's 'essence of religion'. He assumes that the 'essence of religion', which he
52
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 11-12. See also his evolutionary theory when the primitive forms
are seen as 'undeveloped reality' which 'comes to light in full clarity in the highest civilisations and
the highest religions'. This seems a contradiction to his earlier remarks ofnot wishing to grade
religions within a higher/lower scale.
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identifies with 'our religion', that is Christianity, is the same 'essence' with which he
identifies the 'religion' of the 'Greeks, Babylonians, Egyptians, and others'. Whether
or not the term 'religion' is inappropriate to the theocratic state of ancient Egypt,
Kristensen appears to imply that the universal common element of similarity is the
'essence' ofChristianity. Given Kristensen's insistence that, 'Every believer looks
upon his own religion as a unique, autonomous and absolute reality',3" it is doubtful
whether the dogmas and rituals ofChristianity are the same as the rituals and beliefs
of the ancient Egyptians. There are clear socio-cultural differences.
In the end, given Kristensen's insistence that there is no other religious reality
other than the faith of the believer, there is an absence of any textual validation from
the adherents, the ancient Greeks, Babylonians or Egyptians. While the scholar, in
forming categories, groups the religious data into common themes to find their
c/r en
'essence', then looks to the adherents to validate the religious values, the latter
may prove difficult when seeking affirmation from ancient civilisations. Nonetheless,
ancient Egyptian texts and iconography may provide significant understanding and
CO
validation of the authorial intent of the ancient Egyptians. I discuss this aspect later
in subsequent chapters.
Finally, the deciding factor of Kristensen's philosophical, systematic
comparison of religious categories is revealed as, the Spirit: 'We believe we work
objectively and scientifically, but the fruitful labour, without any doubt, takes place
by the illumination of the Spirit who extends above and beyond our spirit. Let us
simply call it intuition - then at least no one will contradict us!'59 He argues that
ultimate understanding ofalien religious data is attained only through the
enlightenment of the Holy Spirit of the Trinity. Kristensen implies that understanding
55
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 6. See also Sharpe, Comparative, 229, and his comment that the
believer is always right - even though the believer may sometimes 'have been disastrously wrong'.
See also the Islamic view in Mujiburrahman, 'The Phenomenological Approach in Islamic Studies',
428, 440, The Muslim World, 91, 2001:425-449. Rather than the believer's validation the recognised
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56
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 280.
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Parliament ofReligions, when the subjective element was considered important, 'to let the adherents
of each religion speak for themselves'. See also Flood, Phenomenology, 104-108, and his comments
on the problem of subjectivity, Husserl, and empathy.
58 See chapters five and six when I use the texts of ancient Egypt as their authorial intent.
59 Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 10.
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ancient Egyptian beliefs, that is alien 'religious' data, may be revealed to him
through the Holy Spirit of the Christian God. That he describes the latter as
'intuition' implies that Kristensen may be aware of an adverse response to his
imposition of the Christian Spirit as the final arbitrator in the classification of a
religious category. 60 James encapsulates the problem:
While we cannot but be impressed with the genuine spirit of
Kristensen's surrender to others and with the depth of meaning he
finds in phenomena which for him and for others were hitherto
opaque, it remains a question whether the meanings which these
phenomena now acquire are the most probable meaning of the
phenomena for the adherents, or whether given his own religious
commitments, they are simply the meaning most intellectually
satisfying to Kristensen himself. 1
In the final analysis, the phenomenological principles of empathy and epoche
appear elusive to Kristensen, given that his proposed 'essence' of religion, the
common motifof classifying similarities into groups of universal categories, carries a
Christian bias. Nonetheless, although many scholars have identified this key issue,
my point is that to identify the 'essence' of religion with the religion ofChristianity
is to challenge the phenomenological principles of category formation. It may be
necessary therefore for students to apply a more rigorous approach to the
phenomenological principles of empathy and epoche, discussed later in the
phenomenological method of van der Leeuw.
Similarly, Kristensen's concept of the autonomy ofboth the empirical data
and the adherents are key phenomenological principles of some significance. The
next section seeks to identify any influences Kristensen imposes on his classification
of the term 'myth', given his subjective approach to the formation of categories of
religion.
2.5.3 Myth: Category of Religion
When 'myth' is classified as a 'category of religion' under the same rubric as
Kristensen's category formation, the inherent assumption is that the 'essence' of
60 See James, Interpreting Religion, 216. 'Kristensen makes the point that the research of the
phenomenology of religion is guided by a spirit that transcends us To avoid a discussion of this
subject he calls it intuition'. See also van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 595. 'God reveals Himself
as Absolute Spirit'.
61
James, Interpreting Religion, 196. Similarly, James suggests the meaning of the category 'prayer' is
that which Kristensen believes 'it ought to have had'.
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religion which classifies the category 'myth' is derived from the dogmas of
Christianity. He refers generally to religious myths and origin myths and compares
them to the Genesis account of the Creation ofAdam: 'Most of the religions which
we know contain theories and doctrines in mythological form concerning the origin
of the human race or the creation of the first man'.62 He classifies 'myth' as a
'religious' category with different types of creation myths, origin myths, light myths
and eschatological myths. His empathic view on myth reflects considerable insight:
'The religious myth is always an attempt to express the inexpressible and make it
transparent'. Conversely, he continues: 'What we understand by the concept
"religious myth" - a story with another and deeper sense than is immediately evident
from the story - simply does not exist for the believer'.6' Kristensen explains that 'to
an outsider, Christianity also has many myths' referring to the Virgin Mary, the
Crucifixion and the Ascension. He concludes:
For the believer this is not a myth, but the adequate formulation of
divine reality. So much of what is written about "mythical thinking" is
based on a deficient insight into the meaning of "myth" for the
believer.64
Accordingly, a believer, from a subjective position as the insider, denies the
existence of the concept of'myth' as a category of their religion that their sacred
texts relate to supernatural beings, creations of a believer's reality. Conversely,
Kristensen designates the sacred texts of an 'other' religion as 'myths' with no basis
in reality. In short, he appears to apply a bi-polar, true-false dichotomy to the term
'myth'. On the one hand, he advocates a subjective insider description of the 'truth'
value; my 'sacred story' is true. On the other hand, he suggests an outsider, objective
view that the sacred texts of adherents of an 'other' or 'alien' belief system are
'false'; 'your sacred story is 'myth', it is false'. James explains: 'Kristensen would
apparently consider a demythologized form ofChristianity illegitimate',63 not
because 'myth', as he interprets it, would be unacceptable to a Christian. Rather,
Kristensen reasons that no believer would consider his or her sacred narratives as
62
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 189.
63
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 70.
64
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 406.
65 See James, Interpreting Religion, 188,n,28.
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'myth'.66 Kristensen, therefore, reiterates the earlier negation of the term 'myth' and
appears to invalidate the taxonomy 'myth' as a universal category.
Finally, Kristensen exemplifies further the issue of comparing universal
categories that are 'nearly identical'; he gives a specific example in the 'religious'
category ofwater. In his comparative analysis, he distinguishes between the
regenerative power ofOsiris and the Nile inundation with the Christian concept of
the 'living water' ofbaptism. The former he describes as the 'divine water' that
'purifies and divinizes' the person and concludes: 'This is the Ancient water
baptism'. He argues that the Christian Church teaches that through the Holy Spirit
the baptismal water creates new life.67 Nevertheless, to the minds of the Ancients,
continues Kristensen, no Spirit was necessary since the water itself not only
performed the miracle, it was also conceived as a living being, as a god, that is, the
Egyptian god Osiris. He concludes: 'What they [the Ancients] beheld as the reality of
water is no longer a reality for us, because we think and perceive in the enlightened
ro
Greek way, not in the Ancient way'.
Although the so-called 'fertility' symbol ofOsiris and the Nile inundation
motif creates new life in the regeneration of the land, any corollary with the Christian
ritual of baptism and the 'forgiveness of sin' is absent in ancient Egyptian culture.
Similarly, the inundation of the Nile fails to either 'purify' or 'divinize' the person in
the Christian sense; its focus is to impregnate the land for new growth.69 Thus while
there is slight similarity in the substance of the category water, the socio-cultural
differences deny any comparison of substance.
In summary, James suggests that if there is tension between Kristensen's dual
role as a phenomenologist and a theologian, then 'it is hard to understand how
Kristensen can justify such extensive use of his own theological understanding in the
66 Cf. see 69 below and Kristensen's comment: 'It is impossible for us to believe this'. Chapter four
explores in detail the dichotomy of the believer and non-believer, true-false nature of'myth'.
67 The Spirit in question is the Spirit of the Holy Trinity of Christianity, referred to earlier.
68
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 408-409. Kristensen continued: 'Ifwe really believed it in all
seriousness the way the Ancients did, we too should have to worship water as a divine being, for of
course it is only God who creates. It is impossible for us to believe this'. For a detailed account of
Osiris, see J. Gwyn Griffiths, The Origins ofOsiris and his Cult, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980).
69 See Frankfort, Kingship, 190-212, and the multifarious forms ofOsiris as the son of Geb and Nut,
the grain, the Nile, Orion, the moon, Lord ofthe West. See especially, 190-195.
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70
interpretation of the religion of others'. Because Kristensen believes that the term
'religion' is not only a universal concept but is also sui generis, he assumes his own
religious experience will provide him with the closest understanding of the
phenomenon under scrutiny. Consequently, when Kristensen comments that 'the
reality in the myth is no longer a reality for us',71 he appears to understand what is
alien only when deciphered through the lens of Christianity. Kristensen's main
criterion, that the phenomenologist should seek the testimony of the believer for final
affirmation, seems to have failed the practical test. Kristensen appears unable to
bracket his own Christian subjectivity. If phenomenologists of religion impose their
beliefs on the believers of other cultures or 'religions', then the fundamental
principles of phenomenology appear in jeopardy.
Kristensen implies that the so-called 'myths' or narratives of ancient Egypt
must contain that vital 'essence of religion', an essential requirement for the
formation of all 'categories of religion'. Equally, that the 'essence' of religion, the
common element of similarity, is identified with the religion ofChristianity. If, as
Kristensen believes, his own religious experience in a Christian sense is the essence
of commonality, then the deciding factor in all 'religions', whether or not their data
is elected as a religious category, is Christianity. IfEgyptian culture is accepted by
Kristensen within the parameters of'religion', then the implication is that the
'religiousness' of the ancient Egyptians was identical to the 'religiousness' of
Christianity.
Other factors of dissent I suggest are Kristensen's ahistorical comparative
approach to categories and his theories of generalisations whether or not his
methodology ultimately provides the ontologically real understanding of'other'
religions. Did his student, van der Leeuw offer a more positive approach to the
formation of categories of religion and in particular the classification of'myth' as a
typology of religion? How did van der Leeuw determine the criterion for a 'religious
typology'? What was his justification, if any, for classifying 'myth' as a 'religious
category'?
70
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2.6 Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950)
Van der Leeuw studied theology at the University of Leidon achieving his
Th.D degree in 1916 under the tutelage of his teacher Kristensen. He was not only
appointed to the new chair of the History ofReligions in the Faculty of Theology at
the University ofGroningen, he also became a minister in the Dutch Reformed
Church in 1918. The theological problems of the first half of the twentieth century
resulted in the secularization ofDutch society and the theological crisis in Dutch
Protestantism. Van der Leeuw identified himselfwith 'ethical theology' and to
reform generally in the Church.72
2.6.1 Van der Leeuw: 'Ideal Types'
Van der Leeuw's approach to the study of religion was similar to that of his
mentor, Kristensen; rather than to explain religions his aim was to understand
religious phenomena. Equally, the aim of both phenomenologists was to group
common elements of similarities into typologies. However van der Leeuw differs
from Kristensen in his search for similarities; Kristensen aims to generalise the
religious phenomena whereas van der Leeuw seeks the meaning of the phenomena as
it 'appears' to him.
Rather than first grouping together similar forms of religious data, van der
Leeuw aspires first to the meaning of religious phenomena, the thing in itself, 'what
appears', or what is manifest to him.77 Only then does he classify the data into
different types. With this purpose in mind, van der Leeuw's phrase seems to clarify
his human-centred search for comprehension: 'the understanding of a connection, or
of a person, or event, dawns on us\74 The 'dawning' process results from a
psychological technique of re-experiencing religious meanings using empathy; van
der Leeuw seeks to contemplate the religious 'essence' of the phenomenon rather
nc
than to comprehend its factual existence. For van der Leeuw therefore a profound
72 See Jacques Waardenburg, 'Religion between Reality', 161-162, 161,n.89, 183,n.132.
71
See James, Interpreting Religion, 209.
74 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 673. See also Waardenburg, 'Religion between Reality', 161.
75
Waardenburg, ClassicalApproaches, 401. Van der Leeuw's concept of empathy is defined as
'transposing oneself into the object, or re-experiencing it'.
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subjective-objective interrelationship exists between the research object and the
researcher.76
His methodology appears to emphasise a positive tension in his
subjective/objective approach in the formation of typologies of religion. Following
Kristensen, he proposes that the object under scrutiny is incomprehensible from the
outside by the objective processing of data. Rather than using traditional empirical
methods of quantifying, enumerating or measuring methods, van der Leeuw argues
77
that religious data is understood first, subjectively, only from the inside.
Accordingly, van der Leeuw, like Kristensen, seeks to endorse an intuitive analysis
78of the religious data. Kristensen agrees that a 'rational and systematic study of
religion is impossible', that 'a certain amount of intuition is indispensable'. He too
79
proposes an inter-relationship 'between feeling and factual knowledge.
As 1 understand van der Leeuw, he seeks to validate the meaning of the
religious data using intuition to understand the intentions of the adherent. Kristensen
offers a different method; rather than the data conveying the intentions of the
adherent, he refers to the adherents themselves to validate the religious data. Van der
Leeuw connects the religious phenomena, 'what appears' in his intuitive process, to
the primal past and historical present of the individual's experience, there is an
interrelationship between the phenomena itself, and to whom it 'appears'. In contrast,
Kristensen suggests an uncertain relationship between the 'Ancient', irrational type
and the 'Modern', rational type. Further, to classify the similar types of religious data
into typologies or categories, 'what appears' to van der Leeuw lacks reality; it is a
'mirror-image' of the religious data. Kristensen, on the other hand, classifies
empirical data into groups of general similarities; abstract forms of divine kingship,
sacrifice and water are some examples.
Van der Leeuw acknowledges that a subjective approach is the first step
towards understanding religious data; the connection is the natural affinity ofour
761 discuss this aspect of van der Leeuw's methodology in chapter five.
77 Kristensen stresses the importance of intuition, although its source is that of the 'Spirit'.
78
Waardenburg, Classical Approaches, 402. See also Flood, Phenomenology, 165. This phrase has
been mis-typed, I have assumed that the printers have omitted the 'not': 'analyses in an intuitive
manner,[not] in a rational manner'.
77
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 10.
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common identity as human beings. He differentiates rightly between comprehension
of the ancient past and the unattainable access to actual lived experience of the
Ancients. For van der Leeuw, comprehension is the result of a subjective-objective
interrelationship between 'meaning: my meaning, and its meaning'.80 Thus the core
of van der Leeuw's phenomenology is towards understanding rather than
explanation. The subjectivity of the scholar, he astutely argues, is an indispensable
datum since, to understand the object, its affect must be experienced by the
researcher.81
Barry Kemp, an archaeologist and Professor in Egyptology at the University
ofCambridge, concurs. His scientific understanding as an archaeologist, a human-
centred discipline, is the study of an ancient culture ofwhich personal validation by
the adherents is impossible. Instead, archaeological artefacts, temple and tomb
reliefs, as well as textual data, convey a semblance of understanding of the intent of
the ancient Egyptians. This human-centred approach to understanding the socio-
cultural beliefs of the ancient Egyptians will form the framework of chapter four.
Although his language is different, Kemp concludes with a subtle awareness of our
common bond as human beings to understand and share human experiences.
Following van der Leeuw, Kemp offers a subjective-objective interrelationship in
which the meaning of the archaeologist and the meaning of the artefacts combine in
profound comprehension. Kemp nullifies any inferior or superior comparison.
We all share, and have in the past shared, a common consciousness
and substratum of unconscious behaviour. We all face now, and have
faced in the past, the same basic experience...That is the crucial
message of biology, of the fact that we are all of the same species.
Progress has not made us into superior beings}2 (my emphasis).
80
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 673. See also James, Interpreting Religion, 204, and his
comment on the understanding of van der Leeuw: 'It is the essence of his life as lived. And it
constitutes, when consciously carried out, the central activity of phenomenology'. This aspect will be
discussed in chapter five.
81 See Waardenburg, 'Religion between Reality', 163-165. If understanding of religious data is the
premise of both van der Leeuw's and Kristensen's methodology, a subjective approach is
indispensable. The problem is, to what extent does the subjectivity of the scholar permeate the
religious data. If, as 1 discuss later in chapter three within a Greek context, the scholar holds profound
religious or cultural beliefs, then his subjectivity may bias his understanding of the data. I should
emphasise that this should not detract from the positive subjective-objective method which results in
understanding the insider view.
82
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 1-2.
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Thus, a subjective human-centred approach appears in contrast with Kristensen's
divisive approach of civilisation in which he compares the rational 'Modern type'
unfavourably to the inferior, irrational 'Ancient type'.8. The latter is similar to the
earlier comparative method of the history of religion rejected by Kristensen, that of
scaling religions as 'higher' or Tower', superior or inferior.
Consequently, van der Leeuw's proposal for a subjective-objective
interrelationship appears in agreement with the phenomenological principles of
epoche and empathy as tools to 'experience' what 'appears' to the researcher.
Equally, his comprehension of the religious phenomena is the premise towards
classifying empirical data into groups of similarities. Only then may the
phenomenologist or researcher describe the data with empathy; only then may the
adherent validate the objective description of their religious phenomena. Sharpe
describes van der Leeuw's profound awareness of the human propensity to compare
the ancient and the modern civilisations in a positive primitive-modern ratio:
'Primitivity', he maintains, [van der Leeuw] is to be found
everywhere; it is not a difference between two men, but a difference
within men, which is involved. Alongside the civilised qualities there
are the qualities of intuition and instinct, and between these two there
may be a deep discord. He suggests that in this discord it may well be
that the mind ofWestern man has taken a disastrous turn somewhere
along the road: that 'logical thought', so far from being a norm by
which all else is to be judged, may possibly itselfbe an aberration or a
deviation from intuitive values and standards.84
Notwithstanding van der Leeuw's awareness of the human propensity to
comprehend each other, it is important to scrutinise further his method of classifying
typologies or categories of religion into 'Ideal Types'.83 On the one hand, for van der
83 For a description of Kristensen's two types of'civilisation, the Ancient irrational and Modern
rational, see Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 18-20. See also James, Interpreting Religion, 176-177.
According to James, the Ancient and Modern types 'may not be the most persuasive feature of
Kristensen's thought' and comments: 'Kristensen's effort to distinguish the "Ancient" from the
"Modern" types of civilisation is among the most problematic of his ideas'. The latter he claims are
'the intellectual history of the West'. See also 177,n.4.
84
Sharpe, Comparative, 193-194. Sharpe connects van der Leeuw's concept of a universal
'primitivity' to Levy-Bruhl's 'primitive mentality', and comments that 'he is claiming one thing, and
achieving another: claiming to distinguish between levels of developing or evolving culture, and in
reality describing what appears to be a universal characteristic of the human mind at all times and in
all places'. See also Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 1-2, and his comment: 'Past and present, we are all -
readers of this text and ancient Egyptians alike - members of the same species, Homo sapiens,
equipped with a brain that physically has remained unchanged since our species emerged'.
85 The concept of the 'Ideal Type' of van der Leeuw is discussed in more detail in chapter five.
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Leeuw, 'religiousness' can only be found in the religious lives of persons and
communities; the 'religion of each individual is distinct'86 On the other hand, the
religious phenomenon, rather than the reality of the object itself, is a mirror-image, a
reflection of reality. The religious element, therefore, manifests itself to van der
Leeuw. This is his justification to classify general 'types' of analogous religious
phenomena into groups. What is manifest, 'whether it concerns a person, a historical
situation or a religion, is called a type, or an ideal type' ,87 His concept of the Ideal
connects not only to a template in which religious phenomena are measured but also
to the unworldly indefinable 'essence' of religion.
As I understand van der Leeuw the empirical object does not appear to him;
rather it is the 'essence' or the indefinable 'religious element' of the object that is
manifest to him. It is only at this stage that he identifies, then assigns 'names' to the
objects of religion: 'sacrifice', 'prayer', 'saviour', and 'myth'. Van der Leeuw
stresses that what is manifest to him is not the actual object but a reflection only of
the phenomenon, that is, its 'religious element'. Rather than to seek knowledge from
the empirical phenomena, van der Leeuw aims for reciprocal comprehension of that
'reflection', both the object and the subjective-objective. The final outcome is
reciprocal comprehension; recognition and identification of the religious 'essence' of
the phenomena.
For James, the process appears intuitive and elusive: 'We see it darkly, not
clearly. It is mediated, not direct'.88 Here is van der Leeuw's profound concept of
'universal primitivity', that form of knowing which, according to van der Leeuw, is
human-centred, and relates to the 'universal characteristic of the human mind'. Given
that Kristensen separates his rational 'Modern type' from the irrational 'Ancient
type' of civilisation,89 van der Leeuw identifies a unity within humanity as a whole.
86
James, Interpreting Religion, 243. See also further discussion by James.
87 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 673.
88
James, Interpreting Religion, 230-231. James is certain that the allusion is to the words of St. Paul,
'For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I
know even as also I am known' (I Cor. 13:12). What seems sublime is James' observation that it is not
a lens but a mirror reflection of one's own face. 'For van der Leeuw this is not the liability but the
profundity of the phenomenological study'. Yet there is a sense that van der Leeuw's religious beliefs
are part of that reflection.
89 See Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 18-20, for a detailed account of his two-type civilisation
model and his two-type Evolutionary theory.
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Accordingly, van der Leeuw's intuitive methodology emphasises his
subjective/objective approach in the formation of typologies. What 'appears' in the
process of reciprocal understanding is his own reflection, the mirror image of
humanity. For van der Leeuw, the image he sees is a reflection of his belief that
Christianity is embedded in the 'Being' of every 'created' human being. He explains
that it is through our understanding as human beings that we recognise and identity
the 'religiousness' of human beings. With this in mind, van der Leeuw's intuitive
process reveals an issue of some substance. For Kristensen, intuition was revealed by
the Spirit. For van der Leeuw intuition was an active, reciprocal, subjective-objective
experience, revealed by God.
2.6.2 Identification of the Issues
. Rather than the principle of epoche, van der Leeuw, like Kristensen,
identifies his Christians beliefs with the element of commonality, the 'essence of
religion'. Van der Leeuw's attitude towards comprehension of religious data is only
best understood from within the Christian tradition. He explains his concept of
'comprehension' from a philosophical stance:
[Ujltimately all comprehension is "becoming understood" then means
that [sic], ultimately, all love is "becoming loved"; that all human love
is only the response to the love that was bestowed upon us. "Herein is
love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us... we love him,
because he first loved us".90
Van der Leeuw follows Kristensen's belief that the concept of the 'essence' of
religion is synonymous with the religion ofChristianity. Comprehension of the
'essence' of the phenomena that is manifest to van der Leeuw is 'revealed' to him by
God. This is similar to the Spirit or 'intuition' discussed earlier as the source of
Kristensen's understanding of the 'essence' of religion.
Consequently, ancient civilisations in general and ancient Egyptians in
particular are unable to validate or identify the characteristics of the Christian God
with the diverse divine powers contained within their multiplicity of deities. It seems
inappropriate that van der Leeuw's unique classification of Ideal Types is described
in universal terms as typologies of'religion' if, like Kristensen, his final
90 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 684. The latter phrase is taken from I John iv. 10, 19. See also
comments by Sharpe, Comparative, 233.
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comprehension is attributed to Christian theology. In this context, the term
'religious' implies and appears interchangeable with the term 'Christian', which by
default is foreign to other 'religions'. Rather than leading to understanding of other
'religions', the Christian overlay distorts the reality of the adherents.
James observes that 'it is difficult to deny that van der Leeuw's treatment of
religion displays an ordering of types and structures that seem to find its fulfilment in
what appears to him in the Christian tradition. 91 Sharpe, too, is critical of van der
Leeuw's theological statement, 'claiming as it does to define an aspect of "God's
utterance"'. He adds that 'it is apparent from whole traces of van der Leeuw's
phenomenology that, although he may not be 'doing theology' in the narrower
dogmatic sense, his whole approach is basically theological (quite apart from his
treatment ofChristianity)'.92 Sharpe identifies also the term 'theology' with
Christianity, that for van der Leeuw, 'religion is neither more nor less than given'. He
summarises the five stages of van der Leeuw's phenomenological method and in a
footnote underscores the theological [Christian] stance of van der Leeuw: 'Once
more it must be stressed that to attempt to interpret van der Leeuw other than in
theological terms is ultimately a self-defeating procedure'.93
However, in defence of both Kristensen and van der Leeuw, James offers an
explanation. While he acknowledges that van der Leeuw views the study of religion
from a Christian perspective in that 'Christianity cannot but be regarded as the
central form of historical religions', he believes that van der Leeuw does not actually
declare the defacto superiority ofChristianity. Given that he begins from his own
Christian religious experience, whilst using restraint to achieve the understanding he
seeks, van der Leeuw argues that the phenomenology of religion could also be set out
by another person from another standpoint. In this phenomenology of religion he
concludes, the other religion's position would emerge as the crown of the history of
religion.94 The dilemma is that van der Leeuw seeks an ahistorical comprehension of
the religious phenomena in 'what appears' to him, the religion of the scholar as the
91




Sharpe, Comparative, 234. See also Strenski, Four Theories, 116-117. 1 will discuss van der
Leeuw's phenomenological model in detail in Chapter five from a different perspective.
94 See James, Interpreting Religion, 238-239.
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crown ofhistory is not an issue. Rather it is that the religion of the scholar is the
crown of religion. Van der Leeuw continues in his own defence:
It would therefore be quite possible, in itself, for a Buddhist to set out
the phenomenology of religion, with his own as a starting point; and
then he would naturally discover the culmination of religion in
Buddhism. Whether he would be "right" in so doing is, however, not a
matter for phenomenology itself to decide, but for theology or
metaphysics. But he would be unable to proceed in any other way.93
Following Kristensen, Van der Leeuw and James appear to suggest that the
core phenomenological principles of empathy and epoche are probabilities only, that
to bracket fully our own religion or beliefs in order to understand an 'other' religion
may be attainable only in some measure or degree. Kristensen elucidates the issue
mentioned earlier; 'Indubitable certitude or clarity cannot be obtained and, indeed,
can never be reached when we are seeking understanding, but we can come to the
greatest attainable probability'.96
In the end, while van der Leeuw's model appears to offer a theoretical
framework of the fundamental phenomenological principles, epoche and empathy,
like Kristensen he appears unable to bracket fully his own beliefs. In his desire to
comprehend religious phenomena, van der Leeuw's claim that 'we understand
ourselves in God', seems to be the definitive affirmation of his Christian theology.
The question is whether the issue is perpetuated given that van der Leeuw includes
the category 'myth' as an Ideal Type of religion, the essence ofwhich has been
established as that ofChristianity. He described his systematic approach with a
Christian slant: 'Man first names his experiences according to their type, exactly as
Adam named the animals'.97
2.6.3 Myth: 'Ideal Type' of Religion
go
Van der Leeuw begins his five-page chapter on 'myth' with a quotation
from Jane Harrison that 'myth is nothing other than the word itself.
95 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 646. This chapter is called, 'The Religion of Love', most of
which centres around Christianity.
96
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 6.
97
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 148.
98 See van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 413-417.
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For it is neither speculation nor poem, neither a primitive explanation
of the world nor a philosophy in embryo, although it also may be, and
indeed frequently is, all of these. It is a spoken word, possessing
decisive power in its repetition; just as the essential nature of sacred
action consists in its being repeated, so the essence of myth lies in its
being told, in being repeatedly spoken anew."
Although there seems little substance on the subject of myth in van der
Leeuw's chapter on 'Myth', the comments by Harrison are not fully indicative of van
der Leeuw's analysis of myth expressed in his later chapters. Initially, he specifies
myth as an 'Ideal Type'. He includes in this typology: saga, legend, and fairy tales
and differentiates between these different types.100 Myth, he agrees, is none other
than the word itself, and adds, it is also a 'verbal celebration': it has power in its
repetition and timelessness, yet it is the actuality of the event.101 Describing saga, his
second type ofmyth, he comments that myth forms part of the saga. Myth, 'the motif
of the saga', he argues, is 'eternally present'. It attaches itself to the saga; it is always
historical, and refers 'wholly to the past'.102 His third type is the timelessness of the
fairy tale; their figures have neither history nor names. The importance of their exact
repetition is also a factor in their inclusion as a type of myth. The religious element
he sees in fairy tales is present also in his short comment on legend: its mythical and
saga-like content 'approaches pious contemplation'.103 In his chapter on 'myth', van
der Leeuw appears to agree with the traditional definitions of the term myth, the
eternal timelessness of a sacred story and the power of each repetition.104 However,
there is an absence in this chapter of any reference to the defining 'essence' of
religion which identifies each Ideal Type as typology of religion.
99 The previous sentence begins van der Leeuw's chapter on Myth and forms part of the quotation
from Jane Harrison, Themis, A Study ofthe Social Origins of the Greek Religion, (Cambridge:
University Press, 1912), 328. Quoted in van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 413,n.l.
100 For the speculative thought of myth see Frankfort, IntellectualAdventure, 7. 'True myth' should be
'distinguished from legend, saga, fable and fairy tale' ... that myths 'are products of the imagination,
but they are not mere fantasy'.
101 The key concepts of the term 'myth' not only as 'the actuality of an event' but also as a concept of
'Power' will be discussed in chapters five and six.
102 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 415.
103
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 416-417. See also Kristensen,Meaning ofReligion, 402.
Kristensen associates myth with fairy tale: 'The myth has, to be sure, the form of a fairy tale'.
104 The traditional definitions of the term 'myth' will be discussed later in the Eliade section of this
chapter.
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In later chapters, Van der Leeuw's analysis on the typology 'myth'
corresponds with his earlier Christian-influenced 'essence' of religion. Given that he
proposes that the common element present in myth, a hieros logos or a sacred story,
centres on the Christian doctrine of salvation, he describes the sacred events whether
enacted or recited, as 'salvation stories'. He gives the Egyptian myth of Isis and
Osiris103 as an example of a salvation typology. The drama, the actuality of the myth
itself, suggests van der Leeuw, 'implies the "salvation" of the hearer and
spectator'.106 Of some significance is the absence in Egyptian texts, iconography, or
temple reliefs of any reference to 'salvation' in a Christian redemptive sense.107
Rather, texts and iconography identify Osiris primarily with immortality and
Egyptian kingship in the Netherworld, as the father ofHorus, the consort of Isis, the
fecundity of the land and others forms.108 There are many epithets ofOsiris, none of
which include names of a salvatory nature.109
Van der Leeuw believes that because the 'salvation motif in the story of
Christ is the focal point of the re-enactments of the hieros logos in Christian worship,
it is the essential universal element in all sacred stories. Moreover, while the ethos of
Christianity is determined in the announcements and events of Jesus Christ as
Saviour; van der Leeuw identifies both Christ and the Egyptian god Osiris as Saviour
figures.110 On the one hand, van der Leeuw concludes: 'For such a form [of
105 Plutarch's so-called myth of Isis and Osiris will be discussed in detail in chapter three; it serves as
an example of literature acting as an 'authority of text' in that Plutarch's version perpetuates the
misconception of the 'truth' of the myth of Isis and Osiris. Van der Leeuw follows a similar
misinterpretation when he identifies the salvation motif ofChristianity with the beliefs of ancient
Egypt. As I understand van der Leeuw, his propensity to see the salvation motif in Egypt and other
cultures signifies that his own Christian belief in the soteriological nature of Jesus Christ is a universal
motif of salvation for all humankind.
106 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 419.
107
Although there is evidence of an ancient Egyptian god, Shed, the saviour, later identified with a
young form of the king, Horus-Shed, the saving aspect concerned saving Egyptians from harmful
noxious creatures. See 105 above. See also discussion on Horus-Shed in my Case Study, chapter six.
108 For the various forms ofOsiris, see Erik Hornung, Conceptions ofGod in Ancient Egypt, (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 68, 281.
109 Cf. Hornung, Conceptions, 90, quoted from Ramadan el Sayad, Documents relatifs a Sais et ses
divinites (IFAO BE 69, 1975), 14-16.
110 See also James, Interpreting Religion, 234. James is critical of van der Leeuw's inability to see
beyond his own Christian theology when he 'submits Christ to comparison with Osiris while he
regards each as a saviour in the full sense of the word'. See also the Christian salvation motif in
Kristensen, Meaning ifReligion, 401 Kristensen comments that the representation of the god of the
temple 'is the saviour in death over the waters of death'.
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salvation] is essential to every myth'.111 On the other hand, like Kristensen discussed
earlier, van der Leeuw refutes the presence of'myth' in Christianity with words of
depreciation; 'the hieros logos ofChristianity is not merely a myth'.112 The apparent
innocuous phrase 'merely a myth' carries a hidden agenda of some significance.
Allen offers a view which is probably accepted by most contemporary scholars: 'to
say that something is 'merely' a myth is to point out that it is 'fiction' or 'illusion',
an 'unreal' and uncritical 'invention' of the imagination, and as such is distinguished
from and even opposed to 'reality'. 112 A sacred story exists in Christianity but its
presence is denied when hieros logos is given the name 'myth'. The implication is
that the taxon 'myth' in a phenomenological sense is denied a universal position not
only as an Ideal Type but also a typology of religion in a phenomenological sense.
Another inter-related example of equal importance is demonstrated when van
der Leeuw argues that the 'Word ofGod' as an Ideal Type is present in other
religions. He compares the Christian doctrine of the 'Word ofGod' with the Greek
concept of the 'Word', often translated in Christian terms as the logos. The Greek
logoi is identified by van der Leeuw as the 'Power ofGod', a concept which he
asserts was 'subsequently in Christendom'.114 He compares also the Christian term
'the Word ofGod' with the Egyptian creation story in the Memphite Theology in
which the god, Ptah creates the world. Rather than the spoken word, the initial
impulse of creation arose in his heart. Only then are the words spoken and written
down by the god Thoth, an action often described with some inaccuracy as 'creation
111 Van der Leeuw, Essence ofReligion, 420. See also Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 404.
Kristensen comments that the 'reality of the myth is no longer a reality for us' and therefore he
asserts, because they always have a form of the fairy tale, although not to be taken as simple fairy
tales, they are far removed from our faith and our view of the world. He claims: 'This is true of all
myths'.
"2 Van der Leeuw, Essence ofReligion, 419. See also Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 406. For
Kristensen, the believer 'does not speak of his "myths", but rather of his "sacred traditions", for
instance the hieros logos at Eleusis'.
113
Douglas Allen, Structure and Creativity in Religion, (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 13. He continues
that for cultures in which myth is 'living', myth means 'true story' in the sense of'sacred tradition'.
114 In this section my purpose is to give brief examples of the assumptions held by van der Leeuw, if
only to demonstrate his theological affinity to Christian doctrines in his role as a practicing
Theologian The logos/mythos debate, and the presupposition that the Greek notion of logos equated
to the Christian 'Word ofGod', will be discussed in chapter four.
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by the word'. Van der Leeuw interprets the Memphite text as the Egyptian version of
the Christian 'theology of the word'.113
Van der Leeuw explained his subjective approach to Christian theology and
Christian doctrines: 'The pre-condition of genuine theology is the existence of the
church... Myth, doctrine, law, rite are all examined as to their significance for human
salvation'.116 Later, when he states that 'God is the actual subject of all theology',117
there is, intrinsic within these statements his conviction that the Christian God is
'present' in both the Memphite Theology and the Greek concept of the logos.
Further, while it may be appropriate to classify ancient Egyptian 'myth' or sacred
story as a 'hieros logosit is doubtful whether van der Leeuw's universal definition
of hieros logos as a sacred story of'salvation' in the Christian sense receives
validation by non-Christian adherents. Given that the Christian redemptive nature of
salvation equates to the saving of human beings from the penalty of sins in order to
achieve eternal happiness, Egyptian texts are silent on this subject.118
Although key aspects ofEgyptian kingship are discussed in the following
chapters as a framework for a new hermeneutic of the term 'myth', a brief illustration
of the issue of comparing general typologies of similarities is necessary. Given that
there are general similarities in the concept of the Christian 'Word', the Greek
'logos', and the Egyptian 'word', when placed in the context of each culture, the
intentions of the adherent reveal differences. I discuss in some detail the term ' logos'
in chapter three, therefore, I will demonstrate here a contextual difference in the
concept of the 'word' in ancient Egypt.
1'
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 421. Rather than the words of creation, the initial impulse
arose in the heart. See also Miriam Lichtheim, AEL,Vol. 1:54, (Berkley; London: University of
California Press, 1975). 'Sight, hearing, breathing - they report to the heart, and it makes every
understanding come forth. As to the tongue, it repeats what the heart has devised. Thus all the gods
were born and his Ennead was completed. For every word of the god came about through what the
heart devised and the tongue commanded'. See also J.B. Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts
Relating to the Old Testament, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 5. '...it is the tongue
that announces what the heart thinks'. 5,n. 15 elaborates: 'The senses report to the heart. With this
reported material, the heart conceives and releases thought, which the tongue, as a herald, puts into
effective utterance'. See also Frankfort, Kingship, 27. Here is an example of the dilemma between the
Egyptian concept of'thinking' and the cerebral scientific meaning of the rational thinking of the brain.
I posit that the Egyptians believed the heart, rather than the brain, 'thinks' or 'intuits'.
116 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 562.
117 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 564.
118 The ancient Egyptians' belief in eternity will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
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The term heka (hkl), exemplified as royal 'power' or 'energy' often translated
as a form of'magic', is a force made visible in many forms; it is 'swallowed' or
'eaten', it is contained within nets to create order from chaos, it is the creative force
in which gods 'come into being by themselves', and it is the creative 'utterance of
kings'.119 Hornung describes its power in the spoken or written word: 'When the
god's creative word has been pronounced, "magic" [heka] ensures that it becomes
reality'. Rather than a God in the Christian sense, creation by the word in ancient
Egypt is held in the office of the divine king. He holds the power of the creative
Utterance; he possesses the creative power of heka.120
There is certainly a general similarity between the Egyptian term heka,
associated with the power of'creative speech' in the Memphite Theology and the
story of creation by the Word in the Old Testament (Gen: 1:31). Similar also are the
opening words of the Gospel of John: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word
was with God, and the Word was God'. (John 1:1) Nonetheless, the differences
identify the disparity of the two cultures: Christians place the salvation motif at the
centre of their concept of the Word. Conversely, the core belief of the Egyptians is
the creative reality of the word, rather than a salvation theme in the Christian
redemptive sense. While universal classifications may go some way in grouping
similarities, the key differences identify both cultural and contextual distinctions.
In summary, although it may be improbable for the phenomenologist to
bracket all religious beliefs, opinions, biases and the like, the aim of the
phenomenologist of religion is an undertaking to comprehend the beliefs of others.
Van der Leeuw's contends that the phenomenologist has little choice other than to
start and end through the mirror image of his own 'religion', whether Buddhist,
Muslim or Christian. Like Kristensen, van der Leeuw appears to identify 'religions'
in general through the personal prism of his Christian religion rather within the
societal context of each religion. When he asserts that a phenomenologist of religion
'would be unable to proceed in any other way', he appears in agreement with
Kristensen's 'improbable' stance. This is not to discount the theory that the religious
119 Heka may be transliterated as either hki (HkA )or hki (HqA )-1 have chosen to use the form hkl.
120 See Hornung, Conceptions, 208-209. See also Allen, Middle Egyptian, 156-157, on the creative
Word and creation generally.
52
2 Development of the Theory of 'Myth'
element of commonality suggested by phenomenologists is present in human beings,
whether within the cultural context of the Buddhist, Muslim or Christian.
The problem is whether or not the abstract terms, 'religious' and 'religions"
can be fully realised. Equally, if'religion' as a socio-cultural function is described in
historical, empirical terms then the identity and beliefs in the diverse forms of the
different adherent is respected. Further, if as I argue later in chapter four, whether or
not certain aspects of phenomenology support my new socio-cultural hermeneutic of
myth, rigorous pursuit of the key issues and fundamental phenomenological
principles are then justified. Whether or to what extent it is possible to use epoche to
bracket one's own religion yet simultaneously remain aware of the elusive concept of
religiousness may be difficult, yet I understand it is central to the phenomenological
method. Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether total epoche is possible or
whether a self-reflexive epoche would be conducive also to the overall approach.
Conversely, if phenomenologists identify the common element of
comparison, the 'essence' of religion, with their own religious belief then
phenomenological understanding of other religions may prove untenable. Adherents
may be unable to validate realistically the scholar's interpretation of their beliefs, if
the universal element of similarity is the 'essence' of Christianity. Kristensen
observes the dichotomy, although this too is a point of some scholarly tension: 'We
should never be able to describe the essence of religion if we did not know from our
own experience what religion is'.121 As I understand the problem, if comprehension
of'other' religions is the aim of the phenomenologist, then the insider view may be
demonstrated only by discussing their differences. Rational thinking corroborates
that there are in existence as many different 'types' of religious experience as
122
religious beliefs and within religions themselves there may be many variations.
The final section demonstrates not only Eliade's broader East-West approach
to the phenomenological approach to comparing religions but also his view that
cultural differences are necessary for understanding.
121
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 10.
522 Cf. For different variations within religions, see Mujiburrahman's Islamic view in
'Phenomenological Approach', 91. For different denominations in Christianity, see Tim Dowley, ed.,
The History ofChristianity, (Oxford: Lion Publishing, 1996).
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2.7 Mircea Eliade (1907-1986)
Mircea Eliade gained his M.A. in Philosophy from the University of
Bucharest in 1928. Through a graduate fellowship he studied Sanskrit and Indian
philosophy at the University of Calcutta (1928-31) before completing his PhD in
1933 with his dissertation on Yoga. Unlike Kristensen and van der Leeuw, Eliade's
background is non-theological. As a historian of religions he taught at the University
of Bucharest and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes of the Sorbonne, Paris; he finally
joined the University ofChicago inl957 as a Professor of the History ofReligions.123
He is generally considered a phenomenologist of religion.124
2.7.1 Eliade: 'Hierophanies'
Eliade offers what seems a radically different approach to the methodologies
of Kristensen and van der Leeuw. Kristensen's method was towards understanding
religious data, to seek validation from the adherent. Van der Leeuw's method centred
on comprehension of the phenomena by a process of revelation in 'what appears' to
the phenomenologist. Eliade's method veers from the narrow approach of Kristensen
and van der Leeuw towards a complex system which incorporates the history of
religion, phenomenology, hermeneutics, humanism and a new historic-centred
concept of the sacred. Given Eliade's broader methodology, my intention remains to
determine his method ofclassifying data into typologies of religion. With regard to
the complex structure ofEliade's system of total hermeneutics, to limit my re¬
appraisal to merely describing Eliade's concept of'hierophany', his term for defining
religious data, would fail to give credit to the interlocking nature of his system. My
aim therefore is to limit my scrutiny to key features of Eliade's systematic classifying
of data: hierophanies, or 'manifestations of the sacred'; homo religiosus, the religious
123 See Cox, Phenomenology ofReligion, 175-176; Eliade, Encyclopedia, 86-90.
124 On whether or not Eliade is a phenomenologist, see Allen, Structure, 108-111, 240-241; Randall
Studstill, 'Eliade, Phenomenology, and the Sacred', in Religious Studies, 36, 2000:177-194. See also
Mircea Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism', 88, in Eliade,
History ofReligions. Eliade comments that the historian of religion must 'systemise the results' of his
research thus 'he completes his historical work as a phenomenologist or philosopher of religion'.
Eliade also considered his work to be creative hermeneutics ofwhich his phenomenology is a part.
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'being'; the religio-historic method of classification. There is however some
contention among scholars whether Eliade's method is historical or ahistorical.123
First, I offer a brief preamble ofEliade's broader approach to the comparative
method of religion before introducing his method of classifying types into
hierophanies. Eliade observes the methodological dilemma faced by the historian of
religions of the mass of religious documents. 126 Rather than following the History of
Religion's systematic method of comparing many religions, Eliade offers an
alternative method. He selects a few, and then only some of their aspects, for
example, rites, myths, divine forms. Only a manageable number of religions are
1 2*7
preferable for a worthwhile comparable analysis. This method is similar to
Kristensen's method that the few may shed light on the many, which links to Eliade's
search to identify patterns of similarity in the religious data.
Since not one religion is under scrutiny, but many, Eliade rightly describes
the comparative study as a vast, diverse and ill-assorted mass ofmaterial. Each
document has a particular meaning, part of the culture and the particular time from
which it has been detached.128 Eliade appears to place importance on the cultural
1 9Q
differences and historical context in religious data. He asks whether scholars have
the right to use religious documents indiscriminately, to group them, compare them,
130
or even to manipulate them according to one's own convenience. His question
demonstrates his concern of the methods used previously in the comparative analysis
of empirical data. Equally, his words appear to clarify the importance of a cultural
presence: 'For whatever its role has been in the past, the comparative study of
religion is destined to assume a cultural role of the first importance in the near
12:1 Both Kristensen and van der Leeuw proposed an ahistorical method of comparing religious data.
The issue discussed later concerns history and homo religiosus.
126 Mircea Eliade, Rites andSymbols ofInitiation, (New York: Harper, 1966), 86.
127 Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (London: Sheed & Ward, 1958), 1.
128 Eliade, Rites, 92-93.
129 For the historical and cultural aspects of a 'symbol' see Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks', 104-
105.
130 Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks', 88-89.
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131future'. Eliade suggests that to understand the cultural values of others it is
necessary to know their different religious sources.
The peoples of the West, he argues, no longer have the monopoly as history
makers. Instead, non-Westerners analyze and compare the spiritual and cultural
values of those who were previously the unquestioned authority. He rightly observes
that to the Western mind, Oriental religions may present some hierophames, sacred
entities, which 'the modern man will never come to accept'.132 The main obstacle, he
argues, is that the Western mind relates all that is sacred, religious or even magical to
certain historical forms of the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and
ITT
Islam. While Eliade acknowledges the existence of East-West cultural differences,
he places the onus on the West to understand not only these 'foreign' cultures but
also Oriental cultural differences. He explained:
The effort expended in correctly understanding ways of thinking that
are foreign to the Western tradition - an effort which is, primarily, that
of deciphering the meaning of myths and symbols - is repaid by a
considerable enrichment of consciousness.134
Eliade's comments seem of fundamental value to the comparative principles
of phenomenology suggests that a positive approach towards understanding cultures
foreign to Westerners may produce a more profound awareness of the true meanings
held by different cultures. Equally important to phenomenology is Eliade's insistence
not only on the religious qualities of the documents, but he urges also understanding
of East/West cultural differences. Such a religio-cultural partnership appears to offer
the phenomenologist of religion a broader and more profound understanding of the
135cultural nature of religious data.
131 Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History andMeaning in Religion, (Chicago: University ofChicago
Press, 1969), 2.
132
Eliade, Patterns, 11. This was certainly the case in regard to the West's initial experience of the
gods and goddesses ofEgypt.
133
My previous sections on Kristensen and van der Leeuw verify the difficulty experienced by both
classical phenomenologists in bracketing their own Christian beliefs. See also Eliade, 'Methodological
Remarks', 89.
134 Mircea Eliade, Myth, Dreams andMysteries, (London: Collins, 1968), 9.
135 A political socio-cultural rather than a religious approach to Egyptian texts which may appear
'foreign', is discussed in later chapters.
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Eliade receives some support from a contemporary scholar in the field
regarding the issue surrounding the so-called Western-biased term 'religion'. Gavin
Flood suggests that to understand beliefs foreign to us, we must actively pursue
differences within East/West cultures. Flood traces the term 'religion' back to its
early roots: 'Religion is an emic, Western category that originated in late antiquity
and developed within Christianity as part of that tradition's self understanding'.136
Flood qualifies this further:
The abstraction "religion" - along with the abstractions "culture",
"mysticism" and "spirituality" - originated in the context of the
critique of Christianity in the Enlightenment and the rise of the
modern individual, which has since become an etic category in being
applied outside ofChristianity.137
Once valid for one particular culture, the term 'Western Christianity' has
become a general statement or overlay for other beliefs; the term 'religion' is another
example. For this reason, Flood is aware of the layers of meaning inherent in the
term 'religion' because of its association with the West and Christianity.
Consequently, it is difficult, Flood reasons, to translate the category 'religion' into
non-Western languages on the understanding that the original Christian association
may adversely influence other religions. Decades after Eliade had voiced concern,
Flood reiterates the problem. Equally, it appears self-perpetuating; when using the
term religion outside Christianity as an etic term, the term 'religion' is often
identified with Christianity in a Western emic sense.118
Eliade seeks reluctantly to broaden the category 'religion' into an East-West
universal; his disinclination is not because of a lack of understanding of foreign
139




Flood, Phenomenology, 45. See also Flood's argument on 'religion as a category'. Fie begins this
section: 'It has been notoriously difficult to arrive at a universally acceptable definition of religion and
it seems that the task is doomed from the outset', 43-46.
138 Kristensen and van der Leeuw are two examples. It also serves to demonstrate the problem of
'myth' as a typology of religion when the term 'religion' carries an overlay of Christianity. See also
Smith, 'Religion, Religions', 269. For Smith, in the generic category 'religion' the indicator is usually
knowledge of God. In a similar vein, the problem arises when the term 'religion' is applied to the
beliefs of ancient Egypt; the issue is exemplified when Egyptian 'myths' are classified as a typology
of'religion'.
139 See preface to Eliade, Quest. This argument is valid for both Kristensen and van der Leeuw since
both classify 'religion' as a universal category. Eliade admits that the term 'religion', to denote the
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similar concern by Wilfred Cantwell Smith caused him to propose substitutes for the
term religion, with the words 'faith' and 'cumulative tradition', a proposal which
failed adoption in Departments ofReligious Studies.140 Eliade argues also that since
the Enlightenment'Religionswissenscha.fi' has been operating with Western
categories in the study ofworld religions, in spite of its avowed principles of
neutrality and objectivity. 141 In the end, Eliade seeks to resolve the issue by re¬
defining religion within a historical frame of reference. Kristensen classified his
religious data into 'categories', van der Leeuw selected the term 'Ideal Types'. If as a
Historian ofReligion Eliade draws on the empirical method to collect historical
religious data for interpretation, described earlier, how does he identify the data as
religious? Eliade chooses to name all religious data as hierophanies.142
For Eliade there are two forms ofphenomena, the sacred and the profane; a
hierophany is simply the 'manifestation of the sacred'. The term 'manifestation'
recalls van der Leeuw's manifestation or revelation of'what appears' to him.
Similarly the meaning of the term hierophany may be interpreted from the Greek
'hiero', the sacred and 'phainein', to show or to appear. The word hierophany is
therefore descriptive of its function, the appearance or manifestation of the sacred.
The distinction between the religious, sacred hierophany, and the non-religious
profane is a dialectical tension, both co-exist in a paradoxical relationship of'being'
and 'non-being'. Moreover, it is only though the profane that the hierophany is
manifest to homo religiosus.
In Eliade's comparative method, a phenomenon becomes sacred when it
reveals something other than itself. Again this is a concept similar to that proposed
by van der Leeuw, that 'what appears' is something other than the empirical
phenomenon. For Eliade, the sacred is revealed only though the mundane world,
through something natural, historical or profane. The religious experience is linked to
the subjective experience of the homo religiosus in the belief that what appears to
experience of the sacred, is inadequate, and like Flood, he 'wonders how it [religion] can be
indiscriminately applied to the Ancient Near East, Judaism, Christianity', and other 'religions'.
140 See Cantwell Smith, 'Comparative Religions', 31. See also a critique of his views in Donald
Wiebe, 'The Role of "Belief' in the Study ofReligion', Numen, 26, 1979:234-249 and Cantwell
Smith's response, 'Belief: A reply to a Response', in Numen, 27,1980:247-255.
141 Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks', 22.
142
Allen, Structure, 130. For an overall view ofEliade's hierophanies, 124-127; homo religiosus in
general, 86-87; homo religiosus and the meaning for Eliade, 208-210. See also Eliade, Patterns, 1-33.
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him or her is the manifestation of something other than the profane, that is, the
sacred. The idea of separating the religious hierophany from non-religious data
seems superfluous; Eliade believes that all phenomena at one time or another have
been a hierophany. He explained:
But somewhere, at a given time, each human society chose for itself a
certain number of things, animals, plants, gestures and so on, and
turned them into hierophanies.; and as this has been going on for tens
of thousands of years of religious life, it seems improbable that there
remains anything that has not at some time been so transfigured. 143
Consequently, myths, symbols, sacred objects, cosmologies, sacred space,
sacred men, are all hierophanies with their own morphology.144 Eliade elaborates on
his system, that a hierophany is named only in the classification of each category of
evidence. For example, each must have two elements, first the modality of the sacred
through which the sacred manifests itself and second, an historical incident that
reveals 'some attitude man has had towards the sacred'.143 It is the latter element
which causes the phenomenon to be defined as a hierophany because it is through the
profane phenomenon that the sacred is revealed. Eliade's methods show some
similarity to van der Leeuw's human-centred approach to the comprehension of
religious data as well as his subjective-objective interrelationship. Equally, van der
Leeuw's revelatory process is similar to Eliade's 'religious experience' identified
with homo religiosus\ the researcher or scholar experiences an ontological
'revelation' of the sacred.
The concept seems complex; the hierophanies, the religious data, not only
have a long historical evolution, Eliade suggests that they have a changing
morphology of the sacred.146 Thus a hierophany concerns the history ofwhat
different cultures have valued as sacred. Equally, the term 'religion' does not
necessarily imply 'belief in God, gods, or ghosts, but refers to the experience of the
m
Eliade, Patterns, 12.
544 Eliade includes also inscriptions, votive objects, rites, oral traditions as well as customs. The latter
has an implication of cultural values. Eliade's inclusion of'myths' as a hierophany raises again the
problem of the definition of the term 'myth', discussed later.
145 Studstill, 'Eliade, phenomenology', 178. He argues that the 'modality of the sacred' is a
phenomenological expression.
146 Eliade, Patterns, 2.
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sacred, and consequently, is related to the ideas of being, meaning and truth'.147 Thus
Eliade interprets the terms 'sacred' and 'religion' within a wider cultural matrix. He
broadens the phenomenological category to a less exclusive 'religious' category in
the Western sense. Similarly, when he defines a hierophany as a universal category,
he removes it from its earlier 'Christian religion' context. Eliade insists that there are
great differences between the many hierophanies but the structure and dialectic are
always the same.
An empirical appraisal of the ancient Egyptian Luxor Temple at Thebes may
serve as a model for Eliade's hierophany of'sacred space'. The historical texts of the
ancient Egyptians confirm the intent of the ancient Egyptians that as human beings
they valued their artefacts, rituals and texts as 'sacred'.148 Given that Eliade identifies
different cultures historically in the changing morphology ofwhat cultures value as
sacred, Luxor Temple illustrates a changing historical morphology of the sacred.147
Further such a human-centred approach may identify what appears as a socio-cultural
'religious' or 'sacred' presence rather than a sacred space which is Christian-centred.
It demonstrates historically not only what different cultures have valued as sacred but
also proves some insight into East-West cultural differences.
The Luxor Temple is the sacred object and a force of power; it stands on the
sacred space ofwhat was previously, the so-called profane 'land'. Eliade names non-
sacred land 'a force of nature'; the natural world he suggests is absent of any sacred
associations. The 'profane' is transformed into the sacred space of the temple by the
rituals and festivals dedicated to their gods by many Egyptian divine kings. A
hierophany arises that varies from one culture to another in the changing morphology
147 Eliade, Quest, 1. Van der Leeuw interprets the meaning of comprehension as 'becoming'
understood, mentioned earlier, which relates in a sense to Eliade's concept of'being'.
1481 use the term 'sacred' to mean an entity which is venerated by its community or, on behalfof its
community by a hierarchy, in the sense that it is either supernatural or is held in high esteem. For
example the word 'sacrifice' concerns a sacred offering. In Egypt, the sacred offering to the gods was
a reciprocal gesture, 'the renunciation of something of value', for example offerings, in return for
stability of the land ofEgypt. In modern terms 'sacrifice' tends to indicate a 'human being's self-
giving or self-abnegating commitment to God'. From the word 'sacrum', sacred place belong to a god.
Rosemary Goring, ed., Dictionary ofBeliefs andReligions, (Herts: Wordsworth Editions, 1995), 449-
451.
149 On sacred space as a hierophany, see Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 25-26. See also Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols, (London: Harvill Press,
1961), 28-56 on his concept of the 'centre' and sacred space.
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of the Luxor Temple. When the sacred space is no longer that of the ancient
Egyptians, it becomes the sacred space of the Coptic Christians. They built their
church in the sixth century CE within the temple precincts of Luxor temple. Later, in
the thirteenth century construction of an Islamic mosque arose within its walls. 'This
mosque still remains in use today and effectively brings the history ofLuxor Temple
as a sacred precinct from its beginning, some time before 1500 BCE, to the present
day - a history ofwell over 3000 years of change, development and growth'.130
Eliade offers an example the religious symbol of the Cosmic Tree which he
suggests is present in the diverse cultures ofMesopotamia, India, Siberia, Central
Asia and Indonesia'.131 Eliade's enquiry concerns the religio-historical circumstances
which result in the same symbol having different meanings within different cultures
in the various locations. Studstill suggests that Eliade 'proves' that 'different
modalities of the sacred exist through reference to different experiences by observers
of the same ritual'132 Whether or not the Cosmic Tree held a universal sacred
meaning is not the issue. It is sufficient that Eliade acknowledges the presence of
human-centred cultural differences in religious symbols which he implies may have
acted as problem-solving societal tools.
The hierophany 'sacred space' therefore is valued historically and culturally
by different human beings while the concept of the 'sacred space' remains constant.
Eliade would query why three different cultures placed importance on that particular
piece of land as their 'sacred space'. I have refrained from giving the sacred space a
'religious' identity in order to maintain the integrity of each culture's uniqueness.
First the temple arose historically within the culture of the ancient Egyptians, it was
followed by the Christian concept of sacred space identified by their rituals and
images, and finally the morphology of the Muslim community was situated in the
sacred space. Given that Eliade has placed some importance on cultural differences
and the historical context of religious data, my example, using Eliade's model may
150 Richard H. Wilkinson, The Complete Temples ofAncient Egypt, (New York: Thames & Hudson,
2000), 167.
151 Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks', 94-95.
152
Studstill, 'Eliade, phenomenology', 182. See also Eliade, Patterns, 7.
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provide empirical verification of'sacred space' as a hierophany. However, in my
example there is little reference to any comprehension of the different belief systems
that identify the cultural uniqueness of the Egyptians, Christians or Muslims.
2.7.2 Identification of the Issues
The Luxor Temple model identifies one of the issues which appear to fail the
practical test. The meaning ofEliade's universal hierophany, 'sacred space', is
understood in the given context, but it is empty of any cultural identity. For example,
'veneration' in the form of communal worship is an experience particular to the
Christian Church and the Islamic Mosque. Conversely, in the Egyptian Temple rather
than communal worship, a reciprocal relationship is present between the divine king
and the various gods. The general populace appears to have no access to the temple
153
proper. ~ Nonetheless agreement is present in the description of the universal
hierophany, 'sacred space' as well as the universal concept of the Ideal Type of a
'sacred building'. A temple, mosque, church or any building used within the context
of supernatural rituals may be defined as a universal 'sacred building'. Nonetheless,
any reference to the cultural differences in the form and function of their respective
sacred space is absent. In order to understand the intent of the sacred space it may be
necessary for Eliade's model to be extended to include the cultural differences.
Jonathan Z. Smith offers his view on the importance of differences.
Smith rightly remarks that 'comparison requires the acceptance ofdifference
as the grounds ofbeing interesting, and a methodological manipulation of that
difference to achieve some stated cognitive end'. 134 He astutely questions what
differences may be maintained or relaxed. Smith uses as a model Eliade's Near
Eastern and Indie temple pattern; it focuses on cosmogony and the replication of the
symbolism of the 'Centre'. The symbolism of the temple is summarised by Eliade in
153 For a fuller description of the economic, political and theological function of the Egyptian temple
see Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 92-105 and 185-207 His comment on ancient Egyptian temples, that they
'bestowed on the gods a status which corresponded to power and importance on a strictly material
scale' and 'shorn of theological nuance, temples comprised a major sector of the 'state' as we would
see it, working in a symbiotic relationship with the palace', 191. See also W. J. Murnane, The Penguin
Guide to Ancient Egypt, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1996), 61-66.
154 Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 14.
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three interrelated concepts: the "sacred mountain" where heaven and earth meet;
every temple, palace, town, royal residence and the like is assimilated to a "sacred
mountain"; the temple, or sacred city as the place where the Axis Mundi passes is the
junction between heaven, earth and hell.1:0
Here is the problem of universals. To assign the Axis Mundi to all temples, to
suggest it is the 'junction between heaven, earth and hell,' is to impose a Judaic-
Christian dogma absent in the beliefs of ancient Egypt. Textual and pictorial
evidence in Egyptian tombs deny the concept ofEternity as a place of suffering 'in
hell'; the ancient Egyptians enjoyed an Afterlife as an extension of their earthy life,
but any concept of torment or anguish is absent.136 Similarly, scholars refer to
'heaven' as synonymous to the Egyptian sky; the latter is described in Egyptian texts
1 S7
and iconography as an expanse ofwater. Further, kingship is associated with the
Egyptian temple with rituals which link their supernatural and earthly worlds. The
function of the Egyptian temple as an economical, political, and theocratic institution
continued throughout Egypt's historical period. Smith's concise comment is apt:
'Common sense would suggest that there are distinctions and differences here that
cannot be so readily relaxed'.138 Acknowledgements of differences therefore may be
the catalyst towards understanding cultures that appear foreign to us. The
convergence of similarities may inflict a cultural strait-jacket on differences, thus
denying the identity of diverse cultures.
Distinctions and differences are seen also in the concept of'religion'. When
Eliade defines religion as the 'experience of the sacred' or 'man's response to the
sacred', Flood suggests that Eliade's definition of religion leans towards
presuppositions about religion. Oddly, Flood chooses not to use Eliade's term
155
Smith, To Take Place, 14. For references to the Axis Mundi see Eliade, Patterns, 99-100, 111, 227-
228. For the AxisMundi and the Cosmic Tree in association with 'Heaven, Earth, and Hell' see
Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks', 93.
156 The Egyptian Afterlife is discussed in detail in chapters three, five and six.
157 The Egyptian sky is discussed in detail in chapter three with textual evidence from the Pyramid
Texts
158 Smith, To Take Place, 14. Smith's remarks are directed to the model of the Axis Mundi as the
symbolic Centre, and the Tjilpa, who do not have such an ideological building.
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'hierophany' for the sacred. Instead he replaces it with the word 'theophany'.139
There is some difference between Eliade's 'hierophany' relating to the sacred and
Flood's god-oriented 'theophany', the disparity unintentionally proving his earlier
point on presuppositions. That is, in slanting Eliade's concept of'religion' from the
sacred to a theological bias, does Flood impose the latter on Eliade's meaning?
Much of the confusion may result from Eliade's paradoxical 'sacred'160
hierophany of religion and his non-theological concept mentioned earlier, that
religion is 'not necessarily a belief in God, gods, or ghosts'.161 He grades
hierophanies from the most elementary hierophany for example, the manifestation of
the sacred in a stone, and ending in 'the supreme hierophany, the incarnation ofGod
162in Jesus Christ. None of this is to deny the existence ofEliade's term 'theophany'
1GT
which he translates as a deity that is manifest in a hierophany. Nevertheless,
Flood made his point:
Eliade's idea of theophany, [sic] the manifestation of the sacred, has
structured his research findings and is based on a pre-understanding or
presupposition of religion as theophany... The definition and the
explanation of religion are interdependent and different answers will
be produced by different research programmes.164
159 See The Chambers Dictionary, 1993, 1794. For 'theophanyGr: theophaneia a vision of god,
exhibition ofgods' statues, fromphainein to show. See also Eliade, Encyclopedia, 313. For
'hierophanyGr: from hieros sacred, and phainein to show, Eliade does not include the presence of
God or gods in all religions.
160 Studstill, 'Eliade, phenomenology', 181. Fie argues that, 'the sacred' is a cover term for that
category of'objects' constituted in the mind of the believer as both 'ultimately real' and as distinct
from the profane world'.
161
Eliade, Quest, 1. See also Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dream andMysteries, (London: Collins, 1968),
130. Eliade refers to the Melanesians who 'implicitly acknowledge several modalities of the sacred -
gods, spirits, ghosts, etc.' Ascribing the power ofmana as the sacred, Eliade concluded that the
religious life of the Melanesians is not confined to belief in the mana conferred by gods or spirits.
162
Eliade, Myths, Dreams, 124. This is similar to the phenomenologist's form of grading when a
measure of similarity only is required of the religious data. The family resemblance may be distant or
close, slight or pronounced.
163 See Eliade, Encyclopedia, 315. When a hierophany manifests the presence of a divinity then that
hierophany becomes a theophany. For example, because the Egyptian sun god Re, a force ofPower, is
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A similar association with 'religion' links the meaning ofhomo religiosus
with 'hierophany', 'sacred' and 'manifestation'. In van der Leeuw's revelation of
'what appears', homo religiosus is a manifestation ofChristianity. In Eliade's homo
religiosus there is implied a general religiousness in which all civilisations whether
Christian, Muslim, Greek or Egyptian, participate in a universal religious identity.
Can the term 'religion' be so re-defined? In Eliade's new inclusive hermeneutic
approach to phenomenology, he argues that his systematic study reveals much of
humanity's religious history. Eliade concludes that 'this history of religious
meanings must always be regarded as forming part of the history of the human
spirit'.165
Here is Eliade's vision of homo religiosus, the archetype of the 'sacred'
history of humanity, and affirmation ofDudley's view of Eliade as the anti-historian
of religions.166 Eliade follows the religious experience of Kristensen and van der
Leeuw: 'For homo religiosus the essential precedes existence. This is as true of the
man of "primitive" and Oriental societies as it is of the Jew, the Christian, and the
Muslim. Man is what he is today because a series of events took place in ab
origine167 Following the premise of Kristensen the question arises ofwhether or
not the ancient Egyptians would validate Eliade's claim. For Eliade history is no
longer human-centred but religion-centred.
Eliade has received some adverse criticisms. He is described as a
phenomenologist who systemises religious phenomena while simultaneously acting
as a historian of religions who analyses the historical facts as well as acting as a
hermeneutist. But history to Eliade is 'sacred' history. His new approach has
brought fierce criticism from Ivan Strenski.
Eliade means to fling open the door to wider speculation in the study
of religion. 'Creative hermeneutics' is unabashedly 'speculative
165 Eliade, Quest, 9.
166 See Dudley, Religion on Trial, 29. Dudley comments that anyone who knows Eliade's work will
recognise his theme of escaping historical time which is evident in his books on religion; a
characteristic ofhomo religiosus. See also Dudley, 'Mircea Eliade as "Anti-Historian"', 345-359.
167 Mircea Eliade, Myth andReality, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 92.
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hermeneutics'. What else could explain Eliade's disrespect for
empirical and historical criteria of confirmation and falsification?168
In Eliade's methodology, the historian of religion 'must trace not only the history of
a given hierophany, but first of all understand and explain the modality of the sacred
that that hierophany discloses'.169 Yet paradoxically the scholar must 'transcend
history' while tracing the history of a hierophany. Flood challenges the hierophany
theory from a cultural materialist prospective. The latter, he argues is 'based on an
implicit theological and ahistorical understanding of religion; an understanding that
170
sees religion as transcending history'.
Thus, the terms, 'religion' and 'sacred', at the core ofEliade's classification
of a hierophany come under scholarly criticism.171 Flood challenges not only
Eliade's theory of hierophanies but also religious data as the premise in the
classification of categories of religion because 'religious data are transparent as
religious'. Flood continues: 'But this is to beg questions about the nature of these
172
'religious data' but also about the nature of the inquiry that is taking place'. His
point is succinct and from the perspective ofEgyptian civilisation, an observation of
some worth; that religion should not be separated from its socio-political framework.
Rather 'religion' should be seen as part of an integrated society. The problem returns
to the meaning of the universal term 'religion' and its subsequent influence on the
taxon 'myth' as a typology of religion.
Flood appears to confirm the issue this chapter seeks to demonstrate, the need
for a socio-cultural perspective in phenomenological categories of religion.
Referring to Eliade's hierophany 'myth', Flood expresses his concern that 'the work
of Eliade has argued for the archetypal nature ofmyth at the cost of its historical
particularity'.177 Given Eliade's explicit claim that every hierophany we look at is
168 Eliade, Myth, 120.
169 Eliade, Myths,Dreams, 5.
170 Flood, Phenomenology, 5.
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also an historical fact, 174I understand his comment to mean that the lens of history is
the profane window though which the hierophany is recognised by homo religiosus.
Flood is rightly concerned that to phenomenologists like Eliade 'religion is a
category that stands outside of history and socio-political structures, and is presented
17S
as a suigeneris phenomenon, beyond other social and historical concerns'. Given
Eliade's concept not only ofhomo religiosus as the universal human condition but
also his ahistorical approach to religion, should 'myth' be classified as a
'hierophany' within the same context?
2.7.3 Myth: 'Hierophany5 of Religion
Eliade without doubt is a scholar whose prolific writing has resulted in an
abundance of books that discuss and offer an array of diverse approaches to the
i "fe:
subject of myth. He poses the question, 'What exactly is a myth?' His response is
a plenitude of definitions suggesting either an unanswerable question or an
indeterminate term. A few of his descriptions serve to highlight the uncertainty of
some definitions, although he admits with some astuteness that it would be 'hard to
find a definition ofmyth acceptable to all scholars and at the same time intelligible to
non-specialists'.177 This selection discerns some aspects ofEliade's meaning of the
term 'myth'
According to Eliade, myth is a hierophany, it is a sacred story, and hence a
178
"true history" because it always deals with realities. In this context most cultures
would consider their sacred stories as true events in their history. Paradoxically, a
hierophany, a manifestation of the sacred, is recognised by homo religiosus only
through mundane history which in itself is synonymous with the profane. What is
recognised by homo religiosus is 'sacred history'. Myth relates a sacred history; it
relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the
174 Eliade, Myths,Dreams, 2.
175
Flood, Phenomenology, 6. See also Dudley, 'Mircea Eliade "Anti-Historian"', 345-359.
176 Eliade, Quest, 23.
177 Eliade, Quest, 5.
178 Eliade, Myth, 6.
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"beginnings". Myth is identical with 'fabled time', 'true history' and 'being'.
Paradoxically, I offer that Eliade implies that the history of the world is non-
religious, non-being and following the binary concept, it is not true. Existence of
'being' therefore means 'spiritual existence'.
Eliade offers more interpretations. Myth tells how, through the deeds of
Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, whether the whole of reality, the
Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality - an island, a species of plant, a particular kind
of human behaviour, an institution. Myth is always an account of creation.179 Myth is
an extremely complex cultural reality, which can be approached and interpreted from
various and complimentary viewpoints.180 Because origin myths relate to the
beginning of human existence, humans are mortal beings because of the events that
happened before history began, in illo tempore. 'If the World exists, ifman exists, it
181is because Supernatural Beings exercised Creative powers in the "beginning."'
Consequently, sacred history is mythical time and the actors in the drama of myths
are Supernatural Beings. In the repetition and re-enactment of the myths, Eliade
suggests, not only is the event repeated but also the secret of the origin of things is
learned.
In summary, from these definitions, it is clear that Eliade's intention is to
explain myth as a sacred or religious narrative, one that is true to the believer of a
particular culture; myth conveys their reality, as they see it. Some 'myths' certainly
concern the creation of the world and humankind by a Supernatural Being; the
'sacredness' may constitute a dimension of something other than itself.182 The 'other'
is a quality of supernatural proportions, which according to Eliade signifies the
'religiousness' of the myth. Similarly, sacred history is encapsulated in the notion of
the homo religiosus, the archetype of the 'religious experience' of humankind,
179 Eliade, Myth, 5-6.
180 Eliade, Myth, 5.
181
Eliade, Myth, 11.
182 There are many myths of creation in ancient Egypt which refer to political rebirths and new
beginnings; they will be discussed later.
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discussed earlier. Eliade's definitions ofmyth indicate clearly a sacredness that is
ahistorical.
Eliade's sacred history is 'mythology'. It 'lays the foundation for all human
behaviour and all social and cultural institutions'. Nevertheless, it is problematic
when he aligns these institutions with 'the "fact" that man was created and civilised
by Supernatural Beings. It follows that the sum of his behaviour and activities belong
183
to sacred history. Flood recognizes similar problems when Eliade follows
Kristensen and van der Leeuw's ahistorical nature of'myth' as a typology of religion
at the cost of its historical particularity. He argues that the 'particularity and temporal
dimension is diminished in the phenomenology of religion's emphasis on ahistorical
universals and patterns'.184 The relationship between the terms 'myth' and 'religion'
is thus increasingly estranged. That Eliade joins with Kristensen and van der Leeuw
and concedes the ahistorical religiousness of human beings as homo religiosus and
by association the universal nature of the 'essence' of religion, as I understand the
issue, defines the kernel of the problem.
2.8 Summary
Given that I have responded throughout the chapter to the issues, I answer
briefly the questions in the introduction. How has 'myth' been defined as a
classification or typology? What are the consequences to the meaning of the term
'myth' when classified as a typology of'religion'? On the formation of categories of
religion, the three phenomenologists systemised the various forms of empirical data.
Then, after separating the religious and non-religious data, they classified the
religious phenomena into groups of similar types. The three concepts involved in the
classifying process, the 'essence' of religion, and the ahistorical nature of the
religious data, clearly signify the defining quality of the typology of myth as
exclusively religious.
The taxon 'myth' was classified variously as a category, an Ideal Type or a
hierophany of religion. Each phenomenologist offered different methods, which in
183
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the end appeared variations of the same theme in that the term 'myth' was classified
with the ahistorical nature of a universal religion-centred typology. The latter denied
any cultural or human-centred identity of'myth' as a story of the beliefs or ideology
of a community. Consequently, there was little evidence of any socio-cultural
differences observed in the 'myths' discussed by the phenomenologists, although I
indicated differences from an Egyptian perspective.
Although Eliade suggested a human-centred cultural context to myth, the
reality was otherwise. In his ahistorical definition of the sacredness of'myth' as a
hierophany, Eliade proposed as a fact that the existence of all civilised human beings
was the result of a Superhuman creator. Both Kristensen and van der Leeuw also
agreed on the ahistorical nature of 'myth' at the cost of its historical particularity.
The ahistorical nature of the religion-myth partnership suggested presuppositions on
the nature of the baggage carried by the construct term religion, which subsequently
was passed over to the term 'myth'.
As a typology of religion, Eliade defines sacred stories as 'myth' on the
whole as origin-myths, although chapters four and five demonstrate that in this
context, Egyptian 'myths' may exist only in part. Kristensen and van der Leeuw
proposed that the common element present in 'myth', a hieros logos or a sacred
story, centred on Christian doctrines. Although both agreed that 'myth' was a
typology of religion, they denied that their sacred story was 'myth'. As a result, both
phenomenologists demonstrated a bi-polar, true-false dichotomy of the term 'myth'
where a subjective insider description ofmy 'sacred story' or hieros logos is true.
Conversely, an outsider, objective view describes the sacred texts of an 'other' or
'alien' belief system as 'false'; 'your sacred story is 'myth', it is false'. I posit that
Kristensen and van der Leeuw invalidate the taxonomy 'myth' as a universal
category of religion. The consequences therefore to the meaning of the term 'myth',
when classified as a typology of'religion', are significant and justify my further
research in chapter four.
What is the meaning intended by the three classical phenomenologists of the
'essence' of religion? Kristensen and van der Leeuw identify the common element of
comparison, the 'essence' of religion, with their own Christian beliefs. The
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difference between Eliade's hierophany as a manifestation of the sacred and van der
Leeuw's revelation of'what appears' is one of degree. Generally, the sacred element
is manifest to Eliade through the universal nature ofhomo religiosus, although there
are hints to a Christian overlay, the concept of the Axis Mundi of heaven, earth and
hell was an example. For Kristensen, the defining factor of the religious 'essence'
was the Spirit or intuition, for van der Leeuw 'what appears' was revealed by God. A
comparison ofKristensen's concept of'kingship' and van der Leeuw's Christian
'salvation' with the Egyptian beliefs revealed an overlay ofChristianity that distorted
the beliefs of the Egyptian. The consequences of a similar overlay of the Greek
culture over the Egyptian deities, is examined in chapter three.
Thus adherents may be unable to validate realistically the scholar's
interpretation of their beliefs, if the universal element of similarity is the 'essence' of,
either the construct term 'religion' with its baggage of the West, or Christianity.
Kristensen explained, as homo religiosus, 'We should never be able to describe the
185
essence of religion ifwe did not know from our own experience what religion is'.
Although my aim in this chapter was to identify the phenomenological issues,
my intention was also to pursue the positive aspects of the phenomenological
method, particular the principles of epoche and empathy. Although it may be
improbable for the phenomenologist to bracket all religious beliefs, opinions, biases
and the like, the aim of the phenomenologist of religion is an undertaking to
comprehend the beliefs of others. First, van der Leeuw argues for the subjective-
objective interrelationship between the phenomenologist and the data. I discuss this
more fully in chapter five. Suffice to say that van der Leeuw seeks as the final task of
the phenomenologist, empirical verification of the text or artefact, 'perpetual
correction by the most conscientious philological and archaeological research'.186
Kristensen's contribution of the autonomy not only of the data but also of the
adherent's beliefs is a phenomenological premise of substance. Both Kristensen and
van der Leeuw displayed some tension in their duel role as a phenomenologist and a
theologian.
185
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 10.
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Equally, Eliade has to some extent broadened and reinterpreted the
comparative process of the phenomenological method to include a less Western
orientated concept of religion. One of the problems I found in my research of the
myriad ofbooks written by Eliade was his frequent references to a cultural approach
to religion. Later, I discovered that his concept of culture was ahistorical; he
demonstrated a sacred approach to religion. Nonetheless the challenge is indicative
of the problem of interpretation given Eliade's prolific writing over a period of time.
Similarly, his insistence on the historical nature of'myth' fails occasionally to
signify clearly that his intent is 'sacred history', a very different concept.
Finally, the issues identified in this chapter relate essentially to the exclusive
religion-centred aspect ofmyth. A religion-theology issue may be identified. If the
study of religion is a scientific discipline in that the empirical data of religion is
analysed and may be subjected to the rigors of scientific proof. Equally, if the study
of theology is the understanding of faith, is there a confusion of definition given that
the religion described in this chapter appears to be more theological than religious?
The issues may be qualified if the phenomenological method, after grouping
empirical data into similarities, is extended. General similarities, for example, of
kingship can be separated further. Each type of kingship may be examined
(Egyptian, Sumerian, Babylonian, and Greek); a systematic analysis of particular
characteristics of each type ofkingship will be used to identify each culture. The
advantage to the phenomenology of religion is that the systemic method of
phenomenology will provide a positive partnership with the cultural reality of a
religion, rather than relying on the exclusivity of the term religion. If'religion' as a
socio-cultural function is described in historical, empirical terms, then the identity
and beliefs in the diverse forms of the different cultures is respected. The Case Study
in Chapter six offers a demonstration of the phenomenological methodology of
Egyptian 'myth' narratives.
186 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 677.
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Chapter Three
Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride: 'Myth' Re-visited
Give your ears and hear what is said,
Give your mind over to their interpretations. 1
3.1 Introduction
In chapter two, I considered, with discussion of Gerardus van der Leeuw,
whether it was a realistic endeavour for the phenomenologist of religion to exercise
epochs, in order to understand the beliefs of others. Van der Leeuw theorised that if
the phenomenologist adopts epoche, 'intellectual suspense' or 'a restraint from
judgement' the result was that extraneous data failed to pervade the phenomena. I
considered also van der Leeuw's practical application of epoche. Rather than 'a
restraint from judgement', he allowed his Christian beliefs to penetrate his
'intellectual suspense'. Consequently, not only was Christianity the defining element
in the 'essence' of religion, the Christian doctrine of salvation was the defining
element in the taxon 'myth'.2
Nonetheless, van der Leeuw defended what appeared as his difficulty in the
practical application of epoche. The phenomenologist, he offered, has little choice
other than to start and end through the mirror image of his own 'religion', whether
Buddhist, Muslim or Christian. 2 Van der Leeuw as a scholar is aware of the practical
difficulties of the phenomenological principle of epoche, yet he is unable to bracket
his Christian beliefs. Flood suggested that van der Leeuw's intent is concerned with
'bracketing ofwhat lies behind appearances, not with the bracketing of subjectivity'.4
As I understand van der Leeuw's comment, he seeks to bracket the 'reality'
of the phenomena, what lies behind appearances as Flood suggests, so that 'what
appears' to van der Leeuw is his own subjectivity. His subjectivity, I posit,
recognizes 'what appears' to him as the 'mirror-image' of his own Christian beliefs.
1 From the 'Instructions ofAmenemope', 3:10, in Miriam Lichtheim, TEL,Vol.2:146-163, (Berkeley;
London: University of California Press, 1980).
2 The phenomenological model of van der Leeuw has been discussed in chapters one and two, and will
be discussed further in chapter five.
2 See chapter two, n.96.
4
Flood, Phenomenology, 98. For an overview of his view on phenomenology, see 96-99.
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Alternatively, Flood may consider that van der Leeuw's intention is to link epoche
with subjectivity, that van der Leeuw identifies the human-centred homo religiosus
with 'what appears' or is manifest to him from the religious data under scrutiny.
Notwithstanding these comments, the literature examined in chapter two clearly
demonstrated the difficulties experienced by van der Leeuw and Kristensen in the
practical application of epoche. The result was that the baggage of extraneous data
not only pervaded the phenomena but also predisposed the 'religious' intent of the
term 'myth'.
In consideration of these comments, this chapter demonstrates a similar
pattern exemplified in Plutarch's version of Isis and Osiris when the Greek historian
allowed extraneous data to pervade the Egyptian so-called 'myth' ofOsiris and Isis.
Rather than adding to the myriad of theories that offer definitions ofwhat is and what
is not 'myth', my aim in this chapter is to bring into sharper focus the fundamental
issue. ' Plutarch appeared to identify Egyptian deities with mirror characteristics of
his own Greek deities.6 Whether or not Plutarch's subjective approach was the result
of his identification with his Greek cultural or religious ideology, his version of the
co-called Egyptian 'myth' of Isis and Osiris appeared as a distortion of the Egyptian
perspective. Consideration is given to van der Leeuw's comment that a scholar has
little choice other than to start and end with the mirror image of his own subjective
view. Similarly, Plutarch also carried an overlay of extraneous data in his account of
the Egyptian 'myth'.
Gwyn Griffiths offered a re-appraisal of the Plutarch version in his seminal
work, Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride. Not only did Griffiths draw attention to the
various misapprehensions posited by Plutarch concerning ancient Egypt's concept of
their divinities, he also identified Plutarch's misconception of Egyptian kingship. A
more serious consequence has resulted from the account of Plutarch's version of Isis
and Osiris in its frequent repetition in current literature on ancient Egypt. Equally
serious is that the Plutarch version is frequently referred to as the extant version of
the Egyptian 'myth'.7 Literature concerning the taxon 'myth', therefore, may inform,
5
Chapter four re-examines the term myth in detail and offers interpretations of the term 'myth'.
6 The importance of a phenomenological, subjective-objective inter-relationship is discussed in
chapter five.
7 Various authors who quote Plutarch's version of the so-called 'myth' of Isis and Osiris are discussed
later.
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interpret or distort the religious or cultural reality of a community. Equally, the term
'myth' may carry the excess baggage the various interpretations impose; the notion
of'falseness' is one example, the imposition of extraneous data is another.
The phenomenological method suggests that to understand another culture,
subjectivity is a necessary criterion. Equally important is an objective approach, one
that allows the phenomenologist to describe the insider viewpoint, to bracket his own
theories and opinions so that the description 'experienced' may be verified by the
insider.8 With some awareness of the difficulties proposed by both Kristensen, van
der Leeuw and to some extent Bleeker in following this method, if understanding of
the Egyptian texts is the goal, the criterion must be a subjective approach after first
collating the empirical data. Only after 'experiencing' the meaning and context of
the texts as //"from the inside Egyptian viewpoint is an objective description of the
texts realised. If I am not seeking a common 'essence' of religion within the Plutarch
or the Egyptian version, then the result will be a determined focus on the texts
themselves. My intention is to demonstrate that the reality of the Egyptian 'stories
about their gods' was functionally very different to that of the Greeks. Given there is
some silence in current literature of a positive response to Griffiths' appraisal of the
Plutarch account of Isis and Osiris, it is appropriate that I offer another re-evaluation.
This section continues first with a brief overview ofGwyn Griffiths'
Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride, a critique on the misrepresentation of the Egyptian
view. It is followed by an evaluation of Plutarch's Greek version, interspersed with
various references to literature and critiques from scholars in the field. The chapter
continues with a comparison of the Egyptian roles of Isis and Osiris. My primary
source is the Old Kingdom Pyramid Texts which, I propose, identifies certain royal
rituals from the Egyptian insider view. Given that Plutarch described Osiris as an
earthly king ofEgypt, it is important that the nature and function ofEgyptian
kingship is realised. The Pyramid Texts therefore are an appropriate source of
research because they describe the dual Power held by the Egyptian king, a Power
which gave him access to both the earthly and the superhuman worlds. One Text
confirms the dual superhuman-earthly authority of the king: '... [Y]our foot will not
be obstructed in the sky, you will not be opposed on earth' (Pyr.622-3). Another
8 Three of the early key phenomenologists, Kristensen, van der Leeuw and Bleeker argue that
comprehension of religious phenomena should be understood first from the insider view.
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denies the king an earthly existence; his choice is to reside in the sky: 'I am not for
the earth, I am for the sky'(Pyr.890).
Not only are the Pyramid Texts considered the oldest and least corrupt texts
of ancient Egypt, they are often quoted as one of the sources of Plutarch's version of
Isis and Osiris. I intend also to introduce iconography and discussion of certain
complex motifs of ancient Egyptian kingship to illustrate the close inter-relationship
between their earthly and superhuman worlds. Mainly, I seek to demonstrate the
scale ofPower held by the Egyptian office of kingship. Throughout this chapter my
aim is to identity any similarities and differences between the Greek and the
Egyptian views, the results may provide a more profound understanding of the
ancient Egyptian concept of kingship and exemplify van der Leeuw's
phenomenology of subjectivity.
3.2 Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride: An Overview
Griffiths' appraisal ofPlutarch's Isis and Osiris9 is of importance to this
thesis because it is similar to the type of issue discussed earlier. The classical
phenomenologists' overlay of Christian theology on other religions is similar to the
Greek overlay of Plutarch's version of Isis and Osiris. Whether or not the
perspective is from a religious or cultural viewpoint, or both, Plutarch offers a
misrepresentation of the Egyptian concept of divine kingship. Equally, he identifies
not only aspects of the Greek goddess Demeter with that of the Egyptian goddess
Isis, he also describes Isis and Osiris as an actual king and queen ofEgypt. Although
Plutarch's interpretation of Isis forms part of this section, some reference to the
overall presentation of his work is necessary, if only to emphasise the difficulty of a
subjective approach to the study of another culture. Griffiths' comment serves to
highlight this issue:
[T]he question arises whether in fact his [Plutarch's] study of the
Egyptian gods is not more marked by a desire to explain their nature
and myths in Hellenic terms than to record the native explanations and
9 The date and place of the composition ofPlutarch's De Iside de Osiride is given as c. 120 CE and
either part or all is thought composed at Delphi, 17-18. See Plutarch's and J.G. Griffiths, Plutarch's
De Iside et Osiride, (Cardiff: University ofWales Press, 1970); Edited with an introduction,
translation and commentary, by J.G. Griffiths.
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the striking ways in which Egyptian religious thought differed from
the Greek.10
This is not to say that either Griffiths or Plutarch followed a
phenomenological methodology in examining the 'myth' of Isis and Osiris, although
there are similarities in Griffiths' observations that link to discussions in chapter
one, in that the Greeks 'saw in foreign deities their own gods under different
names'.11 Consideration is directed, for example, to the earlier discussion in chapter
two, suggesting that the Christian Saviour motif is linked to the Egyptian god,
Osiris.12
Similarly, the phenomenological dilemma of bracketing one's own beliefs is
suggested in Griffiths' comment: 'If this attitude [adapting Egyptian theology to the
Platonic philosophy] seems, nevertheless, to be unduly subjective ... one should
reflect how rare it is for the fervent religious mind to practice a tolerant and
sympathetic observation of other religions'.13 When Griffiths examined Plutarch's
exposition of the so-called Osirian 'myth', he noted not only an absence of
objectivity but also that Plutarch's subjectivity described a distortion ofEgyptian
values. Nonetheless, Griffiths, a classicist, historian, and an Egyptologist, observed
like van der Leeuw, that a scholar's propensity to be overly subjective depends on
the strength of the beliefs whether religious or otherwise, of the scholar.14 Given that
the views of both Griffiths and van der Leeuw coincide, I suggest that the scholarly
unity of thought results from a human-centred rather than a religious experience.
[Plutarch's] descriptive distinctions and psychological analyses [of the
Osirian myth] are coloured by his [Plutarch's] own thinking and that
10 Griffiths, Plutarch, 31.
11
Griffiths, Plutarch, 19. Griffiths is quoting from H. J. Rose, The Roman Questions ofPlutarch
(Oxford 1924), 53. See Griffiths' comments: 'As early as Herodotus the Greeks assumed that the gods
of the Egyptians, like those of other nations, could be equated with their own'. 257. See also Griffiths'
comment that in general, Herodotus 'believed that Egypt was the source ofGreek religion'. He
suggests that Herodotus 'probably means here that the Greek names were modelled on Egyptian
prototypes, conveying a similar meaning in another language', 53,n.2. The 'naming' process and the
inter-relationship between gods and goddesses are particularly important in Egypt -1 discuss this in
detail in chapters five and six.
12
For van der Leeuw's theory of a universal typology of'salvation', see previous chapter two.
13 Griffiths, Plutarch, 32. Griffiths' comment seems to verify the difficulty for the 'fervent religious
mind' to be subjective about another religion. The theological background of the classical
phenomenologists would suggest some support for this theory.
14 See Book Review: R E. Witt, 'Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride', Ihe Classical Review, 22, 1972:207-
209. Griffiths is described as an 'expert Egyptologist' by the reviewer, R E. Witt.
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of the cultured society whom he addresses. To some extent ... the
difference depends on the religious beliefs, or absence of such beliefs,
characteristic of the observer' but his [Plutarch's] strongly held
philosophical views made it unlikely that he would strive hard to
understand ideas that were very different.15
That Griffiths suggested that Plutarch's analysis of Egyptian myth was
coloured by his socio-cultural background, may be indicative of'myths' themselves,
as I propose, that in some form they are reflections of the cultural identity of their
creators, ofwhich religion may form an integral part. Similarly, he suggested that
this seems in accord with the difficulties earlier discussed of bracketing one's own
beliefs in order to better understand the beliefs of others. Plutarch's approach to
Egyptian 'religion' is summarised by Griffiths: 'His belief in a rational approach to
mythology helped to give him the faculty of treating the myths of other peoples in
the same spirit as he did those of the Greeks'.16 An alternative view is expressed by
Sir Alan Gardiner when he introduced his translation of the ancient Egyptian text,
The Eloquent Peasant: 'The only basis we have for preferring one rendering to
another... is an intuitive appreciation of the trend of the ancient writer's mind'.17 The
phenomenological dichotomy of reason or intuition, or a subjective-objective
combination, is seen in both views.
This is not to say that the methodology of the phenomenologist is
unattainable, given Kristensen's view that it is more a probability than a certainty.
Rather it is important to emphasise that students of religion should be aware of the
possible intrusion of their own religious or cultural beliefs, or absence of such
beliefs, in the religion or culture being researched.18 Griffiths voiced the dilemma:
'Can it be that, ifHerodotus was pro-Egyptian, Plutarch was, in spite of his professed
universalism, a somewhat narrow Greek exclusivist, eager to press the Hellenic
15 Griffiths, Plutarch, 32. See also van der Leeuw's comment in chapter two, n.98.
16 Griffiths, Plutarch, 19. See also the preface in R.O. Faulkner, Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), viii. Faulkner's comment is particularly important to this
study: 'Without doubt many of the divergences between Sethe'e translations [of the Pyramid Texts]
and my own arise from just this necessity of personal interpretation, and it is well that differences of
opinion should be ventilated, so that other workers in the field may be made aware of the possibilities
and perhaps be enabled to decide between them'.
17 Alan H. Gardiner, 'The Eloquent Peasant', JEA, 9, 1923:5-25.
IS The difficulties experienced by the classical phenomenologists in the intrusion of their Christian
beliefs, was discussed in chapter two.
78
3 Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride
stamp on whatever he saw in other religions?'19 Although Griffiths acknowledged
the genuineness of Plutarch's interpretation of the Isis and Osiris myth, in that he
'narrates the details of the myth... as accurately and faithfully as he is able', in the
final analysis, Griffiths suggested that 'an objective appraisal [of the Osiris 'myth'] is
impossible'.20 Henri Frankfort interpreted Plutarch differently.
Even Plutarch, who was well informed, has hellenized Isis and Osiris
so thoroughly that his book has long been a source of confusion to
Egyptologists. There is no authority in Pharaonic sources for the
character and some of the adventures which he attributes to these
gods. Yet Plutarch does so, not because he was indifferent, but, on the
contrary, because of the spell Isis and Osiris had cast over him and
over his contemporaries... Thus Isis, the devoted but subservient
consort of Osiris, became the vehicle of Plutarch's philosophy, his
peculiar amalgam ofPlatonic and Stoic views...21 (my emphasis)
Here is an example of the confusion of literature. Frankfort argued above that
Plutarch's version of the 'myth' of Isis and Osiris is a 'source of confusion to
Egyptologists'. Different interpretations may add to the distraction of attempting to
understand a culture's narrative from the insider view. Of some significance is that
both Griffiths and Frankfort implied that it was unrealistic to presume a scholar's
ability to bracket cultural ideals. It is important, therefore, that a comparative
appraisal of Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride is offered, if only to establish any
deviation or otherwise from ancient Egyptian textual sources. Equally, comments
from Egyptologists whether or not they support Plutarch's version are included. It is
not my intention to elaborate on Egyptian theology in general. Rather my aim is to
exemplify the issues surrounding the typology 'myth'. If the term 'myth' is a
narrative that concerns superhuman beings, and the Pyramid Texts are understood to
include the 'myth of Isis and Osiris' and other deities, then are the Pyramid Texts
exemplified as 'myths' of ancient Egypt?
3.3 Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride: an Evaluation
Within the eighty chapters of Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride, only chapters
twelve to nineteen will be researched in this study because, as Griffiths noted, only
19 Griffiths, Plutarch, 31.
20 Griffiths, Plutarch, 32.
21 Griffiths, Plutarch, 31. Quoted by Griffiths from Henri Frankfort's, The Problem ofSimilarity in
Ancient Near Eastern Religions, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 22.
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these chapters 'are constantly credited by Egyptologists as providing a trustworthy
narrative of the myth ofOsiris'. He explained: 'Works on Egyptian religionfreely
use Plutarch's account, one reason being that Egyptian sources, in spite of an
increasing plethora of allusions, do not provide a narrative which is at once
99
comprehensive and coherent' (my emphasis). The question is, whether or not
allusions to the beliefs of another culture are justified as facts, when Egyptian
narratives are silent on the subject of reliable evidence to validate Plutarch's claims.
Recent literature continues to offer Plutarch's version as the authoritative account
often with the proviso, for example, that the 'myth ofOsiris or the strands ofmyth
that gather around him, are mostly preserved as short allusions'.23 The problem is
perpetuated when Plutarch's account is reiterated with the implication that allusions
to facts constitute the reality envisaged by the Egyptians.
Some three decades earlier the historian and phenomenologist, C. J. Bleeker,
agreed: 'The myth of Osiris was made famous by Plutarch's rendering of it. Only
scattered allusions to the mythical adventures of Osiris are to be found in the
Egyptian texts'.24 Although there is agreement among scholars that Plutarch's
version of the Osiris 'myth' fails to provide an accurate account of ancient Egyptian
beliefs, reference is often made to the 'death' or the 'death and resurrection' of Osiris
as if he had been an earthly king.25 This fact in itself appears to challenge aspects of
22 Griffiths, Plutarch, 1-2. See also Henri Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, (New York; London:
Harper & Row, 1961), 126. Frankfort attests that the Osiris, Isis and Horus myth was not only popular
among the Egyptians; it is referred to in the Pyramid Texts and the Memphite Theology. He
comments: 'Yet it is not known as a connected story until Plutarch recorded it'. See also Frankfort,
Kingship, 292. 'The Greeks have not only identified Egyptian gods with their own but have used the
Egyptian material creatively for their own ends. The spread of the cult of Isis throughout the Roman
Empire is the outstanding example of an adaptation in which the original features disappeared almost
completely. Most, if not all, of the information on Egyptian religion which classical authors offer is
disfigured from the Egyptian point of view'.
23
Barry Kemp, BD, 25. Kemp continued, 'For full versions of the Osiris myth we have to wait until
near the end ofEgyptian civilisation, when Greek and Roman authors encountered Egypt as travellers
or residents. The most detailed account is written by an ancient Greek scholar-priest, Plutarch, around
AD 100'.
24
C.J. Bleeker, Hathor and Thoth, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 2. Bleeker does not source his
observations on Griffiths' account of Plutarch's version of Isis and Osiris rather his Bibliography cites
Plutarch's original Greek account, 165. It is commendable to Bleeker as a scholar and a
phenomenologist that he had observed independently that Plutarch's version deviated considerably
from Egyptian sources.
25 See Pinch, EgyptianMyth, 'The murder ofOsiris', 114; A.G. McDowell, Village Life in Ancient
Egypt, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 118. McDowell states: 'The great myth of Osiris is
best known from the account by Plutarch, a Greek'. She described also the 'death and resurrection' of
Osiris. See also Brief Communication by Alan Gardiner, 'Was Osiris an Ancient King Subsequently
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the 'myth', that the 'murder' ofOsiris was committed by either Horus, his son, or
Seth, his brother.26 If the prerogative of the phenomenological method is to
understand another culture from the insider view, then to understand ancient Egypt is
to realise that the office of kingship existed centre-stage in their society. And the
office of kingship in Egypt was the Osiris-Horus alliance of kings. It is necessary,
therefore, that Egyptian sources are re-examined, but first, the Plutarch account.
3.4 Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride: Chapters Twelve to Twenty
Griffiths cited the sources of Plutarch's work as largely originating from
classical Greek literature. Authors such as Homer, Plato, Hesiod, Aristotle and 'the
Pythagoreans', are referred to in a general way. Griffiths explained: 'That Plutarch
used compilations ofmaterial is suggested by the large number of authors whom he
cites. That he used more than one compilation of authors is shown by the
discrepancies between significant statements which seem to be finally approved'.27
The consequence therefore is not only a decided Greek overlay but also what appears
as an indiscriminate use of literary sources.
Griffiths observed that in chapters twelve to twenty in Plutarch's De Iside et
Osiride, 'not a single author is named'.28 Although Plutarch mostly quoted his
Egyptian sources in general terms, for example, 'the priests say', 'the Egyptians
relate', more intangible sources are cited, such as, 'they say', 'some aver', 'some
say', and 'it is said'. Griffiths rightly asked of the Egyptian content: 'Greek
philosophical doctrines have obviously coloured many of the interpretations, but it
may constantly be asked whether a sub-stratum ofEgyptian teaching is present'. He
Deified?', JEA, 46, 1960:104. Gardiner vehemently repudiates holding the view that Osiris was an
earthly king. He asks the scholars who have misquoted him to refer to his paper written in 1916, the
opinions voiced then remain the same. That 'it is improbable' that Osiris was an earthly king, and that
he [Gardiner] would describe him [Osiris] as 'a personification of dead kingship'.
26 It is important to stress that my thesis concerns the issues that result from the term 'myth' as a
typology of'religion' in ancient Egypt rather than detailed accounts of all Egyptian 'myths'. The
Pyramid Texts in particular may give obscure references to aspects of'death' and 'mourning' which I
posit, concern the so-called 'death' of the reigning king. This is a subject beyond the scope ofmy
thesis, and requires future research.
27
Griffiths, Plutarch, 100. Griffiths is referring to the varying descriptions of Typhon, as 'drought',
'as everything harmful' and 'as the element that is without measure and order'. He explains: 'A
unitary source compilation shaped by one viewpoint would not have shown such manifest
inconsistency'.
28 Griffiths, Plutarch, 100.
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agreed that the 'exact nature of the Greek contribution needs also to be assessed'.
The words ofGriffiths are apt:
From the Egyptological point of view - and this viewpoint takes
natural precedence in approaching a theme derived from Egyptian
religion - the basic question is how far the detailed exposition of the
myth and its meaning as presented by Plutarch agrees with the
29evidence of the native sources.
Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride, chapter thirteen commenced: 'It is said that
Osiris, when he was king, at once freed the Egyptians from their primitive and
brutish manner of life', (my emphasis) Osiris is projected as a 'real' king who 'freed'
the Egyptians from an undesirable lifestyle, that 'he showed them how to grow crops,
established laws for them, and taught them to worship gods'. Plutarch presented
Osiris as a king who leaves Egypt to civilise 'the whole world as he traversed
through it winning over most of the people by beguiling them with persuasive
speech'.'0 That the ancient Egyptians considered Osiris as an 'earthly' king and the
Egyptians as 'primitive' and 'brutish' are uncharacteristic portrayals of the ancient
Egyptian king and his people. Equally the notion that Osiris taught the Egyptians to
worship gods implies that either they had no gods prior to Osiris or that the
Egyptians were unaware of the presence of gods. Egyptian texts and archaeological
evidence proves otherwise. Griffiths rightly observed:
The view of Osiris as a human king, and especially as a civilizer and
bringer of culture... belongs to Greek rather than Egyptian thought and
is clearly due to his identification with Dionysus, coupled with the
equation of Isis and Demeter... To the Egyptians of the Old Kingdom
Osiris was a god and a king of the dead.31
Further, Griffiths argued that it was from Demeter, the Greek goddess of
agriculture, that the idea arose that Osiris was the discoverer of agriculture, and it
• * 32
was from Demeter as the 'law-giver' that this epithet was assigned to Osiris.'
29
Griffiths, Plutarch, 2. Griffiths attributes various influences imposed on Egyptian myth: 'Egyptian
theology is here adapted to the Platonic philosophy', 21, 28; and 'The Iranian origin ofPlutarch's
system is beyond question'. 28. The latter relates to the light-dark, good-evil dichotomy personified as
Osiris and Typhon; 'Many of the interpretations are intensely Greek and they derive principally from
two traditions, the Neo-Platonic and the Stoic', 49.
30 Griffiths, Plutarch, 309.
31
Griffiths, Plutarch, 309.
32 Griffiths, Plutarch, 309. See also Griffiths' comments: 'Osiris as the pioneer of civilization and the
discoverer of agriculture, law and religion is a reflection of a Hellenistic image ofDionysus', 53.
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Finally, Plutarch affirmed his overlay of Greek mythology when Osiris is seen
through Greek eyes: 'That is why the Greeks thought he [Osiris] was the same as [the
33Greek god] Dionysus'. " It seems, therefore, that not only is Osiris given the overlay
of the persona of the Greek god, Dionysus, but also some attributes of the Greek
goddess Demeter.
Similarly, Plutarch assigns to Isis characteristics ofDemeter. When Isis hears
that the coffin ofOsiris is washed up in Byblos, she goes there and sits down 'near a
fountain, dejected and tearful'.34 Griffiths observed that the Homeric Hymn to
Demeter described the goddess Demeter 'sitting down by the wayside, sad at heart, at
the Maiden's Well, where the townspeople get water'.35 Although in the Pyramid
Texts there are many references to Isis in mourning for Osiris, Griffiths explained
that 'the detail about her [Isis] sitting and weeping at a fountain is plainly taken from
Demeter's myth'.36
Plutarch described Isis as grieving so much over the coffin of Osiris that she
gives such a loud wail that the younger son of the king of Byblos dies. Next, Isis is
said to take the coffin of Osiris and the elder son of the king with her on the boat
from Byblos, where the coffin was said to have been washed up. When the elder son
approached Isis in her grief, she turned towards him 'and full of anger gave him a
terrible look. The boy was unable to bear the fright, and dropped dead'.37 That a
'loud wail' from Isis killed the younger prince of Byblos and her 'terrible look'
frightened to death the elder prince, may have reflected the awesome Power of Isis
envisaged by Plutarch. Significantly, in Egypt, Isis was never an earthly Queen as
this incident implies; similarly, her consort Osiris was never portrayed in Egyptian
texts as an earthly king. Both aspects are discussed in the next section.
33 Griffiths, Plutarch, 309.
34 Griffiths, Plutarch, 141.
35 Griffiths, Plutarch, 324. See also Helene. P. Foley, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter, ed., (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 6, lines 98-99.
36 Griffiths, Plutarch, 324. See also Frankfort, Kingship, 292. According to Frankfort, Flerodotus also
equated Isis with Demeter, and Osiris with Dionysus, the latter became manifest as a pillar and has
been wrongly associated with the djed pillar of Osiris. Thus any Byblos connection with the Osiris
myth, described in classical sources, should be discounted; it is unlikely that this story originated in
Egypt.
37 Griffiths, Plutarch, 292.
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Certainly the Egyptian Isis laments for her brother Osiris in both the Egyptian
texts and Plutarch's account.,x There are differences: the Pyramid Texts describe the
character of Isis mourning for Osiris as a sister only; it is later in the New Kingdom
that Isis joins Osiris and their son Horus as the divine triad of Abydos. Equally,
Plutarch depicts an image of Isis, that in solitude she 'opened the chest and pressing
her face to that ofOsiris, she embraced him and began to cry'.39 In mourning scenes
Isis is never depicted in solitude; always she is shown in the company of her sister
Nephthys or with other goddesses. Griffiths rightly disputed that the Egyptian
accounts never refer to Isis opening a chest or sarcophagus, even though Egyptian
texts describe her grief. 'It is you [Isis] who mourn over him [Osiris]'. (Pyr. 1791)
Similarly, Plutarch's description of the mourning Isis 'wandering everywhere in a
state of distress' described accurately only the ethos of the Egyptian Isis. Conversely,
that she 'passed by no one without accosting him, and even when she met children,
she asked them about the chest' is an incident unparalleled in Egyptian narratives.40
Although Plutarch's portrayal of the grieving Isis was similar to that of the
Egyptians, absent was the interplay between her divine family members, particularly
that of her sister Nephthys and their brother Osiris.41 The sisterly relationship is
described in a Pyramid Text:
Thus said Isis and Nephthys: The 'screecher' comes, the kite comes,
namely Isis and Nephthys; they have come seeking their brother
Osiris, seeking their brother the King. Weep for your brother, O Isis;
weep for your brother, O Nephthys; weep for your brother! Isis sits
down with her hands on her head, Nephthys has grasped the tips of her
breasts because of their brother the King, who crouches on his belly,
an Osiris in his danger... (Pyr. 1280-1282)42
18 See Richard H. Wilkinson, The Complete Gods and Goddesses ofAncient Egypt, (London: Thames
& Hudson, 2003), 147-148. He describes Nephthys along with her sister Isis as representing 'the
archetypal image of the mourner in Egyptian literature and art. Both goddesses are mythically equated
with the kite, a bird of prey with a particularly shrill piercing cry which has been thought to have been





41 In Plutarch's account there is no mention ofNephthys in chapters 13 through to 20.
421 will discuss this text in detail in the later part of this chapter. Rather than the grieving aspect
because Osiris the King has 'died', 1 posit this text symbolises the 'death' of the Horus-king and
transfiguration, or re-birth, as the Osiris king. The text, on the one hand, justifies the offering of the
mother breast ofNephthys and on the other hand, the grieving goddess signifies the traditional earthly
pose of mourning. The Pyramid Texts are in fact, Texts which imply knowledge of transfiguration.
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Moreover, Plutarch described how Typhon cuts up the body ofOsiris into
fourteen pieces, scatters them throughout Egypt, and Isis in her search found only
thirteen pieces. 'The only part of Osiris which Isis did not find was his male
member'.43 Griffiths' comment is odd considering the superhuman nature of Osiris:
'[I]t was unheard of that a dead person, still less one who had been deprived of his
genitalia, could beget an heir'.44 Nonetheless, it serves to emphasise the functional
nature of the Egyptian Osiris-Horus kingship motif discussed in detail in the next
section. Most problematic about Plutarch's account of the missing phallus of Osiris is
that it is often quoted by Egyptologists as fact.4:> The Pyramid Texts testify to the
intact phallus of Osiris when reference is made to the conception of his son and heir,
Horus: 'Your sister Isis comes to you [Osiris] rejoicing for love of you. You have






See Margaret Bunson, A Dictionary ofAncient Egypt, (New York; London: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 126. 'She [Isis] found all his [Osiris'} remains except for his phallus, which had been
devoured by a Nile fish'. See also Section 29, 'Osiris, the murdered god', in Mircea Eliade, A History
ofReligious Ideas, (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 97. Eliade contends that
'the most complete version of the Osiris myth is the one transmitted by Plutarch ... the Egyptian texts
refer only to isolated episodes'. Eliade refers also to the dismembering of the corpse ofOsiris by Seth
into fourteen pieces. Isis found them all (except the sexual organ, which had been swallowed by a
fish), 97,n.35.
46
See Lichtheim, AEL,\o\. l:35n.4. The heliacal rising of the Dog star, Sirius, or Sopdet, associated
with Isis, signified the beginning of the akhet, the Nile inundation season, and by association, the
period of fecundity. Har-Sopd is identified with Horus, the son of Isis.
47 See also Frankfort's Kingship, 40:Fig. 18. He comments that in a hymn to Osiris, Isis erected the
tiredness of the powerless one [Osiris] and conceived [Horus]. See also Murnane, Ancient Egypt, 272.
He described the relief in the main Osiris chapel behind the Temple of Seti I at Abydos: '[It] is the
climatic moment during which the revived Osiris begets his son Horus on Isis [as a kite] before
passing into the Underworld'. Further, on the conception ofHorus in the Temple ofHathor at Dendera
he commented: 'The crucial scenes are those in which the god brings himself to erection and
impregnates Isis (pictured as a kite hovering above the bier) with the seed ofHorus, future King of the
living', 281. See also Wilkinson, Gods, 146. Wilkinson described the scene and allocates
responsibility to Isis: 'Isis revivified the sexual member of Osiris and became pregnant by him,
eventually giving birth to their son, Horus'. Similarly, Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt,
Tutankhamun: Life andDeath ofa Pharaoh, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984),
250, 269. 'The Osirian legend... states that the goddess Isis, after being fecundated by the dead Osiris,
Fig. 1 Conception ofHorus
and Har-Sopd has come forth from you as Horus
who is in Sothis' (Pyr.632-3).46 Further, a relief in
the New Kingdom Temple of Seti I at Abydos
depicts the prostrate, mummified Osiris with Isis as
a kite fluttering above him (Fig.l).47
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In the end, Plutarch appeared to find the 'fearsome' Power of Isis untenable.
He concludes chapters twelve to twenty with the comment: 'The foregoing are pretty
well the main points of the myth with the exception of the most outrageous episodes,
such as those concerning the dismemberment ofHorus and the decapitation of Isis.48
Conversely, in chapter thirteen, Plutarch alluded circuitously to what appeared as the
supreme authority of Isis.49 'When he [Osiris] was away Typhon conspired in no way
against him since Isis was well on guard and kept careful watch'' (my emphasis)."0 In
Plutarch's version, when Osiris was away from Egypt 'civilizing the whole world',51
Isis alone was able to dissuade the threat to Osiris from Typhon. Only on the return
of Osiris to Egypt did Typhon require seventy-two men plus the help of the Queen of
Ethiopia in his conspiracy against Osiris. '2 Whether or not it was the intention of
Plutarch to suggest that the goddess Isis was a Powerful queen, protecting Egypt
until Osiris, the earthly king returned, there seemed clear indications to this effect.
This view of Isis seems in contradiction to his earlier description that she was
subservient to Osiris. Griffiths agreed: 'On the whole the picture of Isis is less
Egyptian than that ofOsiris'.53
The central issue of the Greek overlay of Plutarch's version of Osiris lay in
the absence of any understanding by Plutarch of the profound meaning to which the
Egyptians attributed to Osiris as Lord ofthe West and Foremost ofthe Westerners.
The West was considered the place of the setting sun, where the journey into the
Afterlife began; the East was the place of rebirth in alliance with the rising sun. '4
whom she had invigorated ...' Also, Erik Hornung, The Ancient Egyptian Books of the Afterlife,
(London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 34. 'Osiris remains entirely passive in the Amduat'.
Scholarly opinions of the conception ofHorus indicate that Isis is the active force in the conception of
Horus.
4!i
Griffiths, Plutarch, 20.147. The episodes relate to Egyptian texts, The Contendings ofHorus and
Seth. The incidents referred to are the decapitation of the head of Isis by Horus and the severing of the
hand ofHorus by Isis. These incidents are examples of the undesirable actions of the deities which the
Greek Sophists and Philosophers rejected. The latter is discussed in chapter four
49 See chapter 13 of Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride.
50
Griffiths, Plutarch, 137.
51 In the Egyptian teaching Osiris is always considered the 'King of the Netherworld' - thus he did not
leave Egypt.
52 The Greek Typhon is identified with the Egyptian snake, Apepi, the adverse force which threatened
the journey of the sun god Ra across the sky and the subsequent rising of the sun in the East.
53 Griffiths, Plutarch, 58.
54 The close association with the daily rebirth of the sun in partnership with the reigning king is
discussed in the later section.
86
3 Plutarch's De /side et Osiride
Equally, Plutarch seemed unaware of the socio-cultural role of the Osiris-Horus
motifof kingship, one that permeated the worldview of the ancient Egyptians. If
Osiris was an earthly king then the concept of kingship as the stability and order of
their society, as the ancient Egyptians experienced it, would nullify the core of their
belief system. Frankfort suggested an explanation for Plutarch's disregard for the
Egyptian perspective of the royal Osiris:
Whatever features the Greeks may have added to the original Osiris
myth, they treated most cavalierly a trait which was of the greatest
importance to the Egyptians. This was the royalty of Osiris. For the
Greeks Osiris' character as a dead king was quite meaningless. To the
Egyptians it was his outstanding characteristic ... that all other aspects
of the god were derived from it. Yet the Greek accounts totally
obscure these Egyptian beliefs."
Flere is the kernel of the issue of the taxon 'myth'. If a narrative or 'myth' is
considered a reflection of a culture's reality or beliefs, it is their story we seek to
understand. Therefore, to impose the term 'religion' is one type of overlay which
may distort a culture's reality. Equally, the pejorative baggage of 'falseness' carried
by the term 'myth' is another overlay in the concept that my 'story' is true, your
'myth' is false. A further distortion may occur as a result of a researcher's subjective
religious or cultural overlay; Plutarch's account is one example. Consequently, it
becomes increasingly difficult to bracket the many superfluous layers in order to see
the insider's reality, to decipher which layer to discard, which to retain. For this
reason if the premise of phenomenology is to understand the 'other' culture, then the
precedent ought to be validation by the insider, whether textually or otherwise.
As a phenomenologist of religion, Bleeker suggests that the
phenomenological method implies not only the 'unprejudiced observation' of data
but also 'an unbiased, critical yet understanding approach'. He commented on the
problem of giving the wrong impression of data by using terms not adapted to the
material. The Egyptian language has no word for 'belief, 'religion', or 'piety',
although he offered that these terms are necessary for the study of religious-historical
investigations. On the one hand he is aware that the word 'religion' is a concept
absent from the Egyptian thinking, yet he appears to impose a religious value on his
Egyptian research. On the other hand his investigation into the characteristics of
55 Frankfort, Kingship, 292.
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Egyptian deities appears to be on the whole one of considerable accuracy and insight
in comparison to the work of Plutarch. If the aim ofBleeker is to try to comprehend
the meaning of Egyptian texts, he appears to have succeeded.36
Egyptian texts provide considerable data on Osiris. To the Egyptians the
character ofOsiris as a 'superhuman' king was as fundamental to the office of
kingship as the concept ofHorus as the earthly reigning king; their alliance indicated
the Egyptian reality of the perpetuity of kingship. The fundamental characteristics of
the god Osiris situate him in his mummified form as the superhuman ruler of the
West, the final place of re-birth as Osiris of every reigning king. The epithets of
Osiris identify him always with the Egyptian afterlife where he reigns supreme.
Images ofOsiris as an earthly king wearing the double crown ofEgypt are absent;
equally his name is not inscribed on any King List.
These facts point to a lack of confidence in the Plutarch version. Similarly,
the Pyramid Texts describe Isis only in the role of a mourning sister alongside
Nephthys. The key role of the goddess Isis in the office of kingship as consort of
Osiris and mother of the reigning Horus king is absent in Plutarch's account. Her link
to kingship arrives later in the New Kingdom period. The differences presented by
Griffiths in his analysis of Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride seem to confirm the
research of this section. The main points of contention are the absence of any textual
reference to Isis and Osiris as an earthly King and Queen in Egyptian literature. Of
greater significance is that Plutarch was unaware of the profound significance the
ancient Egyptians placed on their concept of divine kingship. This is not to say that
the similarities between the Greek and Egyptian deities are insignificant, rather, their
differences suggest the cultural identities of each society. Griffiths again seeks to
understand Plutarch.
If this prominence of the cult of Demeter is characteristic of the first
phase of the Ptolemaic era in Egypt - and the evidence is solid if not
overwhelming - and if Plutarch is reflecting such an attitude in his
direct and indirect comparisons of this cult with Isis and Osiris, what
likely source is indicated thereby?57
56 Bleeker, Halhor, 1-21. A considerable amount of research on Egyptian texts has taken place over
the last thirty years some ofwhich adds to, or in some cases, modifies Bleeker's research.
57 Griffiths, Plutarch, 92.
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One of the main Egyptian sources Plutarch mentioned in his work was that
of the Ptolemaic historian, Manetho, who wrote a history ofEgypt, although he too
58
wrote in Greek. Griffiths observed: 'Great cultural influences must have strongly
exerted themselves on Manetho at the court of his patron [the Ptolemaic king,
Philadelphus]'.59 Yet Griffiths reiterated: 'Direct or indirect citation can rarely be
established'.60 Griffiths is confident that Plutarch gained information from Egyptian
rather than Greek priests and from Plutarch's own contacts with the Isis cult.61
Nonetheless, Griffiths suggested that Plutarch's preference was to use literary
evidence studied at leisure rather than the 'testimony of his own travels in Egypt'. In
the final analysis, Griffiths concluded: 'Ifwe are tempted to deal harshly with him
[Plutarch] for this, it should be remembered that his ignorance ofEgyptian prevented
him from using the worthwhile authorities at first hand'.62
To summarise, Griffiths offered some defence of Plutarch's version of the so-
called Egyptian 'myth' of Isis and Osiris and agreed that it was difficult for a 'fervent
religious' believer to bracket their beliefs. Equally, it was clear that Plutarch's
interpretation demonstrated that the Greek version was a character misrepresentation
of two of ancient Egypt's important deities. Although Plutarch's version has
described some significant cultural similarities, this section has identified clear
differences between the Greek and Egyptian versions.
Consideration should be given to the fact that over three decades after the
publication of the seminal work of Griffiths discussed here, scholars continue to
quote the Plutarch version as if its origins and content are confirmed in Egyptian
literature. Often the Plutarch account is accompanied by the comment that Egyptian
sources are implied or are preserved in short allusions.60 Griffiths referred to one
"8
See Griffiths, Plutarch, 98-99, and his frequent reference to Manetho as Plutarch's source.
59
Griffiths, Plutarch, 79.
60 Griffiths, Plutarch, 81.
61 To say there was an Isis cult in Egypt is to deny the New Kingdom relationship of Isis as mother of




63 Pinch, EgyptianMyth, 115. She described in detail Plutarch's version of Isis and Osiris, she
followed it with the comment, 'This account has no exact parallel in Egypt, but Plutarch may have
been drawing on local traditions and popular tales'. Earlier she made reference to Plutarch's account
with the words, 'Sources like these gave rise to the habit of perceiving Egypt through Greek or Roman
eyes. See also Kemp, BD, 25-26. Kemp acknowledged: 'For full versions of the Osiris myth we have
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scholar's view of Isis in Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride in that 'slightly less than half
of the attributes here assigned to Isis derive from the ancient sources although they
may he Graecized inform'64 (my emphasis). Such a percentage indicates a
significant distortion. Rather than to perpetuate the false impression further, it is
important to situate the narratives of ancient Egypt clearly within the context of
Egyptian society. As Kristensen suggested, it is what the ancient Egyptians value as
their beliefs that phenomenologists seek to understand.
Given the absence ofPlutarch's understanding of the centrality of divine
kingship in the socio-political stability of ancient Egypt, the Pyramid Texts discussed
in the next section reveal an interrelationship of some substance between the Horus-
Osiris axis63 of kingship and the pantheon of gods.66 The question to be asked of the
next section is to what extent does the Egyptian version of kingship demonstrate
Plutarch's deviation from Egyptian sources. Equally, will a re-appraisal of the
concept of divine kingship from the Egyptian perspective illustrate an ontic nature of
transformation that was peculiar to the ancient Egyptians? Implicit in the Pyramid
Texts is the distinction between the earthly life of the Horus-king measured in years
and, in his transfiguration to the Osiris-king, time is eternal. The Old Kingdom
Pyramid Texts, I suggest, are an appropriate primary source from which to begin the
journey towards understanding the ancient Egyptian concept of divine kingship, a
socio-political theology that permeated both their visible and invisible worlds.
to wait until near the end of ancient Egyptian civilisation, when Greek and Roman authors
encountered Egypt as travellers or residents. The most detailed account is written by an ancient Greek
scholar-priest, Plutarch, around AD 100'. A detailed account of the Plutarch version followed.
64 Griffiths quotes D. Muller's Agypten unddie griechischen Isis-Aretalogien (Berlin, 1961:91). In his
book review in JEA, 49, 1963:196-97, Griffiths concluded that although Muller does not believe that a
translation from an Egyptian original is involved, one explanation is that any similarities may be
attributed to a Greek priest of Isis who had access to Egyptian sources.
65 The 'Horus-Osiris axis' term was suggested orally by N. Wyatt.
66 For themes of kingship, see Baines, 'Society, Morality', 128-129. Baines described Egyptian
kingship as 'both the central institution and the main focus ofPower in Egyptian society, and the text
correspondingly incorporates generalized ideas of social order'. On the king as a god, see John A.
Wilson, 'The Function of the State', 71, in Frankfort, The Intellectual Adventure, '[T]he king ofEgypt
was a god and that he was a god for the purposes of the Egyptian state'. See also Murnane, Ancient
Egypt, 45-52.
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3.5 Pyramid Texts: an Introduction
The Pyramid Texts of the Old Kingdom, historically the earliest corpus of
Egyptian texts, are inscribed on the walls of the fifth and sixth dynasty pyramids at
67Sakkara. The texts are often referred to as 'theological' or 'religious', occasionally
as 'religious and mythological' texts or 'myth narratives'. Rarely, if at all, are the
Texts classified simply as 'myth'. Griffiths agreed to the absence of any coherent
mythology: 'Mythological allusions are sporadic and often unconnected'.68 Vincent
A. Tobin rightly offered that the Pyramid Texts were not intended to be a systematic
exposition of Egyptian myth and theology. Rather, he observed astutely that the
context is in some part connected with 'the royal political ideology'.69
Accordingly, given that scholars had difficulty in defining the Pyramid Texts
into a specific category of'myth', this particular genre of texts resists the traditional
phenomenological definition of'myth' as a typology of religion.70 Further, if the
naming process in the phenomenological classifying process is an indication of the
meaning of the texts, then the Egyptian meaning ought to have precedence. Of
crucial importance to the understanding of the philosophy of the ancient Egyptians
was the belief that the words which indicated speech or recitation, djed medu (dd
mdw), when written on papyri or inscribed on the walls of their temples or 'houses of
71
eternity', brought into existence what was written. However, it was required that
the words, djedmedu, were followed always by the name of a deity, or a deified
person; the words signified the speech of divine authority. The ancient Egyptians
believed in the reality of such divine utterances.77 The Pyramid Texts therefore
67
Except as otherwise stated, for general information in this section see Faulkner, FT; Vincent A.
Tobin, 'Selections from the Pyramid Texts', 247-262, in The Literature ofAncient Egypt, (New
Haven;London: Yale University Press, 2003); Lichtheim, AEL,Wol. 1; Nigel C. Strudwick, Textsfrom
the PyramidAge, (Atlanta: Society ofBiblical Literature, 2005); James P. Allen, 'The Cosmology of
the Pyramid Texts', 1-28, in Religion and Philosophy.
68
Griffiths, Plutarch, 33.
69 See Tobin, 'Selections PT', 247.
70 See Jan Assmann, ' State and Religion in the New Kingdom', 56, in Religion and Philosophy, 55-
88. Assmann described the terms 'state' and 'religion' in regard to ancient Egypt as 'anachronistic
concepts' and explained that 'they are aspects or dimensions of one single indivisible theopolitical
unity'.
71 Cf. Faulkner FT, 2, Utterance 13,n. 1. Because of the repetition of the phrase, Faulkner decided to
omit the usual prefix, dd mdw from the translation when 'it is no more than a formal rubric'. For
example, 'Recitation by Nut, (dd mdw n nwt).
72 See Assmann, 'State and Religion', 137.
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demonstrated an important belief in the Egyptian concept of reality, that 'the word'
was a creative force.73
The importance of the Egyptian naming process in its functional form
signifies the meaning intended by the ancient Egyptians. The word akhs (Shw),
describe the transfigured spirits of those who have made the transition into the 'new
world'. The place of transfiguration, the cosmic birthplace of the inert or 'tired' body
into an akh (>//), is given the feminine form and named the akhet (Jht), translated as
'horizon'. This is the place in the sky where the sun rises and sets each day and
where the akhs (ihw) exist in a divine community. The generic term therefore for
funerary texts 'akh-makers' or sakhu (sihw) indicates that the Pyramid Texts were
the means in which spiritual transfiguration took place. The texts, however, carried
Power; they were the causative means of transfiguration. Finally, the texts
incorporated the Power of heka, (hki), a divine power associated with the king, a
term which signified knowledge not only of the predetermined questions and answers
required 'to become' an akh, but also the nature, function and names of the various
portals passed through on the journey.74 Equally, the term heka translates as 'ruler',
thus it is the ruler who holds the divine Power of knowledge of the written word. Jan
Assmann, a Professor ofEgyptology elaborates: 'The spoken word provides the ideal
means of transposing the realities of'yonder' world into this world of symbolic
objects and rituals, but also of transferring the deceased to the beyond, while
enabling him to retain his earthly capacity'.75
Historically and politically, the Pyramid Texts indicated that transfiguration
was initially the prerogative of kings, which in later periods became accessible to
everyone. The Texts therefore offer some insight into the intent of the ancient
Egyptians; our modern term 'funerary' lacks the subtle meaning of the process of
transfiguration earlier described. At its core lay the Egyptian political ideology of the
73 The term heka (hki) was discussed briefly in chapter two.
74 For translations and interpretations ofEgyptian terms throughout this thesis but particularly in this
chapter, see Alan B. Lloyd, 'Psychology and Society in the Ancient Egyptian Cult of the Dead', 117-
134, in Religion and Philosophy; Faulkner, Concise Dictionary ofMiddle Egyptian, (Oxford: Griffiths
Institute, 2002); Allen, Middle Egyptian; Stephen Quirke, Egyptian Literature, 1800 BC, (London:
Golden House Publications, 2004); Assmann, 'State and Religion', 55-88; Assmann, 'Death and
Initiation', 135-159; Allen, 'Cosmology', 1-28; M. Smith, Ihe Liturgyfor Opening theMouthfor
Breathing, (Oxford: Griffiths Institute, 1993); Faulkner, PI
75
Assmann, 'Death and Initiation', 237.
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office of kingship. At the apex of the living stood the king whose subsequent
transfiguration into a spiritual akh followed the path of all previous kings in a
perpetual royal Horus-Osiris alliance. Their domainpar excellence in the new world
was the sky. Given that the reigning king in the company of the gods sailed daily in
the lunar and solar boats in a re-birthing ritual indicates clearly that the sky was
envisaged by the ancient Egyptians as a watery expanse.76
The Pyramid Texts concerned the characters of gods or superhuman beings.
Equally, the Texts concerned the dual nature of the Egyptian divine office of
kingship, a historical office in which the earthly king existed in human fonn. On his
retiral from office the Horus king was transformed into the superhuman ruler Osiris.
Such a human-divine alliance serves to demonstrate the Egyptian belief that the
function of kingship was to maintain a continued world order in the repetition of
royal rebirths.77 The function of the Pyramid Texts appears not only to justify the
belief of a continued royal presence; they also served to avoid the threat of chaos
caused by the death of their king. The inference being that without kingship there is
70
no order and without order there is no life.
Accordingly, to maintain order in the state ofEgypt was to maintain the
divine office of kingship. Equally, the status of the king is reflected in the physical
presence of the royal pyramids. They conveyed to the populace not only an image of
the continued existence of their king, 'writ large', but also that the order and stability
of the Egyptian state as a socio-political institution, was maintained. The physical
structure of the pyramids together with the Texts inscribed on the walls, demonstrate
a royal socio-political ideology which incorporates theocratic Egyptian beliefs rather
than a universal 'religious' dogma. Equally, the Texts described a theo-political
reality shared by elite members of a hierarchical section of Egyptian society and
visually shared also by the populace. The Pyramid Texts indeed concerned
superhuman beings - divine kingship was the protagonist.
Validation of the Power of the earthly king is described in a series ofPyramid
Texts under the heading: The king becomes the supreme deity. In what seems as a
reversal ofPower in one sense, the gods appear to be diminished in the presence of
76
Cf., Allen, 'Cosmology', 7.
77
See Assmann, 'State and Religion', 59.
78 See Assmann, 'State and Religion', 61.
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the king. Then again, it may reflect the absolute Power held by the Old Kingdom
kings who believed that even the sun god Ra was subservient to royal Power. On the
other hand it may reflect the lesser Power held politically and historically by the
priesthood ofRa at this period. Nonetheless, it is the gods who are called upon to be
aware of the king whose Power not only causes the gods to tremble before him, but
the gods are to be subject to him.79 The king mentioned in the text may refer to any
of the fifth or sixth dynasty kings, whether King Unas, King Pepi or another Osiris-
king.80
Lift up your faces, you gods who are in the Netherworld, for the King
has come that you may see him, he having become the great god. The
King is ushered in with trembling... Guard yourselves, all of you, for
the king governs men, the king judges the living in the domain of Re
... The King has power on his head, the King wields the sceptre and
he [Thoth] shows respect to him ... the King commands what is good
and he [Re] does it, for the King is the great god (Pyr.272-274).
In this context, the Osiris-king holds a formidable Power, as Plutarch
suggested. Notwithstanding the texts which describe the Power status of the king, the
Pyramid Texts are essentially a series of instructions or spells that provide for the
transfiguration of the reigning earthly Horus king to Osiris as ruler of the
Netherworld.81 The Texts demonstrate that the royal political ideology of ancient
Egypt expected a continued royal presence in the Netherworld. Rather than a static
philosophy, the Texts described changing beliefs which hint to earlier oral traditions
of the king's rise into the sky as an Imperishable Star (Pyr.759). Political changes
reflect an ideological shift to a new solar theology, the king sails in the sky in the
solar bark of'Millions of Years' with the sun god, Ra (Pyr.274). Then again, texts
describe the transformation of the Horus-king to Osiris, ruler of the Netherworld in
what appears as a royal Horus-Osiris alliance (Pyr.793).
Given that the Pyramid Texts convey various beliefs held by the Egyptians
over time, my intention is to concentrate only on the Osiris-Horus axis of kingship
79
See Faulkner, PT, 62, Utterance 252,n. 1.
80 Faulkner has chosen to discard the names of the pyramid kings preferring instead to use the general
term 'king' because the rituals in the Pyramid Texts all pertain to the superhuman journey of every
king.
81 Faulkner, preface to PT, vii. Faulkner translated the term 'dual' (dwit), as the Netherworld.
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and any Osiris-Isis relationship of consequence. Even if the Power of the earthly king
is validated in the Pyramid Texts, it cannot be said to substantiate Plutarch's belief
that Osiris was an earthly king. Given that Osiris is first mentioned in the Opening of
the Mouth ritual, the stimulus for the initial Horus-Osiris transfiguration, this ritual is
the first to be analysed.
3.5.1 Opening the Mouth Ritual: 'O Horus who is Osiris, the King'82
The name of Osiris is first cited in the Pyramid Texts in the Opening of the
Mouth ritual which re-animates the inertia of the mummified form of the Horus-
83Osiris king. ~ The ritual is performed outside the entrance to the pyramid by his heir
and son, Horus, to ensure the 'rebirth' or regeneration of the royal person prior to the
final destination of the king to his house of eternity or 'house of gold' (hwt.nb).u The
Opening of the Mouth ritual fonns part of the 'a£/?-making' process mentioned
earlier and involves both the actual performance of the ritual as well as the Utterance
oc
or Recitation of the words. The Horus-Osiris transformation is confirmed in a
succinct re-naming ritual: 'O Horus, who is Osiris the King... '(Pyr. 19).
The new Horus king, the old king's successor has enacted the coronation
rituals, received the title of'Horus' at his coronation, and has performed the Opening
of the Mouth ritual on his royal predecessor who is now in the form of Osiris, his
O/T
father. 'Osiris, the King, I bring to you your son [Horus] whom you love, who will
split open your mouth' (Pyr. 15). The new king wears the leopard-skin garment of the
royal Sem-priest (Pyr.223). The functions of the Sem priest were various: to
82 See Faulkner, PT, Pyr. 16.
83 The ancient Egyptians did not use the term 'death' rather they envisaged a form of inertia which
would be re-animated with the various rituals ofakh-makmg.
84 The term 'house of gold' indicates the Egyptian meaning of the term 'tomb', in that gold is an
untarnishable and permanent metal The Egyptians envisaged a timeless existence 'like gold', rather
than 'death' as we know it today. In a similar sense their 'house ofgold' was also envisaged as a
'house of eternity'.
85 For a more detailed account of this ritual see Smith, Liturgy, 14-15.
86 The rebirth motif is seen not only in the Opening the Mouth ritual, when the outgoing reigning king
is transfigured into Osiris, but also connects to the daily rebirth of every Egyptian temple, and the
daily rebirth of the reigning king. Both are linked to the daily rising and setting sun. For a detailed
account of the ritual see A. M. Blackman, 'The Rite ofOpening the Mouth', JEA, 10, 1924:47-59;
T.J.C. Baly, 'Notes on the Ritual of Opening the Mouth', JEA, 16, 1930:173-186; Frankfort, Kingship,
Chapter 10, 110-121; Lanny Bell, 'The New Kingdom "Divine" Temple', 176, in Temples ofAncient
Egypt, (London; New York: I B.Taurus, 1998), 127-184.
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represent Horus as the son of his father
Osiris assimilating the Horus-Osiris
prototype; to maintain the relationship
between kingship and the gods; to provide
offerings to his father, Osiris; to facilitate
the potential Osiris into his transfigured
on
spiritual form. Texts therefore confirm
that it is the earthly reigning king who
Fig.2 Tutankhamun's 'house of eternity' performs the Opening of the Mouth ritual
on his predecessor; thus, the earthly king is pivotal in the transfiguration process of
his predecessor.
A visual display of the ritual is demonstrated in the New Kingdom 'house of
eternity' of King Tutankhamun in the Valley of the Kings (Fig.2). He is shown in the
mummified form of the potential Osiris; he wears the royal Osiris Atef crown and
holds in his hands the royal sceptres. The other figure is King Tutankhamun's
successor, King Ay. In his role of the royal Sem priest, he wears the leopard skin
robe and the royal Khepresh crown. In his hand he holds the adze (wr-hki),88 the
Opening of the Mouth tool which, when touched to the mouth ofKing Tutankhamun
re-animates him; he may breathe, speak, eat and drink in the Netherworld.
Cartouches of both kings, the outgoing Horus-Osiris Tutankhamun and his successor,
Horus Ay, are shown on the walls.
Here is a pictorial example of the symbolic assimilation of the Horus-Osiris,
son-father motif where King Ay is symbolically the Horus son of King
Tutankhamun; in reality there was no familial connection. Although historically,
Akhenaten is often considered the father of Tutankhamun, in the Opening of the
Mouth ritual, Tutankhamun is transformed into Osiris by his symbolic father, the
new Horus-king Ay.
87 See Allen, Middle Egyptian, 56; Lloyd, 'Psychology', 126.
88 Note the term 'wr-heka' which is translated as 'great (wr) Power (heka)\ thus the Egyptian's fluid
use of language attributes the tool for Opening the Mouth, the adze, with the heka Power of the king
as 'ruler' (also 'heka').
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An Old Kingdom Pyramid Text confirms the Opening the Mouth ritual
and the words which actualise the transformation.s9 'Osiris, the King, 1 bring to you
your son whom you love, who will split open your mouth' (Pyr. 15). and the
transformation naming ritual: 'O Horus, who is Osiris the King' (Pyr. 14). The
transfiguration is complete; the earthly Horus-king, Lord ofUpper and Lower Egypt
is now the superhuman Osiris-king, Lord of the West. The iconography of Osiris in
mummified form conveys the image of a king who rules in a superhuman world.
The enactment of the Opening of the Mouth ritual therefore transforms
Horus, the 'eldest son', into Osiris his father; thus, the royal Horus-Osiris axis is in
fact a son-father transference when the son 'becomes' the father. Only then may
subsequent new kings ascend the earthly throne as Horus. In effect, all Horus kings
become Osiris kings in a perpetual cycle of kingship; never is the concept reversed.
The Pyramid Texts clearly describe a royal earthly-divine alliance where the earthly
Horus-king rules supreme.
In the end, the fundamental role of the new Horus king is to demonstrate his
royal Power; he is the instrument who transfigures the retiring king into the form of
Osiris. The same rituals will be performed on the new king when he is overcome by
inertia in a continued process of royal rebirths. The ritual allows also for the 'ka of
kings' to pass from the Horus king into his new Osiris form (Fig.2).90 Equally the
newly enthroned Horus king is now in possession of the royal ka of kingship, a
reciprocal Horus-Osiris earthly-divine alliance of Power. Accordingly, the 'ka of
kingship' is a divine thread which permeates not only the reigning Horus king but
also all past kings now named Osiris. Consequently, the office of kingship is a series
of earthly-divine alliances of some magnitude. The royal primogeniture in the next
89 I have inserted the names of Tutankhamun and Ay to clarify the neutrality of the texts. 'Osiris
(Tutankhamun), the King, I bring to you your son (Horus Ay) who you love, who will split open your
mouth', and 'O Horus, (Tutankhamun) who is Osiris (Tutankhamun) the King'. See preface to
Faulkner, FT, vii. In all texts, the names or cartouches of the appropriate king would have been
inscribed on the pyramid walls. Faulkner has chosen to render the name simply as 'King' rightly
stating that 'the texts have in origin no personal application to one particular king, but are chosen out
of a particular corpus'. Thus the general name 'King' designates the rulers of the 5th and 6th dynasties.
See also Tobin, 'Selection PT', 247-262. Tobin has chosen to include the names of the kings; he
describes Teti as 'Osiris Teti'. See also Lichtheim, AEL, Vol. 1:46, and her use of the term 'Osiris
Pepi'. There are advantages to both methods; Faulkner differentiates between the Horus king and
Horus the god of kingship.
90 On the ka of kingship see Bell, '"Divine" Temple', 89, 92, 114, 140, 142, and 144: Lanny Bell,
'Luxor Temple and the cult of the kaJNES, 44, 1985:251-294.
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section validates the divine status of kingship; as Horus is the eldest son, he is the
heir to the throne ofOsiris; as Osiris is the eldest son of Geb, he is the heir to the
throne of Geb.
3.5.2 Pyramid Texts: Royal Primogeniture91
Behind the concept ofEgyptian kingship a royal ideology is present, a
continual lineage of past kings, the Power of which rests ultimately on the earthly
Horus king. The genealogy and divine inheritance of kings is described in the
earliest Pyramid Texts; the Horus king has been reborn as Osiris. It is appropriate
that he addresses the Great Ennead of the creator god Atum, a collective of nine
deities. 'O Atum, this one here is your son Osiris whom you have caused to be
restored that he may live. If he lives the King will live...' (Pyr.167). The Spell or
Utterance is repeated; Osiris directs his words to his divine parents, Shu, Tefnut,
Geb, and Nut (Pyr. 168-171). Osiris next speaks to his siblings Isis, Seth and
Nephthys (Pyr. 172-174). Finally, Osiris speaks to his son, 'O Horus, this one here is
your father Osiris, whom you have caused to be restored that he may live; if he lives
the King will live... '(Pyr-176). The outgoing Horus king now speaks as Osiris, one
of the four children of the Ennead of the creator Atum, clearly identified in the Texts.
The Horus-Osiris alliance is justified, that ifOsiris lives then so also will the earthly
King who was once inert; the outgoing Horus king is now re-energised as Osiris with
the full support and participation of the Ennead. Isis is discussed only as a sister of
Osiris; a deeper intimacy at this time is absent.
Textual justification for the right for Horus to claim the throne is confirmed.
As the eldest son, Osiris inherits the throne from his father, the earth god Geb. The
royal primogeniture is precise; divine kingship begins with Geb, who passes the
91 The term 'primogeniture' will be examined later in connection with 'the principle or right of
inheritance of the first born child or (male primogeniture) son when the 'occupation' of the 'father' is
handed down to the eldest son. In other words the occupation of the father as king will be the
inheritance of the eldest royal son. See definition in The Chambers Dictionary, 1993:13 61.
92 For example, the King Lists inscribed on the walls of the Temple of Seti at Abydos, Karnak and
Luxor Temples at Thebes, and for example, the British Museum King List, EA117. The Abydos King
List excludes the names ofHatshepsut, Akhenaten, Smenkhkara, Tutankhamun and Ay.
93 'If he lives the King will live'. The King now transfigured from Horus to Osiris will exist in the
superhuman realm as an Osiris king. Also that Atum is said to have 'caused' Osiris to live indicates
that the supreme creator god Atum has participated in the creation ofOsiris as an akh with the full
support of the Ennead.
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crown to his eldest son, Osiris, who in turn passes the throne to his 'earthly' son,
Horus.94 In this context the Horus-Osiris axis appears to concern a royal
interrelationship described succinctly in the Pyramid Texts: Raise yourself, O
King,95 for you have not died,' (Pyr.972) and 'Awake for Horus ... Raise yourself as
Osiris, as a spirit, the son ofGeb his first born... '(Pyr.793). Osiris is depicted as a
key figure; his superhuman nature maintains a constant royal presence in the
Netherworld. In this respect Plutarch has remained faithful to the status of Osiris. On
the question of his rule in Egypt as an earthly king, the Pyramid Texts are silent.
The royal primogeniture theme is continued from the maternal perspective. In
the previous section, Osiris spoke to the gods of the Great Ennead; the context
changes when his mother, Nut, speaks. She begins with a preponderance of
recitations as Nut, the sky goddess and mother of the king.96 'The King is my eldest
son [Osiris] who split open my womb; he is my beloved in whom I am well pleased'
(Pyr. 1). 'The King is my beloved son, my first-born upon the throne ofGeb, with
whom he [Geb] is well pleased, and he has given to him [Osiris] his heritage in the
presence of the Great Ennead...' (Pyr. 3). The king mentioned in the texts is the
earthly king, named Horus at his coronation, now 'reborn' into the Netherworld, as
Osiris. .
Although the royal primogeniture appears to relate to the right of kings to
rule, the sky goddess Nut is the maternal link who holds the Power of royal rebirth.
94 There are various interpretations ofHorus. He is the 'young Horus', son ofOsiris and Isis, Horus,
the 'sky-god', and the royal Horus linked to Osiris. There is no reference in the Pyramid Texts to
Horus as a member of the Ennead ofAtum, although he is later appended as the 'official' son of Isis
and Osiris. The 'young' Horus is discussed in the Case Study, chapter six, in connection with an
incantation text and the Egyptian god, Shed, later Horus-Shed. In the Pyramid Texts Horus is named
throughout as Hern (hrw) rather than the familiar Hor (hr). On the difference between hrw and hr, see
Mordechai Gilula, 'An Egyptian Etymology of the Name ofHorus?', JEA, 68, 1982:259-265. Heru
(hrw) is considered the 'oldest king's title, namely an impersonal expression for "king"'.
95 The 'King' referred to in the Pyramid Texts is identified by his cartouche inscribed on the pyramid
walls. See preface to Faulkner, PT, vii. He has chosen to use the general term 'King' to stress the fact
that 'these texts have in origin no personal application to one particular king but are chosen out of an
existing corpus'. Thus he emphasises the essential continuity of the office of kingship as the
stabilising force ofEgyptian society. The 'King' appears as the main protagonist in the Pyramid Texts
if only because the Pyramid Texts elucidate in textual form, his journey from the earthly world to his
royal domain in the Otherworld.
96 See also Faulkner, PT and a series of addresses to Nut in Pyr.777-786. I interpret the meaning of the
goddess Nut as the mother of the 'first' king, that she is the mother of all kings, since the 'ka of kings'
is kingship in perpetuity. Therefore alt transfigured kings are the eldest son ofNut and Geb, that is,
Osiris.
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Texts which demonstrate her Power as a mother are reminiscent of the Power
Plutarch attributed to Isis.97 'Thus says Geb: O Nut, it is well with you; power was
yours in the womb of your mother Tefenet before you were born, that you might
protect the King' (Pyr.779). The presence of the deities in the Ennead of the creator
god Atum reinforces the collective divine power contained within Nut, even before
her birth. Her power is reflected further in the next text: 'You are violent, moving
about in your mother's womb in your name ofNut'(Pyr.780). It seems appropriate
that the Power ofNut is reflected in her recitations which validate the hereditary
right of kings. Although she confirms that the authority to give Osiris the throne
comes from Geb, her consort, it is the words ofNut which seem to carry weight.98
Later in the New Kingdom period, the image of the mother goddess Nut is
placed on the inside bottom of coffins; her arms are raised in Ca-fonn to receive and
embrace those seeking rebirth into the Netherworld99 (Fig.3). The Pyramid Texts
describe the Old Kingdom ritual: '[Y]ou [the King] have been given to your mother
Nut in her name of 'Sarcophagus',100 she has embraced you in her name of 'Coffin',
and you have been brought to her in her name of 'Tomb'(Pyr.616). Nut is depicted
in her role as the great mother whose body bridges the earthly and the superhuman
worlds. When the earthly, coffined 'body' is embraced in the divine amis ofNut, the
ultimate destination is rebirth into the watery sky. Accordingly, the mummified being
is returned to the body of the sky goddess, Nut, the 'universal mother' from whom
royal births in the Pyramid Texts originated and from whom all future royal rebirths
were forthcoming. The image ofNut is also seen on New Kingdom tomb walls. The
tomb of Tutankhamun is one example; another is the overarching form ofNut on the
ceiling of the tomb ofRameses VI.101
97
A particular aspect of the lack ofPower of Isis is shown when Isis is included as part of the mother
goddess collective.
9!<
Faulkner, FT, 1. From the first eleven Utterances 1-11, only one, Utterance 2, is spoken by Geb
with the words: 'The King is my bodily son'.
99 See previous 90 and 96 on the concept of the ka.
100
See Faulkner, PT, 119,n.7, and his comment: 'The interior of the lid of the sarcophagus, as a
simulation of the sky, was sacred to the sky-goddess Nut'.
101 See Murnane, Ancient Egypt, 325. Murnane describes the image ofNut in the tomb ofRamesses
IV in the Valley of the Kings, Luxor, as she swallows the western sun and gives birth in the Eastern
sky the next day (Fig.4).
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Nonetheless, the final question must be whether or not my interpretation is
validated by the texts as ifthe texts are the intent of the ancient Egyptians. One
interpretation may be that as the first generation of gods, Nut appears as the maternal
impulse of creation. Consequently, if all Horus kings 'become' Osiris kings then Nut
may be seen as the superhuman mother ofall Egyptians kings. It is important also to
recognise that the ancient Egyptians identified the presence ofPower in both the
male and the female. The question is whether or not any significance should be
attached to the absence in the Pyramid Texts of any reference to Isis as the mother of
Horus or the consort ofOsiris. Historically, because the character of Isis as a
powerful figure appears less significant in the Old Kingdom, she was one of a
consortium of goddesses who assisted in the birthing of the new Osiris king. That she
becomes a powerful figure in the New Kingdom period suggests a theo-political
change in the concept of kingship.
3.5.3 The Royal Rebirth: Isis, one of Many
If the key motif in the Pyramid Texts was the perpetuity of kings, then the
goddess Nut was the archetypal mother of all kings; it was later in the New Kingdom
period that Isis as the mother ofHorus gained significant Power. The Pyramid Texts
provide textual evidence of Isis as a mother goddess; but she is part of a collective
entourage of goddesses who assist and share in the various functions associated with
the birthing process. The consortium of goddesses, therefore, are part of a royal
superhuman drama in which they act out their role as substitute royal mothers and
102
protectors.
102 There are other mother goddesses. See Pyr. 1427-1428: 'Selket has set her hands on me, she has
extended her breast to my mouth'; Pyr.2206: '... this king has come forth from between the thighs of
the Two Enneads; he was conceived by Sakhmet, the King was borne by Shezmetet'; Pyr.262 where
Shezmetet gives birth to the king. See also Wilkinson, Gods, 183. Attested in Egypt from the Early
Dynastic Period, this leonine goddess [ Shezmetet], believed to be a form of Sekhmet is 'associated
with, or is a personification of, the shesmet girdle - a belt with an apron of beads which was part of
the attire of kings of the Early Dynastic Period'; Frankfort, Kingship, 41-43. He continues: 'As the
king could be proclaimed the son of various gods to express a relation of dependence and intimacy, so
all goddesses could be addressed as his mother'. However, he emphasises what may appear
problematic in that, as 'mothers' ofHorus and the apparent Western logical consequence that the
'mothers' are therefore the 'husbands' ofOsiris. It is the different roles attributed to kingship that
Frankfort seeks to emphasise, that the two gods Horus, may be the same in one sense, yet different in
another. He is both Horus, the son ofOsiris and Isis as he relates to kingship and the throne, and
Horus, Lord ofthe Sky, son ofHathor with the epitaph of Hathor as the House ofHorns - Isis is
named, 'the deified throne'. Frankfort stresses that Osiris is never the husband ofHathor as described
in Pyr.466a: 'You are Horus, son ofOsiris, the eldest god, son ofHathor'. Thus interpretation of the
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Fig.3 Nut, her ka arms open to embrace Fig.4 Nut swallowing the setting sun. Note the boats carrying the
in her name ofSarcophagus.Pyr.616 entourage of gods. Ramesses VI, KV9. Theban Mapping Project.15068
The most pervasive image of the mother goddess is the goddess Nut. She asks
the Osiris king to arise into the sky: 'Your mother Nut has borne you' (Pyr.626). This
unusual, Egyptian concept ofmotherhood, personified as Nut, is conceived as a
geographic reference, the watery sky. In a different context, Nut is also depicted as a
cow, 'long of horn, pendulous of breast' (Pyr.548), into whose body the sun god Ra
and the earthly Horus king traverse daily in a perpetual process of regeneration. The
reigning Horus king is not only identified with the royal sky god Horus, he is also the
son ofRa. This is an example of the fluid inter-changeable concepts that permeate
the Egyptian world view; the superhuman is intertwined with an earthly existence.
Nut is depicted not only as the mother who participates in the Horus-Osiris
transfiguration; she is present also in the simultaneous daily rebirth of the eastern sun
and the rejuvenation of the living Horus king.
Textually, the cosmic event is described as a ferry journey from the Field of
Rushes for the ultimate birth of the sun and the king, born 'between the thighs of
Texts suggest that Horus is both the eldest son ofOsiris, as well as the son ofHathor. Here is an
example of the fluid characteristics of the Egyptian deities.
103 For a more detailed account of the goddess Nut see Lesko, Goddesses, 22-44. See also A.Piankoff,
'The Sky Goddess Nut and the Night Journey of the Sun', 57, 61, JEA, 20, 1934:57-61. Piankoff
describes the role ofNut swallowing the sun in the evening, 'The majesty of this god enters her
mouth'. In the 'house of eternity' ofRamesses IV, on the leg ofNut are the words, 'He opens the
thighs of his mother Nut; he rises towards the sky'. Also: 'He moves towards the earth, rising and
being born'. The context of rebirth associated with Nut described in the Pyramid Texts continued into
the New Kingdom; all epochs have memories of the concept that 'the sun passed through the body of
the sky-goddess at night'. See also images and description in Amanda-Alice Maravelia, Cosmic
Space andArchetypal Time: Depictions of the Sky Goddess Nut in three Royal Tombs in the New
Kingdom, GM, 197,2003:55-72.
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Nut' (Pyr.l 188). Visually, Nut is depicted on the walls of the tombs of Ramesses IV
and VI, with the various stages of the red orb of the sun depicted within the body of
Nut. The entourage of deities in the solar bark are shown clearly in the burial
chambers ofRamesses VI (Fig.4). Allen suggests that the sky itselfwas conceived as
a 'cosmic amniotic sac' from which the king, like the sun, was reborn daily.104
Significantly, the birth goddess, Mehet-Weret, is often described as the Great Flood,
the primordial water, a celestial goddess who is often represented as a cow.105
Similarly, the concept of a 'Great Flood' may be likened to the bursting forth of the
amniotic fluid at childbirth.106 Equally, the struggle of the birthing process may
suggest the concept of the Osiris king 'drowning' in the bursting forth of the birth
107
waters that indicate imminent birth.
Given that the ancient Egyptians witnessed the reality of the sun rising in the
eastern sky each morning; it is understandable that they envisaged the cosmic region
of the Horus-Osiris transfiguration and the daily rebirth of the sun in the eastern sky.
Texts confirm that the king sailed on reed-floats from the Field of Reeds to arise in
the eastern horizon of the akheX with the sun god Ra (Pyr.337). 'The Field of Rushes
are filled (with water) and I (the king) ferry across on the Winding Waterway; I am
ferried over to the eastern side of the horizon, I am ferried over to the eastern side of
the sky...' (Pyr.340-41). The re-birth motif is a constant theme in the concept of
kingship, both superhuman and earthly. Allen describes texts written on the walls of
the temple of Seti I at Abydos as a 'description of the newborn sun'.108 It may also
suggest the symbolic physical rebirth of the king who, in the company of the sun god
104
Allen, 'Cosmology', 17. For an alternative depiction of the sun god and the king traversing through
the twelve hours of the night, see Hornung, Afterlife, 11- 53. The beginning of the Amduat stresses
knowledge and describes the journey of the sun god through the twelve hours of the night, from
setting to rising, often depicted visually and textually on the walls of royal tombs. In the conjoining of
Osiris and Ra, past kings 'witness' the rebirth of the sun and the reigning king. In the Amduat, it is the
meeting of the inert sun god Ra with the active energy ofOsiris that results in the daily royal-solar
rejuvenation. Equally, the image of the king and the divine entourage sailing on the watery expanse
within the body of the goddess Nut, serves to confirm the socio-political centrality of kingship.
105
Bleeker, Hathor, 25. See also Lesko, Goddesses, 23.
106 There are numerous texts which describe flooding: 'the Field ofRushes is flooded', Pyr.l 102; 'the
Field ofRushes is inundated, the Field ofOfferings is filled with water', Pyr. 1206. Both Fields
mentioned are situated in the akhet, the cosmic birthplace in the eastern side of the sky where the gods
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Ra, displays the redness of the rising sun in a simulation of the redness that occurs in
the birthing process.
The redness after birth,
as he becomes pure in the embrace of his father Osiris.
Then his father lives,
as he becomes akh again through him,
as he opens in his splitting
and swims in his redness.
Inherent in the concept of the Horus-Osiris transfiguration is the
presupposition of his earlier royal existence in human form. Following Plutarch and
the so-called mourning text of Osiris, quoted earlier, and discussed briefly in
footnote 42.1 proposed that the text may symbolise the cosmic rebirth of the Horus-
king rather than the physical death ofPlutarch's so-called Osiris, king of Egypt. The
Pyramid Texts in principle concerned only the transfiguration of the Horus-king in
his rebirth process to become the Osiris-king. In the book Coming Forth by Day,
women are depicted mourning in the traditional pose with their hands raised to their
head.109 The Text under scrutiny describes a similar pose: 'Isis sits down with her
hands on her head' (Pyr.1281). Next, the following text reads, 'Nephthys has grasped
the tips of her breasts' (Pyr. 1282), which may suggest the offering of the mother
breast in the re-birth process. The final part of the text reads, 'because of their
brother the King who crouches on his belly, an Osiris in his danger' (Pyr. 1282).
Referring to the texts and images depicted in the Amduat inscribed with
certain royal tombs, Hornung refers to the 'grave danger' caused by the sun when
sunlight illuminates the seventh hour of the night. The adverse force of the snake,
Apepi, attempts to distinguish the light causing the divine forces to protect the sun
god Ra and Osiris, the combined regenerative forces of rebirth.110 Osiris therefore
faces danger. The fact that the text refers to the 'King' signifies that it is the Osiris-
king transfigured from the earthly Horus-king in a process of rebirth. Alternatively,
109 For the mourning figures in Papyrus Hunifer, BM9901, see Faulkner, BD, 54. A similar scene of
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the danger may refer to the process of re-birth, either the difficulty experienced in
childbirth or the high mortality rate experienced in ancient times.111
Similarly, the dual nature of the Horus king is described. He is not only the
'lord ofmen and gods', he also 'governs men'(Pyr.895, Pyr.273). Geb declares that
the 'King is my bodily son'. The birth of the king appears physical; he splits open the
womb of his mother (Pyr. 1). Additionally, the earthly nature of the human aspect of
the king is denied together with his earthly parentage when he is recognised only as
the child of superhuman parents. 'O my father, because you have no human fathers
and you have no human mothers; your father is the Great Wild Bull, your mother is
the Maiden...you have not died' (Pyr.438).112
Only in the denial of his earthly parentage may the Horus king enter and pass
another doorway into 'becoming' Osiris. The Horus king's mortal form is the
ultimate rejection of his human status; his words transform his earthly body into the
substance of the superhuman. 'O flesh of the King, do not decay, do not rot, do not
smell unpleasant... You shall lay hold of the Imperishable Stars, your bones shall not
perish, your flesh shall not sicken, O King ... because you are one of the
gods'(Pyr.722, Pyr.725). Because the Horus-king has undergone the ritual of the
Opening of the Mouth ceremony, he is able to utter the /te&ct-words of Power. His
heritage has been confirmed; he may take his place as Osiris, son of Geb. The
recitation of the words which deny his physical appearance is part of the ritual of
'akh-making', his ultimate superhuman transfiguration as an akh. Frankfort asserts
that the dismemberment of Osiris
can hardly have been an original Egyptian belief... The pyramid texts
abound in spells in which Isis and Nephthys, Horus and Nut, "unite"
the members of the dead Osiris; they nowhere hint at an earlier wilful
dismemberment. The gods repair the normal results of decay - the
111 There is ongoing research by Greg Reeder, contributing editor ofKMT concerning a crouching
figure, see 'A Rite ofPassage: The Enigmatic Tekenu in Ancient Egyptian Funerary Ritual,' by Greg
Reeder in KMT: A Modem Journal ofAncient Egypt, 5, 1994:53-59. I have suggested that the figure
may be the Osiris-king.
112
Faulkner, PT, 221,n.9. He suggested that the king disowned his earthly parents. See also Pyr.2203:
'... you have no human father and you have no human mother, for this mother of yours is the great
/iwrt-serpent.., who dwells in Nekheb, whose wings are open, whose breasts are pendulous...' Here
the mother symbol takes on another form, yet retains the basic concept of the mother principle.
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dislocation... rats and jackals... and damage following the dissolution
of flesh and tendons.113
Further research on this topic would bring considerable knowledge to our
understanding of ancient Egypt.
The final transfiguration is a cosmic event. Nut with her two daughters, Isis
and Nephthys, participate in the rebirth of the king. 'Nut shouts for joy ... Isis
conceives me, Nephthys begets me and 1 [Osiris king] sit on the great throne which
the gods have made ... I am your son, I am your heir' (Pyr.l 161). Nephthys is
described giving birth to the king who is conceived by Isis. Similarly, a goddess
mother-daughter alliance is offered: '[F]or you [Osiris King] are a spirit whom Nut
bore, whom Nephthys suckled, and they put you together'114 (Pyr.623). The potential
Osiris-king is described as a spirit, signifying his ultimate transfiguration as an akh.
In the rebirth process, the mother's breast is presented to the Osiris-king.
Rather than the breast of the mother goddess Nut, the breast of Isis is offered: 'Raise
yourself, O King! ... you have your milk which is from the breasts ofMother Isis.
Raise yourself, you child of Horus'115 (Pyr.734). The mother motif serves to suggest
further that the Egyptians believed that the cosmic rebirth procedure described in the
Pyramid Texts was a mirror image of the human birth process. In the earthly world,
the mother's breast is the sustenance of the newborn infant; the Text describes a
similar procedure: 'Take the breast ofyour sister Isis... '(Pyr.32a). The goddesses
continue to play their part in the on-going drama after the Osiris king is reborn in his
final ascent into the sky: 'I ascend upon the thighs of Isis, climb up on the thighs of
Nephthys' (Pyr.379). When the Osiris king is finally crowned and enthroned in the
Netherworld, the two sisters enact the role of the mother to the newly born king: 'Isis
nurses him, Nephthys suckles him'(Pyr.372, Pyr.l873).
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Frankfort, Kingship, 201. Frankfort is referring to the so-called deliberate killing ofOsiris in the
Plutarch account discussed earlier. Fiis comments serve to offer further consideration to the physical
deterioration of the body ofwhich the Egyptians must have been aware.
114 The statement, 'and they put you together' suggests a time when the bones of the deceased were
bundled together for burial before the era of mummification. I posit that this is a very different
concept of Isis 'bringing together' the 'alleged' cut up parts ofOsiris. For example, in the Pyramid
Texts the terms: 'collect your bones' (Pyr.654); 'Fionas has reassembled your limbs' (Pyr.635); 'he
has caused Thoth to reassemble your limbs' (Pyr.639); and 'my bones are assembled for me, my limbs
are gathered together for me (Pyr.980). See also the decaying of the royal body described in Pyr.722
and Pyr.725.
115 See also Pyr. 1883.
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The Pyramid Texts describe the final ascent of the Osiris-king to his mother,
the sky goddess, Nut. She is accompanied by daughter goddesses Isis and Nephthys,
the sisters of Osiris (Pyr.755, Pyr.756). The Osiris king is placed between Isis and
Nephthys, who protect and support the enthroned king. 'Isis has your arm, O Osiris;
Nephthys has your hand, so go between them, all is given to you' (Pyr.960-1). The
Osiris king is welcomed by his mother Nut: 'May you arise, O King ... equipped
with the form ofOsiris upon the throne ...' (Pyr.759). Rebirth is complete; the form
ofHorus has been transfigured to Osiris.
That the Horus-Osiris axis of kingship is a central theme in ancient Egypt's
royal ideology is evidenced in the Pyramid Texts examined. Both royal roles are
defined clearly, unlike the characters of the goddesses whose identities concern the
functions of birthing. The Texts portrayed the goddesses in fluid roles which did not
define them rigidly. Rather, their characters are blurred in a unified concept of
motherhood. Later in the New Kingdom Period, the goddesses are given character
roles of some significance. This may serve as an example of the fluidity ofEgyptian
beliefs; texts describe characters that appear to co-exist in an uneasy concept of a
parallel reality. In the Old Kingdom Isis is insignificant in her communal birthing
role. She was one ofmany who gave sustenance to the newborn king in her offered
breast, yet in the New Kingdom, her role changes. She becomes a supreme royal
goddess ofPower, symbolic of the throne, a key figure in the triad of Abydos: she is
mother of the reigning king, Horus, and consort of Osiris, ruler of the Netherworld.
The dominant image of Isis is with young Horus suckling her breast. 116 Her position
in the Pyramid Texts was one of a consortium of goddesses who assist in the birth
process ofOsiris. Later, Isis gained prominence as the sole mother of Horus.
Nonetheless, Nut rather than Isis is the motherpar excellence in the Old Kingdom.
116 See Wilkinson, Gods, 147, and his comment that 'pharaohs of the New Kingdom and later periods
had themselves depicted verbally and visually as the son of Isis'. For example, numerous images of
kings being suckled by Isis are inscribed on tomb walls. For example, on his tomb wall at Thebes,
Thutmose III is depicted being suckled by a tree goddess named as 'his mother Isis'. See also R.H.
Wilkinson, Reading Egyptian Art, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1992), 46-47. He described the situla,
a breast shaped container often held by Isis and associated not only with the concept of fecundity but
also with Isis, as the mother ofHorus.
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3.6 Summary
In Plutarch's account of the so-called 'myth' of Isis and Osiris, there was
clear evidence that his version contained extraneous data which betrayed
significantly the Egyptian concept of dual kingship. If Osiris was an earthly king, as
Plutarch proposed, then the structure ofEgyptian socio-political society as they
experienced it could not exist. It is only when the reigning king seeks entrance into
the Netherworld that Osiris gains prominence.117 The Pyramid Texts discussed in this
chapter have provided clear textual evidence to the existence of a Horus-Osiris
alliance. Their ideology required that Osiris was the name of a superhuman king and
Elorus was the designated name for the reigning king. The constancy of the Horus-
Osiris alliance throughout the historical period of the Egyptian state, suggests that the
office of kingship functioned as a significant stabilising force in the orderly existence
ofEgyptian society. Accordingly, Plutarch appears to have misunderstood the basic
concept ofEgyptian kingship when he described Osiris, not only as the earthly king,
but as one who travelled from Egypt to other lands.
This does not detract from the fact that Osiris is a key figure of considerable
importance in the primogeniture of kingship and the transfiguration rituals. The royal
monopoly of transfiguration into an akh ceased at the end of the Old Kingdom. By
the New Kingdom democratization of royal prerogatives opened the transfiguration
ritual to the populace.118 Throughout ancient Egypt's historical three thousand year
period, the royal Horus-Osiris motif of kingship remained a key element not only in
the office of kingship but also among the ancient Egyptians generally.
Given that the Egyptian concept of their superhuman beings was functionally
very different to that of the Greeks, when Plutarch identified the Egyptian Isis and
Osiris with the Greek deities Demeter and Dionysus, another distortion was created.
In the Pyramid Texts, Isis is given a communal role within a mother-centred
consortium; later in the New Kingdom her character role changes when she becomes
part of the Osiris-Isis-Horus triad of Abydos. She gains status as the supreme mother
117 Griffiths, Plutarch, 6.
118
See Bleeker, Hathor, 8, and his comment that immortality was originally the prerogative of kings,
prior to the later New Kingdom 'democratisation' of the mortuary cult to the ordinary people. See also
Murnane, Ancient Egypt, 74: 'The adaptation of the king's mortuary cult for the common man - a
process that has been going on since the end of the Pyramid age - is increasingly reflected in private
tombs, particularly starting with the New Kingdom'.
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of the reigning king Horus, the consort of Osiris and the hieroglyph for 'throne' on
her head signified she was the Egyptian throne personified and deified. Plutarch hints
at her Power, although there is no textual evidence which suggests that she was ever
an actual queen ofEgypt.
I have endeavoured to interpret the Texts as accurately as possible following
the phenomenological principles of epoche and empathy, to bracket my opinions and
value judgements. My aim was to 'experience' subjectively what the ancient priest-
scribes had intended to convey in their texts. I was aware of the dangers of imposing
an interpretation not present in the texts, given that many of the Pyramid Texts are
obscure and may encourage speculation. Accordingly, my portrayal of the Horus-
Osiris alliance of kingship with their entourage of birth goddesses has been
objectively described with a subjective awareness of the Egyptian beliefs.
I have offered some interpretations of various points which would benefit
from further research: First, I have suggested that the Textual description of the
cosmic birth procedure may reflect the birthing process of the earthly mother and
child or more appropriately a royal mother and child. I propose that the superhuman
prototype of the mother goddess birthing consortium may be a reflection not only of
the entourage of assistance given to the earthly Egyptian queen in the birth process
but also may describe the physical experiences and dangers of childbirth within the
historical timeframe. Next, the Texts suggest that the role and Power of the Osiris
superhuman king appears as a mirror image of the Florus earthly king; the context
therefore appears to be within a theo-political framework. Finally, the Texts appear
to describe the need for the king to deny his earthly parentage when he becomes the
child of superhuman parents. Similarly, he is required to reject his human form so
that his substance is transformed into the element of the superhuman. The Texts
suggest a human-centred concept of kingship, given that the royal scribe-priests were
aware of the physical nature of their king. Thus further research may provide
significant insight into the ethos of the ancient Egyptians.
On the question of the terms 'myth' and 'religion', the Pyramid Texts are
silent. From an objective stance, the Texts may be termed 'myths'; they appear to
centre round superhuman beings although the protagonist is the king. The question is
whether or not the ancient Egyptians considered the transfiguration of their king to a
superhuman being as an actual event. In consideration that the Horus-Osiris
transfiguration remained a key element among kings throughout ancient Egypt's
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historical period, later emulated by the populace, I postulate that this was a belief that
not only served to unify Egyptian society but also was a force which maintained an
ordered society.
On the subject of 'religion', given that the Texts concerned the rituals of
kingship and the Horus-Osiris transfiguration, they fail to convey any concept of
organised public worship identified with institutional religion. Finally if, as Kemp
suggested, Egyptian 'religion' in the form of state-approved written texts is 'an
intellectually manipulated construction'; this may be a viable comment.119 Believers,
whether Egyptian, Christian or Muslim, may disagree that their faith is the result of
human calculation. Nonetheless, Texts provide evidence that the Egyptian stories of
their superhuman beings centre not only on the divine nature of king but also on his
physical human form.




Myth Re-examined: the Religion Connection
But is 'religion' the right word? I don't think so.'
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I first re-evaluated Plutarch's account of the Isis and
Osiris myth and then provided a textual comparison of the Egyptian deities drawn
from the Old Kingdom Pyramid Texts. Similar to the early phenomenologists'
overlay ofChristian beliefs, the results in chapter three demonstrated not only a
Greek overlay of some substance; they also revealed a distorted image of Egyptian
kingship. Moreover, my research revealed that Plutarch's account was generally
presumed by Egyptologists as the extant version of the myth of Isis and Osiris. My
fundamental research method centred on the premise that to describe, interpret or
understand another religion or culture it is necessary to see it from the insider view.
It was essential therefore to strip away the Greek overlay to un-cover the Egyptian
■j
meaning of the role of kingship within the context of their belief system.'
Nonetheless, given human nature's propensity to be subjective rather than objective,
to identify with 'sameness', the classical phenomenologists in chapter two appeared
to agree that to achieve certainty of another's beliefs was an elusive objective.
Scholars therefore rarely realised complete understanding of another 'religion' or
belief system.
I concluded that the phenomenological system proved productive; to examine
the empirical textual data with rigorous awareness of epoche, an endeavour was
made to refrain from reading more into the texts than the ancient Egyptians intended.
Therefore, re-examination of the data objectively followed only after I had
understood the meaning and function of the texts from the Egyptian perspective.
Because my self-conscious approach to the phenomenological method proved a
1 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, (London: Black Swan, 2007), 33.
2 For a recent reference to Osiris as the first king ofEgypt, see Karen Armstrong, A Short History of
Myth, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 50-51.
2
In this chapter I use the word 'beliefs' rather than the presuppositions inherent in the term, 'religion',
the latter I interpret within the framework of the communal worship of a transcendent God.
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positive experience, I intend to follow the same principles in my re-examination of
the literature in this chapter. My aim is to re-evaluate the taxon 'myth' in its
relationship with the construct term 'religion'.
The term 'myth' is not an exclusive category of religion. There are many
studies which discuss in detail the multiple interpretations of myth; what the term
'myth' is, what it is not, whether or not the term arose from within a Greek context,
and the association between the words 'religion', 'myth', mythos and mythologia4
Equally important is the key issue of the concept ofmyth as a 'false story', whether
or not its pejorative epithet is conducive to a myth-religion partnership. In this
context, if'myths' are just 'false stories', why does the myth-religion partnership
persist? In the end, the search is for justification of and reasons why the term 'myth'
continues to be classified as a typology of religion, given its ambiguous true-false
impediment. Conversely, rational thinking may suppose that a false epithet is
justification for its application to 'other' belief systems; 'my belief, 'your myth'.
The second part of this chapter re-examines the issues which have resulted from the
first section and compares them to examples of so-called 'myths 'of ancient Egypt.
4.2 Overview of the Issues
The key issue to be addressed is that the religion-myth partnership
predisposes the religious intent of the term 'myth'. Ifmyth serves not only to identify
the beliefs of a society but also to maintain societal order, then such a belief system
4 Unless otherwise noted this chapter is researched from the following sources: R. Buxton, ed., From
Myth to Reason, Studies in the Development ofGreek Thought, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1999); Alan Dundes, ed., SacredNarrative: Readings in the Theory ofMyth, (Berkley; London:
University of California Press, 1985; Robert A. Segal, Myth, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004). Segal's recent 'short introduction' to myth is a comprehensive study ofmyth with
reference to key authors who have written on the subject. Reference is made to the various theories
and definitions from the disciplines of religion, science, philosophy, literature, psychology and
society. See also McCutcheon, 'Myth', 190-208. For an overall view ofmyth from its beginnings
through to the Enlightenment period and later, see Lincoln, TheorizingMyth. See also Robert Segal,
Myth andRituallheory: An Anthology, (Maiden, Mass.: Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Baines, 'Egyptian
Myth'. On an alternative view of'knowledge as an instrument ofpower', see Baines, Restricted
Knowledge, Hierarchy, and Decorum: Modern Perceptions andAncient Institutions, JARCE, 27,
1990:1-23. Also Wyatt, 'Mythic Mind'; Kirk, Myth, Lawrence Coupe, Myth, (New York; London:
Routledge,1997); The myriad works ofMircea Eliade on myth are referenced in the Bibliography.
For a collection of Scandinavian papers from the disciplines ofEgyptian religion and the history of
religion, see Gertie Englund, ed., The Religion of the ancient Egyptians: Cognitive Structures and
Popular Expressions, (Stockholm: S.Academiae Ubsaliensis, 1987); Lana Troy, Patterns of
Oueenship in Ancient Egyptian Myth andHistory, (Stockholm: Universitetet, 1986).
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in ancient Egypt, for example, may incorporate socio-political aspects of, in
particular, law, economy, protection and defence of their land and people. The issue
therefore concerns the meaning intended by the phenomenological tenn 'religion'
when used in conjunction with the term 'myth. Two of the consequences of the
religion-myth partnership identified in chapter two are the true-false dichotomy and
the universal status ofmyth.
A recent comment by the Egyptologist, G. Pinch exhibits self-conscious
awareness of the myth-religion issue in Egyptian Studies that 'In the English-
speaking world comparatively few Egyptologists now specialise in religion and
myth'/ The aim ofEgyptologists is to study the Egyptians as a people, given that
'myth', as a rich source of information, articulates their core values. The shift is
towards the concept of the 'culture 'of ancient Egypt, away from the inappropriate
term 'religion'. Cultural relativism is the reason given by Pinch because recently,
'Egyptologists have striven to treat Egyptian religion in a non-judgemental way'.6
This statement serves to indicate the presence of epoche in some part, that scholars
now merit a religion or culture from within its own framework.
Conversely, in the study of religions the term 'myth' continues to be
classified as a universal typology. Given the consensus among scholars that myth is a
'story', one that concerns superhuman beings whether as God, gods, or as Eliade
proposed, other supernatural phenomena, each 'story' is culturally relative to each
society. In consideration that the term 'myth' means different things to different
people, there are clear definitional issues. A problem in today's secular world is that
'myth' generally means 'false'; the concept of 'myth' as 'true' had to be rejected by
o
definition, if only because of our modern scientific standards of theory and proof. In
the phenomenology of religion the term 'myth' as a typology of religion may be
interpreted as either 'true' or 'false' depending on whose beliefs are the subject under
discussion. In chapter two, an example was given in context when the classical
5 Geraldine Pinch, EgyptianMyth, 13.
6 See Pinch, Egyptian Myth, 12-13. See also a detailed analysis of the religion-myth problem by
Baines, 'Egyptian Myth', 81-105.
7
Chapter six demonstrates my phenomenological method to the literature of ancient Egypt.
8
For a similar view on the 'reality' of religion, see Hans H. Penner, 'You don't need a myth for
information', 153-170, and Nancy K. Frankenberry, 'Religion as a "mobile army ofmetaphors", 171-




phenomenologists demonstrated the either-or concept of'my belief or 'your myth'.
Armstrong offers another example. When the Bible is removed from its ritual
context, it is easier to approach it in a secular manner for factual information, reading
it like any other modern text.9 It is no longer a subjective study; my belief. A similar
argument can be made for all societies' texts or myths when taken out of context.
Hence, my objective is to 'see' as far as possible from the insider view.
In the academic world, many disciplines offer their own theory ofmyth: in
anthropology myth is cultural; sociology interprets myth as an aspect of society; and
psychology presents myth as a theory of the mind. Most disciplines therefore
incorporate a society's myth within the framework of their raison d'etre.
Occasionally, however, different disciplines gain insight when working together.
Wyatt describes the process as 'rehabilitation', when myth, as the prodigal son,
returns to the fold of biblical scholars and systematic theologians, enriched with the
insights gained from alien peoples such as anthropologists and psychologists.10
Consequently, myth, when freed from the confines of the narrow category 'religion',
was enriched by its contact with other disciplines. My Case Study in chapter six
illustrates an inclusive socio-cultural approach to Egyptian texts."
On the whole, all theories tend to interpret their concept of'myth' with a
natural predisposition towards their discipline, each offering their supporting
arguments to justify their competing 'truth' claims. Moreover, implied in the various
theories ofmyth are imaginary aspects of a community segregated into different
areas of importance rather than one whose different parts integrate society as a
whole. Kirk's comment presents another perspective; that it is essential we
understand what myths are, what they are not and what is their function. He rightly
concluded on differences that it is self-evident that 'myths do not have a single form,




Wyatt, 'Mythic Mind', 3, 3,n.3. See also Segal, Myth ,5. Segal challenged a 'too rigid' approach to
myth: 'For theories from, above all, religious studies, the main characters in myth must be gods or
near-gods. Here, too, I do not propose being so rigid. If I were, I would have to exclude most of the
Hebrew Bible, in which all the stories may involve God but, apart from only the first two chapters of
Genesis, are at least as much about human beings as about God. I will insist only that the main figures
be personalities - divine, human, or even animal'.
11
Following Segal, I seek to avoid a too-rigid approach to 'religious' texts. I use the neutral term
'texts' rather than the value-laden 'religious' texts.
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12culture to culture'. Although he argues there is no single type ofmyth, this is not to
say that myths may not have a primary mode ofmythical expression, a creation myth
is one example. Nonetheless, myth can be applied in different ways and to different
ends.
For example, creation myths may signify a universal concept, although
societal differences reveal their cultural identities. Equally, kingship may be a
universal concept which serves different functions in different cultures, but to
classify divine kingship as a universal typology of religion is to deny the cultural
differences that identify each society. Kirk argues therefore that myth is likely to
reflect 'problem-reflecting aspects beyond what is implied by trivial aetiology'. The
ancient Egyptian focus on a 'future' superhuman life is one example, whether or not
in this context the texts, peculiar to the ancient Egyptians, may be considered
'myths'. Thus, Kirk's comment on the 'error of universalist theories' seems to
suggest that 'myth', as a universal typology of religion, is an unsustainable
1 -3
classification. On the one hand, the insider voice is muffled; the customs and rituals
that identify each society are unified within an external framework of universal
sameness. On the other hand, the phenomenologist of religion may consider that the
believer's voice is not being heard clearly.
Accordingly, there are many theories ofmyth among academic disciplines
and, equally, there are many forms ofmyth that abound in different cultures. Given
the multiplicity of theories and forms ofmyth as well as the dichotomy of the true-
false nature ofmyth, why does the elusive term 'myth' persist in many disciplines of
the academic world? If there is little consensus among scholars of a universal
definition of'myth', and in consideration of the 'near absence of narratives about the
gods that can easily be termed myths',14 then why is myth classified as a universal
typology of religion?
12 Kirk, Myth, 2.
13 See Kirk, Myth, 252-253.
14
Baines, 'Egyptian Myth', 81.
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4.3 The Problem of Definitions
Segal commented that the different theories ofmyth result from the questions
asked and the responses received from different disciplines.1'7 Thus many modern
theories ofmyth are decided on by the questions posed by other disciplines such as
anthropology, psychology, and sociology, as well as religious studies and theology.
Conversely, when examining ancient texts, with no verification from their adherents,
the scholar who seeks understanding may interpret both the questions posed and the
answers received within a subjective view, their responses based on preconceived
ideas. If questions centre on the religious essence of a typology then the responses
may be predisposed towards identifying only the 'religiousness' of the phenomenon.
The question of the form of the religious 'essence' follows. The typology 'sacred
texts' or 'scriptures' is an example. Armstrong's earlier comment voiced her concern
that when sacred texts were read as objective secular texts, their sacredness is
demeaned alongside the biblical meaning intended by the Christian believers. Thus,
the framework of the questions asked of ancient texts may be weighted towards the
answer required by a particular discipline: Near-East archaeology was first intended
as verification of historical, biblical claims.16 The so-called polytheism of ancient
Egypt was compared unfavourably to the Western concept ofmonotheism.17
If there are many theories ofmyth, each from different disciplines, then one
may concede that the category 'myth' is restricted within the boundaries of the
theory of each discipline, whether religion, science, society, anthropology,
15
Segal, Myth, 2-3. On the problem of the form and type of question asked, see Richard Dawkins with
Muriel Gray, 19 August 2005, Edinburgh International Book Festival. See Appendix for full extract.
Dawkins used the apparent suicidal action of a moth flying into a candle flame as an analogy to a
question addressed to him about religion: Is religion itself a revolutionary tool? He replied to the
questioner: 'I think you have to rephrase the question [about religion]. Biologists are accustomed,
when they are confronted with a puzzling piece of behaviour, to asking, "What is its Darwinian
survival value? Why is it there? Why do these animals do it?" Sometimes that is the wrong question.
Sometimes you are focusing on the wrong thing when you ask that question. A good illustration of
that is the habit that insects show at night of flying into candle flames. We all know that behaviour and
it would be tempting to say that it is suicidal, self-immolation or self-sacrificial behaviour. What is the
survival value of a moth committing suicide by flying into a candle flame? However, I think that that
is the wrong way to express the question. Instead, we have to ask, "What is going on in the moth's
nervous system when it flies into a candle flame?"
16
John Romer, Great Excavations. John Romer's History of Archaeology, (London: Cassell, 2000),
164-165.
17
Kristensen, Meaning ofReligion, 21. Kristensen compares the 'us' of monotheistic faiths to the
polytheism of the Ancients. 'The ultimate and autonomous is seen as divine energy, even in events
and objects which would not induce us to worship'(his emphasis).
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philosophy or other. Segal's comment is justified: 'There are no theories ofmyth
itself, for there is no discipline of myth in itself.1* Equally mythos, within its Greek
context, is a word which signifies a story or account the meaning of which is empty
without a contextual framework. Thus each theory is the answer to the prognostic
questions asked by different disciplines. If, however, myth reflects the ideology of a
society, whether or not that ideology concerns superhuman beings, then in this
context myth may serve to unite and maintain societal order. A society's ideology
therefore in textual form is their reality; it may incorporate some if not all theories of
the different disciplines. The presupposition is that what binds a society together is
'religion'. Within the boundaries of the disciplines of religion and theology, the
problem appears unresolved if only it is suggested, because of the lack of a clear
definition of 'myth'. Wyatt explained his position:
One of the problems which besets the whole issue is that no adequate
definition ofmyth has ever been agreed, and this is perhaps especially
true among biblical scholars, with the result that inadequate
definitions have been paraded briefly, adopted uncritically, applied
indiscriminately, and used dismissively.19
Since there appears to be no scholarly consensus for a definition of 'myth', that
different disciplines propose different theories, to suggest another definition of myth
20
to the myriad of definitions proposed by scholars would perpetuate the confusion.
The confusion which results from the myriad of definitions of the term myth appears
to challenge its universal status as a typology of'religion'.
4.4 The Problem of 'Truth'
In 1969, Eliade wrote: 'If in every European language the word "myth"
denotes a "fiction ", it is because the Greeks proclaimed it to be such twenty five
centuries ago'.21 I have chosen to use Eliade's words as the model ofmy enquiry
since he is one ofmany scholars who voice the view that the term 'myth' arose




Wyatt, Mythic Mind, 4.
20 On some definitions of'myth', see Strenski's quotation on the 'workshops of the myth industry',
Four Theories, 1-2, and Wyatt's comment in 'Mythic Mind', 3,n.2: 'These views did not prevent
Strenski from adding to the industrial output'.
21 Eliade, Quest, 72.
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hold that inherent in almost all definitions of 'myth' is the question of its legitimacy.
Segal, writing in 2004, noted that today the term 'myth' is generally regarded as
'false' with the expression, 'Myth is "mere" myth'.22 Barber in 2005 agrees that
mythos is often synonymous with untruth: 'Oh, that's just a myth'.23 In contemporary
literature, when 'myth' is designated as a 'false story' or as the Greeks proposed, a
'story told for children', there is implicit in these assumptions that these so-called
myths are not 'our sacred stories' but belong to some 'other' culture.
On a different level, when someone calls something a 'myth', claims are
being made about its relative level of validity and authority in comparison with other
sorts of discourse.24 When an authority deems that their 'sacred story' is true, that the
'sacred story' of the other culture, designated as 'myth', is 'false', there is implicit in
both assertions that the words are words of'power' spoken from a source of
authority and knowledge; whether superhuman, political or otherwise.2" This position
was described in chapter two when Christian stories of salvation were reasoned to be
'not merely a myth'.26 Nonetheless, today, the essential issue is the 'false' epithet
carried by the word itself.
It is generally agreed that the particularform ofmyth as an authoritative story
binds and identifies each community. For example, the Christian salvation theme
may be the religious authority which unites the Christian community. In ancient
27
Egypt the authoritative power was the theo-political office of kingship. On one
level the concept of truth equates to authority; however, if a 'statement' is not
approved by authority, then it is deemed 'false'. From a different perspective, the
word 'heresy' signifies a false doctrine, a belief contrary to the authorised religious
teaching of a particular society; heresy is therefore a 'false' belief. Given that a
22
Segal, Myth, 6.
23 Elizabeth Wayland Barber and Paul T. Barber, When they Severed Earthfrom Sky: How the Human
Mind ShapesMyth, (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 149.
24
Lincoln, preface to TheorizingMyth, ix.
25 See Wyatt, Space and Time, 3,n.8, and his comment on exclusive truth-claims: '... no religion
should be regarded as having the monopoly of'truth'. There is no cognitive 'truth' in religious
claims'.
26 The concept of'myth' in Egyptian texts as a source ofpower, authority and knowledge is
introduced in the next chapter and serves as the framework for chapter six.
271 use the term theo-political in the context that the office of kingship in ancient Egypt was
considered theocratic rather than 'religious'.
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culture's ideology is revealed in their 'stories', that they are true, then the polemic
use of the term myth to signify the 'other' culture's story may be indicative of the
application of the term 'myth' meaning false or heretical. Significantly, most
cultures use texts and/or rituals to authenticate their power, indicating that there is an
either-or dichotomy; either they are true or they are false signifies clear concepts of
whose knowledge is Power.
The dilemma of a truth claim is explained when the term 'myth' is applied to
the narratives of the Hebrew Scriptures in that some hostility is noted.28 Since 'myth'
has long been associated with 'false' stories, it is understandable that some Jewish
scholars protest when their sacred narratives, unique to their faith, are identified with
the 'untrue' nuance of'myth'. Thus, from the insider or subjective viewpoint,
adherents are aware that their 'stories' reflect the true beliefs of their community.
When their 'stories' are defined objectively, within the universal typology 'myth'
with the baggage of falseness attached, then the term 'myth' is untenable.29
Finally, I suggest that different forms of narrative in which myth plays its
part, express qualitatively different kinds of thinking. The use of what appears as the
conflicting terms emic and etic may be considered complementary views of different
forms of 'truth' claims. Germane to the emic view is the understanding that 'my
story' is an account of'my' truth-claim and is an integral part of'my' socio-political
world view. The word 'emic\ first coined by the linguist Kenneth L. Pike, is culture-
specific and concerns the beliefs held by aparticular society. According to Pike, the
system first used to understand linguistic behaviour, could now be applied to human
behaviour; the more appropriate word emic was created from the language sound-
based, [phonjemic. For Pike, his key feature was that an emic account of a society's
in
beliefs should be validated by the adherents of that society/
28
Wyatt, Mythic Mind, 3.
29 A student in my 2005 class had mentioned that he found one of the recommended course books
difficult because the author had stated that 'Yahweh was a myth'. His difficulty arose, he said,
because as a Christian, he believed that Yahweh was real. See also L. Honko, 'The Problem of
Defining Myth', 42, in SacredNarrative, 41-52. Honko writes: 'To call the Resurrection a myth may
be a dastardly insult to a Christian for whom the concept [of myth] has a pejorative sense. He would
probably prefer some such expression as holy story or sacred history...'
30 Marvin Harris, who offers an alternative theory to Pike proposes that a 'community of observers
themselves must decide' on what is, or is not, the beliefs of the community as a whole. See Thomas N.




The term etic, extracted from [phonjetic, is an account of a belief system that
may be applied and compared to other societies, and is thus universal or culture-
neutral. For example, the scholarly, view observes a society's 'myths' from an
outsider perspective; one formed by similarities of typologies and comparative
■5 i
analysis. A societal, universal, etic account lacks the validation of particular
cultures but its general approach leads towards the subjective emic account of a
32
society's stories. The aim is towards an interrelated subjective-objective, emic-
emic understanding of the beliefs of the adherents.
From an Egyptian perspective, I argue that the texts that concern superhuman
beings are emic accounts in that they are specific to the culture of ancient Egypt.
Although the words 'emic' and 'etic' do not translate adequately to 'insider' and
'outsider', there is an inter-related, local-universal connection in that each society is
an integral part of the universal human society. For example, if'myths', 'sacred
stories' or 'texts' are accounts of the deeds of superhuman beings, then in this
context, they are universal etic accounts in that they are culturally neutral.
Conversely, if the deeds concern gods and goddesses that relate specifically to the
rituals ofEgyptian deities, then they are emic accounts that concern the culture of
ancient Egypt. Here is an example of a system which will benefit phenomenology
since one culture may not be understood in isolation, but only when in comparison to
other cultures.
Segal offers a theory of the insider view: 'A theory which maintains that
myth functions to unify society may circumvent the issue of truth by asserting that
society is unified when its members believe that the laws they are expected to obey
were established long ago by revered ancestors'. Thus from the objective outsider
view, myth 'may circumvent the truth'; the insider view believes their story is true. It
is a question ofwhose definition we follow, whose truth claim to which we adhere.
31
See William E. Paden, 'World', 335, in Guide to the Study ofReligion, 334-47.
32 See Headland, et al., Ernies andEtics, 31. The emic-etic concept is discussed in more detail in the
next chapter.
33
Segal, Myth, 4. Segal suggested that it was not an issue whether or not the 'truth' had originated
with the 'revered ancestors'. See Lillian E. Doherty, Gender and the Interpretation ofClassicalMyth,
(Tondon: Duckworth, 200If 100. Similarly, Doherty contends: 'A myth "belongs" to the people who
tell it, and it in turn shapes their sense ofwho they are'.
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Equally problematic is the phenomenological premise that the beliefs of the
adherent of a 'religion' are true, even though there may be different doctrines among
adherents; they are true for each believer. Christianity is one such example of the
multiform nature of one faith. For example, in the form ofEastern Orthodox, Roman
Catholic and the many denominations ofProtestant churches, each beliefmay be
validated by the adherents of each denomination. The religions of Judaism and Islam
evidence similar multiform beliefpatterns/4
Thus, a universal definition ofmyth as a religious typology seems an
insurmountable issue when different doctrines arise in what was earlier a universal
faith. A fissure is created which results in different truth claims and the question of
whose 'myth' is true. In such a situation, religion fails to be a unifying force for
society. Stephen Quirke presents the issue from another perspective, suggesting that
rather than approaching Egyptian texts, iconography and archaeology from a
religious context, it may be more appropriate if, rather than within a mythic
connotation, they are considered as art, poetry or philosophy. He continued that
religion itself has ceased in European lands to function as a binding
force; religions cross national boundaries and are not confined to one
land, and the nation-state now enjoys other means of uniting its
inhabitants, leaving the individual to organise his or her own response
to existence.35
36
In the end, when the term 'myth', a so-called 'slippery' category, is applied
to the narratives of'other' religions or cultures, not our own, it is then reasoned that
the stories that define their beliefs are 'myths', that is, they are 'false'. Similarly,
when applied to other denominations within, for example, Christianity, Islam or
Judaism the truth issue of'myth' is perpetuated further.37 In the end, the problem
appears more than one of definition or truth claims; rather, the baggage of falseness
is attached to the word' myth' itself. It is an issue which persists.
34 This is the problem envisaged by Harris, see previous, 30, that the many different beliefs of a
'religion' may cause confusion as to whose 'meaning' is taken as the exemplar.
33
Quirke, Ancient Egyptian Religion, (London: British Museum Press, 1992), 19.
36 The term is used by Satlow, 'Disappearing Categories', 17.
37 For a detailed and wide-ranging critique on the distinction between 'true-and-false' and 'verifiably-
true' propositions, the problem of'knowable knowledge' by the insider, and whether or not different
insiders may have 'exactly the same perceptual worlds', see Philip L. Tite, 'Naming or Defining? On
the Necessity ofReduction in Religious Studies', CR, 5, 2004:339-365.
121
4 Myth Re-Examined
The next section concentrates on the origins of the term 'myth', how and why
the tenn arose historically, the apparent changing meaning of the terms mythos and
logos, the context in which myths or mythos were first written and the reasons why
myth may have received its false epithet. The themes are interrelated. The classicist,
Kathryn Morgan, suggested there may have been some cultural alienation in our
possible lack of understanding of the tenn 'myth', that what we mean and what the
Greeks meant when they used the term myth (mythos).38 In the end whether it is a
problem of interpretation or misunderstanding the term 'myth' the consensus is that
the term mythos arose from within a Greek context. The next two sections
concentrate on this theme. The final section tests out the issues within an ancient
Egyptian context.
4.5 The Problem of Language: Mythologia, Mythos and Logos
Eliade is one ofmany scholars who allude to the Greek origins of the term
39
'myth', how and why it arises within the Greek world. '[T]he Greeks steadily
continued to empty mythos of all religious and metaphysical values. Contrasted both
with logos and, later, with historia, mythos came in the end to denote "what cannot
really exist'".40 First, given that the Greeks are said to have denuded all religious and
metaphysical values from myths suggests that these elements were previously
incorporated within the ethos ofmythos.
38 K.A. Morgan, Myth andPhilosophyfrom Presocratics to Plato, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 15. See also'what we mean' in the definition ofmythos in The Chambers Dictionary, 1115:
'myth; mythology; theme; scheme of events, the characteristic or current attitudes of a culture or
group, expressed symbolically (through poetry, art, drama, etc)'. There is some difference in the way
'myth' is defined: 'an ancient traditional story of gods and heroes, esp., one offering an explanation of
some fact or phenomena; a story with a veiled meaning; mythical matter; a figment; a commonly held
belief that is untrue, or without foundation'. Of some interest is that only 'myth' is suggested as being
'untrue'. See also Barber, When they Severed Earth, 149. 'Earlier modes of thought using analogy
could not be understood in the new cause-and-efifect deductive method ofgaining information, thus
'the word myth, originally Greek mythos "a traditional explanatory saying", has now become
synonymous with "untruth"'.
39 See Kirk, Myth, 7. Kirk rightly suggested that there was 'no Platonic form ofmyth against which all
actual instances can be measured'. See also Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 34. She proposed that the
first major culprits in the "creation of mythology" are the Greek philosophers, 'starting with
Xenophanes and ending with Plato'. 34. Wyatt commented [oral communication], that what has
happened historically, is that modern discussion of'myth' had its origin in Greek speculation. The
meaning of their stories and the use of the Greek word mythos is only a historical starting point.
40
Eliade, Myth andReality, 1-2.
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Second, if the Greeks later designated mythos as fiction, what were the
circumstances that resulted in the change from a 'religious' concept to one that was
false? This section seeks to respond only to these questions rather than to enquire
into Greek philosophical concepts. The ultimate question is what were the
circumstances that returned myth to its original so-called 'religious' framework.
Although historically the words mythos, logos, and mythologia41 arose from within a
Greek context, their meanings appeared to change over time, from a goddess-inspired
divine authority to a state controlled authority. These changes will be examined
briefly and only in relation to the transition from the mythos of the eighth century
BCE Hesiod, next to the fifth century Pre-Socratics who re-defined mythos and
logos, and finally to the logos of Plato.
Lincoln's theory into the changing meanings of the Greek terms mythos and
logos merits a brief overview if only because of the variant interpretations of the
terms discussed. He explains the history ofmythos and logos, from its
transformation from the poetic speech ofHesiod and Homer to the rational discourse
of Plato. He proposed serious re-examination and deliberation of the meaning
intended by the terms, mythos and logos in the Greek texts. Subtle nuances were
evident in the juxtaposition of certain words by the Greeks that rendered their
meanings more effective. For example, different forms of the words 'falsehoods' and
'truths' were placed into the mouths of the Muses in Hesiod's Theogony :42
(27) We know how to recount many falsehoods like real things, and
(28) We know how to proclaim truths when we wish.4"1
41 For an interrelated interpretation of the terms, see Claude Calame, 'The Rhetoric ofMuthos and
Logos', in FromMyth to Reason, 119-143. Cf. Calame's interpretation ofmythos as a story comes
under the heading of logos, a discourse, or narrative whose logic is generally that of an emplotment.
42 The Muses were the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, the goddess ofMemory. Zeus stayed with
her for nine days after which she gave birth to nine daughters, the Muses.
43 Hesiod: Theogony, 27-28 quoted in Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 3. See also Morgan, Myth and
Philosophy, 21. Morgan proposed that modern scholarship on Hesiod: Theogony, 27-38, contends that
'all poetic representation may be a "lie" to some extent' but there is no question of the truth status of
myth, or of poetry, that, 'until the rise of philosophy, there was no 'mythology'. Alternatively, in
M L. West's commentary on lines 26-28 ofHesiod's Theogony (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1966), he
suggests that hitherto Hesiod 'had been preoccupied with false things', and now the Muses are saying
that although Hesiod has been ignorant of the truth, the Muses would now reveal the truth to him.
'Admittedly, we sometimes deceive, but when we choose, we can reveal the truth, and we are going to
reveal it to you', 161-163.
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Thus in the two lines the goddesses were able to speak both 'falsehood' and
'truths'. Line 27 describes the language used to denote 'plausible falsehoods'. The
text used the verb legein (to recount) that a poetic formulaic line was used for
'skillful pieces of deception'.44 Hesiod placed into the mouths of the Muses, the
daughters ofZeus, the ability to recount 'falsehoods like real things'. The latter term
suggests deliberate deception.43 In line 28 Hesiod gave the goddesses the power 'to
proclaim', (gerusasthai), 'truths'.46 Significantly, the interchanging verbs discussed
by Lincoln could be used alongside 'truths' in line 28.47 Thus different words may
stress or imply a different nuance to truth claims. Lincoln suggested a subtle
difference in meaning: to use the word mythesaimen (to speak, to tell [mythos]),
alongside truths, signified 'truths' that are told or spoken, that the method of telling
the truth related to 'mythoi and truth'.
Essentially, therefore, mythoi are stories; their meaning may vary depending
on the verbs used alongside. Further, Lincoln proposed that when the verb 'to
proclaim' is placed alongside 'truths', when 'truths are proclaimed', they are perhaps
indicative of an authority.48 Thus, 'to proclaim truths' in line 28 signified that mythoi
were truths spoken with the authoritative voice of the goddesses.49 Because the
goddesses know truth, they are able to manipulate or select an appropriate form of
'truth' as a persuasive tool for a given circumstance; thus they can speak both mythos
and logos.30 In short, the meaning of the tenns was signified by the verb alongside
44
See commentary, West, Theogony, 163:'In these places the meaning is "plausible", the sort of
fiction that can be believed in', in a different sense 'of "probable" conjecture or opinion'. See also,
Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, he points to the same formulaic line used by Odysseus's most skillful (and
morally problematic) pieces of deliberate deception, 4.
45
Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 218,n.3. Lincoln refers to the only other reference to the same formula in
Odyssey, 19, 203, in which the god Odysseus deceives his wife.
46 Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 3-4.
47
Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 4. For Lincoln, the only sources in which these two verbs appear are in
Theogony, 27-28, and Works andDays, 10. The interchanging verbs discussed by Lincoln are
mythesaimen (to speak, to tell), or the word used by modern editors, gerusasthai, (to proclaim).
48 Lincoln, Theorizing Myth, 'divine proclamation of truth', 218,n.4.
49 This is similar to the Egyptian ritual when the term, 'dd mdw\ is followed by the name of a deity,
the latter signifies divine authority.
50 On other interpretations of the enigmatic lines 27-28, see J. Clay, Hesiod's Cosmos, (New York;
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58-60. See also comment by Arrighetti (1996), 54,
quoted in Clay, 58,n,43: 'Ifwe do not establish a precise reference, outside ofHesiod's work, for
Theogony 27, we must then accept as a fundamental presupposition for any interpretation of his work
that it is impossible for him to escape from a condition of uncertainty between falsehood and truth,
since the Muses can inspire the one as well as the other'.
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either mythos or logos', the terms in themselves indicate an account, to tell or relate
an event. The words themselves are neutral. Similarly, the authority is signified by
the person who recites the mythos or logos.
Lincoln's intention was not to suggest the appropriateness or otherwise of one
particular interpretation over the other, rather, to draw attention to the variance and
adaptation of language. Nonetheless, while manipulating the meaning and intention
of the language, and Lincoln suggested it was deliberate, the Greeks sought to
reconcile more effectively the multivalent contrast between true speech and what
appears as deception.31 The term logos according to Lincoln, was used by Hesiod
only five times. Other than on one occasion, it always appeared in the plural, logoi',
sometimes modified by the adjective 'seductive', other times placed alongside
pseudea ('falsehoods'). Thus the term logoi is associated with 'falsehoods', disputes,
and quarrels, language which suggested 'verbal forms of conflict, in which women
excel'.52
Moreover, in Hesiod's Theogony Lincoln offers as an example in line 229,
that 'Quarrels and Falsehoods and Logoi and Disputes' is gender-based in that the
lines inferred the verbal conflicts ofwomen; and the preceding line 228 describes the
physical battles ofmen: 'Combats and Battles and Murders and Manslaughters'. In
the poetic works of Hesiod, Lincoln's theory is that the terms mythos and logos are
not only gender-based, they relate also to an interchangeable relationship between
the true and the false, male and female. It seems that the Greeks, like most cultures
manipulated aspects of language to convey truth claims.55
Of some importance is the reverse meaning attributed to the terms mythos and
logos today; mythos as 'false', logos as the 'Word' in the Christian concept of divine
51 See commentary, West, Theogony, 161,n.2, 26-28. Cf. 'Admittedly, we sometimes deceive; but
when we choose, we can reveal the truth, and we are going to reveal it to you', 162. Also a different
form of truth: 'the meaning of "plausible", in the sense of the sort of fiction that can be believed in. In
a different sense, of "probable" conjecture or opinion, 163. See also Raffaele Pettazzoni, 'The Truth
ofMyth', 98, in SacredNarrative, 98-109. Pettazzoni asked, 'Or is there a kind of double standard of
truth?'.
52
Lincoln, 5. See also West's translation of Hesiod's Theogony 226-229, 20.
53 A similar use of language is employed in the Poem ofPentaur, supposedly 'authorised' by the
Egyptian king, Rameses II describing the account of the Battle of Kadesh. Scholars often refer to this
poem as 'propaganda', but from the point ofview ofEgyptian kingship, it was considered a truism of
the power of kingship. For the Poem ofPentaur, see Lichtheim, AEL 2:62-72
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creation.34 What circumstances caused this significant reversal of meaning? What
were the factors, if any, that provoked the revolutionary change in meaning in the
application ofmythos and logos? The next section continues the theme of the
problem of language but in the context of change.
4.6 The Problem of Change: Mythos and Logos
By the fifth century BCE, power had changed from a goddess-inspired
authority not to a religion-centred but to a state-dominated, elite authority. The word
mythos was gradually transformed. Earlier when in juxtaposition with key verbal
forms, mythos was associated with truth and authoritative speech.33 The conditional
presence of the goddess who enabled poets to speak their 'truths' was discarded;
mythos became 'connected with the traditional tales, stories (myths) that were the
vehicles of authoritative social conventions,56 (my emphasis). Similarly, logos in
conjunction with certain verbal forms, was earlier interpreted as the persuasive,
seductive, false speech generally associated with women. Later, the term was
associated with the authoritative male voice of logos, the 'false' epithet discarded,
the persuasive element retained. Rather than a change in the meaning of the word
logos itself, the context in which the word was framed signified the change from a
goddess authority to the nuance of the secular male authority.
The words mythos and logos seem bound within an intricate language
relationship between knowledge that was power, and its linguistic expression. Why
did the Greeks yield to the apparent reversal of the terms mythos and logos? The
transition seemed convoluted and complex, yet the changing application of these
terms seemed nothing more or less than a linguistic attempt to re-validate the words
S7
in order to justify the Ideal State in a new social order. Logoi retained the poetic,
persuasive quality ofwords and were used towards rational argumentation rather
than narrative discourse. Mythos, from its earlier meaning of authoritative speech,
54 See Lincoln, Theorizing Myth, 4. See also Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 17. 'Since myihos does
not at first have the same implications as does our modern use of the word "myth"'.
55
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 52.
56
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 46.
"7 See Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 305. He
phrases it differently: 'What does change as soon as philosophy appears on the scene is perspective
and verbalization, the kind of questions asked'.
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was relegated, in part, to the stories mothers tell their children.38 Mythoi were
denuded not only of any links to the goddess and divine authority,59 but also to any
disreputable acts of the deities, the fighting and plotting among the gods.60 Given that
all societies are dynamic, subject to change in line with new truth claims proposed by
new social orders, the terms mythos and logos proved no exception. The socio¬
political aspect of both mythos and logos appear to challenge any religious context,
but first, the Pre-Socratics demonstrated a gradual process of change in the function
ofmythos.
4.6.1 The Pre-Socratic Xenophanes
First the Pre-Socratic Xenophanes did not reject all poetry, only that which
undermined the institutions and functions of the state; marriage, family, law,
commerce, the polis. He sought only civil order and the stability of the state. He
rejected stories that were detrimental to the gods, stories that gave them human
frailties of 'stealing, committing adultery, and deceiving each other'.61 Some
importance was placed on the pedagogy of mythos, not only to encourage the
morality of Greek citizens but also to promote the benefits to society as a whole.
Xenophanes suggested that men should not sing of the battles of the gods but should
instead 'hymn god with pure words and auspicious mythoi ',62 Thus the function of
mythos changed; it was not only associated with the well-being of the state but also
the ideology of the gods as an exemplar of human behaviour.
58
See ed., Scott Buchanan, 'Republic II', 352-354, in The Portable Plato, (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1977). Socrates: . . . we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of the
truth, are in the main fictitious ...', 352. 'Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the
writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and
we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only', 353. It was not that
Socrates expounded that mythoi were untrue, rather the fighting and plotting between the gods was not
an accurate portrayal, 'for they are not true', 354.
59
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 46. She stated: 'Presocratics reject the world of poetic
mythologising'.
60
Buchanan, 'Republic II', 353-354. For Socrates, State censorship was required because certain
works ofHomer and Hesiod were considered by Socrates as a ' lie'. He elaborated on the meaning of
Tie'; whenever an 'erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes...In other
words, certain deeds of the gods are no longer considered suitable exemplars for the well-being of the
State.
61
Xenophanes, Fragment B 11, quoted in Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 26. See also Burkert, Greek
Religion, 309.
62
BI. 14 quoted in Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 48. See also Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 29.
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The concept of the term mythos used as authoritative speech was not
abandoned at this time, although its implication, like logos, was changed by the
critique to which it was subjected. Morgan explained: 'Xenophanes composes a new
poetry divested of its roots in revelation and Muse-based inspiration and repudiates
the poetic tendency to tell illogical and harmful tales'.63 Thus the term mythos
became fragmented, selected portions were retained, others were rejected; the
polarity between the use of the terms mythos and logos continued but in different
forms. The goddess-inspired narrative truth of the poets was now in dispute, divine
knowledge and questionable truths were challenged by Xenophanes. The break with
the traditional form ofmythos was accomplished 'and it was never refuted'.64 The
deconstruction of the goddess-inspired poetic authority was also complete, replaced
by a very different authority; one which challenged the traditional truth claims.
4.6.2 The Pre-Socratic Parmenides
Next, Parmenides was a Pre-Socratic who experienced a goddess-inspired
revelation; she 'showed him two paths one identified with divine truth, (is), the other
with non-truth, (is not) the opinions ofmortals'.65 Divine truth (is) now relates to
logos, earlier associated with persuasive speech and 'falsehood', a style of logos now
in the context of conscious argumentation. The second path, (is not), the opinions of
mortals cannot be the subject of any enquiry, because of the inadequacy of mortals to
know the truth66 The meta-language of'what is' and 'what is not' may be analogous
to the language of the goddess who was able to speak both truth and falsehood as
63
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 51. See also Morgan's detailed account of Xenophanes which is
outwith the framework of this section; it concerns the morality and form of the gods portrayed, their
likeness to mortals, as well as the conditional truth claims made by the poets, 47-53.
64
Burkert, Greek Religion, 309.
65
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 68. From a difference perspective, Morgan contends: 'Mental
activity and speech here claim a strong ontological activity, both because they exist in themselves and
because they are inescapably bound to existence (ifwe cannot think it or speak it, it is not), 70. This is
similar to the ancient Egyptian concept of'existence' and 'non-existence' discussed earlier, that the
creative action of speech 'is' further extended, to that ofwriting, drawing or modelling. To eliminate
someone into the realms of non-existence, or 'is not', is simply to erase their name.




truth, yet she can distinguish between both.67 The new truth claim discards this type
of knowledge; logos is the new 'divine' truth.
The epic verse ofParmenides associates the concept of divine 'truth' with
revelation through mythos. Thus the divine logos was revealed through the mythos of
the human being; Parmenides was the mortal vehicle through which the divine
revelations were spoken.68As a mortal he was unable to know the truth. The divine
revelatory concept was reminiscent of Van der Leeuw's belief discussed in chapter
two, that divine understanding was revealed only by God; similarly, the
manifestation of the sacred and homo religiosus. However, the source of the
revelation of Parmenides through mythos, rather than the logos, appears different to
the later concept of logos as the Word ofGod. Nonetheless, it was similar to van der
Leeuw's objective-subjective approach that signified his human-centred approach to
revelation. Yet, both van der Leeuw and Kristensen denied that their sacred story was
mythos. The final stage in the mythos-logos transformation is identified with the Pre-
Socratic, Heraclitus.
4.6.3 The Pre-Socratic Heraclitus
Heraclitus was an aristocratic elitist who rejected any association with the
term mythos. Divine revelations in the form of mythoi, previously experienced
through Parmenides, were no longer associated with 'truth' claims: the rejection of
mythos was the reinstatement of logos as authoritative speech. Poetry was relegated
to the masses, as the language of the common people; its former designation as logos
became a new elitist version of logos. Its meaning had veered from the language of
the poetic persuasive speech to a discourse of written prose. Logos was no longer
considered a narrative recited to the people, validated through the goddess inspiration
67
Morgan, Myth andPhilosophy, 75. On Hesiod's attributes of past, present and future knowledge to
the Muses, see Clay, Hesiod's Cosmos, 175. See also Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 30: 'Come, I [the
goddess] will speak, and having heard my mythos, you will carry it away'. See also Burkert, Greek
Religion, 310, and his comment: 'Thus mythical and philosophical cosmogony are seen to
interpenetrate more than before, yet only in this form of deceptive speech'.
68 Lincoln, TheorizingMyth, 31. See also Empedocles, Fragment B 23 .9-11. Empedocles, another Pre-
Socratic thinker, a poet, physician and prophet also invoked the Muse for inspiration. However, only
after the logos of the goddess was placed in the visceral organs of the poet, did metamorphosis occur;
the logos, earlier associated with false, seductive and beguiling language, was transfigured into the
authoritative mythos. See Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 61-62.
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or revelation. Instead the new cultural male elite appropriated the term logos under
the rubric of dialectic discussion and argumentation.
Where earlier Parmenides had received a revelation, now Heraclitus appeared
as the authoritative voice of the new elite, one that advocated rule by a few good men
on behalfof the majority of citizens who lacked good judgement and intelligence.69
The 'common man', according to Heraclitus, required guidance because 'the masses
are bad'; they had no understanding or intellect.70 The mythos attributed earlier to
the mortal being by Parmenides is re-formed by Heraclitus as the mythos of the
'common man'.
Rather than a sudden change, the transition, although gradual, changed the
earlier applications ofmythos and logos; the narratives of the Pre-Socratics
encapsulated cultural conventions. The Pre-Socratics, whose 'scientific' criterion
was truth or falsity, did not expunge the language ofmythos from their philosophical
enquiry. Their procedure was more subtle. Rather than progressing from mythos to
logos, the Pre-Socratics retained and reconfigured elements ofmythosj'' The disdain
towards the common man because of his apparent inability to know the truth
appeared to begin with Parmenides, continued with Heraclitus and on into the fifth
century. The goddess-inspired poetic authority was suppressed and replaced with an
elitist, dialectic search for logical truth. In the end, the often quoted Fragment 25
attributed to Euripides or the Sophist Critias, a cousin of Plato, echoed the elitist
claims. The text urged not only for state imposed laws which would ensure public
morality but also for the creation of a god who would impose fear on the common
man.
4.6.4 Fragment 25: Euripides or the Sophist Critias
The author of this text believed that the common people would do acts of
violence in secret and, to thwart their actions, shrewdness and wisdom were required
by the state. A god, his immortality stressed, was invented by the author to instil fear
69 Cf. Burkett, Greek Religion, 305. He uses the term religion, that it 'becomes a matter of the theories
and thoughts of individual men who express themselves in writing, in forms of books addressed to a
nascent reading public'.
70 See Heraclitus, Fragments B39, 104, 'the masses are bad, the good are few', quoted in Lincoln,
TheorizingMyth, 27,n,15. See also Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 55.
71
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 88.
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into the people, fear that would induce them to comply with the laws imposed by the
state. Moreover, should the people in secret 'do, or say or think anything not in
accordance with the state', because the gods were aware of all human actions, any
secrecy was futile. The state not only became the new instrument of law to maintain
the new social order, it became also the codex for public morality. Burkert pointed
out that where in the past the people had followed the ways of the gods, they were
now obliged to conform to the rigours of the state. Burkert explained:
This involves restraint of individual wishes, knowing integration,
recognition even of destruction... Who could still say that the divine
cares for man, for the individual man? Here a wound was opened in
7?
practical religion which would never close again.
The final transformation appeared complete; mythoi were replaced by logoi,
although Plato proposed that not all mythoi should be rejected: some eschatological
elements of'truth' remained valid. The gods served a purpose, and to this end some
aspects ofmythoi were commandeered by the new elite to serve the new morality
necessary for the common people. The new elite called themselves Philosophers,
'lovers ofwisdom', in contrast with the previous elite group, the Sophists, 'the wise'.
This section first introduced Lincoln's language-oriented theory of power;
mythos and logos when in juxtaposition with certain verbs defined the divine-
inspired authoritative source. The latter is rejected; the words now in juxtaposition
with the term logos to designate knowledge and power are the fear-induced words of
compliance to state laws. Given Segal's theory ofmyth, that the laws a society were
expected to believe were established long ago by revered ancestors, this was not the
case in the new Greek social order. Rather than mythos, the new truth was logos, now
in juxtaposition with the authority of the institution of the state to maintain an
ordered society.
The term mythos was now associated with divine truths that could not be
proven by philosophical argument, such stories, for example, that mothers may tell to
their children. In consideration that mythos concerned stories about superhuman
beings, it is therefore an untenable statement to say that the Greeks denuded the term
mythos of all 'religious' or metaphysical values. Suffice to say that the final re¬





term mythos; it also links to the question, did mythos in the end denote 'what really
cannot exist'?
4.6.5 Plato: the Rational Atheist orWise Dialectic
Plato resisted poets and the poetry, which he called logos; he believed that the
poets manipulated audiences by stimulating emotion. It may be said that logos
described words which are persuasive. Similarly, the play attributed to either
Euripides or Critias discussed earlier, introduced state monopoly of moral values and
the concept of 'false logoi\ This play reflected much of Plato's concept of logos and
the enforcement of state law in new theological beliefs. Plato propounded that the
'majority ofmen subscribe to practical atheism' and to this end, it was necessary for
the morality of the people to be persuaded by the 'new truth' of the state. ~ Rather
than divine-centred, the new social order under the rubric of logos was now a male-
elite, state-controlled institution; belief in the gods was proclaimed a duty; atheism
becomes a crime punishable by death.74
Moreover, in Plato's concept of the Ideal State, he proposed that the young
should be educated first with the censored, fictitious stories named as the mythoi of
Hesiod and Homer, the derogatory statements attributed to the nature and exploits of
the gods. The deeds of the gods which emulated the adverse qualities of humans
were removed. Only then could nurses and mothers tell the state-authorised versions
to the young.75 Similarly, Plato recognised that the mythoi of the poets had some
value worthy of retaining for the purpose of the state although the divine nature of
the gods could not achieve the kind of certainty towards which philosophical enquiry
aspires. If only the adverse human behaviour attributed to the gods was discarded as
a false description of the gods, then the divine element associated with either mythos
or logos is not fully rejected by Plato.
Plato suggests that the divine aspects of mythos may serve as an
indoctrination tool that the State, as the ultimate authority, is called on not only to
supervise the poets, the makers-of-my/Ao/, but also to approve ofwhat was and what
73 Burkert, Greek Religion, 319.
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was not appropriate for the well-being of the state and its citizens. The state was
content to foster certain beliefs that were both probable and useful. Thus the term
mythos was not stripped of its superhuman beings; rather, 'divine' authority now
came under the auspices of State authority. Censorship of poetry declared by the
state was important because of its appeal to the emotional and unreasoning part of
the baser forms of humanity; women and children were included in this category.
The poets, once the goddess-inspired authority, were demoted, became servants of
the state, not only subordinate to the new elite but also relegated to the lower strata of
humanity alongside women and children. This is the group to which the State-
authorised version ofmythos was aimed, denuded of adverse aspects of the gods
which may influence the young.
Thus the divine authority earlier associated with mythos is now transformed
as the power of the state, and mythos is translated as stories that are told to the lower
echelons of society. Truth or falsity ofmythos seemed not an issue; these stories need
1ft
not be true as long as they express acceptable ethics for the well-being of the state.
In the end, the divine status in mythos or logos was not an issue per se\ the divine
presence persisted, in part.
Whether or not the term mythos denoted 'what really cannot exist' seems an
invalid question if the Greek philosophers manipulated not only the parameters of
meaning but also its validity. There is little doubt that mythos was denuded of all
reference to the negative nature and exploits of the gods. Nonetheless, the divine
aspect was retained as a tool of fear to manipulate the populace. Both mythos and
logos were considered false in various degrees in that the context was determined by
the philosophers. Nonetheless, the meaning ofmythos as a word was never
designated as a story that was 'false'. It was not that Socrates, in Plato's Republic II,
expounded that mythoi were untrue, rather he protested against the fighting and
plotting between the gods, This was not an accurate portrayal, 'for they are not
true'.77 For Plato, the key focus appeared to be the well-being of the State and the
ethics required to maintain an ordered society, thus it was important that the
'founders of a State' ought to know what forms of theology are acceptable to its
citizens. The question is, are the words of Socrates a reflection of the beliefs of Plato
76 See Morgan, Myth andPhilosophy, 163
77
Buchanan, 'Republic II', 354.
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or are they ethical statements for the benefit for the State: 'God is always to be
78
presented as he truly is'. In the end, Glaucan asks the crucial question pertinent to
the dichotomy of the true-false' nature ofmythos: 'Then the superhuman and divine
is absolutely incapable of falsehood?' Socrates replies: 'Yes'.79 It must be concluded
that the origins of the Greek polemic of the 'false' epithet of'myth' appears
unfounded, although further research is required.
Morgan was blunt in her comment that myth served its own ends, that the
incorporation of a new myth signalled the need to reformulate people's ideas and
their cultural identity. The myths of the philosophers were constructed with 'the
same rhetorical tools employed by generations of poets'. Morgan rightly concluded:
'Myth is one of these tools, and it is an important one'.80 The ancient Egyptians may
have followed a similar pattern.
To summarise, historically the origin of the modern term 'myth' may have its
roots in the Greek word mythos. The term itself simply means 'an account', 'story',
or 'narrative'. Only when in juxtaposition with certain words, logos, is the intended
meaning defined. Thus the changing context in which mythos is used determines the
authoritative voice and the form of the narrative. I have given examples of different
types of authority, goddess-inspired or goddess revealed truths and State authority.
Equally, complex changes are attributed to the authoritative meanings of the inter¬
related concepts ofmythos and logos when later associated with words which signify
different powers of elite men or the state.
Essentially the term mythos arose as a linguistic tool of some significance.
Nonetheless, the words themselves, mythos and logos, are mere words, their
changing meaning was demonstrated earlier in this chapter. Equally, the dichotomy
of the true-false element was evident in the use of both mythos and logos, given that
Hesiod put into the mouths of the goddess not only knowledge of how to recount
falsehoods like real things but also to proclaim truths when she wished. Equally, the
Sophists and Philosophers manipulated mythos and logos, transformed later into the




Buchanan, 'Republic IF, 362.
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Morgan, Myth andPhilosophy, 2.
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the words 'false' and 'persuasive speech'.81 The latter was the context in which the
mythos was understood.
Given that the term mythos is merely a word which signifies an account, it is
in the context of the application of the term that distinguishes its meaning. As I
understand the concept, given Plato's rhetoric, it seems not simply a case of false or
true aspects ofmythos. Following Plato, it is not that the divine characters are
subjected to the theory of proof or dialectic reasoning, this is discounted since he
advocates the ethics of God. Although mythos was stripped of its divine authority,
the form ofmythos continued, the divine characters were retained to serve the
interests of the state. Nonetheless mythos in itself does not constitute a story about
the gods; mythos is the framework in which the gods or other supernatural entities,
determine the context of the story, mythos. If at the core of the term mythos is the
concept of authority, then the question of the truth or falseness of a story is subject to
the authority of the author or speaker, the logos. An example is given from the
Egyptian perspective.
4.7 Myths and the Egyptian perspective
Given that societies are dynamic and subject to change, the Greek and ancient
Egyptian institutions of state followed similar patterns, although there were some
differences. Where the early Greeks discarded their divine authorities retaining or re¬
creating a fear-induced divine power to invoke ethics in the 'common people' for the
benefit of the state, the ancient Egyptians absorbed previous divine authorities in a
syncretism of socio-political power in which the authority was the divine office of
kingship.82 The concepts of mythos and logos appear to be present in the function of
the Egyptian state although the context in which the Egyptians articulate authority is
different, as are their truth claims.
For example, the Egyptian creation stories changed over time; historically
they retained their creator gods as if retaining elements of their divine authority in
81 See Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 7, and her comment: 'Language itself is an imperfect tool. The
juxtaposition ofmythos and logos keeps us aware of our human and linguistic weakness, we struggle
between one and the other'.
82 For the power, divine status, rituals and nature of the office of kingship, see Frankfort, Kingship;
Baines, 'Kingship, Definition of Culture, and Legitimation', 3-47, and David P. Silverman, 'The
Nature ofEgyptian Kingship', in David O'Conner, David P. Silverman, eds., Ancient Egyptian
Kingship, (Leiden; New York: Koln,1995), 50-92.
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fluid truth claims. From an objective viewpoint, ancient Egyptian cosmogonies
asserted simultaneous divine validation of their main cities from the Old Kingdom to
the New Kingdom periods: Ptah ofMemphis, Atum or Ra ofHeliopolis, and Amun
of Thebes. Each god claimed creator status and authoritative power of each city.
Each city temple claimed political validation that their sacred space was the primeval
mound of creation.83 By the New Kingdom, the creator gods were merged. The
period witnessed the political statement of the 'new' Theban creator god Amun; the
scribes depicted Amun with the 'local' creator gods ofRa, Ptah, Atum, and Thoth;
they incorporated the body ofAmun in a syncretism of divine power.84 Further, in
the Hymn to Amun, the text proclaimed syncretism of three gods as one: 'Amun, Re
85and Ptah'. In one sense the ancient Egyptians appeared to retain aspects of their
deities not only as a form of divine authority but also as a force to maintain order and
stability in the state of Egypt. In the Greek state, certain aspects of the stories about
their gods were discarded because their presence risked the order and ethical status
they required of their citizens.
Moreover, certain key Egyptian cities were united for eternity; Thebes,
Heliopolis, Hermopolis and Memphis were now under the auspices of a superpower.
The conjoined metapower of the divine creator, the state god Amun, in syncretism
with the previous state god Ra, was now validated as Amun-Ra, the 'new' state
authority in conjunction with the office of kingship. In the New Kingdom the city of
Thebes became the new power centre in a new social order.86 Leonard Lesko
suggested that the creation of a 'national mythology which sought to include almost
every [local] god and thereby to satisfy almost every person... was a product of
83 See Wyatt, Space and Time, 57, 62. He contends: 'In a pre-philosophical world, it [a cosmogonic
truth claim] amounted to an absolute truth claim. Egypt appears to have tolerated a number of such
"truth claims'".
84
Pritchard, ANET, 365-369, esp., A Hymn to Amon-Re, A Universalist Hymn to the Sim [Amun], and
Amun as Sole God.
85 Pritchard, ANET\ 369. See also Hornung, Conception, 219 and AdolfErman, ed., The Ancient
Egyptians, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 282-288. The syncretism of three gods as one: he was
the hidden god Amun, his face was the sun-god, Ra and his body was the creator god, Ptah. On one of
the trumpets from the tomb ofTutankhamun Amun is depicted as the highest of the three gods,
holding out the ankh to the nose of Tutankhamun. Behind Amun stands Ra and behind the king is
Ptah. See also Bunson, Dictionary, 20. It is important to note that although syncretism is true of
Egyptian deities, the word 'syncretism' is a debated word among scholars and is not necessary true of
religion elsewhere.




genius'.87 The earlier creator gods such as Ptah and Atum appeared as if they had
been demoted, although the Egyptian narratives confirmed that the divine syncretism
was as much to do with the collaboration of divine power as well as the political
syncretism of the key Egyptian cities.
Following Lesko, Kemp acknowledged that the pre-eminence of the presence
of the gods in the New Kingdom was a result of deliberate theological emphasis.
Their narratives, I suggest, in the Greek sense of the complementary concepts logos
and mythos, were legitimizing tools for Egypt's socio-political stability.88 Lesko
offers a similar proposal, that Egyptian texts may have been manipulated for political
reasons. Many Egyptian cosmological and cosmogonical variations were
'assimilated, integrated, and interwoven by skilled persons who knew what they were
89
doing'. Later he proposed that if not the king, then priest-scribes authored the
religious texts. Baines agrees on the public status of the king, that in 'public terms,
the king was more important than the gods'.90A more trusting view is held by
Frankfort who suggested that the divine presence reflected the trust which the people
put into their kings: '[T]heir trust was that Pharaoh should wield to the full the
absolute power to which his divinity entitled him - as nothing else could - to ensure
the well-being of the whole community'.91
From the insider view, the ancient Egyptians believed that all their creation
stories were 'true', that they followed their fundamental truth claim; what is written
'comes into existence'. Conversely, like language, truth was dynamic. The Egyptians
believed that in erasing the texts, the 'truth' as they saw it was rendered non-existent.
Questions asked of these texts, whether they are true or false, would seem invalid to
87
Lesko, 'Cosmogonies', 90. Lesko comments further that many versions of the Heliopolitan creation
myth, (CT600; CT76) can be reconstructed from allusions found in texts from various periods, all of
which begin with Atum, who was the chief god ofHeliopolis, 92-95. There is some inference that the
androgynous Atum was the earlier creator, rather than the sun god, Ra whose prominence was first
observed in the fourth and fifth dynasties. See also Pritchard, ANET for various creation myths: Atum
ofHeliopolis, Ptah ofMemphis, Thoth ofHermopolis. See also Wyatt, Space and Time, 57-63, and
his reference to, and comments on, the creation myths ofAtum, Ptah, and Thoth; Frankfort,
Intellectual Adventure, 54-61.
88
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 198. On syncretism, see also Frankfort, Kingship, 160-161: 'by substituting
the deity Amun-Re for Re... was a truly creative thought which realised the potentials of a
combination of the concept of the creator-sun with that ofAmun
89
Lesko, 'Cosmogonies', 90-91.
90 Baines, 'Origins of Egyptian Kingship', 96, in Ancient Egyptian Kingship, 95-156.
91 Henri Frankfort, The Birth ofCivilisation, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 24.
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the ancient Egyptians given their concepts of existence and non-existence. For
example, their truth claims may be written down, and erased by later kings or priest-
scribes, determined and validated by the power and authority of a particular king or
his priesthood.92
To evaluate from the objective scholarly point of view, from the outside, the
Egyptian creation stories are often regarded today as 'myth', often with the negative
connotation of'false'. Conversely, when the word is changed and a society's
narrative or story is described as 'sacred', there is no allusion to its falseness.
Equally, rather than the narrative assigned as 'myth', the problem may be one of
convention: language, like the word 'myth', are such conventions. Morgan suggested
that this conventional view must be challenged and transformed, but what would be
93the consequences? ' It may be that the word 'myth' requires to be modified if only
because of the considerable baggage carried by persistent false connotations.
In the end, the changing concepts of the ancient Egyptian creation stories or
so-called 'myths' may be considered like those of the Greeks, to be a functional tool
in a new social order that signalled what appeared as a change in authority. Where
similarities have been shown in the ancient Egyptians' concept of changing
cosmogonies, their intention was not to discard previous authorities but to absorb
them into a new social order which in turn incorporated a 'new' creator. It seemed
not a question of fitting into a universal definition of 'myth'; rather, the ancient
Egyptian concept of 'myth', if they had one, was a linguistic tool that was neither
92 For the erasing of texts from temple walls, see Erik Hornung, History ofAncient Egypt, (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 100-104. The so-called revolutionary king, Amenhotep IV, first
sought his new capital Amarna. Next he changed his name to Akhenaten and then proceeded to erase
the name of the state god Amun; it was subsequently replaced by the new god Aten. Akhenaten, in
eradicating the past, caused the god Amun to cease to exist. 'Gangs of iconoclasts swarmed
throughout the land ... and whenever they encountered the name ofAmun, they applied their chisels,
even on the tips of obelisks, underneath the gilding of columns, and in archived letters written in
cuneiform'. The names of other gods were erased as well as the word 'god'. When Tutankhamun
became king he issued his Restoration Decree, reinstating the names of the old gods in the temples.
Thus the names of the traditional gods were erased by Akhenaten, the gods became 'non-existent'.
When Tutankhamun became king, the names of the gods were 're-written', and thus reborn. Ancient
Egypt demonstrated not only fluid truth claims, each version of which was given royal validation ,but
also indicated was the importance of their naming ritual. See also Bell, 'New Kingdom Divine
Temple'. Bell gives illustrations of the temple reliefs defaced under Akhenaten and subsequently
restored, for example: 141.Fig.48; 143.Fig.50; 146.Fig.53.
93
Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 52.
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true nor false but simply 'existed' to maintain societal stability. As such it appears
similar to the functional role ofmythos and logos in Plato's Ideal State.
Finally, there is one important power difference. Where the elite of the Greek
state acted as the authoritative power to manipulate the meanings ofmythos and
logos, whether fear-induced beliefs in the gods or selected ethical-inspired attributes
of the gods, in Egypt the office of divine kingship was the ultimate authority; the
king combined both mortal and divine elements. Both cultures signified a political
status of power and as such designated their concepts of true-false, existent-
nonexistent: the Greeks used divine power to control the citizens ofGreece; Egyptian
kingship was the liaison between the gods and the Egyptian populace. Given that
both cultures aimed at maintaining societal order, only their methods demonstrated
cultural differences.
From an objective view the difference is slight. A subjective view
demonstrates that differences indicate clear socio-political beliefs rather than
'religious' beliefs. In both cultures, depending on its application and function,
mythos and logos appear as the unifying force of stability and order depending on the
context of the narrative. The application of the terms appears to reflect the socio-
cultural beliefs of both Greece and Egypt. However, both terms, mythos and logos
and by default, the term 'religion', are absent in Egyptian narratives.
4.8 Summary
If the word mythos, from which the modem term 'myth' is considered a
derivative, that it is merely a word, then its meaning is derived from the context in
which the word appears in texts, whatever the genre of such texts. Therefore to
classify the modern term 'myth' as a religious typology implies that the term 'myth'
is an exclusive religious term. This seems contrary to the Greek concept ofmythos
which determines a distinct socio-political context where superhuman beliefs,
imposed by the state, play an integral part. The functional nature ofGreek mythos in
association with logos appears similar contextually to the narratives of ancient Egypt
in that the focus of power and authority in both cultures is the political authority of
the institution of the state. Given that the socio-political office of kingship as the
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institution of the state ofEgypt is central to all narratives,94 that the gods and
goddesses appear in support of divine kingship, this compares favourably to the
authoritative context of the Greek mythos-logos concept.
The problem appears to centre on the modern terms 'myth' and 'religion',
whether or not 'myth' should continue to be classified under the phenomenological
category of'religion'. The key question is: Are the terms 'myth' and 'religion'
appropriate terms or are they false friends? Considering the traditional caveat about
using ancient terms for modern notions, the terms 'religion' and 'myth' may be
classified as modern terms. The Classicist, Claude Calame, a Professor of Greek
language and literature commented on the problem when the modern term 'myth' as
a universal category, is projected backwards and identified with the Greek mythos.
As far as muthos is concerned, it is now taken for granted that the term
in Greek does not designate what myth has become in our modem
encyclopaedic thought - a foundation narrative, albeit fictitious,
portraying superhuman characters in a transcendent age. "(my
emphasis)
The 'false' epithet ofmyth is not an exclusive 'religious' claim; rather, it is open to
all disciplines as well as in everyday use. The ongoing issue of'myth' as false seems
insurmountable.96
In this chapter I have demonstrated that mythos is merely a word which
signifies an account or narrative, the meaning ofwhich is whatever its context
implies. Thus if the modem term myth is defined as a narrative and the context of the
narrative concerns superhuman beings, then it appears as if the word 'myth' is
similar to mythos as the Greeks intended. But is it? Equally, it is reasonable to claim
that neither 'myth' nor mythos may be subjected to the theory of scientific proof or
dialectic reasoning. Given that myth and mythos are mere words that mean 'account'
or 'story', should not the content or characters in context be subjected to proof?
What could not be proven by dialectic means was not the word mythos; rather, it was
the characters in the account, the gods. Given that the Greeks denuded mythos of its
principle goddess-inspired character as the divine authority, it retained its divine
94 The office of kingship referred throughout this thesis forms the key focus of the Case Study in
chapter six.
95 Claude Calame, 'Rhetoric ofMuthos and Logos', 121-122.
96
Kemp, in Ancient Egypt, 27, described the ideology ofEgyptian kingship as the 'myth of the state'.
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characters. Rather than the word, mythos, it was the divine characters contained
within the structure ofmythos which served the interests of the state.
On the question of the term 'religion', it is not my intention to discuss
whether or not supernatural beliefs in general are the result of faith or state-enforced
dogmas; this may be a future research project. I have chosen to use the term 'beliefs'
rather than the modern term 'religion' if only because as I understand it, the Greek
belief system from the Hesiodic period through to the Platonic era incorporated a
socio-political system of beliefs. Nonetheless, I posit that given the problem of the
ongoing issue, the relationship between the phenomenological term 'myth' and the
typology of religion may be designated as an incompatible alliance. My research in
this chapter indicates that my issue topic is not exclusively with the term 'myth' per
se given that the Greeks did not designate the word false to mythos. Rather I question
whether 'religion' is the right word to describe the beliefs of ancient cultures.
141
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Chapter Five
On 'Myth' and Phenomenology - a Reconstruction
Could this instinct stand the test of examination, or was it merely a temperamental
prejudice masquerading as a reasoned principle.1
5.1 Introduction
The history of the formation of categories by key classical phenomenologists
was examined in chapter two, the significance ofwhich was to establish the
historical classification of the term 'myth' as a phenomenological typology of
religion. The taxonomy remains essentially unchanged today despite numerous
critiques from scholars in the field.2 My hypothesis proposes that 'myths' provide
information of socio-cultural values that may be in some degree inclusive of
'religious' idealsf My research has shown that what began as a simple question,
whether 'myth' was more appropriately classified as a human-centred rather than a
religion-centred typology, has gradually emerged as a phenomenological issue of
some complexity. It is important therefore that an analysis of key critical texts of
contemporary writers in the field and other literature that relates particularly to my
thesis topic continues as an essential part ofmy methodology.
1
Harrison, preface to Themis, vii.
2 Flood Phenomenology, 16. He comments that there has been no development of the
phenomenological method since its adaptation by Van der Leeuw within religious studies although
phenomenology has moved on in other disciplines. This is not to say that scholarly debate is absent.
See Satlow, 'Disappearing Categories', 17. For Satlow, category was a 'slippery' term that was
distinctive to religious studies. Later he suggested categories created for comparison may have no
'independent existence', or indicate anything 'real'. 'Myth' in theory, he concluded, 'becomes
whatever we say it is', 293. See also Paden , 'Universals Revisited', 282. Paden explored cross-
cultural comparativism. Religion as a form of culture he suggested was contextual and therefore
'intrinsically incomparable'. Paden argued that thought, discourse and myth, constituted forms of
social practice.
3 Current debate suggests that religious studies as a discipline may be better placed within the
framework of humanities and social sciences rather than continuing its long association with theology.
Cf. Cox, Phenomenology ofReligion, 201-202; J.L. Cox and J. Sutcliffe, 'Religious Studies in
Scotland: A Persistent Tension with Divinity', Religion, 36, 2006:1-28; Flood, Phenomenology. 1-17.
According to Flood, rather than religious studies being marginalized it would be better served within
the contemporary study of culture and society; Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of
Religion, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1978), 290; J.L. Cox, 'Separating Religion from the 'Sacred':
Methodological Agnosticism and the Future ofReligious Studies' in Religion: Empirical Studies, ed.,
Steven Sutcliffe, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 259-264.
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In chapter three, Plutarch's Greek version of the Egyptian 'myth' of Isis and
Osiris was analysed. My purpose was to establish the veracity ofPlutarch's account
using phenomenological comparative methods. My research showed that rather than
employing Egyptian ideology, Plutarch's account of the Egyptian 'myth' of Isis and
Osiris demonstrated a distinct Greek overlay. His adaptation is often referred to and
quoted today by many Egyptologists as the extant version. Scholarly predilection
was towards Plutarch's Greek version of the 'myth' of the Egyptian deities rather
than to the evidence or lack of it in Egyptian narratives.4 A different perspective of
the myth-religion issue introduced in chapter four focussed on the definition and
interpretation of the tenn 'myth' by contemporary writers in the field of religion. The
term 'myth' was re-examined not only in consideration of the origin, translation and
interpretations of the Greek tenns mythos and logos, the changing authoritative
renderings of the tenns, but also the resultant persistence today of the true-false
dichotomy of the term 'myth'. Although other theories will be discussed later, the
Greek influence appeared as the catalyst of the fictional status of the term 'myth'; a
view that remains prevalent today not only in the academic study of religions but in
the West generally.5 I have identified in chapter three what appeared as a further
Greek superimposition on the authorial intent of Egyptian narratives.
Chapters three and four, therefore, illustrated what may be interpreted as a
consequence of the absence of the key phenomenological premise of epoche\ the
suspension of all judgements, theories, opinions, ideas as well as the bracketing of
any distinctions between the true or false.'5 While most scholars agree that it is
difficult to bracket completely our experiences and biases, nonetheless I will
demonstrate that a scholarly objective approach conjoined with a subjective
awareness may result in a more profound understanding; texts and iconography will
4
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 108. He also quoted Plutarch, as if he was the authoritative
voice that validated Osiris as the king who 'taught men agriculture' and 'gave them [Egyptians] laws
and culture in general'.
5
See my later reference in this chapter to Penner's critique, that myth was 'false'.
6
Cf., Flood, Phenomenology, 98. Flood rightly argued that phenomenologists of religion have
misunderstood epoche, that van der Leeuw did not intend it as a 'denial of subjective faith or belief.
See my comment in the introduction to chapter three. See also the section on van der Leeuw in chapter
two and his comments on the difficulty in bracketing one's personal belief; even if one was a Buddhist
or Muslim one's beliefs would colour our research
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be used as the validating referent.7 Rather than the core principles of phenomenology
being discarded under the current weight of criticism, I aim to demonstrate that
certain aspects of phenomenology have much to offer a student of religion.8 It is my
intention to retain the cross-cultural, phenomenological method of comparing
'myths' as a universal etic term for analysing historical and contemporary
expressions of 'myth'.9 This is not to say that the perspective of the adherent, the
emic description, is negated or reduced. Both the insider (emic) and the outside (etic)
approaches are necessary to attain empathic description and phenomenological
understanding. Nonetheless, I propose that the phenomenological naming process
may be better served if the terms 'myth' or 'sacred texts' are included within the
general nomenclature of 'texts', if only because of the pejorative baggage carried
today by the term 'myth'.10 To support my thesis, I will argue that to re-interpret only
7 See Phillip L.Tite, 'Naming or Defining?', 357. Tite is supportive of a critical-analytical approach to
the insider perspective rather than a phenomenological valuation. I will argue later that a subjective
approach does not necessary entail verifiable or non-verifiable truth claims. That a scientific statement
may be made on the reality of the Christian belief of the resurrection of Jesus is to miss the
phenomenological premise that to a Christian their faith beliefs are 'true'.
8
Cf., for critiques see Hans H. Penner, 'Structure and Religion', 236, HR, 25, 1986:236-254. Penner
wrote: 'I think it is fair to state that both the history and phenomenology of religion as we have known
them since the 1940s are in serious trouble. Many scholars who read the various academic journals on
religion would agree that something was wrong'. See Ezra Chitando, 'Phenomenology of Religion
and the Study of African Traditional Religions', 313, MTSR, 17, 2005:219-316. He comments that the
phenomenology of religion has lost its stature in the academic study of religion in the West. Jonathan
Z. Smith, 'A Matter of Class: Taxonomies ofReligion', HTR, 89, 1996:387-403. Smith rejects
phenomenology as 'largely a blind alley', 389. Throughout his paper he challenges the concept of
'religion' as a universal taxon, particularly the division between 'world religions', and, 'Religions of
Antiquity, New Religions and Religions of Traditional Peoples', 394. On the other hand, he
contributes an important point with reference to William James' The Principle ofPsychology. The
work attempted to reconstruct an American 'phenomenology' since the European import was never
properly translated for use in religious studies, 389,n. 11. Smith referenced this comment to Penner's
essay, 'Is Phenomenology a Method for the Study of Religion?" in BR, 38, 1970:29-54. In my reading
of this work I concluded that Penner critiqued on the whole, Husserlian principles of phenomenology
rather than the European phenomenology of religion ofVan der Leeuw, which was not truly
Husserlian. See also Robert A Segal, 'In Defence ofReductionalism', in The Insider/Outsider
Problem in the Study ofReligion, ed., R T. McCutcheon, (New York; London: Cassell, 1999), 139-
163; Cox, Phenomenology ofReligion, a seminal work that analyses diverse views of the
phenomenology of religion: the Husserlian philosophical phenomenology; the Dutch School; the
British School; and the North American Schools of Phenomenology.
9 See Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Classification', 35-6, Guide to the Study ofReligion, 35-44. Smith
succinctly illustrates the importance of naming in the classification process particularly the
contemplation by Levi-Strauss of a dandelion, that in order to 'see' the dandelion, one must 'see'
other plants that differ from it.
10 The term 'sacred' has also been subjected to various critiques. Cf. McCutcheon, 'Myth', 206;
Penner, 'Is Phenomenology a Method', 37; Gavin Flood, 'The Phenomenology of Scripture: Patterns
ofReception and Discovery behind Scriptural Reasoning', Modern Theology, 22, 2006.503-514.
Flood identified the term scripture with sacred text. See also Smith, Map is Not Territory, 104-115,
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the texts named 'myths' to the exclusion of other forms of 'secular' texts would be
to ignore not only the inter-contextual nature ofEgyptian texts but also the holistic
nature of ancient Egyptian society. I intend, therefore, to include in my
phenomenological comparison, different genres ofEgyptian literature. My
hypothesis is that as human beings, our view of being in the world is human-centred
rather than religion-centred, although this is not to say that 'religion' or the belief
system of a community is negated.11 Nonetheless, when certain texts are isolated
from their societal context, delimited within the narrow parameters of a religious
context, they may fail to acknowledge the integral nature of ancient societies in
general and ancient Egyptian society in particular.12
Given that so-called adherents ofEgyptian 'religion' are unable to validate
any re-interpretation of their texts because their voices have been silenced over time,
I propose that the literary texts together with the visual texts of iconography act as if
they were the authoritative voice of the ancient Egyptian writers.12 Further,
translations and interpretations of the various textual narratives by scholars in the
field ofEgyptology will be included; the different interpretations ofmany scholars
may 'shed light on' the authorial intent of the ancient scribes. Finally, there is
scholarly consensus that the key terms used in this chapter, 'myth', 'religion' and
'culture', are ofmodern origin.54 To 'pre-date' these terms to a civilisation such as
ancient Egypt, may be to impose a semantic meaning that was absent in ancient
societies. Rather than leading to understanding, the premise of phenomenology, the
and the myriad of references to the category of sacred space. His comments on the sacred space of the
land of Israel may equally be applied to other communities.
11 See Smith, Map is Not Territory, 290-291, and his comment that 'religion is an inextricably human
phenomenon'. See also Walter H. Capps, Religious Studies'. The Making ofa Discipline,
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 8-9.
12 See Flood, Phenomenology, 3, and his comment that 'religion cannot be extracted from its cultural
matrices'.
13 Given that only 1% of ancient Egyptians were literate, and validation by the 'adherents' was an
important phenomenological criterion, then the belief system revealed in their texts conveys the
authoritative voice of the literate, 1%. The question remains open pending further archaeological
research, on whether or not the rest of the Egyptian populace followed a similar belief system. See
John Baines, 'Literacy and Ancient Egyptian Society', Man, (NS), 18, 1983:572-99
14 See Tomoko Masuzawa, 'Culture', 70-71, Critical Termsfor Religious Studies, 70-93. Masuzawa
presented many views on the relationship between religion and culture. He argued that the categories,
religion and culture, are 'historically specific, fairly recent formations and our daily employment of
these terms... is energizing a powerful ideology of modernity'. See also Peggy Morgan, 'The
Authority of the Believers in the Study of Religions', Diskus, 4, 1996:1-10. She mentioned
particularly the limitations of the use of the terms, 'religion', 'belief and 'faith'.
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meaning intended by the adherents may be transformed into a distorted reality.13
Therefore, I have defined 'culture' as an integral way of life that identifies a
particular community or nation; the culture of ancient Egypt is the identity of the
ancient Egyptians. Further, I have used the term 'socio-culturaf in order to identify
the term 'culture' within a holistic society of which 'beliefs' form an integral part. In
order to identify clearly the issues being critiqued, this thesis requires that I use at
times the conventional terms within the context of ancient Egyptian civilisation,
'religion', 'myth' and 'culture'.
The phenomenological relationship between the terms 'religion' and 'myth'
is the key issue to be examined in this chapter. Are they false friends? If so, then
why? If the way we define and classify texts influences the way we read texts,16
when 'myths' are classified as religion-centred texts then we may read them with
religious intent. First, I will present a selection ofmyth-religion issues critiqued by
contemporary writers in the field of religion. Next, a critique of the
phenomenological model, with focus on the phenomenological method of van der
Leeuw, will be followed by a phenomenological comparison ofEgyptian literature.
My reason for using the framework of the phenomenological method of van der
Leeuw was his observation as a scholar of the limitation of bracketing one's personal
beliefs whether one's faith was Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or other. In principle,
his aim was an attempt, as far as it was possible to do so, to understand the
15 See Robert A. Segal, 'All Generalizations are Bad: Postmodernism on Theories', 161, JAAR, 74,
2006:157-171. Segal makes a serious point on the creation of vocabularies by modern theorists. They
are unaware that the language used is not part of the cultural language to which it is being applied.
Our terms cannot fit exactly because they are ours, not theirs. Egyptian texts are one example. See
also Smith, 'A Matter of Class', 392-393. Smith's comment is also relevant to this thesis, that words
may have different meanings depending on their context. As an example, he compares the word
'religion' in the ordinary, 'descriptive' dictionaries which defines the common usage of a word with
the prescriptive, Harper-Collins Dictionary ofReligion. In the latter, classification of the word
'religion' is within the context of authoritative definitions by experts in the field. Smith quotes two
definitions which are consistently held, the absence of which would negate the meaning intended by
the word 'religion'. The first is, 'beliefs and practices that are related to superhuman beings', and
second, 'no superhuman beings, no religion'. As I understand it, applying these definitions within the
context ofEgyptian texts in which the majority, in some degree, contain reference to 'superhuman
beings', is indicative of a 'religion'. Where Smith is seeking to clarify the meaning of the taxon,
'religion', I argue against the 'religious' nature ofEgyptian texts. Here is an example of the problem
of language. Smith contends there is little evidence of interest in reduction: '[A] proposal that the
language that is appropriate to one domain (the known/the familiar) may translate the language
characteristic of another domain (the unknown/the unfamiliar) such as in Durkheim's exemplary
reduction of the language characteristic of religion to the language characteristic of society'.
16 Fred. M. Frohock, Sacred Texts in Religion 33, 2003:1 -21.
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phenomena under scrutiny from both the subjective perspective of the adherent
(emic) and the objective observations of the scholar (etic).
5.2 The Myth-Religion issue - Contemporary Critiques
5.2.1 Hans H. Penner: Myth Provides False Information
Hans H. Penner defined two primary theories of religion recently, the
rationalist-intellectualist theory and the expressive-symbolist theory. 'The first holds
that religion, consisting of beliefs, myths and rituals is rational and false' and he asks
why 'rationalists' persist in holding 'false beliefs?'. The second claims that religion
is not rational, that religious belief, ritual and myth are 'neither true nor false'.
Penner puzzled why most religious people were 'ignorant of the fact that their
religious beliefs and actions are neither true nor false'.17 He offered his own theory
of religion as a 'communal system of propositional attitudes and practices that are
related to superhuman agents'.1* Nancy Frankenberry clarified the meaning of
'propositional attitudes', arguing that they were not restricted to 'beliefs' in Penner's
theory of semantics; they included our hopes, fears and desires.19
Penner described 'myth' as 'a story with a beginning, middle, and end, which
was or is transmitted orally about the deeds of superhuman agents'. His explanation
was concise: 'no story, no superhuman beings(s), no myth'. His insistence on 'myth'
as an 'oral transmission', and if I understand his meaning, he appears to deny any
textual transmission. A clear ontological religion-myth relationship is evident, one
that raises complex issues. One issue was the theory of religion as 'the given', a
concept widespread among students of religion; the theory that religion and myth
17
Penner, 'You don't read a myth', 153-154.
18
Penner, 'You don't read a myth' 169.
19 As an example of the different theories of philosophy, meta-theory and religion, and exchanges
between scholars of religion, concerning the recent publication, Radical Interpretation in Religion, see
Nancy Frankenberry, Hans Penner, 'There needs no ghost to come from the grave to tell us this',
Religion, 34, 2004.65-74. The latter is in response to Ivan Strenski's critique, 'Horatio and the
Terminator: a review essay ofRadical Interpretation in Religion', Religion, 34, 2004:53-64. Of
interest to my thesis and new approach to phenomenology is Strenski's reference to Penner's 'searing
critiques of functionalism and phenomenology of religion', 55. Strenski places emphasis not only on
the context of a given utterance, he also challenges Penner's 'truth conditional semantics', 61-63,
20
Penner, 'You don't read a myth', 169.
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were non-rational, neither true nor false.21 He rejected not only the theory of religion
as 'the given', but also symbolic meaning as a theory of interpretation of the
language of superhuman beings. Of interest was Penner's use of the word 'myth' in
the phrase which referred to the error of students of religion accepting, 'the myth of
99
the given'. Ofmore importance, the phrase follows the now accepted modern use
and interpretation of'myth' meaning 'false'. This brief overview illustrates theories
of a complex religion-centred approach to myth, an objective view posited by
Penner, a rigorous critic of the phenomenology of religion; he neglects the subjective
view of the adherent to which all students of religion will acknowledge.23
Given that different aspects of the true-false dichotomy of 'myth' were
discussed in chapter four, the theory of the validity ofmyth offered by Penner
reiterated the question of whose authority lay behind the concept of the true-false
dichotomy of the term 'myth'. If, as Penner conjectured, 'myth' is allied exclusively
with 'religion' in a theoretical partnership of falseness, this concept of 'false friends'
demonstrates a different nuance to my earlier comment on the false link between
myth and religion. Whether or to what extent all 'myths' are structured as Penner
suggested, with a beginning, middle and an end is a theory which will be tested in
my Case Study. His theory that all myths are oral transmissions may prove an
untenable theory in this thesis.
5.2.2 Russell T. McCutcheon: The Insider-Outside, Emic-Etic Liaison
McCutcheon opened the General Introduction to his book on the insider-
outsidermotifwith a quotation which included the phrase: 'You never really
2lPenner, 'You don't read a myth', 170. Penner repeated his theory of'the given', particularly the
'given' of homo religiosus. See also Nancy Frankenberry's comments on the many guises assumed by
'the given' in the study of religion; religious experience, the collective unconscious; subjectivity are
some examples in Frankenberry, 'There's no ghost', 72. See also Penner, 'Structure and Religion',
252.
22
Penner, 'You don't read a myth', 170,
23 See Penner, 'Is Phenomenology a Method', 29-54; Penner, 'Structure and Religion', 241-2. See also
McCutcheon, 'Myth', 190, McCutcheon quoted various examples where book titles used the term
'myth', meaning 'false': Bruce Lawrence (1988), Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence, John
Shelby Spong (1994), Resurrection: Myth or Reality, Naomi Wolf (1992), The BeautyMyth. See also
McCutcheon's later comment that the label 'myth' used to distinguish false from true stories continues
to live on, 193. See also Penner, 'Is phenomenology a Method', 35. He also used the term to denote
falseness in his comment, '.. the "collective unconscious" and the "unconscious" are "dogmas" or
"myths".
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understand a person until you consider things from his point ofview,24 (my
emphasis). McCutcheon proposed that the insider-outsider problem was 'whether or
to what extent, someone can study, understand, or explain the beliefs, words, or
actions of another' (my emphasis). It was a problem, he suggested, faced by other
disciplines who studied the 'human condition'; psychologists, sociologists,
anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and others. He asked whether 'such a
study could take place at all' or, if it did, would the observer 'project his or her own
9 S
desires and fears' on to the observed 'other'. Conversely, whether or not such a
study was viable would depend on the researcher's ability to empathise with another
person. Nonetheless his reference to the study of the 'human condition' suggested a
'human-centred' approach.
The main critique was the difference between the study of the natural world
of 'science' with the observer as an objective outsider, and the study of the meaning,
9f\
intention and belief systems of the 'human being', the insider. The insider-outsider
gap was bridged by the phenomenological method of empathic description, a
subjective approach by the scholarly observer whose aim was to understand the
97
intentions and meanings of the insider. McCutcheon presented the view that the
difference was that humans are creative; they have 'a spirit', 'a consciousness', and
are 'moral agents'. Their behaviour and beliefs systems therefore are unpredictable;
they cannot be reduced to the same regularities or patterns as the scientific study of
28for example, geology, astronomy, chemistry, or physics.
24
Quoted by R.T. McCutcheon, The Insider/Outside Problem in the Study ofReligion, 1, from Harper
Lee, (1982), To Kill aMocking Bird, 29-30.
25
McCutcheon, Insider/Outsider, 2. See also Flood, Phenomenology, 2-3. Flood also challenged the
subjective approach within phenomenology with the words: 'Moccasin walking or empathy does not
provide a sufficiently rigorous theoretical basis on which to build an academic discipline', 4. See also
Tite, 'Naming or Defining?', 341. Tite challenged the concept of the priority and validity given to the
insider view and the presumption that the veracity of the insider's claim was never called into
question.
26 See Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 676,n.3,4,5. He argued for a scientific approach to
phenomenology using the arguments ofHeidegger and Dilthey. See also Flood, Phenomenology, 2-3.
Flood challenged the assumptions claimed by departments of religious studies that 'accurate, objective
knowledge' was generated by scientific methods.
27 For a detailed account of the definitions and meanings of the terms emic and etic see McCutcheon's
'Introduction', 15-22, and Kenneth L. Pike, 'Etic and Emic Standpoints for the Description of
Behaviour', 28-35, in McCutcheon, ed., The Insider/Outsider. See also Headland et ai, Ernies and
Etics.
28 McCutcheon, Insider/Outsider, 3.
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A point of some importance is that the linguist, Kenneth Pike, who first
coined the terms emic and etic, did not envisage a divide between the insider and
• i 29outsider positions. Rather, his intention was to describe cultural behaviour from
two different standpoints, 'cross-cultural' (objective, etic) and 'specific'(subjective,
emic); the results would then 'shade into one another '30 (my emphasis). The terms
emic and etic, often fail to convey adequately the emic-etic interrelated system
devised by Pike and later adopted in part, by the anthropologist, Marvin Harris and
others. The terms emic-etic are often confused with an either-or approach, for
example, subjective versus objective, insider versus outsider, which was not the
intention of Pike. As a linguist, he sought first to understand the 'local' language
with the intention of comparing different sounds within a universal system.
According to Harris, Pike's emic-etic model of languages is very different to
*2 1
the emic-etic model of human behaviour. As McCutcheon observed, the study of
the unpredictable human with scientific enquiry was an enterprise. Nonetheless, the
premise of Pike's emic-etic system was an inter-subjective relationship in which the
outsider and insider considered things from their mutual points of view.
Pike describes the person who has local knowledge as an 'insider'. He or she
knows how to act in a given situation without necessarily knowing in detail how to
analyse his or her actions. Emic knowledge of a person's local culture is enriched
when in contact with the etic outsider, because, as Pike argues, the insider seeks
secure help from an outside disciplinary system. In other words, if the local person
seeks to further his knowledge he must look to an outside authority. To use the emic
behaviour or situation, the outsider observer must act like an insider and to analyse
his or her own actions, the outsider observer must look at, or listen to material as an
outsider. Pike explained the emic-etic interrelationship: 'But just as the outsider can
32
learn to act like an insider, so the insider can learn to analyse like an outsider'. For
Pike, the emic-etic system was an inter-subjective-objective system similar to van der
Leeuw's objective-subjective phenomenology. As I understand Pike, the outsider
29 See my brief introduction to Pike's emic-etic terms in chapter four, 4.4 The Problem of Truth.
30 Pike, 'Etic and Emic Standpoints', 28.
31
Headland, Emics andEtics, 54
32
Headland, Emics andEtics, 33-34.
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seeks to understand the insider, each looking to the other in a reciprocal awareness of
each others 'point of view'.
One of the differences between Pike and Harris was that Pike propounds that
the emic position should not be compromised, that a society's beliefs should be
validated by the adherents of that society. Conversely, Harris contends that a
'community of observers themselves must decide' on what is, or is not, the beliefs of
the community as a whole. His definitive statement reads in part: 'Etic statements
depend upon phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community of
Scientific Observers...'33 Finally, Harris describes the advantages of the emic-etic
system and to the human race, envisaged by Pike:
Pike would personally expect that the study of emic local cultural
differences in developed entropy patterns, and the etic comparison of
cross-cultural differences and likenesses between them, would turn
out to be very important, in the future, to our understanding of the
dilemma of the human race. '4
Thus further scrutiny is required whether or to what extent the statement,
'You never really understand a person until you consider things from hispoint of
view' is appropriate to the understanding of our fellow human beings in particular,
and the understanding proposed in the phenomenological method in general. I
reiterate that Pike's emic-etic system appears very similar to van der Leeuw's
subjective-objective phenomenological method, discussed later. My
phenomenological approach to Egyptian narratives, also part of this chapter, may
function as a theoretical test case for what is considered the insider-outsider issue.
First, I now present an example of a similar inter-related insider-outside method,
from the perspective of legal theory. Can the rigours of the courts of law provide a
case for a viable subjective-objective or insider-outside verdict? Pike's comment
echoes the relationship between the judge and the jurors: 'But just as the outsider can
35learn to act like an insider, so the insider can learn to analyse like an outsider'.
33 Headland, Emics and Etics, 38, 45.
34
Headland, Emics andEtics, 38.
35
Headland, Emics andEtics, 33-34.
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5.2.3 Phenomenology, the Law, 'Beyond a Reasonable Doubt'36
It may be advantageous at this time to provide an alternate perspective not
only of the insider-outsider issue but also the meaning of'certainty', from a point of
law which is human-centred. This is not to say that a belief system is absent.
Jurisprudence, a descriptive term not only for the theory and philosophy of law, is
also a common-law tenn for case law. My example concerns the jury whose duty it is
to establish the validity of the facts, based on the legal phrase 'beyond a reasonable
doubt'. Such a doubt is based upon reason and common sense to judge whether or
not a crime has been committed. The purpose of the presence of the jury in the
criminal trial is to establish the guilt or innocence of the 'defender' based upon the
empirical facts presented to them by the defence lawyer and the prosecutor. The
jurors on the whole lack knowledge and experience of the law. Legal guidance is
37
given to the jury by the judge who has legal knowledge and experience. Given that
a law according to reason ought to be an 'indubitable legal phenomenon' in that
'legal knowledge starts from the axiom that everything that is not prohibited is
legally permitted',38 what is the case for the term 'beyond a reasonable doubt'?
The fact ofmeaning to a juror is a fact of human behaviour since it contains a
comprehension of itself as a human being. Therefore the juror, in order to know it,
actualizes this comprehension. As van der Leeuw comments: 'The essentially human
always remains essentially human, and is, as such, comprehensible'.39 Conversely,
from a scientific perspective, in order for the lawyers to comprehend the fact they
simply record it. Both views display knowledge by comprehension, but where jurors
actualize the understanding into their lives, the insider view, the lawyer externalizes
the comprehension by recording it, the outsider view. The intention of the jury, a
random selection of the local community, is to compare the facts in order to
determine the truth. The term 'beyond a reasonable doubt' traditionally interpreted as
'moral certainty' as opposed to mathematical certainty is a legal directive explained
36 For the phenomenological approach see Carlos S. Cossio, 'Jurisprudence and the Sociology ofLaw
II', Columbia Law Review, 55, 1952:479-501. See also Larry Laudan, 'Is Reasonable Doubt
Reasonable?', Legal Theory, 9, 2003:295-331; Bernard Grofman, 'Modelling Juror Bias', Legal
Theory, 5, 1999:221-234.
37 As the judge (the outside authority) is to the jurors (the local insiders), Pike's view is parallel in that




Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 675.
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to the jury by the presiding judge, an outsider. Given that a verdict of guilt or
innocence ought to be established with the predicate of'moral certitude', the
decision of the jury implies both empirical and ethical understanding.40 The jury is
required also to 'swear an oath' by some sacred object, the Bible or the Koran or a
similar sacred text.41 A Christian appeals to God for the truth of what is affirmed,42
the Muslim appeals to Allah. Different types of knowledge are displayed: human,
legal, ontological, whether religious, spiritual or agnostic depending on the belief of
the juror. An empathic, structural interrelationship of intuitive comprehension
between the subjective insiders, the jurors and the objective legal experience of the
judge, the outsider; ontological intersubjectivity forms an insider-outsider bridge.43
A 'moral certainty' together with the 'sacred' oath of testimony to truth statements
indicates the need for accurate knowledge of the law in order for justice to prevail.
A problem may be envisaged when the jury of twelve persons retires to
consider the verdict. Each of the twelve jurors may reasonably interpret the meaning
of the empirical facts from their different ontological viewpoints in their
consideration of'moral certainty'. The twelve jurors may be representative of
different types of 'cultures', 'religions', 'moral standards', Taws' 44 In order for
jurors to 'live the meaning' to obtain moral certainties, they must take it into their
lives, to re-create it.4? Although some limitition is acknowledged, the juror may
labour under the illusion that he may apprehend the fact of his cognition in the same
scientific manner as a physicist or a biologist (outside). Such a belief implies that the
personality of an individual can be separated from one's historical background, 'but
40 See Cossio, 'Jurisprudence', 480. Cossio states: '... truth requires not merely systematic coherence
between the assertions that are predicated but also agreement between the concept and intuition'.
41 The swearing in statement by Christians: 'I swear by Almighty God that I will faithfully try the
defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence'. The Islamic Oath: 'I swear by Allah that
I will faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence'.
42 'Ye shall not swear by my name falsely', Lev. 19:12.
43
See Cossio, 'Jurisprudence', 481. For Cossio, 'truth is not the work of an operative intellect, but the
intellect discovery ofwhat it is as an intersubjective unfolding'. Cossio's observation is an echo of
Pike's emic-etic system discussed earlier in that the outsider observer must act like an insider and to
analyse his or her own actions, the outsider observer must look at, or listen to material as an outsider.
44 Different types of law may be present. The Islamic Sharia law is different to the Statute law of the
English legal system which is also different to the laws of the Torah. See Cossio, 'Jurisprudence', 481.
Cossio acknowledged that 'man is simultaneously history, society and culture'.
45See Cossio, 'Jurisprudence', 481. Cossio: '.. there is a complete correspondence between what is
grasped by intuition and what is lived'.
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it cannot be separated from the community feelings and the meanings of its own life
which are an essential part of it'.46 Given that the verdict ought to be 'beyond
reasonable doubt', how may the juror achieve 'moral certitude'? The judge and the
juror are not two beings who exist in different worlds; rather they have an inter-
subjective insider-outside role. Jurors, in order to be 'knowing' subjects, must put
themselves in the place of the judge, to experience the legal knowledge from the
point of view of the judge, that is to go outside themselves in order to experience the
legal knowledge objectively.47 Epoche allows the juror to bracket bias, opinions, and
any previous distinctions between the true or false. In the active interaction between
the judge and the juror, judge is the juror, the juror is the judge; consequently, the
juror intuitively comprehends the principle of the 'moral certainty' ofjustice.
Whether or to what extent all twelve members of the jury are able to fully
comprehend another person's point of view in order to achieve fair and unbiased
justice, a phenomenological approach of epoche and empathy may be considered a
worthy method. Legal theory has suggested the possibility. The Other in this case
may be both judge and/or the defendant who seeks justice, 'beyond a reasonable
doubt'; the protagonist is the juror who seeks understanding in order to fulfil a
48'sacred' oath. Finally, to establish a verdict 'beyond a reasonable doubt', the twelve
jurors who may have diverse ontological views, would find it necessary to test and
re-appraise the empirical evidence in order to bracket any bias that may colour their
decision. A similar rigorous method of scrutiny and testing of data may be identified
with van der Leeuw's theory of the 'infinite need of correction'.
5.3 Phenomenology Revisited: 'Infinite Need of Correction'49
Questions raised of the phenomenological method have resulted in intense
critiques from scholars in the field of religious studies; some of these critiques have
46
Cossio, 'Jurisprudence', 497.
47 See Cossio, 'Jurisprudence', 480. 'Intuition, although mute and incommunicable, nevertheless is
lived as knowledge'.
48
Although Cossio, the author of'Jurisprudence', does not use the terms epoche or empathy; these
terms are implied, particularly in his section, The Ontological Conscription of Science in which he
discusses Husserlian phenomenology. The section on 'The Egological Solution' described the role of
legal ontology, 480-482.
49 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 695.
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been mentioned earlier. Although there are many variations with little consensus of a
phenomenological method,M) one must question whether the method itself should be
dismissed in its entirety because of such critiques, some ofwhich may prove to be
justified. Did the classical phenomenologists compare religions and religious
phenomena on the wrong grounds? To what extent, if any, did phenomenological
comparisons entail hidden Christian theological categories as universals?J,/ What are
the resultant problems to phenomenology in general and to the term 'myth' as a
typology of religion in particular?
This section responds to these critical questions. It is necessary to re-examine
the phenomenological process which determined the term 'myth' as a typology of
religion in order to facilitate the precise nature of issues critiqued. First I propose a
re-appraisal of the classical phenomenological stages using the method of van der
Leeuw as a general frame of reference. Other phenomenologists will be introduced to
support or to offer alternative approaches to the general phenomenological theory
although chapter two has indicated and discussed many of the key issues. Only
critiques that relate to the formation of categories and the classification of'myth' as
a typology of religion will form the focus of the re-appraisal of the
phenomenological method. Next, I will present an overview of the phenomenology
ofEgyptian literature.
5.3.1 Assign Names to the Texts: Naming, Classification, Empathy
In his Epilegomena, van der Leeuw outlined the five stages of his
phenomenological method, although in practice he proposed that the stages should
52
not be considered in succession, rather they should arise simultaneously. In order
50 See Morgan, 'Authority of the Believers', 1-10. Morgan quoted various authors and different kinds
of phenomenology of religion which have come under attack in various ways: C.J. Bleeker, (1963)
The Sacred Bridge; M. Eliade, (1969), The Quest; W.B. Kristensen, (1960) The Meaning of Religion;
N. Smart, (1973) The Phenomenon ofReligion; G. Van der Leeuw, (1938) Religion in Essence and
Manifestation She also included a short overview of the historical development of phenomenology in
E. Sharpe, (1986) Comparative Religion: A History, Chapter 10. Included also was reference to J.L.
Cox, (1992) Expressing The Sacred, a study of phenomenology of religion in its historical and
philosophical context which also discussed the application of phenomenological skills and criticisms
of its methods. See also Cox's seminal work, A Guide to the Phenomenology ofReligion which draws
together, 'key figures, formative influences and subsequent debates' in phenomenology.
51 See Jeppe Sinding Jensen, 'Universal Terms and the Comparative Study of Religion', 238, Numen
48, 2001:238-266.
52 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, Chapters 107-110.
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for a rigorous re-appraisal of the phenomenological method to take place, I will
describe van der Leeuw's system in stages, not only because the stages seem a
'complicated procedure' but also viewing the stages successively allows for a more
53
precise re-appraisal." Such an appraisal may benefit not only my later application of
the phenomenological method to Egyptian narratives but may also ascertain whether
or to what extent 'myth' is appropriately classified as a phenomenological typology
of religion. For this reason, I am required to analyse with some rigour the method of
classifying typologies. The assigning of names to the phenomena which 'appear' is
the first stage of van der Leeuw's system. Empathy, his second stage, is not only an
important factor in the subject-object inter-relationship but it also plays a key role in
the naming-classification process. Thus stages one and two form an initial unity in
the classification of phenomena.
According to van der Leeuw, a phenomenon is 'what appears'; because
'something exists', it 'appears' and is therefore a 'phenomenon'. Given the presence
of an empathic subject-object interrelationship, it is the 'essence' of the phenomenon
that is given in its appearance to the observer-researcher. It is only when a researcher
describes 'what appears', analyses it and gives it objective meaning that
phenomenology of religion arises. Not only does van der Leeuw suggest that this
type of research may be described as 'Transcendental Psychology',54 he also
proposed that an 'Ideal Type', whether 'it concerns a person, a historical situation or
a religion', appears or is manifest to the researcher as an image., it has no reality. Van
der Leeuw described the image, a projection of the phenomenon in the mind, as
timeless; its meaning is both 'experienced' and 'understood' by the researcher. For
the 'image' of the Ideal Type to be timeless with no reality implied a transcendental
quality. Waardenburg explained the concept of'image' in his understanding of the
thinking of van der Leeuw:
The image as such is a 'symbol' of which the immediate reality
coincides with another reality. So in the last analysis the religious
image has a sacramental reality, and this sacramental reality has as its
base Christ's becoming man, Christ's incarnation. ... In man after the
53 Van der Leeuw, 677.
54 Van de Leeuw, 673,n. 1. See also the 'psychological method' in van der Leeuw's phenomenological
theology in Waardenburg, 'Religion between Reality', 166.
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Fall, the image of God is merely the image of the Crucified One, the
figure of the servant, and this is now the image ofGod in man.55
Although the phenomenological system of van der Leeuw has received
considerable critiques because ofwhat is seen as his overlay ofChristian doctrines
on empirical facts, further research is required, if only to attempt to 'understand' the
issue from his point of view. The Ideal Type, the paradigm to which typologies of
similarities were measured, may be considered the first obstacle, if as Waardenburg
suggested the predicate for comparison was the Christian faith of van der Leeuw."6
Van der Leeuw accounted for the concept of the Ideal Type as an empathic subject-
object inter-relationship in which the phenomenon (the object) was apprehended and
brought into the consciousness of the researcher (the subject). Before the phenomena
can be described and interpreted, the appearance must be experienced. Even then,
interpretation may not be immediate because what 'appears' is symbolic. 'It dawns
on us'. The premise of van der Leeuw's phenomenological system was towards
'understanding'(verstehen) rather than 'explaining' the object of research; the scholar
was required to allow the object to affect him, in a psychological sense. Using the
principle of empathy, (Einfuhlung) the researcher had to make the effort 'to let his
object be "object" as little as possible', to disregard its empirical factual existence. It
was not a passive enterprise; an effort was required. Intersubjectivity arises where the
researcher has to 'transpose' himself into the object of research in order to re-
experience it; re-construction ensued. The 'reality' was psychological rather than a
spatial-temporal reality; 'it was understood from within'. In this way the 'essence' of
the research object was intuited rather than rationalised. '7
55
Jacques Waardenburg, Reflections on the Study ofReligion; Including an Essay on the Work of
Gerardus van der Leeuw, (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 212.
56 See van der Leeuw in Religion in Essence, 679. Van der Leeuw commented that 'religion is the
extension of life to its uttermost limit'. See also Waardenburg, 'Religion between Reality', 173. He
states that van der Leeuw's concept of the essence of religion 'can only be grasped from God's point
of view'.
57 See Waardenburg, 'Religion between Reality', 163-164. It is important to note that Waardenburg
made few references in this paper to the influence of van der Leeuw's Christian faith on his
phenomenological method. In comparison, his later discussion on van der Leeuw in Reflections,, 194-
246, demonstrated a detailed account of his Christian influence on his phenomenology. My comment
is merely to illustrate an example of the problem of literature research in general, and the key premise
of van der Leeuw's concept of'understanding' in particular. What causes the research scholar to seek
more accuracy, to weigh up the 'facts', to contemplate the 'evidence' of the texts, to understand or
intuit the intentions of the author, whether in this case it is either van der Leeuw or Waardenburg?
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The process of'knowing' historical religious data, alternatively a
metaphysical 'knowing', cannot be separated from the phenomena themselves. The
subject-object interrelationship therefore was the fundamental structure of the
'religious experience'; it was shared by the subject-object interrelationship.88
(Subject-♦Structure/Ideal Type ♦-Object) What seemed a complicated concept was
suggested by Waardenburg as a soteriological experience: 'such power [religious]
could only be explained as coming from God'.59 Given that 'religious experience'
was the premise of the classification of a typology of religion, some consideration is
required for its application to religions in general, ifChristian concepts were the
main criteria. Waardenburg suggested that van der Leeuw's intention was to
describe the meaning of religion in general beyond the boundary of the Christian
community and the Church. Given the eschatological character of each mediated
experience of meaning, the verstehen experience was directed at a final 'ultimate
meaning ... by which man is understood (by God)'. Waardenburg interpreted this
concept to mean, the 'saving fact of the Incarnation'.60
Van der Leeuw posited that researchers have no choice: the phenomena are
drawn into his-her life experience because of the existence of the empathic subject-
object interrelationship. "Reality" proposed van der Leeuw 'is always my reality,
history my history'.61 Thus we are urged to recall our spiritual past with 'intense
sympathy' [empathy] not only with our own experience but also with the experience
other than our own.62 Van der Leeuw acknowledged there were limits to such an
empathic experience; nonetheless 'the essentially human always remains essentially
human and is, as such comprehensible'.63 Thus by bringing into focus the 'religious
58 See also Waardenburg, 'Religion Between Reality', 167. On the subject of knowing, 'Van der
Leeuw alludes here to a metaphysic which is implicit in verstehen [understanding] in general, but
specifically in verstehen of religious experience'.
59 See Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence. The concept of the eternal and the timeless element of van
der Leeuw's Ideal Type may be identified with the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. Similarly, the
terms 'religious experience' can never be understood from the moment, it may only be understood in
the 'ultimate meaning' of eternity. The 'essence' of the 'religious experience' is described by van der
Leeuw as 'revelation', 462, 683. Also 'the essence of religion is to be grasped only from above,
beginning with God', 679.
60
Waardenburg, Reflections, 198.
61 See van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 671-674.
62 See van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 675.
63 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 675.
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experience' that is 'human', we are able to understand what it is to be religious as a
human being. Nonetheless the 'religious experience' that van der Leeuw identified as
human is a reflection only of what must be seen as a Christian overlay.
Consequently, the naming and classification of empirical data, the universal
commonality of Christian 'religious experience', would seem an inappropriate frame
of reference for comparing other 'religions'.
5.3.2 Epoche, Clarification, Comprehension, Testimony
Van der Leeuw's concept of epoche, the third stage in his phenomenological
method, not only concerned the bracketing of what lies behind the phenomena but
also the concept of reality in a phenomenological sense, that it was 'neither
metaphysics, nor the comprehension of empirical reality'.64 Understanding, the
fundamental objective in van der Leeuw's phenomenological method may be
achieved only by bracketing everything but the phenomena itself. Bracketing or
epoche was to suspend opinions, judgements, and to bracket distinctions between the
true and the false. In van der Leeuw's words, epoche was 'intellectual suspense',65
Only by contemplating what 'appears', using epoche, could the phenomena be given
form and meaning. Burkert's comment appeared to indicate an intuitive
understanding of the phenomenological method of epoche.
If you start to tell the tale about 'the beginning' of 'everything', you
must first delete 'everything' from your mental view, i.e. our whole
world of heaven and earth, sea and mountains, plants, animals, and
humans: all this has to go.66
Van der Leeuw's fourth stage emphasised the simultaneous nature of the
phenomenological method. The testing and further clarification of the phenomena
64 See Flood, BeyondPhenomenology, 98-99. Flood suggested that the concept ofbracketing allowed
the subjective religious facts to speak for themselves after which they become objective. Flood's
comment on the viability of objective and value-free creations of typologies of religion is a valid
observation, although van der Leeuw did comment on the limitations of epoche. Flood rightly
contended that the epoche of van der Leeuw was not a denial of subjective faith. Van der Leeuw
appeared to suggest that one's subjective faith was the link to understanding phenomena. Conversely,
the phenomenological method argues that one's personal faith should not be allowed to influence the
data, although van der Leeuw is one ofmany phenomenologists who found this concept difficult. See
also Waardenburg, Reflections, 199. Waardenburg commented on structural relations, that 'they are
not just of a formal or objective nature, but they obtain their content through the experience of faith of
the author'.
65 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 688. Fie outlined only four stages.
66 W. Burkert, 'The Logic of Cosmogony', 92, in From Myth to Reason?, 87-106.
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was the initial objective; the grouping together of similarities and separating out into
different types was the ultimate aim of the researcher. The structural relationships
introduced in stages one and two were used to classify the different types of the
'ideal typical interrelation'. Although we are reminded by van der Leeuw that each
stage was an integral part of the whole, the adoption of epoche, 'intellectual
suspense' or 'a restraint from judgement' by the researcher was to ensure no
extraneous data pervaded the phenomena.67 The final stages of the van der Leeuw's
phenomenological method focused on the full impact of comprehension; the
structural interrelationship between the researcher and the phenomena had
culminated in an intuitive understanding. Only then was 'reality' revealed. 'The
empirical, ontal, or metaphysical fact becomes a datum'.Given that the researcher
should respect the intentionality of the phenomena, only the appearance of what was
revealed may be described by the researcher. Only then does the researcher analyse it
and give it objective meaning. Van der Leeuw admitted that interpretation of the
material facts revealed a 'shallower' meaning than the more profound
phenomenological understanding. Nonetheless, underlying the theory of van der
Leeuw's phenomenological method was the fundamental principle of understanding
the phenomena; only then was the researcher better qualified to describe the
empirical data.
Conversely, given that van der Leeuw suggested that the scholar described 'a
reconstruction', this is not to say that such a reconstruction was the 'reality' of the
phenomenon. Van der Leeuw claimed that what was 'real' can be revealed only by
God.69 In the end, the drawing together of the 'religious experience', the subject-
object inter-relationship, signified to van der Leeuw a man-God, faith-revelation
unity. This was the framework of his Ideal type but it was an ideal which ultimately
failed the test of the phenomenological principles of epoche and empathy; he allowed
extraneous data to pervade the phenomena. Therefore, to compare the so-called
67
See Waardenburg, 'Religion Between Reality', 171,n. 111. Waardenburg suggested that van der
Leeuw's meaning of the term epoche was unlike the Husserlian meaning. The general meaning of
epoche intended by van der Leeuw was to understand, but it was an understanding that was particular
to the subjective-objective versteheii relationship, in that it allowed the researcher to experience both
the internal structure as well as its broader connections.
68 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 676. This is not say that van der Leeuw was unfamiliar with
Egyptian culture.
69
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 677, 684.
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universal categories of'religion' using the religion signifier of Christian revelation
was to negate any comparison. Accordingly, given van der Leeuw's suggestion that
all empirical data should undergo a rigorous re-appraisal and correction process, I
conclude that the questions raised earlier now merit a response.
I repeat the questions 1 posed earlier and offer my conclusions. Questions one
and two may be answered together. Did the classical phenomenologists compare
religions and religious phenomena on the wrong grounds? To what extent, if any, did
phenomenological comparisons entail hidden Christian theological categories as
70universals? In chapter two I alluded to the problem of the presence of a Christian
overlay in the descriptions of religious phenomena by the classical
phenomenologists. Many versions of phenomenology have subsequently arisen from
the classical models. The core structures of typologies, epoche and empathy have
continued in one form or another. One of the criteria of scholarship is a clear
definition of the meaning and intention of the ambiguous terms used by scholars in
their particular disciplines. Baird recognised the assumption by scholars of religion
that the terms 'religion' and 'definition' were not ambiguous, were clearly
understood with no need for clarification. He asserted, 'Both assumptions are
wrong'. 77 Baird offered the term 'essence' as a further example of an ambiguous
term used by scholars of religion. In order to achieve clarity and understanding,
scholars ought to define the meaning and significance of any ambiguous term
introduced in scholarly works to enable other scholars to understand clearly the
semantic intention of the author. The intentionality of the phenomenological method
described by van der Leeuw is clearly signposted; his Christian faith and reference to
the Christian God are reflected not only in the subject of his chapters but also in the
clear reference to his beliefs within the chapters. His naming and classification of
typologies also reflected Christian doctrines: sacrifice, saviour, sacred, purification,
myth are some examples.
In the final analysis, van der Leeuw appeared not only to compare religions
and religious phenomena within an inappropriate Christian framework, he was
unable also to bracket his personal Christian faith. Nonetheless, epoche and empathy
I suggest may prove worthwhile phenomenological principles to follow. Equally, to
70
See Jensen, 'Universal Terms', 238
71
Baird, Category Formation, 1.
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bracket the intruding 'essence' ofChristian soteriology as the common theme of
comparison seems an essential criterion. The term 'Power', van der Leeuw's more
general concept of essence, or religious experience, devoid of any Christian overlay,
appears a more appropriate term in which to classify similarities into typologies. The
final stage in van der Leeuw's phenomenological method was the directive of
'perpetual correction' in the sense of a phenomenological method that undergoes
continued re-appraisal. My aim is to emulate these principles, to re-evaluate again
the re-constructed methodology in the practical application of the phenomenological
method to Egyptian narratives. The latter would seem an appropriate subject not only
because the naming principle was a key concept in ancient Egyptian society but also
because Van der Leeuw held an interest in Egyptology. He offered the Egyptian first
dynasty as an example of the interrelationship between the objectivity of the
researcher and the subjectivity of the Egyptian culture. The structural link was the
human interrelationship of the historical past using the premise of human
understanding.
If we are astonished by an ancient myth, or an Egyptian head, and
confront it with the conviction that there is something that is
intelligible in accord with our experience, although it is infinitely
remote from us and unattainable ... we have at least the possibility of
a more deeply comprehending glance, and perhaps of achieving a
living representation.72
Van der Leeuw acknowledged the human-centred nature of comprehension,
that as human beings we are able to understand an ancient myth or archaeological
feature because of the nature of society as a human construct. Following this theme, I
have selected three different disciplines in which to illustrate the scholarly
application of the phenomenological principles of epoche and empathy. Following
this positive approach to phenomenology, my final objective is to apply a similar
methodology, including re-appraisal of the crucial naming and classification, to the
textual narratives of ancient Egypt.
5.4 Scholars 'do' Phenomenology: an Overview
This brief overview is relevant to this chapter if only to illustrate that the
secondary literature used in this section appears to demonstrate a scholarly awareness
72
Jaspers, Psychopathologie, 404. Quoted by van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 611,n. 1
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of the fundamental principles of the phenomenological method, yet with little
reference, if any, to the term 'phenomenology'. It may be that a scholarly subjective-
objective interrelationship is indicative of a human-centred approach to
understanding empirical data. Equally, the aim of the phenomenologist of religion is
to compare and interpret the different ways in which the 'supernatural' is
experienced by human beings, the ways in which humans understood the phenomena
in their lives. The experience of the Christian God in the life of van der Leeuw for
example, may be similar to the experience of the plurality of gods in the lives of the
ancient Egyptians, although the concept of the superhuman may be different in form.
Van der Leeuw illustrated a human-centred approach to his phenomenological
method when he suggested that because the past was closed to us its reconstruction
was necessary for meaning and understanding. The historian, archaeologist,
phenomenologist or researcher, are representative of those who may perform such a
reconstruction; their interest concerns the actions of human beings in the world.
Thus, we may understand our human neighbours suggested van der Leeuw, whether
geographically distant in China or temporally distant in the past three of four
thousand years ago in Egypt, only though reconstruction of the past.73
Similarly, Kemp, the Field Director of the excavations at el-Amarna, an
archaeological site in Egypt, recognised the biological premise that we are all
members of the same human species. Kemp emphasised that the human ability to
'cross cultural boundaries' demonstrated the 'common nature of human
consciousness', whether, as van der Leeuw proposed, the boundary was geographical
or temporal. Kemp acknowledged also the objective-subjective view that some
religions have survived to take their place in the modern world: '[religions] are thus
directly accessible to outsiders and have found within their own ranks apologists
[insiders] to teach outsiders'.74 Conversely, in ancient Egypt because priests failed to
'explain their beliefs in cogent form to outsiders', the insider view has often been
misrepresented.1^ The Greek overlay of the Isis and Osiris myth discussed in chapter
74
See van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 671 -673.
74
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 2.
75
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 2. Given the divergence between the predominance ofmodern literacy skills
and their diminutive, 1% presence in ancient Egypt, knowledge of any beliefs would be conveyed
orally. Further, given that the divine office of kingship was symbolic of the Power and stability of
Egyptian society, and priests, who acted on behalf of the king, had 'insider divine knowledge', they
had no need to share such knowledge with the populace at large.
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three may be a case in point. Kemp suggested that all avenues of perception are
present in each one of us; the significance we give to different cultures, he proposed,
may vary according to our own cultural values. Nonetheless, he described an
empathic approach to the scholarly study ofEgyptian culture reminiscent of the
theme of epoche: 'My speculation is restrained partly by professional considerations
-1 wish to remain true to my sources', [objectivity]; 'But rational knowledge has
proved to be far more fragile than knowledge about the deeper meaning of things that
people feel is conveyed by religion', [subjectivity], Kemp's overall view
demonstrated the phenomenological premise that the belief of the adherents is a key
factor towards understanding cultural differences. He continued:
If we have the diligence and time we can learn their languages, live
amongst the people themselves, absorb their culture, and generally
immerse ourselves to the point where we can recreate the mental
processes in our own minds, [subjectivity]... My ancient Egypt is very
much an imagined world though I hope it cannot too readily be shown
76
to be untrue to the original sources, (my emphasis).
Kemp appeared to reiterate the concept of human understanding described earlier
although in a different form: 'You never really understand a person until you
consider things from hispoint ofview(my emphasis). He also acknowledged the
importance of being true to his original sources, not to impose his own value
judgements on other cultures.
Equally relevant to this section is the scientific discipline of
archaeoastronomy. Amanda-Alice Maravelia, an archaeoastronomer and
Egyptologist centred her critique on the 'biased interpretation of the archaeological
records'. As an objective 'outsider' she explained the bias as ifshe was describing
the absence of epoche; scholars 'project their own misconceptions ... claiming to
explain Antiquity'77 (my emphasis). The focus of her challenge was the computer-
generated methodology of certain scholars who implied that the priests-astronomers
76
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 1-3. Although Kemp in the first part of this statement was referring to
Oriental philosophies and religions, his comment may refer equally to ancient Egypt. Kemp's concept
of recreating mental processes may be likened to van der Leeuw's theory that understanding results
from a reconstruction that 'dawns on us'. Kemp's reference to 'my' Egypt appeared to illustrate a
human response to scholarly research. See also Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 672-3.
77 Amanda-Alice Maravelia, 'The Stellar Horizon of Khufii', 55, in Bickel, S., Loprieno, A. (eds.),
BasilEgyptology Prize 1: Junior Research in Egyptian History, Archaeology, andPhilology. (Basel:
Schwabe & Co., Verlag /AH. 17, 2003), 55-74.
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of ancient Egypt used a similar method to ascertain the simultaneous transit of two
78
stars. The aim of the computer-generated method determined an exact north-south
orientation of the pyramids during the Old Kingdom and particularly the Great
Pyramid of Khufu at Giza. Maravelia argued it was a false assumption that the
ancient Egyptians were aware of the precession of equinoxes and had knowledge of
the celestial equator as an astronomical meaning. As if from the insider view she
explained: 'The Egyptians were not preparing celestial snaps or scientifically precise
diagrams, but only symbolic and mythological representations which contained
rudiments of the truth ... '79 Numerous texts inscribed on pyramid walls confirmed
the stellar origins of theocratic thought in the Old Kingdom, when the king travelled
to the Imperishable Stars, the fixed, circumpolar stars situated in the northern skies.80
No textual reference was present in the Pyramid Texts of a measured, northern stellar
exactitude. Similarly, there was an absence of any empirical semi-religious or
astronomical textual and/or epigraphical evidence that claimed two specific stars
were used to align any Old Kingdom pyramid.
Maravelia implied an insider understanding. She considered the empirical
data from the view of the ancient Egyptians: 'Their adopted methods were used to
obtain practical results, which would be applicable to their everyday life (calendar,
measuring time and land, orientation ofmonuments) but never did they work on
science per se '.81 The Egyptian deity Sopdet, the Greek named star Sirius, was
associated with the inundation of the Nile, one of the three seasons of the ancient
82
Egyptian calendar: akhet (inundation), peret (growing) and shemu (drought). Any
textual reference in the Pyramid texts to the exact timing of the helical rising of the
star Sirius or Sopdet was absent; the appearance of the star at the time of the
inundation was the criterion rather than its exactitude.
78 Cf. For an accurate search today, see Kate Spence, 'Ancient Chronology: Astronomical Orientation
of the Pyramids', Nature 408, 2000:320-324; D. Rawlins and K. Pickering, 'Ancient Chronology:
Astronomical Orientation of the Pyramids', Nature, 699, 2001:412; Kate Spence, 'Ancient
Chronology. Astronomical Orientation of the Pyramids, Nature, 412, 2001:699-700.
79
Maravelia, 'Stellar Horizon', 57.
80 See Faulkner, PT, cf. Pyr.152: 'The king joins the sun-god as an imperishable spirit'; Pyr.458: 'The
king becomes an imperishable star'; Pyr.472: 'The king climbs to the sky on a ladder'; Pyr.502: 'The
sky is opened to the king'. See also Lichtheim, AEL.Wol. 1:30, and the king's ascent to the sky. See
alsoLesko, 'Cosmogonies', 118.
81
Maravelia, 'Stellar Horizon', 61.
82
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 10.
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Maravelia, an astronomer, acknowledged the importance of the insider view,
that to understand a culture one ought to consider things from the adherent's
perspective. The phenomenological presence of epoche and empathy are evident
when Maravelia suggested that a modern twenty first century computer-generated
model would be foreign and would not be validated by the ancient Egyptians. 'If we
analyse this model (objective approach) and try to put ourselves in the place of
ancient priests-astronomers who were unaware of sophisticated techniques and did
not use Mathematical Astronomy (subjective approach), we are going to be
disappointed'.'VJ Maravelia described a proposed reconstruction of the past by
scholars who appeared to have misinterpreted and subsequently misunderstood the
supernatural principles of Egyptian beliefs. Given that she did not use the terms
phenomenology, epoche or empathy her language implied understanding of the
principles.
My final example of the phenomenological method may be observed in the
systematic scholarly approach of Literary Studies; the interpretation of literature and
the definition and meaning of texts. The familiar themes of phenomenology are
present, although as previous examples, the language used may be different. Recent
scholarship in the field ofEgyptian literature has acknowledged the gradual shift
o4
from a discipline closely related to and derived from biblical studies. Such a shift
from viewing Egyptian narratives specifically as texts from a historical perspective
or linguistic data, to the understanding of texts from an Egyptian perspective using
their 'authorial writings, as witnesses', is an example of modern scholarship applying
r 85
the phenomenological principles of empathy and epoche. Given that scholars, as
81
Maravelia, 'Stellar Horizon', 71.
84 See R.J. Williams, 'The Sages of Ancient Egypt in the Light ofRecent Scholarship', 1, JAOS, 101,
1981:1-19. Williams pointed out that the term Wisdom was 'not native to Egypt and has been adopted
from biblical studies'.
85 This is not to say that early Egyptologists were unaware of the principles of epoche and empathy.
Cf. A. Erman, preface to Literature ofAncient Egyptians, (London: Metheun, 1927), vii-viii. Writing
seven decades ago, Erman commented that no-one ought to pass judgement on the Egyptians, nor on
the period in human development to which they belonged, that they [scholars] should not infer from it
[the Egyptian texts] 'more than it is in a position to give'. Referring to the translation of texts Erman
noted: 'An Egyptian's work affects one quite differently, when read as a whole, than when as is
customary with us, it is laboriously translated sentence by sentence', See also Strudwick, Texts
Pyramid Age, 17-18. Strudwick agreed with Erman on the move away from taking Egyptian texts at
face value and assessing them too much in relation to the norms ofmodern society. Insistence was on
careful consideration of the meaning within a particular context. Both comments emphasise
understanding and meaning of the texts from the Egyptian viewpoint, the adherent.
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outsiders, now define texts into typologies of similarities in order to compare,
understand, interpret and describe texts, as if to comprehend the authorial intent of
the insider, implies a degree of phenomenological awareness.86 Such studies now
stress the importance of an objective-subjective interrelationship, not only in the
internal structure of such texts but also their intertextual solidarity and their cultural
significance to ancient Egypt as a whole.87 These principles may form a significant
key to the resolution of the issue of the presence or otherwise of texts not only
defined as 'myth' but also classified as a typology of religion.
My purpose in illustrating what appears as a phenomenological presence
within the methodology of scholarly research is to emphasise, following van der
Leeuw, that we are human beings, as such we have a 'natural' interrelationship of
understanding to the 'other'. Secondly, the cultural differences which identify
different communities may form an overlay which blurs the distinction between our
'human' and our 'cultural overlay'. Ifwe lack such distinctions and identify deeply
with our cultural heritage, then we may have difficulty in 'bracketing' or suspending
judgements, theories, opinions, ideas as well as any distinctions between the true or
false. This is not to say that it is possible to bracket fully one's value judgements;
rather, the intention is the endeavour. The classical phenomenologists discussed in
chapter two illustrated the difficulties they experienced in bracketing their religious
affinity with Christianity. Today's Egyptologists also experience limitations in
reconstructing historical reality, but their method of understanding is from an
intuitive, insider view. A recent comment explained:
86 Cf. For classifying various texts into typologies, Antonio Loprieno, ed., Ancient Egyptian
Literature: History and Forms, (AELHF); see esp. the section on 'Phenomenology ofEgyptian
Literature', 191-336; Parkinson, Voicesfrom Ancient Egypt', Simpson, Literature ofancient Egypt;
Lichtheim, AEL Vols: 1-3, See also Hans, Ulrich Gumbrecht, in 'Does Egyptology Need a "Theory of
Literature'", 15, in AELHF, 3-20. Gumbrecht's use of language implied a phenomenological insider-
outsider method: 'At the end, an outsider cannot quite repress the question ofwhat is at stake in the
Egyptologists' contemporary fascination with a concept of literature'... this fascination must be
'guided by some intuitions which the outsider, for a sheer lack of reading competence, is not capable
of sharing'. See also preface to Bruce G. Trigger, Early Civilisations: Ancient Egypt in Context, vii.
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993). Trigger proposed a comparative study hoping to
reveal more about the nature of factors which constrain human behaviour. He compared other types of
ancient civilisations 'to encourage Egyptologists to develop a comparative interest in other early
civilisations'.
87
Loprieno, preface to AELHF, ix-x. See review of this seminal work in JNES, 61, 2002:310-11. The
reviewer, John L. Foster states: 'This volume is the most extensive treatment of ancient Egyptian
belles lettres that has appeared to date'.
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Whenever Egyptologists, in their analytical practice have not relied on
the universal validity of patterns generalized within cultures, they
have produced insights that are all the more important for the historian
and the theorist of literature as they are highly counterintuitive. In
their majority, these insights focus on the pragmatic conditions for the
productions and reception of texts in ancient Egypt.88
Accordingly, their research has not depended on the traditional universal
patterns of data rather an intuitive approach has been recommended. My task
therefore as a researcher, is to attempt to reconstruct the past, to understand as far as
possible, the meaning intended by ancient Egyptians with the support of epoche and
empathy. Equally my reconstruction is an attempt not only to re-experience the data
'as if from the Egyptian insider view but also to identify the data devoid of any
Christian overlay. As van der Leeuw suggested, the texts may be revealed to me as if
through a mirror, but the test is whether I may be able to identify fully or in part, the
authorial intent of the ancient Egyptians. Kemp suggested this may prove difficult;
first, due to the empirical lack of an extensive literature and second, because of the
emphasis on non-verbal, pictorial symbolism to convey ancient Egypt's meaning of
89
reality. My intention is first to re-examine the recent scholarly research on the
literature of ancient Egypt briefly introduced earlier. What measure of importance
may be placed on the inter-contextual, holistic nature of texts? Secondly, my
objective is to reappraise the naming and classifications of different types of texts
generally and those designated by scholars as myths as if from the insider Egyptian
perspective. In the final analysis, my aim is towards identifying whether or to what
extent if any, the narratives defined phenomenologically as the taxon 'myth' provide
empirical data within a socio-cultural context.
5.5 Phenomenology of Egyptian 'Texts': a Re-appraisal
Earlier I re-appraised the phenomenological system of van der Leeuw in
order to establish whether or to what extent a phenomenological model may be
applied to the textual narratives of ancient Egypt. I offer this in the Case Study in the
final chapter. First, I use the term 'narrative' in the context of'story', or 'account'
which concerns activities of the various deities or superhuman beings of ancient
88
Gumbrecht, 'Does Egyptology need a 'Theory of Literature?', 12,
89
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 2. See also Strudwick, Texts PyramidAge, 3. He emphasised the
interdependence of text and image in Egyptian representational art.
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Egypt, whether or not the narrative has a beginning, middle or end. Further, I use the
word 'text' when there is reference to a supernatural being whether in context, for
example a type of text, a ritual, incantation or with a brief reference to the name and
power of a deity. The priest-scribe may assume the recipient of the text has
knowledge of the character and power of the supernatural being and the implication
of his or her presence within a text.
Next, I take into consideration that van der Leeuw established a type or ideal
type and classified particular types in his naming process as types of 'myth'. Given
that van der Leeuw's type or ideal type 'concerns a person, a historical situation or a
religion' with no reality in an empirical sense, it is a suitable tool ofmeasure for
classifying similar types of texts.90 An analogy of an Ideal type may be compared to
a model of religion. An adherent's 'religion' is measured against an Ideal model of
religion. It does not exist in reality; some elements may be emphasised more in one
tradition than another, other elements may be absent. Sufficient similarities may be
identified within the Ideal model in order to justify the name 'religion'.91 Similarly, a
phenomenological model may be applied to similar types of narratives or texts, to
which a 'name' is given. The Case Study in chapter six presents the example of the
Egyptian Opening of the Mouth ritual. The presence of a superhuman being appears
as an essential element within van der Leeuw's Ideal type ofmyth; thus the measure
of the presence of a superhuman being is also a key factor to consider when
classifying different types of'texts'.
Finally, the key issue, the 'essence' or essential character which identified
typologies of religion into commonalities, was defined by van der Leeuw as the
'sacred' or 'religious experience', discussed earlier. Given that the essential
characteristics of typologies of religion were defined within a Christian context, I
reiterate my earlier suggestion that the more neutral term 'Power' may be an
alternative to the value-laden 'religious experience'.921 have defined the term
90
Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 673.
91 Cf. Models of religion are described in Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience ofMankind,
(London: Collins, 1979), 3-8; Frank Whaling, Christian Theology and World Religions, (Basingstoke:
Marshall Pickering, 1986), 37-48.
92 Cf. On power, see SmithMap is not Territory. 'What we study when we study religion is the
variety of attempts to map, construct and inhabit such positions ofpower through the use of myths,
rituals and experiences of transformation', 291, and 'texts as power sources for temple elite', 293. See
Burkert, 'Logic ofCosmology', 102: 'Practically all the names [of the gods], celebrate power and
supremacy'. See also Carl Olson, 'The Concept of Power in the Works of Eliade and van der Leeuw',
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'Power' meaning something which is not only set apart from the mundane in a
supernatural context, but also that which has special significance to a community.
The concept of Power may have a similar supernatural nature although its
significance may be neither homogeneous nor uniform. Each community may
identify not only their concept ofPower in a different form but also diverse Powers
may have different characteristics. The office ofEgyptian kingship, 1 suggest is such
a Power.
For example, not only were the gods and goddesses of ancient Egypt
considered Powerful in this sense, the different types of Power, discussed later in
chapter six, were understood in their descriptions, both in narrative texts and
iconography. The falcon-headed god Horus displayed different Power characteristics
to the mummified god Osiris in ancient Egyptian ideology; both were identified and
interrelated with the eternal concept of kingship. Horus symbolised the reigning
king; Osiris ruled the eternal Netherworld. Thus, kingship is considered a divine
office.93 In comparison, narratives that concerned the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity may display similar supernatural Powers identified with the religion of
Christianity. Three different characteristics of a similar eternal Power may be present
within the concept of the Christian God: the Father, the Son and the Spirit or Holy
Ghost.94
Studia Theologica, 42, 1988:39-53, and the many references to Power in van der Leeuw, Religion in
Essence.
93 See Baines, 'Society, Morality', 123-124. In the context of'divine kingship' as the ruling force for
Egypt's social, political and economic structures, Baines noted, that, although the Egyptians had no
single term for 'religion', the small elite with kingship at its apex, represented Egyptian society. As
such, they interacted with 'religious' beliefs. I posit, that to apply the term 'religion' to ancient Egypt
with its presupposed similarity to world religions is to impose a 'religious' value absent within the
texts of ancient Egypt.
94 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 414. The image ofGod as 'Father' is not suggested as a 'given
fatherhood', the image proceeds inferentially not from "reality" to the picture, but rather from the
picture to reality. Van der Leeuw explained the subtle difference, 'a paternal form in which every
given fatherhoodmust conform'. See Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 26. Kemp noted that when looked at
through the eyes of an archaeologist, 'it is illogical that Christianity should be classed as a
monotheistic religion'; the variety of sacred images in stone, wood, brass and stained glass' may
suggest Christianity as a 'many-centred system of belief. See also Dowley, History ofChristianity,
153. The Apostles' Creed: 'I believe in God Almighty [the Father almighty], And in Christ Jesus, his
only son, our Lord Who was born of the Floly Spirit and the Virgin Mary...'
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In the context of a typology of religion, the eternal and timeless nature of
'myth' in both examples, operate in van der Leeuw's model as a 'type' ofmyth.95
Van der Leeuw named saga, fairy tales and legends as similar types of'myth'; each
contained some degree of the eternal or supernatural. Although van der Leeuw does
not discuss the degree of'religiousness' required for the classification of'myth' he
confirmed the presence of some measure of the supernatural. In this context certain
Egyptian narratives which contained a degree or measure of the 'superhuman' may,
in a broader context, qualify as a type of 'myth'. I will argue in the Case Study in the
chapter six that if all texts or narratives of ancient Egypt contain some measure of the
supernatural, then all texts may be described as 'myths' or a story about superhuman
beings. The problem lies with the modern meaning of the pejorative term 'myth'.
John Baines, Professor ofEgyptology, suggested that differentforms of
myths constitute different types; the mythic forms are 'affected by the genres to
which they belong and by their contexts of performance, use or storage and
transmission'. Literary myths, he suggested, constitute one type ofmyth among
many.96 As I understand his comment, a brief evocation of a deity within, for
example, an 'autobiographical' narrative may indicate conformity in the life of an
individual to the ethical principles of the goddess Maat in that the biographer
Q7
included in the text, the phrase 'loved Maat'. Similarly, deities may be used as
metaphors to describe certain traits of kingship within royal battle texts; the analogy
Tike Mont' implied that the king had superhuman, war-like powers Tike Mont', the
god ofwar. Equally relevant, is the name 'Osiris N' discussed in the Case Study. In a
95 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 414. See also Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 20. Kemp proposed that
Egyptian ideology, he does not differentiate between ideology and religion, stressed three themes:
continuity of the past; a unity over geographical and political subdivisions; and stability through the
ethical principles of right government by kings. The eternal or continuing nature of myth may be
interpreted as ancient Egypt's tracing a myth of the past as a model for the present. 'It knew its own
past, and fitted its images within the myth-world of ideology'.
96
Baines, 'Myth and Literature', 362, in AELE1F, 261-378. Baines considered 'myth' a 'sacred or
culturally central narrative', that 'such narratives concern deities'.
97
See Parkinson, Voices, 17. He described an Autobiographical text as a private funerary text which
presented the tomb owner's identity, virtues and career in an 'autobiography' inscribed on the walls of
his tomb or on a stela; it evolved gradually from lists of titles into formulaic epithets extolling the
virtues of the tomb owner. See also the numerous examples in Lichtheim, Maat in Egyptian
Autobiographies and Related Studies, (Freiborg Geottingen: Universiteatsverlag Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1992). 'Doing Maat' indicated that the 'author' had lived in accordance with the ethical
principles of the goddess Maat. When in a royal autobiography, reference to Maat concerned the
king's political rule within society.
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text with no reference other than the context to give meaning, the term by itself,
Osiris-N may fail to convey knowledge of the meaning of the name and the prefix
implied. Each reference implies a supernatural presence associated with the
protagonist of the text; the textual context therefore is important.
Such brief references to deities in general have little narrative structure and
may not, according to Baines, constitute the genre, 'mythic narrative'. Lichtheim
concurs that mythological material is employed in varying degrees in Egyptian
literature; she presented The Contendings ofHorus and Seth as a re-telling of an
ancient myth: 'it is set entirely among the gods'. Conversely, the tale of Truth and
Falsehood also takes place among the gods, but the protagonists, she argued, are
personified concepts; thus, 'their personalities and actions are those of human
beings'.98 These comments appear in agreement with Penner's theory discussed
earlier, that 'myth' is a story with a beginning, middle, and an end which concerns
the deeds of a superhuman beings.99 The criterion for the definition of 'myth'
therefore suggests the absence of human activity within the context of the story.
From the ancient Egyptian perspective, was it their intention to separate their
texts into different genres?100 Did the ancient Egyptians envisage their writings as an
integral whole where different genres formed part of the multifarious textual nature
that described their socio-cultural existence? These are crucial questions and
pertinent to the understanding of Egyptian texts given that all texts or narratives may
have some measure of the presence of supernatural beings.
Conversely, if the term literary narrative incorporates literary theory with its
associated fictional implications then the term 'mythic narrative' may confirm
Penner's theory that the information 'myth' provided was 'false'.101 On the other
hand, modern literary theory incorporates non-fiction and history within for example,
the context of cultural studies. I propose the term 'literary theory' in a cultural sense
98
Lichtheim, AEL. Vol.2:197. For versions of The Contendings ofHorus and Seth; Truth and
Falsehood, see Lichtheim, AEL. Vol.2: 214-223; Simpson, Literature ofAncient Egypt, 91-103.
99 See the earlier section on Penner, 5.2.1.
1(10
See Williams, 'Sages of Ancient Egypt', 7. Williams rightly suggested that the Egyptians
themselves may not have defined their texts into different genres.
101 Cf. On the fictional status of literature, see Loprieno, 'Defining Egyptian Literature', 43-44. See
also Harrison, Themis, 327. Harrison writing in 1912, echoed and seemed to anticipate Penner's
definition of the term 'myth': 'A myth ... is a "purely fictitious narrative". When we say a thing is
"mythical" we mean it is non-existent'.
172
5 On 'myth' and phenomenology
as a general theory of interpretation of texts; I will argue that the fictional or non-
fictional status may be peripheral to the ancient Egyptians' concept of reality as
expressions of their truth claims. Equally relevent to the presence or otherwise of
superhuman beings in Egyptian texts is the reminder that although mythic narratives
are present in other cultures, in Egypt there is 'the near absence ofnarratives about
the gods that can easily be termed myths'.102 (my emphasis).
Nonetheless, the absence or rarity of the presence ofmythic narratives in
Egyptian texts should not be construed as an argument in absentia although it merits
serious consideration. The lack of a scholarly consensus on a clear definition of
'myth' may be one factor to consider, another may be the fluidity of the meaning of
the term 'myth' generally. Was it the intention of the Egyptian priest-scribes to
create a literary narrative or to convey in various textual forms concepts of their
socio-cultural relationship with the supernatural? In the final analysis, the empirical
evidence present in almost all Egyptians texts of the activities and characteristics of
the deities of ancient Egypt implies a superhuman presence within the texts as a
whole.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter my aim was to present positive aspects of the
phenomenological method in preparation for the Case Study in the final chapter
which incorporates a new hermeneutic of texts with a new approach to the
phenomenological method. My research has shown that although many scholars do
not use the terms phenomenology, insider, or outsider, their texts displayed
considerable understanding of this method. The phenomenological principles of
epoche and empathy discussed earlier, through the various disciplines of religious
studies, law, astronomy and the various views of Egyptian scholars, illustrated the
positive aspects of the phenomenological method.
Conversely, I presented critiques from scholars whose views represented a
selection of general critiques on aspects of religion and myth. Penner's theory on the
false nature of the terms religion and myth coincided with McCutcheon's challenge
whether scholars may fully understand another person's beliefs. Given Penner's
theory that myth was not only a story that concerns the deeds of superhuman beings
102
Baines, 'Egyptian Myth', 81.
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he suggested that the information myth provided was false. Whether or not these
aspects ofmyth may be applied to the texts of ancient Egypt, the question is finalised
in the Case Study.
McCutcheon's negative approach to the insider view was addressed in this
section in a positive format. Throughout my thesis I have emphasised that the
phenomenological method does not claim to fully understand an adherent's beliefs;
rather, the claim is for a probable outcome of understanding given the elusive nature
of certainty, if only because of phenomenology's human-centred approach. It is
appropriate therefore that the principles of phenomenology have provided not only
my method of research but also a bridge of some substance between the key emic-
etic, subjective-objective, inter-relationship approach.
In the final chapter, my method in the Case Study is to re-appraise the
modern naming and classifying of Egyptian texts, to compare the typologies
suggested by scholars against the meanings intended by the Egyptians. The primary
texts will act as the authorial intent thus translations of various terms from primary
texts will be necessary in order to validate the meaning intended by the ancient
Egyptians. The aim is to re-appraise and compare the meaning of the texts, to
respect the adherent's views and to avoid any compromise to the intentions of the
Egyptian texts. I mentioned earlier that Pike suggested one should not attempt to
utilize an etic (outsider) description when an emic (insider) one was required,
103
implying that a cultural key was required to gain knowledge to an emic system.
Only then was a subjective-objective approach viable. Finally, following van der
Leeuw, I will re-examine the naming and classification of texts not only for accuracy
but also from the adherent's perspective; the texts will act as the validating referent.





A new phenomenological concept of 'myth' in an Egyptian
socio-political context
The important task is not to prove this, it is plain to see, but to clarify its relationship
to the message of the document, and ask the hermeneutical question: in what sense
is the interpretation an exegetical "reading into" - and in what sense is it an
exegetical "drawing out of' the document.1
6.1 Introduction
My earlier analysis of the meaning of the term 'myth' in chapter three
concluded that the terms mythos and logos were, in the Greek context, words which
refer to a story or an account the context of which designated the meaning of the
terms. Therefore, 'myth' is a word; it is a story or account in which the context
defines the subject and actors in the drama of the narrative. The context therefore
reveals the meaning of the 'myth'. Equally, the context should be whatever the
authors of the 'myth' say it is. However, given that the term 'myth' has acquired over
time the adverse status of'false', all forms of accounts that concern supernatural
beings carry a similar pejorative meaning.2 Equally, in the secular world today the
term 'myth' is frequently used in a general context to mean 'false'. For these reasons
and with the integrity of the ancient Egyptians as the premise, I elect to use the word
'texts' or 'narratives' in my Case Study rather than the baggage-laden term 'myth'.
The comments above on the context ofmyths apply in equal measure - that texts
reveal the meaning intended by the priestly scribes, the literati of ancient Egypt.
In previous chapters, I presented texts which demonstrated the office of
kingship in a socio-political context. I will argue that the king is the protagonist in
1
Ragnhild Bjerre Finnestad, 'Egyptian Thought about Life as a Problem of Translation', 37, in
Religion ofthe Ancient Egyptians.
2 For a critical approach to myth in the Classical and Romantic Periods and in particular the
ambivalent relationship between the Enlightenment period and myth, see Christopher Jamme,
'Portraying Myth More Convincingly,' IJPS, 12, 2004:29-45
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most if not all texts of ancient Egypt, either directly or indirectly in the various
textual genres to be examined. My meaning of the term socio-political is in the
context of the political role of governance and affairs of the state ofEgypt; the close
liaison between kingship and the Egyptian population results in an ordered society.
Equally, the king was supported by an entourage of goddesses, described earlier in
the Pyramid Texts, although the roles of the goddesses were neither submissive nor
subservient. My point is that the king and the elite members ofEgyptian society
appeared to consider a superhuman presence essential to their world order, both
earthly and cosmic. 3 The dual role ofEgyptian kingship indicates that the king is
both a human king and, as the manifestation of the royal god Horus at his coronation,
he is also a divine king.4 Allen's explanation of the complex motifofEgyptian
kingship is succinct.
When referring to the king's divine power, texts use the word nswt
usually translated "king". It is the nswt, for example, who issues
decrees, appoints officials, and represents Egypt before the gods.
When referring to the individual who happened to hold this divine
power, texts use the word hm. It is usually translated "Majesty", but it
really means something like "incarnation": the hm is the individual in
whom the divine power is incarnated.5
An alternative, although empathic, view is voiced by Quirke, of the
'untranslateability' of hm and hm.f traditionally rendered by Egyptologists in English
as 'Majesty' and 'His Majesty' respectively. Its meaning is reduced to a synonym for
the modern interpretation 'king'. Quirke and like-minded Egyptologists today now
interpret the meaning as hm nswt meaning 'the Power of the king'; the term hm is
translated Power hm.f as his Power.6 Although the interpretations ofAllen and
Quirke appear to differ, as I understand it, both interpretations convey comparable
meanings.
3
Archaeology is sparse on detailed information of the general populace of ancient Egypt. Recent
archaeological research gives evidence of'workmen villages' but this section of the community, the
artisans, sculptors and scribes, are considered members of the elite. See Barry Kemp, 'The Amarna
Workmen's Village in Retrospect', JEA73, 1987:21-50.
4 For Donald Redford's so-called 'mythological jargon of kingship' see, 'The Concept of Kingship',
160, in Ancient Egyptian Kingship, 158-183. For an empathic approach to the 'phenomenon of
kingship' on culture, on the institution of kingship, and his divinity, see Baines, 'Kingship, Definition
ofCulture', Ancient Egyptian Kingship, 4-47
5 Allen, Middle Egyptian, 31. For Ancient Egyptian society and kingship, see also 31-33.
6 See Quirke, Egyptian Literature, 7.
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Both interpretations convey the active force of hm as a superhuman Power,
something beyond that of the human being as an earthly ruler, although it is within
the human frame that the Power of kingship resides.7 Further, the Power of the
Egyptian king is contained within a social context; the physical manifestations, the
result of the labours of the populace on behalf of the king, produce benefits for the
state ofEgypt. Accordingly, as the people are the servants of the king, he is a servant
to the gods hm ntrw. The traditional meaning of a servant hm signifies the 'agent' of
royal Power. Equally a priest hm is a servant, an agent, who acts on behalf of the
king.
Here is an example of epoche, yet it is a word not mentioned by either
scholar. As I understand it, scholars of this calibre search for modern words to
convey their obvious understanding of the complex nature of the office of kingship.
The process implies an interrelationship between the subjective non-verbal
understanding of the texts and the objective scholarly need for a descriptive account
to convey that understanding. The aim is for clarity, to convey the meaning of a
complex aspect of Egyptian kingship as if from the insider view.8 Thus texts reveal
an interrelationship of some substance not only between the Egyptian king and his
people but also a supernatural liaison between the king and the state gods. Thus, I
posit that the Egyptian king is considered a god in the context of the divine office of
kingship.
The Case Study will take the form of a new hermeneutic of the term 'myth',
demonstrated within the framework of a new approach to the phenomenological
method and commensurate with the method of comparing data. The difference lies in
the absence ofwhat is considered the essential common elements which classify
categories of'religion'. The textual comparisons may be applied to other cultures in
the model provided. The final part of the Case Study presents an example of a so-
called Egyptian 'myth' generally named as an 'incantation'.
7 For the annual rejuvenation at Luxor Temple of the superhuman Power of the king and his ka see
Bell, 'Luxor Temple and the Cult of the ka\ 251-204.
8 See Bleeker's concept of clarity in 'Phenomenological Method', 98. For Bleeker, because
phenomenology of religion is concerned with the 'ideological connection', clarity of the phenomena is
gained when 'the facts are severed from their historical settings'.
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6.2 Framework for a New Hermeneutic of the Taxon 'Myth'
Whether Egyptian texts concern a story with a beginning, middle and end,
Quirke confirms that certain Egyptian texts include indicators of a beginning, a
formulaic opening phrase hSt-r and end-note phrase iw.fpw 'this is its end', for
example, in literary papyri of the late Middle Kingdom.9 Equally, whether a brief
reference to deities in statements or the name only of a deity in texts constitutes a
'mythic account', narrative or text, I suggest that the classical phenomenologists
accorded a similarly broad textual context to religious data. They refrained from
determining the degree or measure of similarity between each type of text, whether
general, 'slight or pronounced' or in their familial analogy from the close similarity
of a sibling to the more remote relationship of distant cousins.10 Accordingly, given
that my thesis centres on whether or not Egyptian texts may be designated 'myth' in
the context of 'religion' or as I propose, in a socio-cultural context, this chapter
offers a demonstration of the latter. This is not to say that the Egyptian texts lack a
superhuman presence; rather, this element forms an integral part of their socio-
cultural structure.
My method follows the phenomenological principles not only of epoche and
empathy but also a subjective-objective approach to the empirical data generally
following the phenomenological method of van der Leeuw described in chapter four.
First I collated and scrutinized objectively a large selection of published texts.11 Next
I compared different scholarly interpretations of the texts before the third stage,
grouping the empirical data into similar types or textual genres. Following this stage,
my next objective was to classify the different genres into their appropriate type of
texts; given that the textual context rather than a 'religious' or supernatural presence
9
Stephen Quirke, Egyptian Literature, 30. An opening phrase also used to introduce speeches of
various gods: dd rndw n (words spoken by).
10 See chapter two.
11
Except otherwise noted, a selection ofEgyptian sources used in this chapter with reference to
genres and modern literary theory applied to Egyptian texts, see Lichtheim, Maat in Egyptian
Autobiographies; Strudwick, Textsfrom the PyramidAge, Quirke, Egyptian Literature; Loprieno,
'Defining Egyptian Literature', in AELH,F, 39-58; John Baines, 'Classicism and modernism in the
literature of the New Kingdom', in AELHF,157-174; Loprieno, The "'King's Novel"', in AELHF,
277-295; Quirke, 'Narrative Literature', in AELHF, 263-276; Simpson, 'Belles Lettres and
Propaganda', in AELHF, 435-443; Williams, 'Sages of Ancient Egypt', 1-19; John Baines and
Christopher Eyre, Four Notes on Literacy', GM, 61, 1983:65-96. On ine general characterization and
historical studies of kingship, see the various sections in Ancient Egyptian Kingship. For further
references to literature sources, see chapter five, 166,n.86.
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informs the different genres. Accordingly, rather than seeking a common 'religious'
element to classify similar types into groups, the key issues identified in chapter two,
the signifiers of commonality, the 'essence' of religion, homo religiosus; and the
ahistorical nature of religion, are removed.
Given the phenomenological premise of the adherent's autonomy of the data,
what appears to be foreign to the ethos of the ancient Egyptian texts is omitted from
the new paradigm of the phenomenological system. Consequently, further re¬
appraisal of the texts from a contextual perspective was necessary; the fourth stage
was a subjective approach. The texts previously grouped by scholars of Egyptian
literature into different genres are re-examined; the names designated previously to
the miscellany of texts are compared with the textual contexts.12 This is not to say
that scholars have grouped texts into inappropriate genres; rather, the grouping may
have been classified within the context of modern terminology. Nonetheless, the aim
of the new hermeneutic is to consider the texts as if from the perspective of the
ancient Egyptians.
The fourth stage therefore is to identify 'what appears' to the researcher from
a human rather than a religious perspective, to refrain from imposing an overlay of
modern concepts of 'religiousness' over Egyptian texts. In chapters two and three an
overlay ofChristian beliefs and Greek culture was demonstrated. This Case Study
seeks not only to clarify the Egyptian meaning of their texts but also to establish the
positive contribution of the phenomenological method to future research. My
endeavour is to understand the empirical texts from the insider view with some
awareness that as a human being, I may not achieve full understanding of the
meaning of the texts as the adherent intended. The practical application of the
phenomenological method, I propose, is a systematic subjective-objective approach
of considerable benefit to scholarly research.
My intentions therefore are to re-appraise the naming of texts. The 'naming'
principle is a key concept in ancient Egypt, and in the process a deeper understanding
of the texts may be realised. Consequently, names and context matter. Equally to
understand the texts from the insider view may determine the socio-political
significance, if any, of the texts. As a phenomenologist, Bleeker's comments serve as
12 See 11 above.
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a reminder of one of the key principles of phenomenology that 'the
phenomenological method implies the unprejudiced observation' of the data. Given
his statement that the phenomenologist seeks to 'fathom the meaning' of the texts, he
infers that the phenomenologist may have some difficulty in achieving an 'unbiased,
critical yet understanding approach (my emphasis).13 Nonetheless, his premise
appears to be the endeavour to understand the perspective of the adherent.
In the final analysis, I propose that the subjective-objective partnership is
realised in the fifth stage when the researcher-phenomenologist 'draws back' from
the subjective position and attempts to describe his or her understanding of the texts
objectively. In other words, what he or she has understood from the texts now
retained in human memory, whether recalled only in part, the scholarly textual
records of the human experience act as support of the understanding experienced by
the phenomenologist. Thus, the researcher is able to re-appraise objectively the
textual records experienced at the time the researcher experienced understanding of
the texts, van der Leeuw interprets the human experience that it, 'dawns on us'.14
For this reason, I propose a continuous re-appraisal of the texts if only to
achieve the most credible unbiased account of the experience. The familiar
archaeological one-liner that an archaeologist 'knows only as much as his or her last
dig' is one view of archaeology as an ongoing process of knowledge. Similarly, the
criterion of the phenomenologist is to draw out of the texts the authorial intent of the
adherents whether Egyptian or otherwise then follow with a continued re-appraisal of
the data. In my research the terms 'myth' and 'religion' within the disciplines of
phenomenology, religion, Egyptology and briefly within other disciplines, were
subjected to this level of scrutiny.
6.3 For a Socio-Political Status of the Taxon 'Myth'
If the Greek terms mythos and logos examined in chapter three determined
the changing authoritative context of the meaning of the words, then Plato and the
philosophers interpreted and imposed a socio-political authority on the meaning of
13
Bleeker, Hathor, 3.
14 This is not to say that the subject-objective human experience is the same as van der Leeuw's
'religious' experience, rather the experience concerns understanding the content of the texts from the
insider view, that is, the ancient Egyptian view. Thus the subjective-objective interrelationship
concerns the phenomenologist-outsider's understanding of the texts of the insider-Egyptian; empathy
and bracketing implies the absence of any imposed overlay.
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mythos and logos for the purpose of the state. In this context, rather than denuding
mythos or logos of all supernatural characters, the Greeks chose to retain their divine
status as a functional tool to maintain societal order, whilst simultaneously
assimilating for the state, the authoritative power previously held by the Hesiodic
goddess-inspired authority. As I interpret the terms mythos and logos in the Greek
context, the terms may be more appropriately interpreted in a socio-political context
in which a superhuman presence is evident
From a different perspective, the concept of a 'false' belief is similar to that
of the false nature ofmyth; both reveal an authoritative truth claim. For example, the
early Christian Church had difficulty in knowing on what authoritative grounds
certain doctrines may be accepted or refuted. 'In a word the central issue was that of
Authority'.13 The polemic against the non-conformists of the early Church who
disagreed on the Rule of Faith proposed by Irenaeus and Tertullian,16 a summary of
the beliefs of the 'whole Church', was reminiscent of the Greek Sophist and
Philosophical polemic against the Hesiodic divine authority. The Greeks required an
ordered state in which the elitist 'few' assumed authority and responsibility for the
ethical standards and supernatural beliefs of the 'populace of the many', as did the
early Christian community.
Accordingly, if the beliefs of the people opposed either the philosophical
teachings of the fifth century Platonic state or the doctrinal teachings of the Christian
'Church', then such beliefs were deemed 'false' or 'heretic'. Equally, given that the
Church authorities considered biblical texts difficult and obscure for the 'simple folk'
to understand, then priests and ministers became the representatives ofChurch
Authority; biblical texts were interpreted on behalf of the people. Similarly, the
various 'inquisitions' levied by the different Church and State authorities may serve
as examples of the religio-political pressure to comply with 'religious' truth claims.
The persecution of the Christians, Jews and Muslims to the various inquisitions was
the result of heretical beliefs. Following the 'mythic' analogy that 'my belief and
'my story' are 'true'; those beliefs which are different, they do not conform to 'my'
authoritative teachings, the 'other' story then, falls within the rubric of'false'.
15
Henry Chadwick, The Early Church, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 41. Worthy of note is
Chadwick's use of the capitalised word 'Authority'.
16 For the concept ofFaith and Order in the early Church and various aspects which constituted heresy
see Chadwick, Early Church, 32-45.
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This is not a phenomenological problem per se\ rather, I suggest it is a human
issue, the result of the absence of epoche in the research method for example, in the
bracketing of any distinction between the true and the false. When phenomenology is
religion-centred the distinction is between 'my' religion compared to 'your' religion
and, as I indicated in chapter two, van der Leeuw suggested that the religion of the
phenomenologist may itself act as the signifier of commonality.
My point is that historically 'religion', like the terms 'myth' and 'truth', are
elusive terms, slippery in the meaning that the terms are difficult to grasp and given
that they may mean different things to different cultures. In a secular state, religion
may form an exclusive role in which there is no compulsion to be 'religious' but the
Church will hold authority over religious doctrines. Equally, when Church and State
conjoin in religious doctrines, the religiousness of the people may be subject to the
authority of the Church and State; the Early Church is an example. Either concept
forms part of the structure of a culture's socio-political stability. For example, in the
Judiciary system ofCourts ofLaw truth claims are made under oaths, different
divine authorities (Islam is an example) are validating referents.17 The purpose of all
civilisations is to maintain an ordered society.18 These comments lead to the next
section the aim of which is to demonstrate the role of kingship as the defining factor
in an ordered society.
6.4 Phenomenology of Egyptian Texts
The purpose of the Case Study is to establish the socio-political significance
of the office ofEgyptian kingship within the various Egyptian texts and iconography.
Equally, it is to ascertain whether 'myths' in the modern sense may be identified
within these texts. In the next sections I offer a practical demonstration of the
classification ofEgyptian texts into different types; the context is the signifier which
determines the meaning and type of each group. My aim is not only to re-appraise
the use ofmodern terms to interpret Egyptian texts but also to offer alternatives from
the Egyptian perspective.
17 On the phenomenology of law, see the section in chapter five.




For example, rather than the term 'funerary' texts I will use 'transfiguration'
texts sih.w\ for 'tomb' the more appropriate 'house of eternity' or 'house ofgold'
hwt-nbw; for the 'tomb-owner' I propose the general term Osiris-N used by
Egyptians in their stock supply of the books ofComing Forth by Day.19 When
discussing specific papyri I will use the names, Osiris Ani and Osiris Hunefer.20
Finally, for the modern term 'mortuary temple' I will use the Egyptian phrase 'house
ofmillions of years'- it demonstrates textually the Egyptian meaning of the concept
intended of eternal time. Next I appraise the aptly named 'instruction' texts the
context of which demonstrates a royal and supernatural presence. A general
summary follows with the remainder of the texts. I present in the final section a re¬
appraisal of the familiar so-called 'mythic' account of, The God and his Unknown
Name ofPower.
6.4.1 Naming and Classifying Types: 'Funerary' Texts
The so-called conventionally named 'funerary' texts21 inscribed on the walls
or written on papyri enclosed within the Egyptian named 'houses of gold', form
quantitatively the majority textual sources from ancient Egypt.22 The modern naming
process by Egyptologists classified the context of texts with their location; the term
'funerary' appeared appropriate in that the primary sources were discovered in
'burials' (houses of gold) or 'mortuary temples' (houses ofmillions of years). The
main genres included in the 'funerary' types of texts are: Pyramid texts; Coffins
texts; the books of Coming Forth by Day (Books of the Dead); Books ofBreathing;
The New Kingdom Books of the Netherworld, The Amduaf, The Books ofthe Sky,
19 I have chosen to apply the Egyptian name Coming Forth by Day rather than the modern rendered,
Book of the Dead.
20
Although each king is identified by his cartouche in the Pyramid Texts, either 'Osiris-N' or 'the
Osiris-N', are the conventional naming format of the book, Coming Forth by Day. Generally the
Osiris-N was followed by the name of the transfigured being, together with his or her titles of office.
For brevity, I have omitted the titles. Archaeological records show certain so-called 'stock' papyri.
They indicate that the temporary 'N' would be replaced later with the name of the subsequent owner
of the papyrus, for example, Osiris Hunefer. For a similar naming process, see Faulkner, preface to
PT, vii. In his translation Faulkner used the uniform term, 'King', to indicate that the corpus refers to
all kings of the fifth and sixth dynasties.
21 For an Egyptian perspective on the term 'funerary', see Werner Forman, Stephen Quirke, eds.,
Hieroglyphs and the Afterlife in Ancient Egypt, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 7.
22. See Gumbrecht, 'Does Egyptology need a "Theory ofLiterature'", 12; Parkinson, Voices, 23;
Quirke, Egyptian Literature, 14.
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and others.21 All texts concern the transfiguration process which transforms an
earthly being, either royal or non-royal into superhuman status.
Other names designated to the genre 'funerary' texts, for example, 'religious'
or 'theological', may suggest the presence and actions of superhuman beings.
Conversely, the modern terms fail to realise the meanings intended by the Egyptians.
This is not to imply that scholars used the terms 'religious' or 'theological' in the
context ofChristian theology or a colonial interpretation of the term 'religion',
although it serves to emphasise that both words carry a subtle implication.24 The
universal nature of the term 'funerary' implies that cultures have more similarities to
their beliefs than differences, that similarities are the criteria. Ancient Egypt appears
to demonstrate a difference.
For example, from an Egyptian perspective, to name the texts 'funerary'
9 S
implies an association with the modern concept of the finality of death. Egyptian
texts convey the absence of a transcendent god in the Christian sense where at death
the person would become one with all; to an Egyptian such unity implies non-
96
existence. Equally at the apex of the model ofworld religions the concept of a
Transcendent Being presupposes similarities that all belief systems have a common
97
'Supreme Being' Texts reveal that the ancient Egyptians rather than seeking non¬
existence their beliefwas to continue not only an existence in the 'living' world
(although in a different fonn) but also they expected to exist among the hierarchy of
gods within the superhuman world.28 Quirke describes the process where a 'dead
person could be made into an eternally rejuvenated being':
23 For a detailed summation of the majority of texts that concern the Egyptian Afterlife, see Hornung,
Afterlife.
24 See Flood, Phenomenology, 230-234, and his section on Post-colonial theory On the 'secret
identification of religion in ourWestern culture', seeNinian Smart, The Phenomenon ofReligion,
(London: MacMillan Press, 1973), 7. See also Gertie Englund, 'Gods as a Frame ofReference', 7-8.
25 Chambers Dictionary, 673, defined the term funeral as 'disposal of the dead, with related
ceremonies or observances'.
26 Cf. The NIVStudy Bible, 1991: John 17:21, '[Tjhat all of them may be one, Father, just as you are
in me and I am in you', and Luke 17:21, '[T]he kingdom ofGod is within you and among you'.
27 Cf. Models of religion, quoted in chapter five, are described in Smart, Religious Experience, 3-8
and Whaling, Christian Theology, 37-48.
28 See Edward F. Wente, 'Mysticism in Pharaonic Egypt? ',161, JNES, 41, 1982:161-179. See also
Allen, Middle Egyptian, 95.
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Today we call these ancient texts funerary literature, but this technical
term does them little justice; these are texts to transfigure the dead, to
make human beings into immortal gods.29
For these reasons and given the majority status of the so-called group of texts
classified by scholars today as 'funerary', I propose that the texts of the ancient
Egyptians signified an inter-active participation in an earthly-superhuman sense of
being rather than the final passive state conveyed by the meaning of the term,
'funerary'.
The Opening the Mouth ritual, a formulaic rite referred to briefly in chapter
three, demonstrates the significance in which the Egyptians held this transforming
ritual; rather than death, it signified rebirth. 30 Equally, similar forms of this key ritual
remained constant and testify to its importance throughout and beyond the three
thousand years of ancient Egypt's historical era. the Opening the Mouth ritual
inscribed on the walls ofPyramids, written on papyri and depicted in iconography, is
suitable source data to validate the context of the beliefs held by the ancient
Egyptians of an Afterlife of some substance. The ritual shares common elements
practiced continuously from the historic Old Kingdom period through to the New
Kingdom period, into the Greco-Roman period and on into the second century C.E.31
An awareness of these common elements may help towards understanding not only
the function of this important ritual but also its importance to the Egyptian concept of
being; papyri and wall inscriptions in the 'houses of gold' revealed a fluid concept of
existence over a period of three thousand years.
6.4.2 Naming and Classifying Types: 'Transfiguration' Texts
In the Old Kingdom period, texts inscribed on the walls of the pyramid of the
fifth dynasty King Unis, the oldest corpus ofEgyptian literature, expounded the
29
Forman, Hieroglyphs and the Afterlife, 7.
30 For a general overview of the ritual see Svein Bjerke. 'Remarks on the Egyptian Ritual of "Opening
the Mouth" and its Interpretation', 206, Numen, 12, 1965, 201-16. His comment written 40 years ago
serves to demonstrate the scholar's propensity towards understanding the Egyptian beliefs from the
insider view: 'In an indirect way the Egyptians have thus given us a valuable clue to our
understanding of this ritual'.
31 For Opening the Mouth rituals, see the description in Murnane, Ancient Egypt, 1996. For example,
inscribed on the walls of the tomb of the vizier, Rekhmire, 76; the tomb of Tutankhamun, 317; the




various supernatural forms to which the king expected to exist in the Netherworld; as
an Imperishable Star, later as Osiris, or to join the solar boat ofRa. Central to the
superhuman transformations were the pyramid inscription of the Opening the Mouth
ritual. Although the ritual continued in a similar form throughout Egypt's historical
era, socio-political changes at the end of the Old Kingdom introduced the ritual to a
wider populace.
Kings no longer enjoyed the monopoly of immortality in which the Opening
the Mouth ritual was an essential part. Coffin Texts developed from the Pyramid
Texts, extended the ritual and beliefs of immortality to non-royal elites during the
First Intermediate Period, although there is some evidence in the late Old Kingdom
period/ By the New Kingdom state authority gave the populace in general similar
guarantees of immortality if the book, Coming Forth by Day, was included in their
'houses of gold'. The Opening the Mouth ritual therefore was an essential element
not only in the transition from an 'earthly' to a 'superhuman being' but also a
significant presence in both forms of existence. We may call it an element of
transcendence.
One of the earliest texts is in a section of the Pyramid Texts with the chapter
heading, The Ritual ofOpening the Mouth, introduced briefly in chapter three. It
33
required the reigning king to perform this key ritual on his royal predecessor. The
full ritual is described in Pyr. 1330-1: '[YJour mouth is split open by Horus with this
little finger of his with which [he] split open the mouth of his father, with which he
split open the mouth ofOsiris. I am your son, I am Horus, I am a 'loving-son' priest
ofmy father in this my name of 'Loving son'.34 My point in quoting this text is to
illustrate the importance of the royal son-motif later absorbed by the elite members
ofEgyptian society in that the eldest son of a family emulated the role of the royal
son. As the eldest son of the king he was required to give offerings and perform
32
Non-royals in the Old Kingdom occasionally shared the royal status of immortality when given
'approval' by the king. The 6th dynasty 32-roomed mastaba ofMereruka, the vizier and son-in-law of
the 6th dynasty king, Teti, is one example. The mastaba was built close to the pyramid of Teti at
Sakkara. A 'false door', offering table and 'serdab' to house the ka ofMereruka, not only testified to
his expectancy of a supernatural existence with the gods, it may serve as an example of the later elite
burials in the later First Intermediate Period.
33 See Faulkner, PT, 3. See also Pyr. 11.
34 Faulkner, PT, 209.
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various rituals to ensure the continued existence of the ka of the king. A similar
expectancy was required of the eldest son of each family where the superhuman
father was dependent on the earthly son. The living family were conjoined to their
supernatural family in a repetition of rituals and offerings.
For example, in the Pyramid Texts, the aim of the Opening the Mouth ritual
was the return of sensory life to King Unis and other sixth dynasty kings.
Performance of the ritual enabled the kings to see, smell, breathe, hear, and eat, to
partake of ritual offerings of food and clothing presented by Horus, the reigning king
and 'loving-son' of Osiris. Offerings intended for the sustenance of the ka, the 'life-
force', 'twin' or 'double' ofKing Unis, formed an essential part of the Opening the
Mouth ritual. Pyr.772-3 described offerings made to the king's ka\ 'O King be aware,
take this god's offering of yours with which you are content every day, a thousand of
bread, a thousand of beer, a thousand of oxen, a thousand of fowl, a thousand of all
•> c
sweet things, a thousand of every kind of clothing'. The Opening the Mouth ritual
accompanied by offerings of food, drink and linen for the ka of the transfigured
being as well as the ritual participation of the elder son, were key factors in an
anticipated continued superhuman existence. The ancient Egyptians expected to
enjoy an on-going existence.
To clarify the meaning further from the insider view, almost one thousand
years after the first appearance of the ritual in the Pyramid Texts, common features
of the Opening the Mouth ritual were illustrated on the chamber walls ofNew
Kingdom 'houses of gold' and papyri lodged within the mummified beings. The
walls of Tutankhamun's 'house of gold' discussed earlier although in a different
context, displayed a pictorial version of the Opening the Mouth ritual described in
the Pyramid Texts.36 In the examination of both texts and iconography, a deeper
understanding of the more obscure meanings of the Egyptian concept of existence is
realised. Rather than seeing the chamber of the 'house of gold' as a place of finality
the iconography revealed that it was golden-yellow, the colour of gold and symbolic
of its imperishable and eternal nature (Fig. 5). Similarly, in naming the chamber the
35 See the Offering Rituals in Ian Shaw and Paul Nicholson, BritishMuseum Dictionary ofAncient
Egypt, (London: British Museum Press, 1995), 209. See also 'offerings for your ka' in Allen, Middle
Egyptian, 80.
36 For the earlier reference to the tomb of Tutankhamun see chapter three.
187
6 Case Study
Fig.5 The 'house of gold' of Tutankhamun. KV62.
Theban Mapping Project Ref. 15161
Fig.6 Detail: Osiris, Horas-Tutankhamun and his
ka. Theban Mapping Project, Ref. 14894
'house of gold' the ancient Egyptians conveyed textually and visually their meaning
and significance of eternity rather than the finality of death in the modern sense.37
Horus, Tutankhamun and his ka (Fig.6) illustrate the three-fold concept of the
eternal nature of kingship. In the centre, Tutankhamun is Horus the reigning king, he
embraces and is embraced by his father Osiris, the simultaneous unifying force of the
ka LJ presence results in a syncretism of all three. The perpetuity of divine kingship
is illustrated in the ritual of transfiguration; the past king Horus is transformed into
his father Osiris. The next king, through the performance of various rituals at his
coronation, 'becomes' and is named Horus. The eternal and divine natures of the kas
of kingship are present in all past, present and future kings. See also the wooden ka-
figure ofKing Hor (Fig.9). Similarly, Pyr. 1653 is one ofmany texts which describe
the eternal royal unity with the gods: 'O Atum, set your arms about the King, about
this construction, and about this pyramid as the arms of a ^-symbol, that the king's
essence may be in it, enduring for ever'. The hieroglyph image of the 'extended-arm'
&<2-symbol U is here metaphorically described as an embrace 0, believed to be the
origin of the 'extended-arm' hieroglyph.38
Although the text and iconography in the New Kingdom tomb of
Tutankhamun indicated the rituals which ensured the immortality of the king, the
37 For colour symbolism see Richard H. Wilkinson, Symbolic andMagic in Ancient Egyptian Art,
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), 108. See also Desroches-Noblecourt, Tutankhamun, 259.
38 For the Aar-glyph 6U 9 above the head of the ka of Tutankhamun (3rd figure) and the embrace-glyph
'0' between the Horus king Tutankhamun and his Osiris form (1st and 2nd figures), see Fig.6. On the
ka glyph, see Allen, Middle Egyptian, 80; Wilkinson, Reading Egyptian Art, 50-51.
188
6 Case Study
Egyptian people in general were also provided with a similar transformation into
their Netherworld. A brief reference to this text will confirm not only the historic
continuity of the Opening the Mouth ritual but also that the naming process was
more important to the ancient Egyptian concept of existence than in modern
societies.39 The so-called 'democratization' of immortality for everyone was
dependant on whether the family could 'afford' a stock version of the papyrus with
the Osiris-N format; later the actual name replaced the 'N'. Equally, the proviso was
whether the people could 'afford' a scribe and artist to create a personal version.
Everyone therefore was offered a place amongst the gods with the condition
that they had within their 'house of gold', the modern named papyrus, Book ofthe
Dead. The papyrus held the answers to the questions posed by the gods and signified
a form of guarantee of an eternal existence.40 The book ofComing Forth by Day was
divided into approximately two hundred Chapters named variously, Utterances,
Recitations, 'Spells' or 'Incantations'. They guaranteed the Osiris-N a place in the
Netherworld, provided that he or she was in possession of the papyrus, Coming Forth
by Day.41 Here is a further example of naming and classifying data within a modern
context rather than from the insider view of the adherent.
The Egyptians named the papyri to accompany them into the Netherworld,
Coming Forth by Day, it describes clearly their intention that they expected a
continued existence in both the earthly and supernatural world. The inappropriately
named The Book ofthe Dead demonstrates an evident difference in meaning.42 An
immediate disparity is discerned between the two titles. The active movement
implied by the words 'coming forth' indicates the authorial intent of the Egyptians
29 The hacking out of the names of deities during the reign of Akhenaten signified the importance
placed by the Egyptians in the naming process. The removal of the names from temple inscriptions
indicated that the person 'ceased to exist'. See also chapter four, 138,n.92.
40 The books ofComing Forth by Day ofAni and Hunefer are two examples of texts recovered from
their respective coffins.
41 The earliest papyri, more appropriately named the book of Coming Forth by Day date to the mid-
fifteenth century, BCE.
42 The German Egyptologist Karl Richard Lepsius, who coined the phrase, Totenbuch (The Book of
the Dead), published a selection of translations in 1842. On the whole, the traditional title Book of the
Dead, continues to be used although, increasingly today, the title is qualified with the alternative title,
the book ofComing Forth by Day. Cf. Faulkner's, The Ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead, was re¬




that they expected a superhuman form ofexistence. The
concept ofOsiris-N in his or her &a-form leaving and
returning to the 'house of gold' each evening indicates
an active participation in the earthly world (Fig.7).43 See
also (Fig. 10) which depicts the ba of the Royal Scribe
Ani hovering over the mummified Osiris Ani.44 The
contrast between the passive finality of the modern terms
'funerary' and 'death' demonstrates clearly the absence
of such a context in the Egyptian ethos.
A brief textual example may suffice from the
papyrus ofOsiris Ani. In Chapter 68 of the book of
Coming Forth by Day Osiris Ani is described 'going out
into the day': 'The doors of the earth are opened for me,
the door-bolts ofGeb [the earth god] are opened for me,
the shutters of the sky-windows are thrown open for me... I go out into the day to the
place where I desire to be'. The text continues with an unknown god granting Osiris
Ani, 'Power' in his heart, in his arms, in his legs, in his mouth, in all his members,
and over his invocation-offerings. The chapter concludes with affirmation from the
gods that Osiris Ani 'shall walk on earth among the living and he shall never suffer
destruction'43 Chapter 71 reveals the importance of 'naming' and the knowledge
given to Osiris Ani contained in the book of Coming Forth by Day. 'I know you, I
know your names; may you know me just as I know your names'.46 The chapter ends
with the familiar phrase, 'A matter, million times true'.
The following chapters from the papyrus ofOsiris Ani follow the same
format as the Opening the Mouth ritual ofKing Unis. Chapter 22 is entitled, 'For
giving a mouth to Osiris', and the words are spoken by Osiris Ani: 'My mouth has
been given to me that I may speak ... for I am Osiris'. The texts ofChapter 23 with
43 After Frankfort, Kingship, Fig.22, 'The ba descending the tomb shaft to go to the Mummy'.
44 British Museum 10470. Hieroglyphic funerary papyrus of the Royal Scribe, Accounting Scribe for
Divine Offerings of all the gods, Overseer of the Granaries, Ani. Nineteenth dynasty, cl250 BCE.
45
Faulkner, BD, 69-70. Chapter 68 is one ofmany references to the Osiris N going out into the day.
See also Chapters 9-13, 68, 71, 72.1 have used the more positive term 'chapter' rather than the term
'spell' used by Faulkner.
46
Faulkner, BD, 72.
Fig.7 The ba- bird returns down the




Fig.8 Opening the Mouth ritual Fig.9 Above. Life-size wooden ka statue ofKing Hor4'
Papyrus Hunifer. British Museum Fig.10 Below. The ba and mummified Ani.
Papyrus Ani EA10470/3 5 British Museum.
the heading 'for opening the mouth of 'N' is a similar personal utterance: 'My mouth
is opened, my mouth is split opened by Shu with that iron harpoon of his with which
has split open the mouth of the gods'.48 The ba, often translated as the soul, hovers
above the mummified form ofAni (Fig. 10),49 whether leaving or returning to Ani
through the shaft of the 'house of gold' (Fig.7). The royal ^-figure ofKing Hor
(Fig.9) displays the same ka sign as Tutankhamun (Fig.6).
More may be gleaned from the named papyrus of another non-royal, the
King's Scribe, Osiris Hunefer.50 He is depicted in a similar vignette to that of
Tutankhamun although the papyrus ofHunefer provides more detailed visual
information of the ritual (Fig.8). For example, the erect mummified form ofHunefer
is held by the god Anubis, behind the offerings the sem-priest in leopard skin robe
holds a sensor. The stela behind Anubis shows Hunefer praising Osiris; behind the
47 The A»-statue of the 13th dynasty Middle Kingdom king, Auibe-Ra Hor. JE30948. Cairo Museum.
48
Faulkner, BD, 51-52. See also Chapters 54-59 for breathing. In the Egyptian creation myth of Atum,
Shu was the god of air; his presence is significant in the Opening the Mouth ritual in that in order for
humans to live they must breathe the air of Shu. See also Allen, Middle Egyptian, 55.
49 See 44.
50 British Museum.EA9901 sheet 5, funerary papyrus of the Royal Scribe, Scribe for Divine Offerings,
Hunefer. Nineteenth dynasty, cl275 BCE.
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stela is the doorway of the chapel of the 'house of gold' from which the ba ofOsiris
Hunefer may emerge into the day.31
The upraised arms of the 'mourners', the wife and daughter of Hunefer agree
in pose to the textual description in the Pyramid Texts of the upraised arms of the
mourning goddesses Isis and Nephthys. Similar also to the textual description of
Unis is the upright, mummified Hunefer outside his 'house of gold'. A like attired
sem-priest in leopard-skin robe performs the Opening the Mouth ritual. Both Osiris
Ani and Osiris Hunefer participate in a ritual previously the prerogative of kings;
now non-royals emulate the ritual so that they too may enjoy a similar supernatural
existence.
Further, the texts and iconography presented testify also to the socio-political
aspects of the Egyptians: the power of the king was evident, for the Egyptians to
achieve life in the supernatural world it was necessary to emulate the rituals of the
king. The text and iconography inform us of the social role ofwomen as 'official'
mourners also that the eldest son acts as the sem-priest following the royal ritual. The
images and texts depict actual rituals enacted by the living on behalf of the
52
transfigured beings. The offerings are made 'symbolically' by the eldest son,
whether royal or non-royal, and textually describe and image the beneficiary, the ka,
the father, whether Unis, Tutankhamun, Hunefer or Ani. The father-son motif links
the living and the supernatural.
Truth claims are also evident. When an unidentified god testifies to the 'truth'
of his words, 'A matter a million times true', neither Ani nor Hunefer would consider
the validity or otherwise of this statement. From the adherent's perspective the
written word was verification of their truth claim.34 That the same gods and similar
rituals are present in both the royal and non-royal Opening the Mouth ritual implies
that non-royals emulate royal rituals to achieve the state-approved promise of
31 The lower register ofPapyrus Hunefer depicts the ritual tools for Opening the Mouth as well as a
cow with her calf. The traditional offering of the foreleg shows evidence ofblood flowing from a leg
torn from the calf s living form.
32 For example, Tutankhamun was not the actual 'father' of the king who succeeded him neither was
Ay the son of Tutankhamun. In the process ofmaintaining the function of the ritual, the father-son
primogeniture discussed earlier, is maintained.
33
Faulkner, BD, 70. This line closes BD, chapter 68.
34 The Egyptian 'Negative Confession' is an example ofthe concept of the written word as validation.
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'democratized' immortality. Equally, as the Horus-king was transfigured into the
Osiris-king, non-royals underwent similar transformations - they too 'became' Osiris.
Again the naming process carries considerable significance.
To emphasise the importance of the Opening the Mouth ritual my penultimate
re-appraisal of textual and archaeological evidence describes the Opening the Mouth
ritual texts of a first century C.E. papyrus, The Liturgyfor Opening the Mouth for
Breathing.55 The time period is over one thousand years after the time of
Tutankhamun, three thousand years after the historical era ofEgyptian history began.
I mentioned previously the names 'Spells' or 'Incantations' given by scholars to
sections of the texts in the book of Coming Forth by Day. I have argued that such
modern classifications may carry a less positive meaning than the name given to the
Recitations by the Egyptians. Similarly, although I chose to use the term 'chapter',
its neutrality fails to convey the authorial intent of the scribe-priests. The uttering of
the words in the chapters are the means which initiate the transfiguration process.
Accordingly, the Egyptian term sih.w, meaning 'glorifications' or
'transfigurations', not only implies a continued existence of some merit rather than a
sudden departure from an earthly life, it is also indicative of the precise meaning
intended by the ancient Egyptians.36 The ancient Egyptians believed that the purpose
of the texts was to restore the mental and physical faculties of the Osiris N in order to
achieve a superhuman existence in the Afterlife. The term sakhu (sih.w) is the
causative means, the texts and rituals incorporated into the ritual of the Opening the
Mouth. The akh (ih) or 'light', is the indefinable 'spirit' or being, named Osiris N
because he or she possesses the knowledge contained within the book of Coming
Forth by Day. Therefore all whose name is prefixed with the name Osiris is justified,
'true of voice', they become one of the many akhs (Ih.w), who exist in the horizon,
the akhet (Sh.t). The text therefore offers its own validation that the presence of
Osiris-N in the Netherworld is justified.
55 See Smith, The Liturgy ofOpening the Mouth. The main papyri discussed by Smith are P. Berlin
8351, P. Louvre E10605, P. Louvre 10607, P. Strasbourg 3 verso.
56 See Smith, The Liturgy ofOpening the Mouth, and his research on the Papyrus Berlin 835 land
other related papyri. Smith proposed that the term sakhu, ,'glorification(s)', was not a description of
the ritual rather the means of transition, 7. Similarly, Loprieno in Defining Egyptian Literature
interpreted the term as 'transfiguration', 48.
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Fig-11 A detail from the false door ofMehu, Fig. 12 From the Mastaba ofMereruka, Sakkara
Keeper of the Diadem, Overseer of the Two Offices of the Copyright Jon Bodsworth
Royal Insignia, Overseer of all Judges from his Mastaba at
Sakkara, 61 dynasty, Old Kingdom. The ka ofMehu is seated
before his offerings.57
I have demonstrated that the rituals described in the book ofComing Forth by Day,
ofwhich the Opening the Mouth ritual formed part, were recited by the priest who
CO
acted on behalf of the eldest son whether royal or non-royal. The ritual began with
a call to the 'inert' owner of the 'house of gold' to 'awaken' and 'be renewed'. The
earthly form of existence was transfigured, the body was 'revived', accepted into the
company of the gods; the transformed 'beings' experienced eternal freedom of
movement throughout the cosmos, whether in the sky or on the earth.59 The 'sakhu'
texts named by the Egyptians, 'glorifications' or 'transformations', described the
intertwined and interdependent key rituals of'rejuvenation' and 'offering':
[the individual] is rejuvenated ... his mouth is opened ...his eyes see
... his ears are open ... his lips speak ... his heart functions ... his limbs
are firm ... and his bones knit together ... The individual is purified,
57 Picture Credit: Schultz and Seidel, eds., Egypt, 83.
58 The recitation of the texts implies the importance of the ancient Egyptian concept of'naming' in
association with, what is named, 'coming into existence'. The creation 'myth' ofPtah discussed
earlier, described the naming process and its significance to existence.
59 For various texts that relate to transformation, see Walter Federn, 'The "Transformation" in the
Coffin Texts', in JNES, 19, 1960:241-257; Wente, 'Mysticism in Pharaonic Egypt?', 41.
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nourished and clothed by means of a series of offerings. ... incense ...
water ... beer ... bread and loaves ... linen and cloth ... 60
Offerings of food, drink and linen mentioned in the Pyramid Texts were also
part of the rituals in the book of Coming Forth by Day discussed earlier, an essential
part of the 'transformation' rituals. Archaeological evidence depicts the owner of the
subterranean Houses of Gold with a chapel above ground containing a fez-statue or
relief ofOsiris N to which offerings were made by the living.61 The focal point of the
chapel was a niche with a "false door" and an offering table located on the west wall;
the 'transfigured spirit' or ka o/Mereruka emerges from the false door to 'partake' of
the nourishment offered (Fig. 12). The ka ofMehu, vizier under King Pepi I, is
depicted on his false door enjoying his offerings (Fig. 11). The false door ofMehu
through which his ka-form enters to receive the offerings given to him, also includes
a textual request for offerings to be brought to Mehu on every festival and feast day
(V)
in the length of eternity.
The various 'transformation' rituals performed by the priest not only restored
aspects of the physical abilities of the transfigured being, they also conjoined with
the various 'supernatural' forces. The reunion allowed the human-headed ba, the soul
(Figs.7,10) to be released from the mummified form to rejoin the symbolic fez-form,
the life-force (Fig.9). The new non-physical being was transformed into an akh, a
'transfigured spirit' or Tight'. An example of one ofmany texts which described the
freedom of the akh to relate spiritually to those who continued to live in a worldly
existence:
60 P. Berlin 8351 quoted in Smith, The Liturgy ofOpening the Mouth, 16-17. The Papyrus is dated to
the early first century AD. See earlier periods of the Opening Mouth rituals from the Old Kingdom to
the New Kingdom in Ann Macy Roth, 'The Peseshkefand the 'Opening of the Mouth' ceremony: a
ritual ofbirth and rebirth', JEA, 78, 1992:113-147; Bjerke, 'Opening theMouth'. For archaeological
evidence of the New Kingdom ritual, see the tombs at Thebes, ofRekhmire, Gurna; Seti I, KV17;
Tutankhamun, KV62; for the later 26th dynasty see the chapel ofAmenirdis at Medina Habu, Thebes.
61 See Quirke, Ancient Egyptian Religion, 152.
62 The annual festivals of, for example, the Feast of Sokar and The Beautiful Feast of the Valley are
examples of the bonds which unite the living and those in a 'transfigured' state. The rituals reaffirmed
family bonds whether royal or non-royal. See Murnane, Ancient Egypt, 76.
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The one who knows these secret designs is an outfitted akh. He goes
out and comes in within the netherworld. He speaks to the living -
truly attested a million times.63
Only then was the ba empowered to emerge daily through the false door and return
to his 'house of gold' at night (Fig.7).64 The 'beings' who were transfigured from
their mundane earthly form are named by the living as 'those who have gone to their
has'. Here is a clear indication of a belief in an infinite supernatural existence, rather
than a finite non-existence in the modern concept of the terms 'funerary' and
'death'.65
I conclude this section with a brief reference to a key offering ritual, an
essential part of the Opening the Mouth ceremony. Its continued survival throughout
Egypt's historic era testifies to a belief of considerable magnitude. The 'offering
formula', htp di nsw traditionally described as 'an offering which the king gives ...
to the Ka of... ' nkS n, was followed by the titles and name of, for example, the ka
of the Royal Scribe Hunefer. The formula indicated that all non-royals were subject
to the king's favour and reliant on the patronage of the king for an ongoing existence
in the Netherworld.
Alternatively, it may be interpreted that the earthly king alone contained the
Power to communicate with the gods, in that all offerings are made to gods, most
often Anubis or Osiris. For example, the top three lines of the false door ofMehu
begin, 'an offering which the king gives to Anubis', following in the second line with
'an offering which the king gives to Osiris'. The third line states 'an offering which
the king gives'; all offering formulae end with a description of the actual offerings.
Accordingly, when the son of Hunefer offers sustenance to the ka ofOsiris
Hunefer, offerings may be received only through the office of kingship with the
appropriate words, 'an offering which the king gives', for example, to Osiris.
Consequently, as reigning kings made offerings to past kings in their own name as a
Horus son offers to his Osiris father, the Egyptian people through the process of
emulating royal rituals in son-father offerings did so only in the name of the king.
63
Wente, 'Mysticism in Pharaonic Egypt?', 166. This is one of numerous examples quoted by Wente
of the ancient Egyptians belief in a continued existence.
64 See Hornung, Conceptions, 61. Hornung interpreted the ba as a 'divine being'.
65 Allen, Middle Egyptian, 95.
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Thus texts and iconography evidence that the Egyptian people were
dependent on the Power of kingship not only for their daily sustenance but also in
maintaining their familial ancestral ties in Eternity. The liaison mentioned earlier
between the king and his people, and the king and the pantheon of gods is a constant
reminder of the active nature of the reciprocal relationship between the living and the
supernatural, the transfigured beings who helped to maintain the stability of the state
ofEgypt.
It is not my intention either to read more into the texts than the Egyptians
intended or to make claims of certainty for my interpretation of ancient Egyptian
rituals, rather to offer theories which may provide further research. Nonetheless the
textual and archaeological evidence presented suggests that the Opening the Mouth
ceremony with the key ritual offerings demonstrated an active inter-relationship
appropriate to the genre 'transfiguration'; rather than the modern typology
'funerary'.
Given that the ritual of the Opening the Mouth was present in all periods of
Egyptian history, I propose that this fact demonstrates not only a Power constancy of
some longevity, but also a steadfast ideology in a socio-political liaison between the
king and his people and the king and the gods. Consequently, I argue that given the
importance in which the Egyptians held the naming principle, the passive and
inappropriate term, 'funerary' with its association with finality and death, fails to
provide the meaning the Egyptians intended. In the final analysis, to claim that
'transfiguration' texts may be described in terms of 'myth' or 'religion' is not only to
turn aside from the evidence presented, but also to deviate from the meaning
intended by the ancient Egyptians.
Finally, a brief re-appraisal of the remaining texts is required, if only to
substantiate further my hypothesis of the importance of understanding texts from the
insider view. The conclusion which follows this section seeks to propose not only a
re-interpretation of the inter-related nature ofEgyptian texts but also the problem of
isolating one type of text, whether or not given the name 'myth', from texts as a
whole. This is not to deny the importance of the phenomenological method of first
classifying texts into different types. My research has shown that although this may
be the initial step, to understand the texts fully from the insider ancient Egyptian
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view the final re-examination merits an inter-textual analysis. Thus it is important
that 'transfiguration' texts are re-united contextually.
6.4.3 Naming and Classifying Types: 'Instruction' Texts
In the previous section I evaluated 'transfiguration' texts with some rigour
and demonstrated that the term 'funerary' texts failed to convey the meaning
intended by the Egyptians. In this section less rigour is required for the next group of
texts, because 'instruction' texts, quantitatively the second majority group is similar
to the name given by the Egyptians, 'instruction' texts, sbfyt.66 Like the
'transfiguration' texts discussed in the previous section, 'instruction' texts not only
include other genres within the same classification, they also have distinct profiles.67
Where 'transfiguration' texts appeared ritualistic in that they concerned the
transformation from one type of being to another, 'instruction' literary texts appear
as an Egyptian response to the universal question of human beings: 'How should I
live?' Thus 'instruction' literary texts clearly have a beginning, middle and an end
and include for example, 'instructions for right living in society', 'royal testaments to
right rule', 'laments on socio-political disorder', 'loyalist instructions for loyalty and
devotion to the king' and 'autobiographies'. If they have a beginning, middle and an
end and to some degree concern supernatural beings, the question is, are they
'myths'?
My point in including 'instruction' literature is to demonstrate the inter-
contextual nature ofEgyptian texts, that general 'instruction' texts from non-royal
elite officials related advice from respected elders to their sons or juniors on 'right
living'. For example, this can be seen in works similar to the 'Instructions of
Ptahhotep', a vizier who seeks retirement from his royal office and proposes to the
king, his son as his successor. Instruction texts, the core of which concerns
appropriate behaviour in keeping with royal protocol, offer brief statements of
68
Ptahhotep's status; he is described as 'beloved of the god [the king]'. Equally,
66 Lichtheim is one ofmany scholars who identify Egyptian 'instructions' as 'literary texts'.
67 See Lichtheim, AEL, Vol. 1:134-135; Lichtheim, 'Didactic Literature', in AELHF, 243-244;
Simpson, Literature ofAncient Egypt, Parkinson, Voices.
68 On ancient Egyptian society see Allen, Middle Egyptian, 31. Little is known about the ordinary
people ofEgyptian society; our knowledge ofEgyptian society in general is limited. Most of the
iconography and inscriptions studied by Egyptologists were produced for temples and tombs of kings
and their officials. Allen suggested our knowledge reflected only 10% of the population although he
considered this small percentage of elites were 'fairly representative ofEgyptian society'.
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'royal testaments' instruct their sons in state politics and 'right rule'; the 'Instruction
for Merikare' is a political testament on how to rule.69 The name ofMaat or the
phrases 'right living' and 'right rule' mentioned within either genre of texts implies
compliance with the principles of the goddess Maat.
Instruction texts named as 'laments' had a political dimension. They berated
and deposed the social order and depicted a de-centralised Egypt, a diminished
Power of kingship and demonstrated the absence of the concept ofMaat in Egyptian
society.70 'Loyalty' instructions, the counterparts of the 'laments' acclaimed the
benefactions of kingship from loyal officials. Royal 'Power', reminiscent of van der
Leeuw's concept of'awe', appeared menacing with an ultimatum: if one obeyed and
loved the king who had divine knowledge and power, then a life in eternity would be
11realised. Such texts serve to emphasise the inter-relationship of texts in general. For
example, in the 'transfiguration' texts the power of the king was absolute, whether or
not to maintain offerings to the kas of non-royals to ensure their continued existence.
'Biographical' texts by the elite non-royals emulated earlier royal
declarations discussed in the previous section. They described the social ideal that
their elite owners had 'fed the hungry', 'clothed the naked', and lived righteously
79
according to the principles ofMaat. Most non-royal texts included a statement of
royal support, 'I am one honoured by the king' juxtaposed with phrases of doing 'the
69 Lichtheim, 'Didactic Literature', 247.
7H
See The Admonitions ofIpuwer known also as the Lament ofIpuwer, Papyrus Leiden 344, Recto,
Translated by Lichtheim, AEL.Vol. 1:149-163.
71 See Simpson, The Literature ofAncient Egypt, 172-4. The 12th dynasty Loyalist Instruction from the
Sehetepibre Stela instructs the author's children on the design for eternity and a way of living in peace
in the world One must 'adore the king': 'He is Perception. He is Re', he makes the land green; he fills
the Two Lands with victory and life. The king gives nourishment, feeds those who follow his path.
'The king is Ka', 'He is Khnum'; 'He is Bastet who protects the Two Lands'. The inscription
concludes with the words, 'The one whom the king loves shall be a well-provided spirit; there is no
tomb for anyone who rebels against His Majesty...Do this and your body will flourish ... for eternity'
The counsel to his children from the sage Sehetepibre relates a royal Power of some force.
72 See Lichtheim, Maat, 10. Lichtheim translates and interprets a large selection ofBiographical texts
from the early 5th dynasty to the Ptolemaic period. The presence and concept of the goddess Maat was
therefore evident in Egyptian society for most ofEgypt's historical era. Lichtheim interprets the
function ofMaat as 'doing Maat', the motivation is stated tersely: 'the god loves/desires it, and "it is
the good". See also David B. O'Connor, 'Beloved ofMaat, the Horizon ofRe: The Royal Palace in
New Kingdom Egypt', in Ancient Egyptian Kingship, 263-300.
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right which the god [the king] loves'.73 Instruction texts described not only the way
to live an orderly existence in society, they also described periods ofpolitical chaos
when order was absent. Right living signified that the populace should live according
to the principles of the goddess Maat; her absence indicated chaos. Equally, the
principles ofMaat were key requirements of royal rule. Rather than to live according
to Maat, the premise of kingship was to rule and defend Egypt with her principles;
absence implied societal chaos.74
'Instruction' literary texts incorporated a variety of texts; each genre signified
an aspect that related to the chaos or stability of the state ofEgypt. Kingship was the
key motif of stability. The king is also described in texts as a god and, like the
goddess Maat, the divine element in texts was the universal directive for right rule
and right living. In the 'transfiguration' texts the kas of the divine beings were
dependent on offerings from the Horus king for their survival in the Netherworld.
Equally, the king who failed to rule according to Maat caused the demise of order;
the failure to provide offerings led to non-existence of the kas in Eternity. Thus the
institution of the state ofEgypt depended on the office of kingship to maintain social
order amongst the populace and political stability in the land ofEgypt in both the
earthly and cosmic worlds.
In the final analysis, in order to understand the Egyptian naming principle in
relation to kingship, it is necessary to acknowledge the functioning value of the
Egyptian written word as they understood it. Thus as a conclusion, I offer as a final
test case, an incantation text named variously, Isis and the Name ofRa, or The God
75and his Unknown Name ofPower, a text often referred to as 'myth'.
6.5 Phenomenology from the Inside: 'Myth' Revisited Again
Throughout my thesis I have emphasised the importance to the ancient
Egyptians of the 'naming' principle, whether as a brief textual reference to a deity or
the significance of 'naming' an entity into existence. I have established the presence
of superhuman beings in some measure within the texts examined and within the
73 From the 6th dynasty Sakkara tomb of the vizier, Kagemni, quoted in Lichtheim, Maat, 12. See also
Lichtheim's interpretation, when the term 'god' follows immediately after mention of the king, it is
normal usage to interpret the text as 'the king is a god', 15.
74 The premise of kingship was that he had to rule according to the principles ofMaat.
75 Cf. John Wilson, ' Unknown Name', 12; Quirke, Ancient Egyptian Religion, 12.
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context of the office of kingship. My aim has centred on the issue ofwhether or not
the so-called universal term 'myth' may be classified as a typology of'religion' in
ancient Egyptian texts.
It is not my intention to deny the existence in modern societies of the fact of
'religion' as a functioning belief system with shared doctrines and rituals, public
worship whether in churches, temples, synagogues or mosques.76 Instead my aim has
been to establish the absence of these features of 'religion' in ancient Egyptian texts.
Equally, in the classification of 'myth' as a typology of religion, it is not my intent to
vouch for its absence in texts generally, but to acknowledge the scant proportion of
texts designated 'myth' by some Egyptologists. As I understand ancient Egyptian
beliefs, the modern overlay of the terms 'religion' and 'myth' on Egyptian texts
constitutes a challenge to phenomenology and the fundamental principle of the
Egyptian naming process.
I return to my final test, the scrutiny of the incantation 'myth', The God and
his Unknown Name ofPower. My aim is to examine this text vigorously as a test
case to ascertain whether or not one text may be extricated from other texts and in its
isolation provide information of the key motif of Egyptian kingship. In addition,
given the premise of the Egyptian naming principle, in order to progress further
inside the ethos of the ancient Egyptians, I intend to replace the traditional Greek
names with the Egyptian names in an approximate phonetic interpretation.
Following the 'thinking' of the ancient Egyptian, if the uttering of the name of a
deity causes its character and Power to 'come into existence' then the Egyptian name
of the deity is the signifier rather than the foreign Greek name.
For example, the conventional Greek names 'Isis' and 'Osiris' fail to realise
the interrelationship demonstrated in their Egyptian names 'Aset', and 'Asir'
(Fig. 13). Both names contain the hieroglyph 'throne' or 'seat'. Their son, the royal
falcon god, Hor77 is depicted in iconography wearing the double crown ofEgypt
(Fig. 13) and Hor is the name given to each king at his coronation. In the Egyptian
76 Cf. Frank Whaling, ed., Religion in today's World, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987). Following
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the word 'tradition' replaces the word 'religion'. See also Ninian Smart,
Dimensions of the Sacred, (London: Harper Collins, 1996).
771 now use the Egyptian Hor (hr) for the Greek-named Horus - the designation Heru (hrw) used in
chapter two was the Horus name for the king in the Pyramid Texts. It is not known why the name of
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naming process, each king is manifest as the god Hor. Finally, Asir the ruler of the
Netherworld is the 'father' ofHor, the reigning king. The Egyptian named triad Asir-
Aset-Hor signifies a fluid relationship which concerns kingship, the throne and the
crowns ofEgypt; their names are symbolised in their hieroglyphs (Fig. 13) and their
iconography (Fig. 14).
Equally important is the link of the royal falcon in the iconography of the
very ancient partnership ofHor king (Horus) and Hwt.Hor (Hathor), the goddess of
the house ofHor. Hwt.Hor is often considered an earlier mother ofHor and the close
bond is signified in their hieroglyphs. Significant also is the sun god Ra and Hor who
conjoin in the form of the god Ra-Horakhty. Incorporating the Egyptian names Aset,
Asir, and Hor in my final analysis may serve as a small step towards the
phenomenological criterion of examining a culture from the adherent's perception
whilst simultaneously employing the Egyptian iconic imagery. Frankfort explained:
'An example of the coalescence of a symbol and the thing it stands for is the treating
of a person's name as an essential part ofhim - as it were, in a way, identical with
OA
him'. Wyatt agreed: 'Names were an essential part of a person. Erase the name, as
in Egyptian rituals, and the consequence was "his name is not; he is not!"'81 For
78
Although the hieroglyph does not depict Hor wearing the pschent or double crown, he is seen with
his crowns in his iconography in temples and 'houses ofgold' (Fig. 14).
79
Ra-Horakhty, a character in the incantation text being discussed, is the god of the Two Horizons,
the East and the West; he is the dual form of the sun god Ra and Hor united in their dual positions on
the throne of the akhet. The name describes the function: Ra + Hor on the throne of the Two
Horizons; Ra + Hor + akhet + y, the key connection ofwhich is kingship. As the sun sets and rises
each day the reigning king is 'reborn' at each daily rising. On the sun in all creation, see Stephen
Quirke, The Cult ofRa, Sun Worship in Ancient Egypt, (London: Thames and Hudson, 2001), 30-31;
on the arcane knowledge of kingship, 52-54.
80 Frankfort etal. The Intellectual Adventure, 13. See also John Wilson's comment in 'The God and
his Unknown Name ofPower', ANET, 12-14, that the name was an element ofpersonality and of
power', 12.
81
Wyatt, Mythic Mind, 38.
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Fig. 14 The Abydos triad of Asir-Aset-Hor
from the Temple of Seti I, Abydos. From the
left, the royal falcon-headed god, Hor who
wears the pschent, the Red and White double
crown of Egypt, stands behind his mother
Aset offering approval of Seti I. She wears the
Hwt-Hor (Hathor) cow-homs as well as the
sun-disc; the latter signifies her role as the
'daughter' of the sun god Ra. She also carries
on top of the sun-disc, the iconography of the
throne which designates her name, Aset.
Seated on the Aset throne is her brother-
consort, Asir. He wears the Atef crown part of
which comprises the White Crown. He
receives offerings from king Seti who wears
the Red crown and is identified by his
cartouche.
Each section of text begins: dd rndw n hr,
dd mdw n Aset, dd mdw n Asir.
example, the destruction of names, a practice evident in the Amarna period discussed
earlier, signified the elimination of that person, whether god or king; the erased
o?
names are 'reinstated' by later kings and their existence 'returns'. Thus the naming
ritual was of some significance to the ancient Egyptians. Griffiths' comment is
succinct: 'To the ancients nomen implied numen\
The ancient Egyptians did not only describe their 'truths' in words but also in
symbolic iconography the purpose ofwhich was to 'make real' their ideology. The
Metternich stela, on which is inscribed one of the many versions of the 'myth' being
revisited in this section, depicts Hor as the central character rather than Aset, who is
generally described textually as the protagonist in the incantation 'myth'. My
premise is that in order to understand texts from the insider view, comprehension of
the characteristics andpurpose of the presence of the deities within Egyptian texts
was an important criterion towards understanding the authorial intent of the ancient
writers.
In the previous section I suggested that when a brief reference was made to a
deity in texts, knowledge of the character of the deity was important to the
understanding of the textual context. The brief textual reference to Hor in the so-
called incantation 'myth' examined in this section fails to indicate why the figure of
Hor is the key figure on the Metternich Stela and 'Horus' cippi in general (Figs.22,
82 See chapter four 138. n.92 for the erasing of the names of the gods and subsequent re-instatement.




22).84 Thus a subjective-objective reappraisal of the incantation text coupled with
data gleaned from previous texts in my research as well as archaeological data, may
explain to some extent, the presence ofHor as the central figure on the many
Egyptian cippi.8i
To maintain the phenomenological integrity ofmy thesis the Greek names of
Isis, Osiris and Horus will be referred to as Aset, Asir, and Hor and for clarity, the
Greek names Isis, Osiris and Horus will be used when referenced so by scholars. For
example, to maintain coherence I will refer to 'Horus cippi' rather than Hor cippi.
Other names are generally true to those of the Egyptians. On their first introduction,
reference to names are accompanied with their hieroglyph rendering and afterwards
only when I seek to emphasise an aspect of the iconography or an interrelationship of
value.
6.5.1 The God and his Unknown Name of Power86
The text to be examined was communicated not as a literary text but
contained within the genre of incantations and remedies against snake bites and
scorpion stings of which there are many variations.871 posit that the 'incantation'
text, often described as 'myth', follows a similar format to the texts discussed earlier,
that they indicate the Power of kingship, although the reference may be brief and
obscure. Joris F. Borghouts suggested that 'scorpion and snake-spell myths have a
much more straightforward purpose - which does not mean that they lack
sophistication - and in them, if anywhere, the plasticity ofmyth is most
84 For information on the Metternich Stela and other cippi see Nora E. Scott, 'Metternich Stela',
MMAB, 9, 1951, 201-217; Kamyar Abdi, 'An Egyptian Cippus ofHorus in the Tran National Museum,
Tehran', JNES, 61, 2002, 203-10; and Allen, 'Cosmology', 103-16. In the next section the traditional
name 'Horus' will be used when discussing Horus cippi.
85 Kristensen believed that in studying the data ofmany religions they 'shed light on the few'.
86 For the various versions see John Wilson, 'The God and his Unknown Name ofPower', ANET, 12-
14; E.A. Wallis Budge , 'The Legend ofRa and Isis' in The Gods of the Egyptians, (New York:
Dover, 1969), 372-87; For translation and transliteration of the text, see McDowell, Life in Ancient
Egypt, 118-120.
87 From the Middle Kingdom onwards incantations were used as healing strategies of, for example,
snake bites or scorpion stings. The so-called 'myth' of'The God and his Unknown Name ofPower',
also known as 'Isis and the name ofRe', was found on several Rameside sources; the surviving
sources come from Deir el Medina. For sources, see http://www.digitalegvpt.ucl.ac.uk: Papyrus Turin
1993, Papyrus Chester Beatty 1 l(one of a group), and ostracon from Deir el Medina 1263. See also




transparent'. Similarly, Kemp proposed: 'Texts of this nature recorded only on
papyrus, were the speculative literary products of the scribal elite, part didactic, part
entertaining, not meant as statements of theology'.89 Kemp cited the 'scorpion'
incantation as an example of this textual genre.
Although the translation of pertinent phrases and scholars' interpretations will
be discussed, my overall aim is first a subjective view, to draw out from the
incantation text, where possible, the meaning intended by the priest-scribes. If in
previous texts examined most, if not all, referenced kingship as the voice of authority
and Power, then is there evidence of a similar reference to kingship in this often-
quoted 'myth'?
Kemp summarised the incantation text: '... the goddess Isis ("a clever
woman. Her heart was craftier than a million men") schemes to discover the secret
name of Ra, depicted as an old man who succumbed to the pain of a scorpion sting
and revealed his hidden name to Isis'.90 According to Kemp, the purpose of the text
was clear in that 'it provides "historical" authority for using the story itself as a cure
for a scorpion sting'.91 In other words, the story concerning Ra i ^ and Aset
acted as a precedent; all persons who, after recitation and performance of the ritual
may be similarly cured or protected from scorpion or snake bites, that is, if they
follow the incantation ritual. On the whole, Aset appears as the main character;
most scholars placed little importance on the brief reference to Hor ^ A the son of
Aset J ^ in the final resolution of the 'myth' or to the preponderance ofHor figures
on the various cippi. Therefore what is the evidence, if any, of an 'historical'
authority?
The incantation began with the phrase, 'words spoken by Serqet', the
scorpion goddess, dd mdw n srkt indicated that this particular text concerned a
88 Joris J. Borghouts, 'Magical Practices among the Villagers' in Pharaoh's Workers, ed., Leonard
H. Lesko, (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 122.
89
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 25.
90 See Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 12-14. Kemp quotes from Wilson's translation.
91 See Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 12. Wilson's comment, that because the text was used as a remedy
for scorpion stings, 'this use probably accounts for the survival of the text'.
92
Quirke, Ancient Egyptian Religion, 61. 'The mythic prototype [of the incantation spell] also offered
a model of hope for mothers with child ...'
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The three forms of the sun god Ra
Fig. 15 Left. Khepri pushing the sun
over the horizon. It also signifies the name
ofTutankhamun, neb-kheperu-ra.
Egyptian Museum, Cairo.
Fig. 16 Above. The sun god Ra at his zenith
sailing in the solar bark.
Fig. 17 Above. Atum within the orb of the
sun god Ra sailing from the western to
the eastern horizon .The name ot Atum
is written within the sun disc.
Fig. 16 and 17: Papyrus unknown: Coming
Forth by Day.
remedy for the poisonous sting of scorpions.93 This confirms my earlier comment
that, when speech is accompanied by a deity, he or she carries the authority and
Power (heka) to bring the truth of the words 'into existence'.94 In the earlier section
of the Case Study, I also mentioned that the name of the king was similarly invoked
in the 'offering formulae'. Offerings were made in the name of the king. I posit that
the incantation text is a similar vehicle for the familiar Egyptian formula, the inter¬
relationship of earthly and cosmic communication: 'gods —> Hor <— people'. In
Egyptian society, the everyday dangers encountered by the people ofEgypt may be
alleviated only by recourse to the name of the Hor-king, who had access to the
Egyptian deities.
Aset J ^ who appeared as the protagonist in the narrative is described
variously as clever, wise, cunning, rebellious, or skilled.95 Hor is mentioned briefly
with no reference to his character, only that he is the son ofAset. The text described
the daily journey of the sun god Ra • He 'entered every day at the head of the
crew taking his place on the throne of the two horizons [as Ra-Horakhty^] '.The
sun god Ra was depicted not only as a royal creator god of some significance, but
also as Atum an old man whose 'divine old age had slackened his mouth'.96
Here again is evidence ofEgyptian political syncretism; Atum, previously a creator
Q7
god in his own right was now diminished to the aged status of the sun god Ra. The
multiplicity of forms of the sun god Ra were depicted in his three-fold appearances
93 See MacDowell, Village Life, 118-120
94 A similar goddess-authority was present in the Greek poetic versions ofHesiod and Homer.
95 Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 12-14; MacDowell, Village Life, 118-120; Budge, Gods, 372-387.
96
Wilson,'Unknown Name', 12.
97 See chapter three and the frequent references to the creation by Atum, for example, Pyr.600.
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which complimented the daily rising and setting of the sun (Figs.15,16,17). He was
the god Khepri $ Jl who pushed or rolled the newly-risen sun over the horizon in
the dawning of each new day (Fig. 15).9X At its zenith the sun god Ra i $ was
displayed at the peak of his Power; he was both the destroying heat of the sun and the
light of the day (Fig. 16). As Ra subsided in the evening sky as the setting sun, he
became Atum *=.>:! (Fig. 17) the old man, the aged sun god ofwhom Aset as a
daughter showed no pity in her desire for his hidden name. Because of his declining
age, the 'weakened' form of the sun god as Atum dropped his spittle to the ground.
When Aset saw this she scooped up the spittle with the earth and formed it into a
snake. 99
The narrative continued.100 While the sun god Ra i $ was on his daily walk,
the 'snake' bit him and 'living fire ... raged through him'. Because he was unable to
dispel the venomous poison, Ra appealed for help to the gods, particularly to the
healing powers of his daughter Aset. She responded innocently: 'What is it, my
divine father? What - a snake stabbed weakness into you? One of your children
lifted up his head against you? Then we shall cast it down with effective magic. I
shall make it retreat at the sight of your rays'. After some prevarication she asked
the crucial question: 'Tell me your name, my divine father'. Eventually Ra confided
to Aset that, although he was the creator of all that existed, he was unable to either
relieve his own suffering or dislodge the lethal poison. The tonnented sun god Ra
eventually succumbed to his daughter Aset, and agreed to divulge his secret name.
However, he issued a proviso. Ra insisted that Aset reveal his secret name
only to her son, Hor who under oath, must promise not to reveal it to anyone
else.101 The text reads: 'tell it to your son Horus after you have threatened him with
98 The name ofKhepri clearly demonstrates his purpose, in the meaning of the word, 'to be formed, or
to come into existence'. Thus the sun god Ra, as Khepri is 're-formed' or 're-born' each day. The
hieroglyph also depicts the image of the sun rising over the horizon lQ), the result of Khepri pushing
the sun into existence, to be re-born.
99 It appears that this text may originate from different sources given that the text alludes to a scorpion
as well as a snake yet the words are spoken by the Scorpion goddess. See Wilson, 'Unknown Name',
12. He suggested that the text 'came to be employed as a conjuration against the bite of a scorpion,
and this use probably accounts for the survival of the myth'. See also Borghouts, 'Magical Practices',
122. His interpretation, that this was 'the first snake that ever was', implied that the narrative
concerned the first snake bite.
100
Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 13
101 See Borghouts, 'Magical Practices', 122. He proposed that the secret name ofRe held the key 'not
only to divine kingship but to control of the world'.
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an oath of the god' (my emphasis).102 Finally, Ra i revealed his name to AsetJ ^
who recited the healing words: 'Flow forth scorpion poison! Come forth from Ra,
Eye of Horus'.103 Any reference to the character or function of the Eye ofHorus,
(named after as 'Eye ofHor') is absent from the incantation text. Nonetheless, the
text infers an association between the scorpion poison and the Eye ofHor <=■
when the poison leaves the body of the sun god Ra, Aset urges the Eye to 'come
forth'. Because of the silence of the texts I must refer to other texts in an attempt to
clarify the character and function of the Eye ofHor.
In the text, The Destruction ofMankind the gods advised the sun god Ra to
send his Eye to destroy those who conspired against him but because the Eye was not
strong enough Ra suggested that the Eye 'should go down as Hathor'. The Eye was
considered a separate Power from the sun god Ra. In the Contendings ofHorus and
Seth, when the Eye ofHor was removed by Seth and later restored to Hor by Hathor,
the removal of the Eye ofHor signified the loss of the throne ofEgypt; restoration
indicated that Hor was heir to the 'the sovereignty ofEgypt'.104 Finally, in the
Pyramid Texts, Hor was not only described as the 'son of Ra', reborn every morning,
he was also the Eye of his father: 'I [the king] am that eye of yours which is on the
horns ofHathor, which turns back the years from me; I spend the night and am
conceived and born every day' (Pyr.705). The Eye ofHor therefore appears to
signify kingship with a strong connection to the sun god Ra.
The concept of the Eye ofHor is fluid and complex and to discuss the Eye
further is to go beyond the boundaries ofmy thesis. Nonetheless it is a subject which
merits further research. It is enough that my brief references to the Eye ofHor may
102 See Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 13. Wilson's full translation of the words of the sun god read: 'If
there should take place a first time of (its) issuing [from] my heart, tell it to (thy) son Horus, after thou
hast threatened him with an oath of the god and hast placed the god in his eyes', (Wilson's emphasis).
See also Wilson's comment, 13,n.l 1: 'IfRe had to divulge his name, he was willing that Isis
communicated it to Horus, but only on condition that Horus be laid under an oath to keep it secret'.
See also McDowell, Village Life, 119, and his translation ofRa's proviso to Isis: 'Tell it to the son
Horus, when you have bound him by an oath of god, the granting of the god his two eyes'.
103
Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 13. See also McDowell, Village Life and his translation: 'Depart,
scorpion, come out from Ra, Eye ofHorus, leave the god. 1 [Aset] am the one who made you; 'I
[Aset] am the one who sent you. Come out upon the ground, powerful poison', 119. See also Budge,
The Gods, 386.
104 Griffiths, Origins ofOsiris, 179. For the Eye as the crown and symbol of kingship see Lichtheim
AEL.Vol.2:219; Wilson, 'Unknown Name', 15; Lichtheim, AEL.2:223,n.\ \ Griffiths, Origins of




shed light on the meaning of the final words. The incantation concluded with
instructions on the use of the spell.
Words spoken over an image of Atum-Horus-Hekenu, an image of
Isis, an image of Horus, written on the hand of the bitten patient, to be
licked off by the man and drawn likewise on a strip of finest linen,
placed at the neck of the bitten patient. The herbal remedy is the
scorpion herb, ground into beer or wine, to be drunk by the patient
bitten by a scorpion. ... Really successful a million times.105
Given that the instructions for removing the poisonous venom centres on the
name and image of the king, Hor ^ S. as well as Aset J ^ his mother, then my
earlier proposal appears justified, that the Egyptian people are healed only through
the utterance of the name of the king. Of interest is that one of the names to be
spoken, Atum-Horus-Hekenu is one of the names of the sun god Ra, which
incorporates the royal 'Horus'. In addition, the Litany ofRa recounts the many names
of Ra, for example, Horus is one, another is Aset.106 Thus the multiplicity and
complexity of the naming principle may be gradually unravelled when viewed
through the subjective lens. However, a further complexity arises. If Aset already
possessed substantial healing Power, then what type ofPower was coerced from Ra,
if not healing Power? I suggest that the names in the incantation text signify the
greatest attribute of Ra, his creative power.
6.5.2 Phenomenology and an Incantation 'Myth' Re-Appraised
Close scrutiny of the text as if from the Egyptian perspective, revealed that
the beneficiary of this sequence of events appears to be the office of kingship but
only through what seemed initially as the active Power of the goddess Aset. It was
through her 'persuasive' Power that her father, the sun god Ra, divulged his secret
name to his daughter, Aset. On the one hand, her motives initially suggested self-
interest. The Power ofAset as the personified throne and mother of the reigning king
were now augmented by the Power of Ra. Given that Hor, the reigning king now
also possessed the hidden Power ofRa, then the office of kingship is further
empowered. On the other hand, the context appears more than a mere incantation text
105 McDowall, Life in Ancient Egypt, 120. For the final sentence, see Wilson,' Unknown Name', 14.
106
Quirke, Cult ofRa, 31.
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for healing scorpion or snake bites. Kingship appears as the predicate. The obscure
reference in the text of the removal from Ra, of the Eye ofHorus, may indicate the
removal of the Power of kingship in which the Eye, discussed earlier, is associated.
I proposed earlier that the incantation text, the genre in which the scholarly
consensus classify this text, may demonstrate the formulaic royal privilege of divine
communication, that the people ofEgypt may gain healing only through rituals
enacted in the name of the king. Of key importance is the fact that the power to
disperse scorpion or snake poison was not an aspect of the Power ofRa, since only
Aset demonstrated such Power. Although Aset was exemplified as the throne and the
mother of the king, the Power that she desired, the secret name ofRa, concerned an
aspect ofPower absent from her authority. I posit it was the conjoined creative power
of the sun god Ra and the creator god Atum - when incorporated in the name ofHor
the office of kingship reigned supreme.
Bourghouts suggested that the sun god Ra is often the 'object of downright
ridicule' in the incantation text.107 There appears some substance to this theory given
not only the image depicted of the aged son god Ra dropping his spittle to the ground
but also that he was powerless to the machination ofAsef s desire for his name. If a
'myth' conveys some measure of a living experience, then the incantation text
implies a political statement engendered by the powerful elite to empower the king at
the expense of the priesthood of the sun god Ra. On the other hand, although it
appears that some concession should be allowed the sun god Ra. In the text, he
insisted that his secret name coerced from him by his daughter Aset, must be shared
with her son, Hor. If increased power in the office of kingship was the premise, then
the text would need to reflect some reference to a 'handover of power'.
Nonetheless there appeared to be some anomalies. The incantation text failed
to indicate any relationship of substance between Ra and Hor, although I indicated
earlier that the sun god Ra may also take the form ofHor. Previous texts and
iconography examined revealed that the sun god Ra i $ and the royal falcon god
Hor Jl were conjoined in the form ofRa-Horakhty two gods as one. When
seated upon the dual thrones, Ra-Horakhty sailed between the western and eastern
107




horizons . The daily rebirth of the sun therefore activated the rebirth of the
king; in this context, the sun god Ra was Hor. A further royal connection is present at
the coronation of each king when he is given five titles of kingship. The first title of
kingship is 'Hor', and his fifth royal title is the 'son ofRa\ In this context the titles
of kingship reveal a supernatural father-son relationship, that Hor was the son ofRa.
If a father-daughter relationship ofRa and Aset is described in the text, then in this
context Hor and Aset are siblings.109 Thus kingship again is the beneficiary and this
apparent family inter- relationship sheds some light on the issue, that for kingship to
gain his Power, the sun god Ra is required to be the victim.110
In my re-appraisal of this often quoted incantation 'myth', my attempts to
understand the text in isolation have proved difficult and I have had to resort to other
texts for clarification.111 Moreover, the brief reference to Hor and the Eye ofHor in
contrast with the dominance ofRa and Aset in the text, have failed to produce
significant results, although the kingship connection is prominent. This serves to
demonstrate that when one text is extracted from an ancient culture's myriad of texts,
in its isolation the text fails to communicate the meaning of its more obscure
references. Even with rigorous scrutiny, the various stages of awareness, insight, or
intuition are also required. If anything, the subjective, insider view has provoked
more questions than answers, if only because the characters of the deities have been
an important part ofmy thesis research. Consequently, the questions act as a catalyst
towards a wider phenomenological research, to compare the incantation text with
archaeological evidence ofHorus cippi.
108 See also Wilson, 'Unknown God', 12. 'Now Re entered every day at the head of the crew, taking
his place on the throne of the two horizons' that 'He [Ra] made his journey between east and west in
his sun barque'.
109 Here is an example of the fluid concepts of the relationship between deities. If the king at his
coronation is named Hor, his 1st title and also 'the son ofRa' as his 5th title, and in the incantation text
Aset is named the daughter ofRa, then Hor and Aset are brother and sister. Yet in the New Kingdom
the Abydos triad defines Hor as the son of Aset and Asir. Our either-or Western logic has difficulty in
comprehending the Egyptian concept of reality. Given the principle of the Egyptian naming process,
that in assigning a name simply brings the named into existence then Aset and Hor are siblings in one
text. Re-naming the relationship in a later text as mother and son, this also comes into existence. The
reality of the Egyptians was fluid.
110 A similar model may be discerned in the role of Judas in the crucifixion of Jesus, the absence
suggests the absence of the salvation doctrine.
111 Cf. Borghouts, 'Magical Practices', 122. Borghouts describes the incantation text, 'The God and
the Unknown Name ofPower', as a 'well-known' myth' ofwhich there are many variants down to the
Late Period c350 BCE.
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Fig. 20 A pectoral of Shed the saviour
standing on crocodiles and grasping
snakes and other dangerous creatures,
c. 19th dynasty New Kingdom. Roemer
and Pelizaeus Museum, Hildesheim
6.5.3 Horus cippi, Horus kingship and 'Myth': the Final Analysis
Horus cippi were so-named because the central figure, the naked child Horus,
was depicted standing on crocodiles grasping in his hands scorpions and snakes and
other noxious creatures. Most Horus cippi were protective amulets, some of which
could be kept in the home, in a public place or worn around the neck for protection,
whether for travellers or any who ventured within the vicinity of harmful creatures.
The Petrie Museum in London has a number of such Horus cippi on display.113 The
earliest Horus cippi dates from the New Kingdom Rameside period, but were
widespread from the later Saite Period, c500 BCE to the Ptolemaic period, c300-30
BCE, then later into the Roman period. The Metternich Stela c.400, on display in the
Metropolitan Museum ofArt, New York, is the largest Horus cippi found; the
inscriptions and images on the Metternich stela are the source ofmost ofwhat is
known about the Horus cippi.114 It is important therefore to ascertain whether or not
the Horus cippi in general shed light on my theory that kingship is the ultimate
beneficiary in the incantation text.
Although the many forms of the sun god Ra provide us with some
understanding of his character and role as the Egyptians depicted him, it fails to
explain the presence ofHor on the many cippi. What is significant in (Fig. 18) is that
Fig. 18 On one side of the plaque
Horus is depicted as Shed the
saviour. New Kingdom Period.
Fig. 19 On the other side Horus is
shown as the royal falcon god with
the pschent crown ofkingship.
Fig. 18 and 19 New Kingdom period, provenance unknown. cl250 BCE(?)
Drawn by Christine Barratt.112
112 From Quirke, Ancient Egyptian Religion, 115.
113 For Horus cippi at the Petrie Museum, London, see: UC16545, UC 16546, UC 16568.
114 See Scott, 'Metternich Stela', 201-207.
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the image ofHorus is similar to the form of the Egyptian god Shed (Fig.20) yet
unlike the traditional naked form ofHorus on Horus cippi in general (Fig.21, 22). In
(Fig. 19) rather than a young naked Horus on the reverse of the plaque, the king is
shown in his royal falcon motif wearing his pschent, the double crown ofEgypt. But
he is depicted trampling on three snakes in the form of the Egyptian god Shed.115
Deeper scrutiny of the incantation text in conjunction with the archaeological
evidence provides further information. Research indicates that the Egyptian god Shed
the saviour, is attested from the Middle Kingdom, although the majority of papyri
date from the New Kingdom period.116 Shed is first portrayed as a young warrior
wearing a broad collar and a form ofkilt with the typical sidelock of youth. His
'hunter-warrior' status is displayed in the quiver slung over his back. The sidelock of
youth and the hunter status suggest that the god Shed is a 'youth' whereas the naked
Horus with his sidelock depicted on the Horus cippi in general, suggests that Horus is
a child.
The function and character of the god Shed represent him as a hunter ofwild
beasts of the desert including antelopes, serpents, scorpions and crocodiles. He was
primarily a god of the people depicted on protective plaques, pendants or larger
stelae sometimes placed on byways where such creatures threatened the lives of the
Egyptians. In time, Shed became the lord of the desert and named 'saviour' because
his actions benefited the lives of all Egyptians. The figures on (Fig. 18) and (Fig.21)
show the iconography of the hunter figure of Shed although both clearly indicate
syncretism between the lesser known Egyptian god Shed and the Egyptian king. Both
gods are seen saving the Egyptian people from wild and harmful desert creatures.
There is some archaeological evidence ofearlier New Kingdom Horus cippi
found at the Workmen's Village at Amarna. Kemp identified limestone stelae
dedicated to the goddess Isis and Shed 'the Saviour' who offered protection against
accidents such as scorpion stings.117 Wilkinson elaborates further on the Shed stelae
'15 See also Quirke, Ancient Egyptian Religion, 115.
116 For Shed, the saviour and Horus cippi in general see Bunson, Dictionary, 246; Quirke, Egyptian
Religion 114-115; Wilkinson, Gods and Goddesses, for the Horus cippi, see 132; for Shed the saviour,
135, the source of (Figs. 18,19).
117
Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 304.
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Fig.21 The Mettemich Stela. The naked child Horus with
sidelock of youth standing on crocodiles and wild
desert animals. With Ra-Herakhty, Aset and the Eye ofHor
c, 350 BCE. Metropolitan Museum ofArt, New York.
Fig.22 Cippus of the naked child Horus with sidelock
holding snakes, scorpions and noxious creatures
Ptolemaic Period.
Egyptian Museum, Cairo.
and confirmed they were found in a chapel at the Workmen's Village.118 Noblecourt
described traces ofTutankhamun's presence at Amarna in the objects he owned and
inscriptions mentioning him, particularly his reverence towards Aset, Atum and
Shed.119 Although not at Amarna but on the road east of Iuni (Heliopolis), Quirke
recounts 'a remarkable group statue' ofRamesses III inscribed with some of the
same texts that occur on the Horus stela ofMetternich eight centuries later. 'May the
child live and the poison die then shall Horus be healthy for his mother Isis'.
The position of the cippi appears to ward off desert creatures from the city of
Iuni. Wilkinson illustrated the 18th or 19th dynasty protective pectoral at the Roemer
and Pelizaeus Museum, Hildesheim, which depicts Shed holding in his hand the
familiar snakes and wild animals and standing on a crocodile (Fig.20). The image
appears similar to the traditional textual description of the protecting god Shed as a
warrior hunter but unlike the naked Horus-cippus of the Ptolemaic Period in the
Egyptian Museum, Cairo (Fig.22). In the latter cippus, Horus-the-Child is shown
standing on two crocodiles holding the traditional snakes, scorpions and other
dangerous creatures. Some iconographic similarities and differences are evident. The
Horus cippi show essentially the same iconographic attributes of Shed; both figures
are shown standing on crocodiles, grasping dangerous animals of the desert,
118 Wilkinson, Gods and Goddesses, 135.
119 Desroches-Noblecourt, Tutankhamun, 181. Noblecourt also acknowledged in the tomb of
Tutankhamun the presence of Shed, 'like Horus the saviour' who would protect with the bows and
arrows [the tools of Shed the hunter-warrior] in the tomb, any malignant forces, 254.
120 Quirke, Egyptian Religion, 114.
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scorpions, snakes and other noxious creatures which must be overcome. The purpose
of both the child Horus and the Egyptian god Shed is to protect the Egyptian people.
One difference is that the attire of Shed signifies his role as a hunter and puts
into context his sidelock of youth, that he is a young man defending the people of
Egypt against dangerous creatures. In contrast, the Horus cippi depict the traditional
'Horus the Child' image, a naked child with the sidelock of youth. The naked child
image appears incongruous as a protector defeating the creatures of the desert when
compared to the young hunter Shed. Although the form of 'Horus the Child'
demonstrates the protection of his mother Aset in the Delta, there is no reference to
this mother-son aspect in the incantation text. On the contrary, Aset shows little
compassion to her father on whom she inflicts the scorpion poison.
In the end, although there are other divine figures, the key figure on the
Horus cippi remains Horus. The archaeological evidence is sparse and provides some
insight into the healing and incantations in general. The cippi and stelae exist to
protect the Egyptians from noxious creatures of the desert, whereas the incantation
text examined concerned a different form of incantation. The suffering ofRa was the
result of the machinations of his daughter; the scorpion was her weapon. Some
syncretism appears likely, for example, between Shed and Horus-Shed and the role
of the king as protector ofEgypt and his people in the traditional 'smiting' motif.
The incantation text, The God and his Unknown Name ofPower, appeared to centre
on kingship although the reference was obscure, given that the sun god Ra and his
daughter Aset were the principle characters. The texts were silent on any deeds of
Horus, but as I understand it, knowledge of the characteristics ofHorus was
assumed.
Resolution of the connection between kingship and the sun god Ra came
from a description of kingship by the ancient Egyptians themselves. It seems to me to
explain the presence of the naked child Horus as the key figure on the cippi and
sheds light on the bond between Ra and Hor and offers a possible reason why Ra
should insist that Hor share with Aset, the Power of his Name.
Ra has placed the king on the earth of the living for ever and
eternity... The name of the king is in the sky like that of Ra, he lives
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in joy like Ra-Horakhty ... Nobles rejoice when they see him; the
populace gives him praise in his role of 'the Child'.121
Further evidence comes from the Old Kingdom Pyramid Texts of King Teti;
'Teti is Horus the little child with his finger in his mouth. Teti is the little child who
can trample on you'. The concept of the Child Horus symbolises rebirth. Two
thousand years later a similar text is written on the Metternich stela, 'It is Horus who
has been stung, innocent child youngest of the gods'.1221 suggested earlier that the
incantation text concerned the creative power ofRa; whether or not this was the
Power desired by Aset, I return therefore to the first words 'spoken' by the sun god
Ra in the incantation text examined, a formulaic tradition. Ra was self-created, that
he created the sky, the earth and the breath of life. He had the Power to create in his
form ofRa; as Atum, Ra absorbed his creative force. Moreover, the name ofKhepri
provides its meaning, 'to appear, to come into existence'.
The key to understanding the incantation appears first, a subjective approach
as if 'seeing' from the insider view. When my vision was obscured and I realised that
I was unable to understand the obscure reference to kingship, it was necessary to
scrutinise other texts, iconography and archaeology. I realised also that it was
inappropriate and not conducive to phenomenology to extract one genre of texts to
the exclusion of others. Nonetheless, my final example suggested the centrality of the
power of kingship in ancient Egypt. The office of kingship in ancient Egypt signified
Power.
6.6 Summary
The first objective ofmy Case Study was to bring a conclusion to my
research into the issue of whether or not 'myth', as a typology of religion was an
appropriate classification for certain Egyptian texts. My second task was to confirm
my confidence in my chosen phenomenological research method. Following van der
Leeuw's object-subjective phenomenological method, emptied of its 'essence' of
religion, together with Pike's similar, emic-etic model, I was aware that if I was
seeking to understand the issue ofEgyptian 'myth', then I required subjective
knowledge.
121
Quirke, Cult ofRa, 20.
122
Scott, Metternich Stela, 203.
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This type of knowledge is gained only through dialogue with the local people
(insider or emic), and the researcher who acts as the observer (outsider or etic); my
dialogue has been textual since the ancient Egyptians have been silenced over time.
In the Case Study my task was to comprehend and analyse the research data gleaned
from the Egyptian literature. Following van der Leeuw, various relationships were
necessary: first, the objective observation and classification of empirical data. Next
an objective < > subjective relationship was necessary; as a researcher (eticj I
examined the local Egyptian texts to try to hear the Egyptian voice (emic). The next
subjective < > subjective stage indicated the importance of an inter-textual dialogue
where I assumed the position of the insider. This did not detract from the linking
position of the local person (emic) whose voice (or texts) was the source of the
knowledge sought by my research. Finally I presented an objective analysis which
contained the subjective knowledge of the ethos of the ancient Egyptians. Only then
did I have sufficient knowledge to assess whether or not there was an issue of 'myth'
as a category of religion in ancient Egypt. For van der Leeuw, his subjective
phenomenological method seeks to comprehend the religious data, where Pike argues
that in his emic-etic system, the expert researcher after analysing the data then shares
the information with the local people. In the end, the emic-etic system is more
analytical than van der Leeuw's which is, as I understand him, human-centred. For
example, following Pike, the local people may have no desire to 'analyse' their
rituals or beliefs.123 But both methods have similar, positive aspects.
Following van der Leeuw's phenomenological method, I concluded that most
Egyptian texts referenced the name of deities, some more frequently than others. I
argued therefore that a brief reference to the deities Maat, Horus, Osiris or any deity
whose character was the signifier of the context of a particular text, was not to imply
a measure of insignificance. For example, the term 'doing Maat' or Tike Maat'
indicated knowledge of and compliance with her principles in life. Similarly, the
Elorus-Osiris axis infers knowledge of the functional aspect of socio-political
kingship.
Equally, in the 'transfiguration' texts, there was an assumption of knowledge
to the function and characteristics of the god Shu, when a brief reference was made
123 For example in Headland, Emics andEtics, 34, Pike comments: 'But just as the outsider can learn
to act like an insider, so the insider can learn to analyse like an outsider'.
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to this lesser-known god. Knowledge that he symbolised the 'atmosphere' or 'air'
substantiated his presence in the Opening the Mouth ritual in that the god Shu existed
in individual human breaths. It was also significant that the name Shu was given to
the tool used in the Opening the Mouth ritual, that it gave new breath to every Osiris-
N. In my final example, the incantation text referred briefly to Hor, only that he was
'the son of Isis'. Yet he appeared later as the key healing figure in Horus cippi, as if
in association with incantation texts in general. Because my research gave me
knowledge of the purpose and function of the royal god Hor as a manifestation of all
reigning kings, I was aware that wider research into the obscure references within the
incantation text, justified a comparative analysis of other texts.
Some texts mentioned deities in brief phrases that the royal servant 'was
supported and loved by the king', who was described as a god. Other texts directed
assurances to the goddess Maat that non-royals had lived, and royals had ruled,
according to her principles.1241 have demonstrated the key role of the divine king as
the referent in the majority of texts in which all offerings, royal and non-royal, were
made in the name of the king.
Finally, the transfiguration and instruction texts, quantitatively the majority
texts, demonstrated a socio-political rather than a 'religious' context although all
texts indicated the presence in some degree, of supernatural beings. Equally, in the
context of the office of kingship, the king is considered a god and acts as the
protagonist in most texts. This concept may fit within the general theory that 'myth'
is a story that concerns superhuman beings. Conversely, I gave an example in chapter
one in which the Epic ofGilgamesh described the exploits of the semi-divine
Babylonian king, Gilgamesh. Dalley argued that because he was a real king, his
name was listed in the Sumerian King List, then the Gilgamesh narrative came under
the rubric of 'epic' rather than 'myth'. A similar argument may be applied to the
Egyptian king in his human-supernatural role. The king's name was most often
included in Egyptian King Lists. Exceptions, for example, included Akhenaten,
Smenkhkara, and Hatshepsut; their absence indicated non royal status by the
authoritative elite. In this context, 'myth' is absent from Egyptian literature.
124 See Allen, Middle Egyptian, 43, and his claim that 'there is hardly any text or inscription that does






Name is no mere specification, but rather an actuality expressed in a word.1
7.1 Issues Identified
My aim throughout this thesis has been to understand Egyptian texts from the
perspective of the ancient Egyptians. My interpretation of the term 'texts', within the
context ofEgyptian texts, was in the form of literature, narrative or brief inscriptions,
the majority ofwhich have reference in some degree to superhuman beings.2 Within
this framework, Egyptian narratives were described in broad terms, and, on the
whole, they served a purpose; 'they commemorate, instruct, exhort, celebrate, and
■j
lament'." Different types of narrative texts examined throughout this thesis have
demonstrated the functional nature of the two main genres that formed quantitatively
the majority texts to which the ancient Egyptians designated the names,
transfiguration (slh) and instruction (sbiyt). For the Egyptians, the naming principle
signified the function and form of their textual narratives. For these reasons, to
impose the term 'myth' on the narratives of ancient Egypt is to deny the autonomy
and validation of narratives which identify the local cultural identity of the ancient
Egyptians.
This thesis began with an interrelated myth-religion issue, first, whether or
not the taxon 'myth' was an appropriate classification for so-called 'myths' of
ancient Egypt.4 The word 'myth'or the alternative term narrative text are interpreted
within a similar broad framework. My endeavours to reconstruct the Egyptian past,
using the phenomenological principles of epoche, empathy, and validation by the
adherent, have resulted in a profound awareness of the holistic nature ofEgyptian
1 Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence, 147.
21 have excluded legal, medical or similar genres. See Allen, Middle Egypt, 43. He commented that
'there is hardly any Egyptian text or inscription that does not at least mention one or more of the
gods'.
3 Lichtheim, preface to AEL, Vol. 1 :vi.
4
Kirk, Myth, 207-208. He doubted that the term 'myth' could be applied to Egyptian narratives, that
most of their accounts 'do not exist in the form of continuous accounts, either tales or epics, but have
to be reconstituted from prolific but fragmentary allusions in ftinerary formulas'.
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texts. I became aware of the dangers of isolating texts in my Case Study when I
found it necessary to refer to other texts for clarification of obscure references.
Further, to separate one type ofEgyptian text from another, and in its
isolation to name the genre 'myth', a term which carried the pejorative meaning,
'false', appeared to devalue the fundamental principles of the 'adherent priority' of
phenomenology. Equally, the reality of the ancient Egyptians, as they experienced it,
was invalidated. I have argued that because myths carried the overlay of 'false', it
was an inappropriate name with which to designate the beliefs of the ancient world in
general and ancient Egypt in particular. Finally, given that the texts ofall adherents
function as knowledge signifiers, any distinctions between the true and the false are
not in the interests of those seeking to understand or to be understood.
The second part of the issue centred on whether or not 'myth' was an
appropriate classification as a typology of religion, given the absence in ancient
Egypt of any communal worship and the monotheism of a transcendent God.3
Although Christianity and the West are generally associated with the construct term
'religion', this is less so now than when the classical phenomenologists first used the
term as the defining factor to compare religious data.6 This is not to say that the word
'religion' is a precise signifier of a universal belief system, given the absence of a
communal system ofworship and the multiplicity of deities in ancient Egyptian
society. Equally, my research has indicated the absence of 'religion' in the Western
sense when compared to the beliefs inscribed in Egyptian texts and iconography.
Notwithstanding these comments, it is not my intention to deny the existence of
'religion'.
I have demonstrated that ancient Egypt practised a functional, reciprocal
system in which the king made offerings to the gods. In return, the reigning king
expected the gods to provide stability in the land, great strength to defend the land of
5 Cf. For no common worship in Egyptian temples, no public access, rituals concerns only the priests,
see Englund, 'Gods as a Frame', 8. For religion and communal worship see Penner, 'You don't read a
myth'. 169.
6 Cf. See Flood, Phenomenology, 2-3. Flood argued that while the academic study of religion has
largely moved away from the idea of a common, perhaps transcendent essence, there remains a faction




Egypt and her people, and fecundity of the land to provide sustenance.7 The Poem of
Pentaur described the Battle of Kadesh in which Ramesses II, single handed,
defeated the Hittites. Because Ramesses made many offerings to the state god Amun,
he expected divine support, as his words suggest:
His majesty [Ramesses II] spoke: 'What is this father Amun? Is it
right for a father to ignore his son? Are my deeds a matter for you to
ignore? ... Have I not made for you many great monuments? Filled
your temple with my booty? Built for you my mansion ofMillions-of-
Years, given you all my wealth and endowment? 8
In the Poem's conclusion, Amun provided Ramesses with great strength in
battle. The king returned to Egypt not only in peace, but also a victorious royal
warrior, defender of the people and the unified state ofEgypt. Equally, the iconic
depiction on temple walls of kings offering the image of the goddess Maat to the
gods signified a reciprocal relationship in the offering ritual. The royal statement was
clear, that the king had established order in the state ofEgypt, and that the status quo
was maintained. In other words, the king was king not only because of his liaison
between the gods and the people but also that he ruled according to the principles of
Maat.9 Rather than 'religion' in the modern sense, the king practiced a reciprocal
system where offerings were made to the gods with the expectation of returned
favours. The beneficiary was the office ofkingship, the symbol and key focus of the
socio-political institutional state ofEgypt.
7.1.1 Issues Overview
Throughout this thesis, I offered textual evidence to demonstrate that the
socio-political function ofEgyptian kingship symbolised the Power of the state of
7 For the functional aspect ofEgyptian offerings see Emily Teeter, 'The Life ofRitual', 148-164, esp.,
the section on 'The Daily Offering', 150-1, in Ancient Egypt.
8
Lichtheim, AEL, Vol.2:65. For a detailed account of the source material of the Kadesh Battle
inscriptions, see 57-72.
9 For kings offering the image ofMaat to the gods, see the wall inscriptions ofRamesses II at the
temples ofKarnak, Luxor, and Ramesseum; Ramesses III at Medinet Habu; Seti I at Abydos. For the
king to rule according to the principles ofMaat and to maintain the status quo, see Emily Teeter, The
Presentation ofMaat: Ritual andLegitimacy inAncient Egypt, (Chicago: Oriental Institute of the
University of Chicago, 1997). The Egyptian perception of the universe was in binary form as order
{maat) and chaos {isfet). Similarly, the daily rising and setting of the sun denoted light and darkness.
Equally, the annual flooding and subsiding of the Nile, whether high or low, signified famine or
plenty. If the king failed to overcome chaos {isfet) then he was not ruling according to Maat. For an
overall view of kingship see Thomas Schneider, 'Sacred Kingship', 323-9, in Egypt: the World of the
Pharaohs, eds. Regine Schulz and Matthias Seidel, (Cologne: Konemann Vorlagsgesellschaft, 1998).
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Egypt. I demonstrated in my Case Study that the study of the Egyptian texts provided
knowledge of a society within which so-called 'myths'or textual narratives were
formed. The Pyramid Texts, as well as the transfiguration, instruction, biographical
and royal texts were examples of primary Egyptian texts which provided not only
source research information, but also knowledge that was particular to the ancient
Egyptians. The interrelationship between the king and the gods, and the king and the
Egyptian people, in the format, 'gods king <-> people', demonstrated that the king
was the liaison between the gods and the populace. Hieroglyphs, iconographic
images and archaeology provided further primary evidence.
The myriad definitions of 'myth', and associated issues presented in this
thesis, confirmed that the word 'myth' was a difficult concept to realise.10 Although a
consensus of a clear definition ofmyth was absent, there was some agreement that
'myth' concerned 'a story about the gods' or 'a story that concerned superhuman
beings'. The dilemma is that each story,peculiar to each society and grouped as a
category of religion, shared the same universal religious overlay with other cultures.
Although Wyatt also understood that 'myth' was local, that it was particular to each
culture or religion, he suggested that myth was destined to continue as a typology of
religion.
Anti-mythic views of this kind have at times been taken as axiomatic,
as though the problem is over and done with, so that we can now get
down to the serious business of an adequate, non-mythological study
of the text and the religious beliefs to which it bears witness.
Unfortunately, however, myth remains obstinate. Even apparently
outvoted, it will not go away, and returns again and again to haunt
us.11
McCutcheon proposed a different approach, that the problem may be resolved
ifmyth, as a category of religion, was re-described. Because myths functioned as a
social construct, as narratives, they were identified by their content. For
McCutcheon, myths were the 'ordinary human means of fashioning and authorizing
their lived-in and believed-in worlds'; myths were 'utterly mundane' and should be
assigned ordinary rather than extraordinary status. The consequence of a re-
description of the term 'myth', he concluded, was that myths no longer would be
10 For interpretations by the pioneer phenomenologists see chapter one.
11
Wyatt, 'Mythic Mind', 6. Wyatt refers here to the anti-mythic views of the 'biblical theology
movement' discussed in his paper.
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'considered unique, symbolic, religious narratives', nor concern superhuman
beings.12 McCutcheon concluded:
The implication of all this for scholars of religion is that if we take for
granted the already established meaning and unquestioned authority of
'myth' - myth's sacredness - we too may have come under its spell
and, as a consequence, perpetuate a politics of which we may be
unaware.13
As I understand it, the problem is the word 'myth' and to a lesser extent, the
word 'religion'. This is not to say that the myth-religion issue in ancient Egypt
should be perpetuated. McCutcheon's theory of a re-description ofmyth as a social
rather than a religious category and Wyatt's theory of the continuance ofmyth as a
category of religion, appear as conflicting theories.14 Nonetheless, both admit there is
an issue with the word 'myth'. Rather than offering another definition of 'myth' to
perpetuate the confusion, I resolved to seek knowledge through the source material
of the ancient Egyptians; their texts, iconography and archaeology, in particular,
knowledge of the existence or otherwise of a genre 'myth'. Because the ancient voice
has been silenced through time, I was unable to seek validation ofmy research with
the adherents. Consequently, the Egyptian texts acted in my research, as if, they were
the voice of the adherent. To this end, I researched vigorously the primary and
secondary literature of the disciplines of phenomenology, the study of religions and
Egyptology. Finally, because the local Egyptian perspective was the criterion, it was
necessary to discard the common element of comparison, the 'essence' of religion.
My objective throughout my thesis was two-fold. First, that the results ofmy
research would change the way phenomenology was understood as a method to
compare belief systems. Second, the new approach to phenomenology would be a
significant contribution to the knowledge and understanding of ancient Egyptian
culture.
12 McCutcheon, 'Myth', 199-200.
13 McCutcheon, 'Myth', 206.
14 See Lincoln, preface to TheorizingMyth, xii. Lincoln suggested a new classification ofmyth as




One of the periphery issues identified in chapter two was the assumption that
Egyptian beliefs were identical to the universal religious 'essence' which classified
empirical data into typologies of religion. The removal of this issue in my Case
Study served to rehabilitate the phenomenological method, to incorporate the beliefs
of the adherent within a wider socio-cultural context. Because the concept of
'religion' was alien to the ancient Egyptians, the more appropriate term 'belief
system' conveyed more clearly the context of their textual narratives. Given that the
Egyptian naming principle was a fundamental concept in the culture of ancient
Egypt, as evidenced throughout this thesis, the words 'religion' and 'myth' failed to
realise the Egyptian ethos.
For example, I mentioned earlier that communal worship, a key function in
the practice of the modern concept of religion, was absent in the Egyptian belief
system. An issue of some substance was identified when one type of Egyptian texts
was extracted from their socio-cultural context and studied, as if that is, the
designated religious 'essence' or 'experience' was the common identity of all beliefs.
R.S. Ellwood explained:
[I]n the end, myth had to become mythology to be useful; it had to be
studied and analyzed, and from it extracted what was universal and as
applicable today as ever. This was tricky, for in fact myth in its
original packaging is only particular and one dimensional. It is always
a myth of a particular tribe or people, originating from some particular
time in history, full of allusions to matters that would be best known
to people of that time and place. Moreover, except in later literary
versions ancient or modern, myths do not usually spell out the moral
at the end. The reason why it is told, what it is about, must simply be
known, perhaps without words. 15
Ellwood's comment re-affirmed my understanding of the original meaning
and function of'myth' discussed in chapter four. Textual narratives, stories about
their gods were particular to the community whose authors not only wrote the texts
but also had knowledge of the key rituals to which the texts referred. When Egyptian
beliefs are reduced to facilitate a universal concept ofmyth as a typology of religion
and grouped under a common 'essence' of religion, then the basic principles of
15 R.S.Ellwood, The Politics ofMyth, (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1999), 7.
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phenomenology are undermined.16 If phenomenologists seek to comprehend the
beliefs of the adherent, then the insider view should be seen in the context of their
belief system.
For example, Egyptian scribes had knowledge of the functional relationship
between the king and the gods; it was particular only to the Egyptians. I indicated in
the Case Study that a brief textual reference to the god Ra implied knowledge of the
link between rebirth and the rising and setting of the sun. Equally, the royal Horus-
Osiris axis demonstrated knowledge of the perpetuity of kingship. If the words Ra
and Horus were inserted into the 'sacred' texts of other religions or cultures, then
their presence would be meaningless. The concept of the function of 'myth', whether
verbal or non-verbal, a brief reference to, or a story about, superhuman beings in
Egyptian texts and iconography, identified beliefs that were peculiar to the ancient
Egyptians.
I have demonstrated a contrary view in this thesis in which Egyptian textual
sources exhibit kingship as the centre pivot around which all aspects of the
institutional state ofEgypt functioned. Equally, the societal interrelationship between
the king and the Egyptian populace demonstrated not only their emulation of the
rituals of kingship, but also that the people had recourse to the state gods, only
through the auspices of the king.17
When the concept 'myth' was classified as a universal typology of religion by
the early phenomenologists, it may be deduced that various questions were asked of
the empirical data which resulted in the taxonomy in the first place. If, as a
researcher, my question concerned the religious nature of the empirical data, then I
compared my religious rituals and doctrines with your religious rituals and doctrines.
Does my question arise from a need to comprehend your religion as you 'experience'
it? Alternatively, do questions asked of other religions confirm that my religion is
similar to your religion, that the practice of religion itself is the common
denominator? Similarly, if a comparison is made from a researcher who believes that
16
Loprieno, preface to AELHF, x. Loprieno stated that the contemporary international community of
scholarly research was 'inspired by a number ofguiding principles', one ofwhich was 'to remain
aware of the dangers inherent in any uncritical application to the Egyptian material of modern, but
hermeneutically spurious methodological categories'.
17 See the Offering formula, 'Offerings which the king gives' discussed in the Case Study. See also
Emily Teeter, 'Life ofRitual', 148-9.
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his or her religion is the 'right' or 'true' religion, then the belief system being
compared may be, by degree, 'lesser than' your religion?
These theoretical questions demonstrate the possible difficulties experienced
by the classical phenomenologists and to researchers in general, to classify data into
common elements of similarity. My research in chapter two confirmed that
Christianity was the 'essence' of religion which identified the 'religiousness' of
typologies. Consequently, when 'myth' is classified as a typology of religion, the
texts or 'myths' of ancient Egypt acquired a perpetual overlay of religiosity.
Although I concurred with the difficulties of the early phenomenologists, 1
was seeking also to understand and describe an Egyptian culture which incorporated
a belief system foreign to my own. Rather than grouping Egyptian texts into
similarities within the common element of the 'essence' of religion, I sought to
comprehend the data from the typologies designated by the scribal elite.
In Chapter two, the Greek deities Dionysus and Demeter, were a further
overlay in Plutarch's version of the Egyptian deities, Isis and Osiris. I demonstrated
that Plutarch not only identified the Greek deities with the Egyptian characters of Isis
and Osiris, but also that Plutarch described Osiris as an earthly king. When I
compared the Greek account with the Egyptian Pyramid Texts, any reference to
Osiris as a king who once ruled Egypt, was absent. Rather, he is described always as
Osiris, the Lord of the West, a king who ruled the Netherworld. Further, the Pyramid
Texts provided clear textual evidence of the existence of a royal Horus-Osiris
alliance, an ideology in which Osiris was the name of a superhuman king and Horus,
the designated name for the reigning king, later transfigured into Osiris. Throughout
ancient Egypt's historical three thousand year period, the royal Horus-Osiris axis of
kingship remained a key element in the socio-political office of kingship. That the
Plutarch version is often quoted in today's literature as if, his account of the Egyptian
'myth' of Isis and Osiris was the extant version was another periphery issue.
Further, rather than an earthly queen as Plutarch proposed, the goddess Isis
was described in the Pyramid texts as part of an entourage ofmother goddesses
whose role was to support the Horus-king transfiguration to an Osiris-king. In the
course ofmy research on the Pyramid Texts, I indicated the opportunity for future
research. First, the cosmic birth rituals may be indicative of the earthly mother-child
birth procedure of the wives of the king, where the goddess entourage may be an
analogy of their human counterparts. Next, when the Horus-king denied his earthly
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human form and parentage in his transfiguration to the Osiris-king, this aspect also
may concern a cosmic-earthly parallel. A socio-historical aspect of the Pyramid
Texts may add considerable understanding to the interpretation ofEgyptian texts, as
a whole. Finally, definitive research from Egyptian sources cited in the Plutarch
version ofDe Iside et Osiride would add significantly to the earlier research by J.W.
Griffiths.
In Chapter three, I re-appraised the so-called Greek origin of the false epithet
ofmyth and identified the changing authoritative status of mythos and the
consequential change in context. If the word mythos from which the modern term
'myth' is considered a derivative, that is as merely a word, then its meaning is
derived from the context in which the word appears in texts, whatever the genre of
such texts. As I understood the Greek meaning of mythos in association with logos, it
was similar to the socio-political context of the ancient Egyptians, the purpose of
which was to maintain order. The focus of Power and authority in both cultures
centred on the institution of the state. The evident differences served to signify each
cultural identity. Kingship was the central socio-political Power in Egypt throughout
its historical, three thousand years period. In contrast, around the fourth century and
later, Greek Power centred on the State, an elite-ruled democratic assembly.
The definitive response to the word mythos in Greek texts indicated that it
was only a word. The word mythos itselfwas never given a false epithet, rather the
context ofmythos as a story, determined its meaning. As I understood the issue,
mythos remained empty ofmeaning until the frame was given substance in its form,
function and characters. I posit that the dichotomy of the true-false nature ofmyth
did not arise from a Greek sourceper se. Rather I have argued that today's false
epithet ofmyth is a result, in part, of the principle that 'my' story is true', 'your'
story is 'false'; it is myth. Similarly, the myth-religion partnership appeared a
contradiction in terms given the false epithet of myth; ifmyth as a category of
religion is false, then religion is false.
In the final analysis, if 'myth' is a word, the frame of a story, the context of
which concerns the deeds of superhuman beings, then no issue exists when the word
'myth' is applied to Egyptian texts. Then again, it is a complex issue when the
modern term 'myth' is classified as a typology of'religion'; the assumption is an
exclusive religious context. If the term 'myth' is merely a word, that is, the context
defines its meaning, then phenomenologists of religion have chosen 'religion' as the
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context. I have proposed that this is part of the issue; the other is the false epithet.
Consequently, if, on the one hand, the modern concept of religion is imposed on the
beliefs of ancient Egypt and, on the other hand, 'myth' is given the meaning of false,
then I posit that the taxon 'myth' as a typology of religion is a significant problem in
ancient Egypt.
In chapters five and six I draw together the issues identified in chapters two
and three and offer a positive alternative. A new subjective-objective approach to
phenomenology, in which Egyptian texts were understood within the naming context
intended by the ancient Egyptians, formed the core of the Case Study in chapter six.
7.2 Phenomenology Revisited
In chapter five the phenomenological principles of epoche and empathy were
introduced as a prelude to the Case Study in chapter six. First I introduced critiques
from scholars in the field of religious studies. I compared the critiques to diverse
topics from the disciplines of religious studies, phenomenology, archaeoastronomy,
law, Egyptian studies and archaeology, as well as a re-appraisal of the methods of
van der Leeuw. My aim in this chapter was to demonstrate the positive aspects of a
subjective-objective approach to phenomenology; the method was applied later to the
phenomenology of Egyptian texts.
Rather than offering different theories of controversial issues in the
phenomenology of religion, I chose to compare the work of scholars from different
disciplines who applied the basic principles of phenomenology to their research. For
example, the scholars quoted in chapter five appeared to demonstrate intuitive
awareness of the insider view of their diverse disciplines. The overall aim of the
different disciplines was to comprehend the data from both a subjective and objective
perspective. Jane Harrison provides a further example of a scholarly subjective-
objective approach to knowledge.
The self-questioning of Harrison may be identified as an 'intuitive
awareness'. Writing on the social origins of Greek religion, she pondered on the
religious nature of the anthropomorphic gods ofHomer and the cult of the mystery
cult ofDionysus. Her initial self enquiry was the meaning she attached to religion.
Later, rather than an objective approach, she suggested her 'instinct' informed her
that the Olympian gods were non-religious, that they were posing as divinities. Her
subsequent question may be compared to van der Leeuw's 'intuitive understanding'
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as well as a subjective-objective approach to research in general. Harrison asked:
'Could this instinct stand the test of examination, or was it merely a temperamental
prejudice masquerading as a reasoned principle'.18
Following the positive research of the different disciplines in chapter five,
my aim was to test my new approach to phenomenology in chapter six. I mentioned
earlier that my endeavours to reconstruct the past using the phenomenological
principles of epoche and empathy resulted in an awareness of the holistic nature of
Egyptian texts. For the texts to be understood from the Egyptian perspective, whether
narratives or brief textual citations, I was attentive to the importance of interpreting
the texts inter-contextually, as a collective whole.19
Following van der Leeuw's subjective-objective phenomenology, in part,
when applied to the texts of ancient Egypt proved positive.20 Not only did I scrutinize
objectively a large selection of published texts on ancient Egypt, I compared
different interpretations of the translations by scholars in the field of a vast selection
of primary texts. Once I had identified the different types of texts designated by the
name, for example, 'funerary', I then re-appraised the texts subjectively in an attempt
to comprehend the meaning intended by the Egyptians.
In my test case to ascertain the consequences, if any, of isolating one text
from the collective whole ofEgyptian texts, the results proved of significant value to
my argument (Section 6.4). When I extracted the incantation text, The God and the
Unknown Name ofPower from the myriad ofEgyptian texts, I had to resort to other
texts and archaeological evidence in order to comprehend some of the obscure
references to kingship.
The objective ofmy phenomenological method was to identify and
comprehend the insider meaning of the authorial intent located within the ancient
18
Harrison, preface to Themis, vii.
19 Cf. See Baines, 'Egyptian Myth', 81. He comments: 'Because of the paucity of evidence [ofmyth],
it is often necessary to combine material from widely differing periods and contexts in order to
suggest a meaningful interpretation'. See also Loprieno, 'Defining Egyptian Literature', 42-3. He
stated: 'For the historian ofEgyptian literature, no text can really 'speak for itself: we always need
the interpretative support of a theory of literature derived from internal evidence provided by the
Egyptian documents'. For the comment that many religions shed light on the few, see Kristensen,
Meaning ofReligion, 143.
20
Chapter five provides the initial impetus for my new approach to phenomenology following van der
Leeuw; chapter six, section 6.2 details the method more precisely.
229
7 Conclusion
Egyptians narrative texts. Following my main reference to Pike in chapter five, I was
aware that a cultural rather than a religious key was required to gain knowledge of
the emic system of the ancient Egyptians. Equally, I argued that the emic, the local
cultural, should not be compromised in favour of the etic approach, although to some
extent, both were conjoined principles. Initially, an objective approach was necessary
for a systematic empirical reconstruction and re-appraisal of the different types of
texts within ancient Egypt's historical timeframe.
In my Case Study, using Egyptian texts and iconography as an example, I
examined the translations and interpretations of the different genres identified by the
conventional naming procedure in Egyptian literature.21 Although there was an
absence of texts which may be described definitively as 'myth', the preponderance of
texts contained references to superhuman beings, in particular 'funerary' and
'instruction' texts. After I had systematically evaluated the context of the empirical
data and grouped together the major genres of texts, I approached the data
subjectively, as if, from the Egyptian perspective. My aim was to maintain an emic
99
approach, to seek validation from Egyptian texts that the conventional naming of
texts conveyed the meaning intended by the Egyptians. One of the key principles of
phenomenology was to understand the data from the local cultural (insider)
perspective.
This is not to say that the objective-subjective approach to phenomenology
demonstrated an either-or system. Following van der Leeuw, insightful, human
research illustrated a simultaneous interrelationship. An objective-subjective
awareness was present in the scrutiny of the data. When understanding of the insider
21 See preface to Lichtheim, AEL. 1 :vii. Lichtheim commented on the limitations of our understanding,
the conjectural nature of interpretations, and the variations in translations of one and the same
Egyptian text. For this reason I have drawn on a broad range of translations and interpretations and
thus limited my examples to the resulting consensus. I have presented my arguments accordingly and
offered only the name 'transfiguration' rather than 'funerary' texts as an example of the meaning
intended by the ancient Egyptians. 'Instruction' texts, the other genre examined in my Case Study,
agrees with the Egyptian meaning.
22 See Headland, Emics andEtics. For example: Given that there are many forms of the emic-etic
system, 15, my understanding ofPike's meaning of emic, is its complexity. In his search for 'local'
knowledge Pike envisaged the 'objective' researcher having a 'subjective' dialogue with the local
'subjective' person. He called this a 'subjective-subjective' dialogue. 'I [Pike] act as the insider'. An
emic worldview is emic knowledge of a local culture, 33. He argues: 'Just as an outside can learn to
act like an insider, so the insider can learn to analyse like an outside', 34. He considers that the emic




perspective 'dawns' on the researcher, it was a human experience rather than
religious. I proposed that the meaning intended by the Egyptians was realised within
the constraints of human perception. Consequently, when Egyptian beliefs are
compared through the spectrum of the universal typology of 'religion', an overlay of
'religion' prejudiced the Egyptian identity. A similar issue was present in the Greek
overlay of the Egyptian deities in Plutarch's De hide et Osiride.
I was aware of the importance of a constant re-appraisal ofmy methods of
evaluating the texts; my objective was to ensure that I was bracketing my own value
judgements. The various overlays I had identified were in some ways a reminder to
be vigilant, that the texts under scrutiny should be examined alongside epoche and
empathy. Due consideration was given always to the meaning the Egyptians
intended. For example, the modern name, 'funerary' given to the various texts
inscribed on the walls of their 'tombs', 'mortuary temples' or papyri may be
appropriate to the modern meaning within a mortuary context. It was, however,
inappropriate given the context in which the ancient Egyptians named such texts. For
example, a 'tomb' was named 'a house of eternity' or a 'house of gold', and a
mortuary temple was named 'a house ofmillions of years'. The name
'transfiguration' was given to the rituals that allowed the Egyptians to journey into
the Netherworld. The inevitable finality of decay and death implied by the modern
term 'funerary', 'tomb' and 'mortuary' were in sharp contrast to the more active
names specified by the Egyptians, 'house of gold or eternity' and 'house ofmillions
of years'.
The fact that quantitatively most textual sources from Egypt are inscribed on
the walls or written on papyri enclosed within their 'houses of eternity' seemed
validation of their belief in an eternal existence. I argued that the word 'funerary'
failed to explain the meaning intended by the Egyptians. The name 'transfiguration'
described succinctly the context and meaning, while simultaneously placing
emphasis on the functional importance of the naming principle held by the
Egyptians. 'Transfiguration' was the means by which an earthly being was
transformed into a supernatural being.
As I understand it, in order to compare 'the other' within the classification of
universal categories it was necessary first that I understood what was being
compared from an objective position. Phenomenologists of religion seek to compare
religions in order to comprehend other religions; the comparative process of
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universal etic categories provided information on similarities as well as differences.
For example, following Pike, in the comparison between the cross-cultural naming
procedure between the universal typologies and the ancient Egyptians' culturally
specific texts, the result was a more profound comprehension of the socio-political
interrelationship between the office of kingship and the populace of ancient Egypt.
7.2.1 Phenomenology: The Socio-Political Question
As a result ofmy rigorous appraisal of the Egyptian texts any reference to the
king in a religious context was absent. In the Old Kingdom the texts and rituals of the
pyramid complex formed part of an integrated structure, a visible manifestation of
the political, economic and theocratic Power of the reigning king. He was the model
ofEgyptian society. The divine office of kingship remained at the apex ofEgyptian
society throughout its historic era. Texts acted as a form of 'identity card' to justify
the genre of 'divine decrees'. The priests who acted on behalf of the king maintained
daily offerings and rituals to past kings. The living Horus-king therefore participated
in, and perpetuated, the existence of royal divine beings through the ritual offerings.
A continued royal existence in the Netherworld was dependent on offerings from the
reigning king; thus the divine office of kingship symbolised the perpetuity in
existence of the royal kas of kingship.
The instruction texts evidenced the dependency of all Egyptians on the king's
relationship with the gods. Of some significance was the strength of the social belief
held by the living, that the existence of their supernatural 'kin' was dependent on
continued offerings of sustenance for their kas.24 The social significance of royal
authority was also present in the self-explanatory phrase, 'an offering which the king
gives'. When the non-royal elite inserted this ritual formula in their houses of
eternity, although they were emulating royal procedures, in reality, only the Egyptian
king had the power to communicate with the gods. Thus, the insertion of the royal
offering formula in the non-royal houses of eternity claimed the authority, approval
and support of the king. Here was a socio-political bond of some significance - the
25
king as the intermediary between the Egyptian people and the gods.
23 See Frankfort, Kingship, 61-78.
24
Conversely, if the 'house of eternity' was inscribed with texts or images of offerings then these
offerings would be offered in perpetuity. See Quirke, Egyptian Religion, 152.
25 On the divine nature of kingship see Allen, Middle Egypt, 31.
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I illustrated also in chapter six an historic continuity of the Opening of the
Mouth ritual, a causative ritual in which the transfiguration rituals activated the
rebirth of the Horus king into the supernatural Osiris king. This ritual was
demonstrated from its early beginning in the Old Kingdom to the demise of the state
ofEgypt about thirty BCE. The emulation of the theocratic andpolitical authority of
kingship adopted by the upper echelon ofEgyptian society was a universal
expectation, 'to become one with the god Osiris'. I proposed that the eternal nature
of the Horus-Osiris alliance of kingship appeared to act not only as the divine
protagonist in ritual transfiguration texts, but also as the key divine referent to which
all deities appeared to show deference.
A complexity arose when the Horus king, identified as the intermediary
between the state gods and the populace ofEgypt in a socio-theocratic role, acted as
if he was the protagonist in the Pyramid Texts.26 This is not to infer that the Pyramid
Texts may be a type of story, although they appear to have a beginning, middle and
an end. The texts inscribed on the pyramid walls of the Old Kingdom kings of the
fifth and sixth dynasty testified to rituals which concerned the royal transfiguration
from the form of a Horus-king to the supernatural status of Osiris.
Similarly, in the Case Study, instruction texts evidenced the elite members of
society who, in emulating the king, testified, albeit briefly, that they were 'loved' by
the king. The implication of this phrase, discussed in chapter six, indicated that
approval by the king was an essential requisite. A similar context indicated that the
king was 'loved' by the gods.27 In the final analysis, the dual role of the king was
demonstrated in the majority of texts cited in this thesis. As a human-divine being he
acted as the mediating focus between the people and the gods and in his socio¬
political capacity he was the authoritative Power in the state ofEgypt.
Rather than the modern concept of religion, this thesis has demonstrated that
28 i *
the office of kingship appeared the supreme constant in Egyptian society. In this
26 See Ian Shaw, Nicholson, BritishMuseum Dictionary, 209. Although the eldest son was committed
to presenting the ritual offerings it was necessary for the king to intercede with the gods on behalf of
the relatives. Shaw and Nicholson propose that this practice illustrates the essential role played by the
king as the divine intermediary.
27 For example, many cartouches testify to the king as the 'beloved of Amun', (mry imn).
28 For the king as the pinnacle ofEgyptian society, the link between human beings and the gods and
his status as both divine and human, see Allen, Middle Egyptian, 64; Frankfort, Kingship, 51-60.
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context, kingship may be said to supersede the typology 'religion'. My re-appraisal
has revealed that the Horus king has emerged as the key protagonist with deities as
the supporting actors within supernatural textual dramas. As Penner theorized earlier,
a myth concerned the deeds of a superhuman being - the earthly-superhuman
Egyptian king appeared to be within this category.
7.2.2 Phenomenology: The 'Myth' Question
There is a problem when certain Egyptian texts given the name 'myths', are
defined as a type of religious text after being extricated from the preponderance of
different genres ofEgyptian texts and studied in isolation. The procedure may be
compared to my attempted analysis in chapter six, of the so-called myth, The God
and his Unknown Name ofPower. My test case demonstrated that, in order to
comprehend any obscure textual references, I had to refer to other Egyptian texts for
clarity. Kristensen proposed a similar comparison. If one type of religious data was
absent from a religion, the missing data was obtained from other religions. In a
comparative analysis, references made to other Egyptian texts were resolved because
the texts under scrutiny were identified within the ethos of ancient Egypt. When
'myths' of different religions are compared they are weighted within different
cultural contexts.
For example, when texts, said to be myths, were removed from the Egyptian
socio-political context, separated from their office of kingship, then, while detached
from their frame of reference, they were classified and compared within so-called
similar types of 'religious myths'. The meaning intended by the ancient Egyptians
was submerged under substantial overlays of which the 'essence' of'religion', or
presuppositions about religiosity, was one. Another is the comparative method
between so-called 'myths' of one religion to another which resulted in the quandary
ofwhose 'myth' was a sacred story, and whose 'myth' was false.
The myth-religion partnership was alien to the Egyptian belief system in that
the institutional state ofEgypt was dependent on the theocratic office of kingship for
its stability. Equally, there was no textual or archaeological evidence to support the
theory that the Egyptians participated in a religious system ofmonotheistic worship.
This thesis has demonstrated the presence of a multiplicity of deities. If the texts are
29 See Hornung, Conceptions, 192,
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designated as 'religious' in the modern meaning of the term, then the adherent's
beliefs are compromised and the phenomenological premise of the autonomy of the
adherent is defeated. Further, literature research identified the paucity of ancient
Egyptians texts which may be defined as 'myth'.30
On the other hand, a re-evaluation of the issue may offer some resolution.
Given that a scholarly consensus on a universal definition ofmyth is absent, a
general overview describes 'myth' as a story that concerns superhuman beings. I
have demonstrated in this thesis that Egyptian texts testify to the presence and
actions of superhuman beings. I posit that the term 'narrative texts', on the whole,
may incorporate the meaning of the general definition of'myth' minus the false
epithet and the religious overlay. For example, Egyptian types of narratives were
named: transfiguration, instruction, biographical and others. My point is that the
premise of phenomenology is comprehension of an adherent's beliefs, given that the
adherents, for example, the ancient Egyptians, lack any reference in their texts to the
concept of 'religion'. If the voice of the ancient Egyptians is heard, they would be
unable to validate the modern interpretation of the reading of 'religion' into their
texts.
In the Egyptian context, the rituals and dramas were enacted by superhuman
beings, whether deities or divine kings. I proposed also that narratives which
contained reference to a measure or degree of any superhuman being may qualify in
a general sense, as a type of 'text', with the implication that all 'texts' are not
necessarily narratives with a beginning, middle or end. In this context, a brief
mention of the name of a deity or a Horus or Osiris king implied knowledge of the
character and function to which the name implied.
The incantation text, God and his Unknown Name ofPower, discussed in
chapter six is one example. The name, Horus, was mentioned briefly in the
incantation, yet, Horus cippi, which purport to be the later versions of the incantation
301 refer to what appeared as an irreconcilable issue ofwhat constitutes a 'myth' or 'epic' in ancient
Mesopotamia, a similar question may be raised within the context of ancient Egypt. For scholars who
have noted the paucity of mythical narratives in Egypt, see John Baines, 'Myth and Literature', 363;
Bleeker, Hathor and Thoth, 16; Griffiths, Origins ofOsiris, 1; Parkinson, Voices, 23. On the problem
of categories see Loprieno, preface in AELHF, x. Loprieno stated that the contemporary international
community of scholarly research was 'inspired by a number of guiding principles', one of which was
'to remain aware of the dangers inherent in any uncritical application to the Egyptian material of
modern, but hermeneutically spurious methodological categories'.
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text, placed him visually and textually as the central figure. A brief reference to the
name of a deity or a Horus or Osiris king implied knowledge of the character and
function to which the name implied. If textual fragments indicated mythic references
of substance, then following the Egyptian naming principle, the name 'narrative text'
is a suitable nomenclature to displace rather to supersede the name 'myth'. This new
category ofEgyptian texts both justifies and conveys the 'uniqueness' and Power of
the Egyptians' relationship with their gods. Given that the general definition of
'myth' concerned the stories of a superhuman being or beings then I propose,
following the Egyptian naming procedure, that all Egyptian narrative texts have an
inter-contextual, supernatural relationship in which the socio-political and theocratic
office of divine kingship played the key role.
On the wider issue of cultural comparisons, I discussed in chapters one and
six the problem ofwhen a narrative was a myth or an epic in the Mesopotamian story
about the exploits of a semi-divine king, Gilgamesh. Because Gilgamesh was a real
king and his name was on the Sumerian King List, Dalley concluded that the story
was not truly about the deeds of a superhuman being; therefore it was not a myth.
Consequently, the Epic ofGilgamesh was an 'epic' rather than 'myth'. A similar
context is seen in the Egyptian concept of kingship. The king is divine in the context
of the office of kingship and his name is written on the various King Lists. In this
context to displace the term 'myth' with the name 'narrative texts' appears to be
justified. The Egyptian texts described in this thesis, testily to the uniqueness of the
narrative texts as the cultural identity of the ancient Egyptians. Equally, the polemic
of the epithet 'false' is denied.
Although the true-false issue of religion is implied by the classical
phenomenologists, this either-or approach to truth claims, as demonstrated in chapter
four, is absent in ancient Egypt. For the Egyptians, each creation story was a
variation in one form or another, with many layers of interpretation conflated to form
the ancient Egyptians' worldview of 'truth'. The fluid true-false concept of their
stories was peculiar to the ancient Egyptian worldview of reality and differed to the
'either-or' nature of the true-false concept of the term 'myth'. In the end, in order to
understand the culture of the ancient Egyptians, their texts must be understood from
their point ofview. For the texts to be understood from the Egyptian perspective,
whether narratives, texts or brief textual citations, I have demonstrated the
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importance of re-evaluating and interpreting the texts inter-contextually, as a
collective whole.
In summary, I have made full use of the existing translations and
interpretations of the literature of the disciplines ofEgyptology, religion and
phenomenology of religion as well as extraneous literature on a selection from other
disciplines. I reiterate my re-evaluation of the concept of 'myth' when applied to
ancient Egyptian texts. If all texts contain some measure of a superhuman presence,
then, in the broader spectrum of the term and within a holistic socio-cultural context,
all Egyptian texts may be classified within the simple typology of'narrative texts'. I
posited earlier that the new hermeneutic of the word 'myth' allows the concept of
myth, as a story that concerns the particular beliefs of a society, to return to
phenomenology, minus its various overlays. I researched with some tenacity the
reasons why the term 'myth' was encumbered with a 'false' epithet. If'myth' is
designated with the epithet false, and the word 'myth' is interchangeable with the
concept of a 'sacred story', a term often suggested to supersede 'myth'. It may be
argued, that the classification ofmyth as a typology of religion indicated an
incongruity. The problem is that the taxonomy ofboth terms, religion and myth,
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Appendix
Richard Dawkins with Muriel Gray, Friday, 19 August 2005,
Edinburgh International Book Festival
URL: http://www.edbookfest.co.nk/readings/archive05.html#k
Questions from the audience.
Extract:
I was interested to hear about your new book. I wonder what you think about the theory
that religion itself is an evolutionary tool. I have read studies that say that religious
people are generally happier, that they may live longer and that they have fewer serious
illnesses. Do you think that that is that a scientificfact or is it just a random theory?
Richard Dawkins: Whether that is factually true is one question—some studies seem
to suggest that it is but others suggest that it isn't. It would not surprise me in the least if
it was true. It is quite likely; since psychosomatic illness is so important and stress has
such an important effect on health, it could well be the case that people who manage to
retain throughout adulthood the equivalent of a childhood imaginary friend might suffer
less stress as a consequence. They might well live longer and be less susceptible to
duodenal ulcers or goodness knows what. I wouldn't be surprised about that.
I would say two things, however. First, this is too obvious to say to a sophisticated
audience like this one, but there might be people who think that because religion makes
you healthier and freer from stress that somehow makes it true. Obviously, that's not the
case. It's not logical.
The second thing is the question that the questioner asked, which is whether it could be
a Darwinian adaptation. Every single civilisation in the world has religion, as far as I am
aware. That doesn't mean that every individual is religious, but religion is part of the
norms of the culture of every people that has ever been looked at. It looks as if it is in
some sense a Darwinian adaptation. Could the reason why religion is so ubiquitous be its
beneficial effects on health, if such they be? I suppose it just about could, but it doesn't
sound to me like a strong and big enough theory to account for the enormously important,
ubiquitous phenomenon of religion. I think that there is more to it than that. I don't think
that protection of a minor statistical kind from psychosomatic illness is a strong enough
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effect to be the reason why we have religion (if indeed that protection is there at all; I
perhaps bent over backwards to concede the fact too readily, given that it is highly
disputed.) There's got to be some other reason.
Muriel Gray: Do you have any theories about what it might be?
Richard Dawkins: Yes. 1 think you have to rephrase the question. Biologists are
accustomed, when they are confronted with a puzzling piece of behaviour, to asking,
"What is its Darwinian survival value? Why is it there? Why do these animals do it?"
Sometimes that is the wrong question. Sometimes you are focusing on the wrong thing
when you ask that question.
A good illustration of that is the habit that insects show at night of flying into candle
flames. We all know that behaviour and it would be tempting to say that it is suicidal,
self-immolation or self-sacrificial behaviour. What is the survival value of a moth
committing suicide by flying into a candle flame? However, I think that that is the wrong
way to express the question. Instead, we have to ask, "What is going on in the moth's
nervous system when it flies into a candle flame?" Maybe it is something like the
following.
In nature, before candles and artificial light were invented, the only light that a night-
flying moth would ever see would be the stars and the moon, which are at optical infinity.
Insects are known to use light as a compass. Day-flying insects use the sun as a compass
and night-flying insects use the moon and the stars. Light from celestial objects is at
optical infinity, which means that the light rays are parallel. A rule of thumb in the
nervous system that tells the insect to maintain, let's say, a 30 degree angle to the light
rays will cause the insect to fly in a straight line. That is a useful thing to do and many
insects are known to do exactly that.
Suddenly—by evolutionary standards—candles appear on the scene. The same rule is
in the insect's nervous system. The moth behaves towards the candle as though it was the
moon. It maintains a 30 degree angle to rays that are not at optical infinity but are
radiating out from a candle flame. That rule will cause die moth to describe a neat,
logarithmic spiral into the candle flame.
We have rephrased the question. Instead of saying, "What is the survival value of
suicidal behaviour?" we have said, "What is the survival value of maintaining a fixed
angle to light rays?" We have a very good survival value for that. We phrased the
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question wrongly when we talked about suicidal behaviour. I think that religion is like
that. The rephrasing of the question might be something like this: "What is it in the child
brain that would benefit by doing something that might manifest itself as religion?" That
is the parallel question to the one about the moth flying into the candle flame.
Children need to believe what adults—especially their parents—tell them. A child
cannot afford to use the experimental method to decide how to survive. If the parent says
"Don't go into the jungle because you'll be eaten", the child had better believe that.
Children are born with a rule of thumb in their brain that tells them to believe what their
parents tell them.
Parents pass on to their children what their parents told them. In turn, the parents got it
from their parents.
It's a bit like computer viruses. A computer is an electronic machine that is wired up in
such a way that it obeys whatever it is told to do, provided that that is written in the right
language. In a sense, computers believe what they are told. They have to, or they couldn't
do useful things like word processing or spreadsheets. But a computer that is wired up to
obey instructions for doing useful things like word processing cannot help obeying when
it is given bad instructions like "erase the contents of the hard disc, and before you do
that pass me on to another computer" or something equally malevolent. That is what a
computer virus does.
The possibility of computer viruses is a necessary consequence of the fact that
computers are programmable machines. Human children are programmable machines
too, for very good reasons, and their brains are equally vulnerable to viruses. I think that
that is what religion is. It is a brain virus that gets passed from generation to generation.
Sometimes it gets passed sideways within one generation when a particularly charismatic
preacher like John Wesley or Billy Graham starts to have great revival meetings and
infects people with the virus. There is an epidemiology of brain viruses—they are not
genetic viruses, obviously—and I think that that is exactly what religions are, although
they are somewhat more complicated than that. The reason why our brains are so
vulnerable is that they are programmable machines, for very good reasons.
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